Iran's Government Steps in to Address Paper Crisis, But Papers Over the Cracks

Among currency fluctuations and returning sanctions, Iran is now battling a paper crisis. Gradual price hikes have been increasing pressure on book and newspaper publishers over the last year, but the scale of the crisis became clear when Culture Minister Abbas Salehi announced on August 4 that the country has just enough newsprint paper in storage to meet two months worth of demand. In response to the shortage, some newspapers have been forced to cease publishing, while others, including the popular reformist newspaper Shargh, have put up a pay wall.  

The government has rolled out a support package that includes importing paper as an essential good. This will most likely calm agitated publishers in the short-term, but will prolong a vicious cycle and defer the real reform needed to address a decades-long problem of corruption and inefficiency. The paper crisis represents something bigger.

Mahmoud Sadri, a veteran journalist who currently heads the publishing department of Donya-e-Eqtesad, Iran's foremost business daily, sees the paper crisis as just the latest manifestation of “Iran's economic inefficiency.” Speaking to Bourse & Bazaar, Sadri explained, "We have no phenomenon called a paper crisis as a separate and standalone phenomenon. It's not accurate to just say paper is in crisis since many goods are in crisis.”

In Sadri’s view, the paper crisis has its roots in the time of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, during which the government took on the mission to foster cultural production and provided for all the paper and raw material needs of the publishing industry. In order to do that, the Iranian government has typically opted for one of two options: they have either purchased the paper and offered it at cheap subsidized rates or offered handouts directly to private importers.

This misguided approach created conditions ripe for rent-seeking and corruption. Importers sought to abuse the cheap money they were being provided instead of creating actual in-demand value.

Such rent seeking accelerated in recent months, as the Iranian rial came under increased pressure due to returning US sanctions. "A group of profiteers and rent-seekers have entered the market and are making things much harder for paper consumers," Abolfazl Roghani Golpaygani, president of the Iran Paper and Paperboard Syndicate said in a recent interview.

But the government seems intent to maintain the longstanding subsidies. On August 6, the Ministry of Industry announced that paper used for publishing had been added to the limited list of essential commodities that will be imported using the preferential government exchange rate of IRR 42,000 to the dollar. That rate is to remain unchanged until at least March 2019 as President Hassan Rouhani promised recently. Furthermore, the ministry agreed to immediately import 20,000 tons of paper to address the shortage.

Many journalists and publishers, like Sadri, are critical of this arrangement. They believe that the government should not use taxpayer money for handouts to publishers who often publish content simply to maintain their license, or who wish to publish content in accordance with their own political and economic leanings. There are growing calls for for a free market approach to publishing  in order to encourage competition that will boost newspaper quality and balance prices.

"How and based on what logic has paper been considered an essential good under the current circumstances?" asked Saeed Laylaz, a prominent journalist and pundit in a recent interview. He also referred to the decision as "explicit theft.”

However, cutting the flow of government support will mean that hundreds of book, newspaper, and magazine publishers will fold, with the potential for thousands of job losses at a time when high unemployment is a major challenge for the Rouhani administration. It should come as no surprise that the administration is unwilling to take a leap and reform the paper subsidies, despite Rouhani’s longstanding intention to reduce subsidies across the economy.

"The other issue is that the majority don't accept that government paper subsidies are wrong in essence," Sadri adds. In this way, Iran's government is failing to address the long-term problem by dealing with the current paper crisis as a short-term phenomenon.

But while change to the government policy may not be imminent, Sadri does believe it is inevitable. "Even if no prospects of change are foreseeable at the moment, it will happen either way," he said, pointing out that many countries have undergone similar processes of reform that on many occasions took decades to realize. In publishing, as with other parts of Iran’s economy, reform remains a waiting game.

Photo Credit: Deposit Photo

Rising Prices Push Homebuyers Out of Iran's Capital

A 41 percent rise in Tehran City’s average home prices has left some residents, especially renters, with no option but to leave the capital for more affordable housing units in suburban areas close to Tehran.

Figures released by the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development show that 37,700 housing units were sold in Tehran city during the first quarter of the current Iranian fiscal year (March 21-June 21, 2018) at an average price of IRR 70 million per square meter. A year-on-year comparison indicates 6 percent and 41 percent increases in total number of home deals and the average prices, respectively.

The rental market has also experienced a surge in recent months. No public statistics are yet available about current year rentals in Tehran. However, Hessam Oqbaei, the deputy director of the Iranian Realtors Association, reported in a recent interview a 51 percent increase in Tehran’s rental price index in the past few months. This is while the Central Bank of Iran reported 12.5 percent growth in rental index of urban areas across the country during the third month of Iranian year.

Oqbaei believes that home prices are the key factor impacting rentals in Tehran, explaining “the surge in rents cannot be lower than the growth in home prices.” “Rentals are expected to increase rapidly in coming months,” he said, adding “This is beyond what citizens can afford.”

Monthly data released by Tehran Realtors’ Association also indicates a sharp 22 percent drop in number of rental contracts in the city during the month to June 21—the number is down from 22,143 last year to 17,200 this year. 

Price Shocks

As per the latest national census conducted by Statistical Center of Iran in 2016-17, Karaj was the top destination for residents moving out of Tehran during the five years to December 2017.

In just the last three months, more than 53,000 individuals have moved from Tehran to Karaj City. In the first quarter of the Iranian fiscal year, the Karaj housing market recorded 65 percent growth in home sales and an 18 percent increase in the average price of residential units.

New housing developments and easier transport links, including expanded highways and suburban rail connected to Tehran’s subway network, have attracted homebuyers to the city. 

Following Karaj, several less expensive areas also saw increased market activity. Pakdasht in the south-east of Tehran Province and Andisheh, located south of Tehran City, recorded significant growth in home deals in the first quarter—75 percent and 56 percent, respectively.

Homebuyers paid an average of IRR 900 million in Pakdasht and IRR 1.73 billion in Andisheh City, which is closer to the capital. By comparison, the average price of sold residential units in Tehran stood at IRR 6.5 billion in the same period.

The same trend can be observed in Kamal Shahr and Mohammad Shahr, which saw the highest number of home deals in Alborz Province after Karaj. More than 1,178 deals were recorded by realtors in Kamalshahr at an average price of IRR 650 million.

The Role of Speculation

Homebuyers are not the only players in Iran’s real estate market. Choas in parallel markets such as the currency market, rising inflation, and low returns on bank deposits, have spurred speculative activities in the housing market.

Speculation in smaller towns remains risky, as sudden increases in home prices could reduce the attractiveness of the suburban markets.

The government is also taking various measures to help real homebuyers in the face of speculation—this has been on top of the Ministry for Roads and Urban Development’s agenda since President Hassan Rouhani took office.

In a recent interview, the deputy minister of roads and urban development, Hamed Mazaherian, cautioned speculators over their presence in the housing market and recommended they exit the market before they bear losses.

“The ministry will soon start addressing speculation in the market by levying taxes on vacant housing units and lands…Lawmakers are also studying a bill to levy tax on revenues earned from home sales,” he declared.

The bill proposes levying taxes equal to 80 percent of the difference between the value of residential units at the time of purchase or sale. However, an exemption is considered for deals in which the owner sells the residential unit at a lower price than the money they paid at the time of purchasing it.

More than 490,000 residential units are left vacant in Tehran City, according to roads minister Abbas Akhoundi. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance has also said it strongly supports the measure, for it helps balance the housing market.

In a futher move, the ministry is also considering a series of measures to support renters. According to Mazaherian, a bill has been proposed in parliament, which suggests increasing the minimum period of rent contracts from one year to two years or more.The proposed measure also includes setting a 10 percent cap for rent increases.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Iran Sanctions Hopes Fly on Possible Delivery of Eight ATR Aircraft

In a recent interview, French Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire expressed optimism for the delivery of eight ATR turboprops to Iran as part of a contract with Iran Air, the country’s national airline.

The encouraging comments come after Le Maire disclosed two weeks ago that the United States had rejected a joint European letter requesting a broad range of waivers and exemptions that had been sent to Secretary of Treasury Steve Mnuchin and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in June.

In a change of tone, Le Maire spoke of being “hopeful that the United States will provide authorization to deliver these aircraft.” The ATR deliveries, like the three Airbus deliveries made prior to President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, are highly symbolic of the hope and expectations for increased trade and investment following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Le Maire described the intention for ATR to deliver eight aircraft prior to the August 6 sanctions deadline. At least four ATR 72-600 aircraft have been registered to Iran Air. A further four aircraft have been photographed in Iran Air livery, but have not yet had their registrations altered. These eight aircraft can be identified as follows:

• F-WWEP (now EP-ITI)
• F-WWEU (now EP-ITJ)
• F-WWEF (now EP-ITK)
• F-WWEG (now EP-ITL)
• F-WWEC
• F-WWED
• F-WWEE
• F-WWEX

To date, Iran Air has received an initial eight ATR aircraft, having signed a contract in April 2017 for 20 planes. Iran Air is using these planes as part of a new regional service. 

The ATR contract, like so many others, was immediately put in doubt following President Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8 and the announcement that the US would be reimposing secondary sanctions that had been removed as part of the JCPOA. Having already manufactured the aircraft on specification for Iran Air, only to see delivery delayed by financing issues related to sanctions concerns, ATR announced it would seek a new license from the US Treasury to permit the delivery of the aircraft following the US withdrawal form the nuclear deal. 

In July, US Department of Treasury assistant secretary of terrorist financing Marshall Billingslea downplayed the likeliness of any such licenses being granted, telling FlightGlobal, "At this stage, I think we are not in a position to suggest we would be issuing such licenses.” Billingslea cited an inability to “show flexibility on transactions.”

But Le Maire’s comments will give rise to new hope that the US authorities may be adopting a more flexible stance. The French minister disclosed that he has been “negotiating for weeks” with his counterpart, Mnuchin, “fighting so that in the health sector, in the agri-food sector, which are now sanctions exempt, there may be funding channels that remain open."

In the context of this fight, the delivery of the ATR aircraft will prove the most clear indication of US flexibility. There are three reasons US authorities might decide to issue a waiver. First, ATR’s smaller aircraft are used for regional routes. This limits concerns of possible “dual use” of the aircraft for military applications. US authorities have sanctioned Iranian airlines and aircraft for conducting “resupply” flights to the conflict in Syria. Such concerns clouded the Airbus and Boeing contracts for larger commercial aircraft.

Second, unlike Airbus aircraft, ATR turboprops, manufactured under a joint venture between Airbus and Italian aerospace company Leonardo, have limited US parts content. According to ATR executives, US components account for “slightly over 10%” of total parts content, or just above the sanctions threshold. Additionally, the aircraft are already manufactured, meaning that there is no further activities necessary with US entities along the supply chain.

Finally, there is a clear humanitarian justification. As shown by the tragic crash of an Aseman Airlines ATR 72 in February, smaller aircraft are especially vulnerable to accidents caused by aging and poor maintenance. Improving air safety has been a primary consideration for Iranian authorities as they sought to acquire new aircraft following the lifting of sanctions.

A focus on delivering eight turboprops and protecting banking channels for sanctions exempt sectors does not equate to a full-defense of French business interests in Iran. It is clear that Iran contracts of leading French enterprises such as Total, Peugeot, Alstom, and Airbus remain outside the scope of compromise with the US Treasury.

However, even a small victory would be important for Le Maire, as it would push the Trump administration into a mindset of negotiated compromise rather than blanket rejection. The Trump administration is unlikely to announce any softening in their position. So the clearest indicator will be whether the eight ATR aircraft make their long-awaited flights to Tehran. The eyes of a nation will be watching.

Photo Credit: ATR

Iranian Women Face Uphill Battle Toward Equal Pay

In recent months, longstanding social issues Iran have taken a back seat to major economic challenges such as a sliding national currency, rampant corruption, and the return of sanctions. But social inequality has an economic cost too as proven by the gender pay gap and disparity in work opportunities for men and women in Iran.

According to data compiled by IranSalary, the country's first specialized online platform for remunerations, Iranian women earned 27 percent less on average than their male counterparts in the previous Iranian year (ended March 2018). The wage gap has widened in recent years, rising from an average of 23 percent three years ago. 

World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report put Iran at a dismal rank of 140 in 2017, only ahead of Chad, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. Iran ranked 108 in 2006 among 115 nations. Iran's worst-performing index in 2017 was "economic participation and opportunity".

IranTalent, a leading jobs website and parent company of IranSalary, began collecting and publishing detailed data on Iran's employment market five years ago. Its statistical sample was initially around 30,000 people and has since grown to over 130,000 in its latest report.

"The thing that really spread in the press and in other circles from the very first year was the income gap," Aseyeh Hatami, the founder of IranTalent and IranSalary told Bourse & Bazaar. "Before that nobody had really examined this issue and hardly any awareness had been promoted around it".

"There are no written laws in Iran saying men have the right to earn more than women," she pointed out, but added that at the same time there are no laws that actively protect women's right for equal remuneration.

IranSalary's figures offer interesting insights into Iran's work environment. For instance, the wage gap increases with seniority. The few women who manage to climb their way up to a management position in a male-dominated system find that they earn as much as 47 percent less than male managers.

According to Hatami, the private sector is responsible for the majority of the gender pay gap in Iran’s labor market. That is not to say, however, that governments have been champions of equal pay. The reason behind their less significant role in widening the pay gap is that they have simply employed fewer women, especially in the higher echelons.

State-run companies are much less equal in dispersing job opportunities—just 25 percent of employees in state enterprises are women. That rate stands at 34 percent and 38 percent among private sector and foreign firms respectively. 

Another useful indicator in IranSalary numbers was the size of companies. Larger companies in Iran contribute to inequality—only 17 percent of their high-ranking managers are women. These companies are reluctant to admit their failure. "Even in our interviews with the big companies they said [the disparity] is not true and the reason behind the disparity is that men mostly earn more through overtime work since they take it on more than women," Hatami said, stressing that their data clearly signals otherwise.

On the other hand, she said figures show that married people are earning more than single workers, mostly since they employ their negotiating powers more.

On the whole, Iran suffers from a lack of transparent and comprehensive data across all its sectors. The job market is no different. IranTalent has managed to establish its reputation by gathering more than one million profiles from employers and employees.

The firm's CEO says it can help women and all jobskeers, leveraging this data to show them their potential professional trajectory in relation to their educational degree. "One major problem is that people don't even know what they can do in the future with the degree they're holding.”

For example, only 40 percent of people studying law actually become attorneys and legal counselors. Knowing that information will help Iranians—both men and women—carve out a better career path, Hatami hopes.

But what can be done to rectify the situation of the gender pay gap? Hatami does not hold out much hope for a major cultural shift both among officials and private sector employers, at least not in the short term. She points out that some hardliners in Iran still say women should not even be allowed to work.

She has felt the sting herself as well. "Most people are surprised the first time they find out the CEO of IranTalent is a woman." But she says she is sure that as women increasingly enter the work field, they bring positive change with them.

"We must work to create a more open and accepting culture that pays better attention to women's potential. But most importantly, women must start believing in themselves and negotiate for higher salaries when they are applying for a job," Hatami said.

She has not mounted an equality program in her company, but says they have managed parity through holding a simple view when taking on employees. For Hatami, "Talent and capabilities have always been central, not gender.”

Brexit Britain Must Match EU Efforts to Save Iran Nuclear Deal

The European Union and its member states have been scrambling to to preserve the economic benefits of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran following President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement on May 8. In the last month, the European Commission has moved to add Iran to the investment mandate of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s long-term lending institution (even in the face of significant resistance from EIB’s management). Similarly, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) has set-aside a pool of funding to support projects in Iran. The European External Action Service is also coordinating discussions around central bank payment channels and the European Commission’s revival of the blocking regulation, which prohibits European compliance with extraterritorial sanctions.

As a core party to the JCPOA, the UK government has a strong interest in seeing these European efforts succeed. However, in March of 2019, at the end of the Brexit process, the UK will likely leave the EU, meaning that it will end its participation as stakeholder in European institutions, including EIB, as well as European legal frameworks, such as the blocking regulation.

While the Bank of England is exploring the creation of payment channels with the Central Bank of Iran, the UK government has shown little real initiative to match European efforts to sustain economic engagement with Iran. In recent weeks, Iranian authorities have indicated that they believe bilateral efforts will prove the most successful in delivering solutions to protect trade and investment in the face of US secondary sanctions. Countries like France, Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden have been exploring whether it may be possible to use state investment vehicles and financial institutions to facilitate investments to Iran. The UK has not, pointing to the EIB's expanded mandate. But given that EIB is unlikely to finance projects in Iran, and given that the UK is set to exit the EU anyway, the UK government can no longer lean on European efforts in devising an economic package for Iran. 

To demonstrate its commitment to the JCPOA, the UK should parallelize its Iran policy with that of EU member states and seek its own mechanisms through which to support access to financing in Iran’s economy—both because of the clear national security implications of maintaining the the nuclear deal, but also to take advantage of economic opportunities in a major emerging market, particularly one in which UK companies can continue to make inroads from a low base of activity.

The reimposition of US sanctions means that the UK government cannot reasonably rely on British private sector financiers to engage in project finance in Iran. Just as European governments are exploring state-owned entities through which to provide financing, so will the UK financing entity need to be state owned. Helpfully, such an institution exists.

CDC Group is the overseas investment arm of the UK government. The group is a state-owned development bank overseen by the Department for International Development. It currently overseas an investment portfolio of around GBP 5 billion and primarily funds projects in Africa and South Asia, with a strong focus in countries where were formerly part of the British Empire and now part of the Commonwealth.

CDC has a wide portfolio of investments in infrastructure, health, manufacturing, food and agriculture, and construction. The investment philosophy is focused on “sectors where growth leads to jobs” and the institutions “decision-making process ranks sectors based on their likelihood of creating jobs.” Investments take the form of both equity and debt financing.

On the basis of its focus on emerging markets and its investment philosophy focused on job creation, there is justification for the UK government to extend the investment mandate of CDC Group to include projects in Iran. Such a move would parallel the EU’s attempted move in regards to EIB and the still planned funding via DEVCO, as well as the various efforts at the member-state level.

If CDC’s investment mandate is extended to Iran, the challenge will be to ensure that the relevant capital can be deployed in Iran. For this purpose, the UK government should seek to use the UK-regulated branches of Iranian financial institutions. These institutions will be able to maintain correspondent banking relationships with their Iranian parent banks in the face of US sanctions. If the UK government can institute additional due diligence protocols around the transfer of funds via this channel, it should be possible to deploy capital in Iran without the need to rely on the UK’s tier one banks.

Importantly, in order to encourage the UK to make such a move, the Iranian government must be prepared to offer a privileged pipeline of investment opportunities to CDC Group, particularly with regard to public-private partnership projects in Iran that would include the participation of UK multinationals or SMEs. For example, CDC Group financing could help support the strong inroads made by UK solar energy developers in the Iranian market. Furthermore, the Iranian government should explore export credit or sovereign guarantee arrangements that would project CDC Group’s investments in order to lower the assessed risk behind a given project in Iran.

The Iranian government should actively seek a UK commitment to facilitate development financing in Iran. Politically, such a move would be consistent with the ambitions of “Brexit Britain” as the UK will need to replace its reliance on EU institutions in regards to engaging global growth through proactive investments. As with bilateral relations with other European countries, an expansion in economic engagement could reduce pressure on political relations. The UK will no doubt expect to see progress on its consular cases as part of trust-building and the deepening of ties with Iran.

Beyond challenges of structuring, the continued political uncertainty in the UK, including the recent change in foreign minister, will make such plans complicated to execute. But Iran can leverage its relationships with key stakeholders within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as in the House of Parliament and House of Lords in order to seek a structured dialogue on this matter. Whether through CDC Group or another special purpose vehicle, Brexit Britain should be pushed to at least match EU proposals to support trade and investment in Iran, and thereby to safeguard the nuclear deal.

Photo Credit: IRNA 

Encouraged by Government, Iranian Entrepreneurs Dream of 'Smart Cities'

“Smart Cities” integrate multiple information and communications technology (ICT) and internet of things (IOT) solutions to create more successful and sustainable urban environments. There is growing interest in smart city technologies as governments around the world struggle to manage population growth and the resource consumption of major cities. Smart city transformations can improve quality of life, increase sustainability, and boost economic competitiveness.

Recently, the Iranian government has also expressed greater interest in bringing smart cities technologies to the country. Spearheaded by the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology and the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development, the Iranian government is promoting the adoption of smart city technologies and holding various events and conferences to increase awareness among government stakeholders and the business community. Iranian authorities are drawing inspiration from successful cities including Berlin and Seoul in order to adapt proven approaches to suit the Iranian cities.

With almost 120 percent internet penetration rate in Tehran, 110 percent in Mazandaran, 100 percent in Qom, 96 percent in Isfahan, and 95 percent in Khuzestan provinces, Iran already has the essential infrastructure to become “smart.” At a consumer level, Iran has 40 million smartphone users of which 28 million are mobile internet subscribers. Iran’s consumer technology and communications companies are at the forefront of smart city innovation.

MTN-Irancell, Iran’s second largest mobile network provider, is actively promoting the transformation of Iranian cities. Irancell provides relevant equipment and sensors for development of smart cities and is seeking to rollout efficient and reliable systems that will enable municipal governments to collect and manage data securely and transparently. Irancell’s technologies will allow governments to monitor, analyze, manage, and set alerts for selected urban parameters.

To prove its technologies, Irancell launched a pilot program in Khuzestan province in February 2017. Under this plan, 5,000 low-power wide-area network technology gas meters were installed in the province. In March 2017, Irancell also invested in Anzali free trade zone to implement systems for waste management, landscape watering, street lighting, parking spot management and air quality checks.

Another active company in the field is Iranian firm Nobka, which seeks to accelerate the adoption of smart city technologies in the country. One of Nobka’s projects is production of smart portable hospitals, using converted buses and shipping containers, which can support emergency responses to nature disasters. These portable hospitals use smart lighting and ventilation systems and telemedicine software to help the injured in an emergency.

Nobka is also using smart city technologies to support tourism in Gilan Province. The company has installed solar-powered Wi-Fi hotspots and smart lighting systems at Lahijan Lake. It has also used augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) to promote tourism to simulate a visit to Lounak Waterfall.

Iran’s capital, Tehran, which is approaching "megacity" status, is the primary target for smart city transformation as the government seeks to address heavy traffic jams, extreme air pollution, high energy consumption, among other challenges. The municipality of Tehran, has been actively promoting the topic, in part by supporting startups which are active in the field.

As part of its promotion efforts, Tehran Municipality, in cooperation with Pardis Technology Park, sponsored the 7th International Innovation and Technology Exhibition (INOTEX 2018). Moreover, the Tehran Municipality ICT Organization regularly holds workshops to educate the policy makers on smart cities and organizes competitions to drive innovation. The organization has also signed an agreement with China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) to spur adoption of smart city technologies. CETC will provide services including consulting, project design and research and development.

Following the withdrawal of the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the European governments have sought to support the Iran deal and sustain economic ties between the European and Iranian companies further. Cooperation around smart cities could be an ideal area of focus. 

European companies and institutions have demonstrated interest in supporting smart city transformations in Iran. Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT) held a workshop in Vienna in June 2017 on “smart city development” for officials from the city of Bushehr, which was selected as a pilot smart city project by the Iranian government. This workshop provided training on topics including the application of ICT for smart cities, urban governance and big data exploration.

While the return of US sanctions poses new challenges for European investment, such educational exchanges should be sustained. European companies and institutions should continue to engage with the Iranian entrepreneurs and urban planners in a non-political environment, demonstrating their goodwill, sharing best-practices, and supporting Iranian dreams of smart cities. 

Photo Credit: Inotex 2018

US Officials Warn of ‘Deceptive Web’ of Iran Business, But Hamper Transparency Efforts

In a recent speech, Under Secretary of the Treasury Sigal Mandelker warned that foreign companies that maintain a presence in Iran must conduct “extra due diligence to keep them from being caught in Iran’s deceptive web.” Mandelker has been touring countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, engaging governments and businesses in order to “make clear the very significant risks of doing business with companies and persons” in Iran. 

Many Iranian companies, particularly in the private sector, have long taken seriously the need to conduct enhanced due diligence, including on their own customers and partners. Improved transparency is a prerequisite of working with foreign companies, which remain wary of the wrath of US regulators for any inadvertent sanctions violations.

Since the implementation of the JCPOA nuclear deal, and in anticipation of new foreign trade and investment, many Iranian enterprises have hired specialist consultants to help establish internal compliance departments and institute robust anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) processes. Technology solutions are central to any such transparency efforts. 

While Iran is witnessing a wider push for transparency, particularly around Iran’s compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan, there remains internal resistance to compliance reforms. As explained by one consultant who advises Iranian companies on compliance policies, "Elements of the Iranian government contribute to the problem by issuing instructions that foreign companies and technologies should not be engaged to assist the banks in their compliance efforts." These sensitiveness are especially acute for the Central Bank and Ministry of Economy, where Iranian officials fear that foreign technology could be used for espionage. Given that there are no homegrown compliance tools, system-wide implementation remains a distant prospect. 

In the meantime, ambitious banks such as Middle East Bank and Saman Bank have been at the forefront of the effort to empower their compliance departments and to demonstrate competencies in know-your-customer (KYC) and know-your-transaction (KYT) due diligence. 

However, conversations with several international compliance specialists, who agreed to describe their experiences on background, make clear that—counterintuitively—US sanctions pose the most significant challenges in the effort to improve sanction compliance within Iranian banks and companies. These sanctions prevent industry-standard technology, including software that enables the automated searches of companies and entities for hits against global sanctions lists, from being accessed by users with Iranian IP addresses.  

For example, World-Check, a market-leading compliance tool from Thomson Reuters which allows users to “automatically and cost-effectively screen all of their customers, partners, employees, and business transactions for potential Iran sanction risk,” is inaccessible from Iran, despite the fact that the company advertises a specific “Iran Economic Interest Solution” comprised of World-Check and a second product called IntegraScreen. So while foreign companies can use the product to mitigate their sanctions risks, Iranian companies cannot do so for the benefit of their foreign clients or customers.  

American companies such as Thomson Reuters are reluctant to enable use of their service from Iran due to primary sanctions prohibitions on exporting a service to Iranian companies, even if that service is intended to help Iranian firms improve their compliance with US and EU sanctions laws. Compliance professionals report that smaller European software companies, which could have filled the gap, are reluctant to do so due to the possible negative impact on their US business and difficulties in processing related licensing fees.

These circumstances leave some Iranian companies to pursue less-robust software solutions from markets such as India, which can contribute to screening failures. Alternatively, Iranian companies seek back office support “offshore,” in effect subcontracting their compliance work on an ad hoc basis. Neither of these solutions reflect the compliance best-practice that US officials insist upon for those companies that wish to pursue trade and investment in Iran. In the event of a compliance failure, such measures are unlikely to hold up to regulatory scrutiny.

US officials could remedy these issues through smarter sanctions policy. Given similar fears among consumer technology companies, the US government enshrined the accessibility of internet and communications tools in 2014 with the creation of General License D, which protects the provision of services and software “incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.” The license, which has been only partially successful at preserving access to technology products for Iranians, reflected an assessment on the part of US officials that protecting the free exchange of information was consistent with the aims of Iran policy.  

Despite the consistent message from US Treasury Department and State Department officials that a lack of transparency in Iran’s economy represents a national security threat to the United States, particularly in regards to terrorist financing risks, there has been no similar effort to ensure the availability of compliance tools for Iranian end users. One compliance executive, who specializes in enhanced due diligence, wondered, “If Iran cannot access the very tools that it needs in order to reform, is it being set up to fail?”

Photo Credit: Wikicommons

Negotiations On Legal Status of Caspian Sea Approach Finish Line

Negotiations on the international legal status of the Caspian Sea, which started in 1996, appear to have at last reached the finish line. After 22 years, the five countries around the sea have come close to signing a convention on its legal status. If they do, it seems that the agreement will allow to pave the way for the construction of the underwater the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and other projects and will also close the access to the sea for the armed force of third countries.  

Russia has completed its part of the work on the preparation of the convention. According to its official legal information website, the government in the end of July approved in the draft submitted by the Foreign Ministry after coordination with Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It is expected that the document will be signed at the summit of their heads of state on 12 August in Aktau, Kazakhstan.

Over the long negotiating process, the Caspian Five have held 51 meetings of a special working group at the level of deputy foreign ministers (the main negotiating platform established in 1996), about 10 meetings of foreign ministers and four presidential summits (in 2002 in Ashgabat, in 2007 in Tehran, in 2010 in Baku and in Astrakhan in 2014). In the last years the negotiators agreed on 90 percent of the draft convention. The delay in the agreement on the last 10 percent was because the most controversial issues remained to be solved. Two of the most acute have been the principle used for the division of the Caspian Sea and the mechanisms of approval of underwater pipeline and cable projects.

Iran has had a special position on the first issue. Insisting on Soviet-era agreements, it has not recognized the agreements between Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea signed in 2003. These three countries used for delimitation the middle modified line (equidistant from the coast line and taking into account the length of the coastline). The Iranian position was instead to divide the sea into equal sectors of 20 per cent, since using the middle modified line would leave it with the smallest sector of about 11 per cent.

In response to such a difficult challenge, the draft of the convention does not include precise wording with geographical coordinates of the boundaries of sectors, but rather only the principles for the division of the sea. This allows for the transfer of responsibility for the division from the five-sided discussion to the two - and three-way level, as was the case when the northern part of the sea was divided.

Judging by the dynamics of recent contacts between Iran and Azerbaijan, bilateral negotiations on the division of the southern part of the sea are in full swing. This positive trend in relations between the two may have been one of the reasons for progress in the five-sided Caspian dialogue.

The second cornerstone for the negotiation process was the possibility of building trans-Caspian projects. Originally Russia and Iran emphasized the environmental danger of such projects and stressed the need for coordination by all five countries. Turkmenistan defended its right to build the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline without any consultations with its neighbours. In response to this challenge, the draft of the convention indicates that all submarine cables or pipelines must meet the necessary environmental requirements and standards approved under inter-state agreements. However, all the countries around the Caspian Sea would have the right to lay any pipelines and cables without the consent of their neighbours, but with the necessary notification about the routes taken. This means that, theoretically, after signing and ratifying the convention, Turkmenistan will be able to start looking for partners for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.

There is still a possibility that one of the parties refuses to endorse the draft document in its current form at the last moment. But the approval of the draft by Russia’s government and the announcement of a date for the summit indicate that the meeting will take place and, most likely, will bring about the long-awaited convention. 

Photo Credit: Russian Press Service

Three Years Later: Europe’s Last Push on the Iran Nuclear Deal

This article has been republished with permission from the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

The Iran nuclear agreement marked its third anniversary in a gloomy state. Despite repeated attempts to keep him on board, US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the deal – signed on 14 July 2015 under the formal title the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and thereby pulled the rug from under Europe’s feet. European policymakers are now focused on salvaging the agreement. For a growing number of European corporate decision-makers, the deal is already dead. In reality, the JCPOA is on life support and the next few months could open either its next or final chapter. Despite the significant challenges they face, European governments have some limited time to avert the deal’s collapse.

In 2015, global powers unanimously hailed the agreement as a historic achievement that proved the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, the JCPOA provides unprecedented oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, the agreement states that parties anticipate it will “positively contribute to regional and international peace and security." Many hoped that the resolution of the nuclear dispute would result in a new understanding between the West and Iran, opening a pathway for detente rather than confrontation. Relations between Europe and Iran have certainly made gains in this direction, but the Trump administration’s maximalist stance on Tehran has created an extremely hazardous environment for all remaining stakeholders in the nuclear deal.

Washington's Pressure Package

Since the formal US exit from the agreement in May this year, the Trump administration has sought to sabotage European efforts to sustain the agreement. This has involved a policy of relentlessly threatening and otherwise pressuring any country or company inclined to maintain economic channels with Iran, by weaponising US secondary sanctions. Reportedly, the US administration recently rejected an appeal by the EU foreign ministers to negotiate broad exemptions to such sanctions for European companies. The US clearly intends to specifically target European trade with Iran – although there remain questions about its ability to do so and the reach of US enforcement.

Together with its allies in the Middle East – particularly Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – the Trump administration is increasing its efforts to squeeze Iran on multiple fronts. As a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations outlines, this anti-Iran front views the collapse of the JCPOA as the trigger for a wider policy aimed at confronting Iran. The policy seeks to cause a deep economic crisis in the country, creating domestic divisions intended to bring about regime change. As part of this, the Trump administration has signalled its willingness to go further than any previous administration by choking off Iran’s oil exports. 

European Resistance to US Sanctions

European leaders’ have repeatedly stated their commitment to upholding the JCPOA. Policymakers are making genuine efforts to find an economic package that minimises the impact of looming US secondary sanctions to sustain Iranian compliance with the deal. But these efforts have yet to generate an environment in which a reasonable number of European entities can make a firm commercial decision to continue doing business with Iran.

Although the European Union’s leaders remain unified in their support of the JCPOA, divisions are emerging between the 28 member states over how far they are willing to test the limits of US secondary sanctions. Moreover, several proposed ideas for safeguarding European companies against extraterritorial US sanctions would require months or even years to implement, as they require alternative financial mechanisms that are ring-fenced from US exposure. European governments are also falling short in the political momentum needed to salvage the nuclear deal. For instance, Germany and the United Kingdom are now far more preoccupied with challenges at home than they were in 2015, and EU institutions are focused on averting further transatlantic divide on trade and NATO.

Unsurprisingly, many European firms have little confidence that European policymakers will create the conditions necessary to protect them from US secondary sanctions, including by providing alternative mechanisms for doing business with Iran that are compliant with US sanctions. This has resulted in a wave of pre-emptive corporate overcompliance with impending US regulations and a decline in European business with Iran even before sanctions come into force.

Iran's Patience Wearing Thin

This month, the foreign ministers of France, the UK, Germany, Russia, and China (the E3+2) met with Iran to discuss political and economic pathways through which they could safeguard the JCPOA. And Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, visited Austria and Switzerland to deliver two overarching messages. The first was that Iran’s patience was wearing thin and its full compliance with the JCPOA was only feasible if it continued to receive tangible benefits from the agreement. The second was that Tehran would abandon the agreement if it became unable to maintain oil exports and, accordingly, its share in global energy markets.

Rouhani’s visit followed a tense OPEC meeting, Trump’s call for Saudi Arabia to increase oil production, and weeks of speculation about the extent to which the US could pressure other countries to halt exports of Iranian oil. In Europe, Rouhani stated: “assuming that Iran could become the only oil producer unable to export its oil is a wrong assumption”. 

The leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was quick to emphasise that elite forces were prepared to act on Rouhani’s words, noting: “we will make the enemy understand that either everyone can use the Strait of Hormuz or no one”. Iran has issued such warnings in the past, including during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and in 2011 in advance of the EU and US embargo on Iranian oil. Iran may retaliate against any US attempts to curb its oil exports by disrupting regional crude shipments in the strait, through which 35% of all seaborne oil exports pass. Such measures seem unlikely for now – given the risk of military escalation with US and regional naval forces, and of damaging relations with China and Russia, which wish to keep energy markets stable.

Rouhani’s statement suggests that Iran is hardening its position. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, unexpectedly welcomed Rouhani’s threat.

Despite the significant political and economic challenges shaping Iranian domestic politics, the Trump administration’s maximalist posture may inadvertently lead to a consensus between the Rouhani government and the military elite on how to respond to national security threats. This may abruptly or gradually prompt the Iranian political establishment to shift away from diplomacy with Europe and towards confrontation with the US. Calculations on whether the JCPOA can be sustained will heavily influence this decision.

Iran is likely to continue implementing the JCPOA and engaging in diplomacy with Europe for at least a few more months, as it assesses the impact of US sanctions on its economic relations with Europe, China, and India (particularly in relation to oil exports), as well as the likely trajectory of US domestic politics in the aftermath of midterm elections.

Necessary European Action

Unless one side backs down, Tehran and Washington will escalate their dispute in a manner that poses real risks to European interests in non-proliferation, security in the Middle East, and global energy supply. It is imperative that in the coming weeks and months European governments redouble their efforts to sustain the nuclear agreement and ease regional tensions.

Firstly, they should continue to explicitly warn the US and their partners in the Middle East that they will not support a strategy aimed at destabilising Iran internally or pursuing regime change in the country. Such an approach risks destabilising a country of 80 million people close to Europe’s border. At the same time, European governments should address their many areas of disagreement with Iran – most urgently, those involving regional security. As ECFR’s new report recommends, this should be done in a strategically careful manner that avoids fuelling further conflict in the Middle East.

Secondly, European governments must strive to fulfil their commitments under the JCPOA. They have made a good start by incorporating US secondary sanctions into the EU Blocking Regulation, due to be amended in August. But they need to quickly implement more practical solutions that will affect companies’ calculations on Iran (for a detailed list of recommendations, see the box below). Otherwise, there will be an exodus of European firms from the Iranian market.

European efforts to keep Iran in the JCPOA will face major challenges, including US attempts at sabotage. The Trump administration will look to use the JCPOA as a bargaining chip in its bilateral negotiations with Europe, China, and Russia on trade policy, tariffs, and sanctions. Therefore, European leaders must make important decisions about how far they are willing to go to secure a nuclear agreement borne out of more than a decade of diplomacy. They can only do so if they act collectively and firmly. Yet they must do so to prevent escalation between the West and Iran that will have disastrous consequences for global security.

Recommendations

1. The EU/E3 should accelerate measures to establish a foundation for sustaining financial channels (including SWIFT) with Iran before November, when the US will introduce secondary sanctions designed to hit Iran’s oil and banking sector. In this, European central and state banks will have act as a bridging mechanism. While there are ways of moving funds to and from Iran, state banks will have to engage in operations that provide settlement and clearing facilities. At the same time, European governments should remind Iran that their banking relationship can only continue if the country follows the Financial Action Task Force’s road map.

2. The EU and member states should devise a financial framework within which European companies (particularly small and medium-sized enterprises) can do business with Iran while complying with US sanctions. Technical experts have called for the creation of special purpose vehicles or “gateway banks” (supported by European state banks). These mechanisms will need to avoid direct links between Iranian entities and European private banks. Cooperation on this should extend into a larger structure that crosses a coalition of willing member states, thereby sharing risk between them.

3. The EU and member states (particularly leading importers of Iranian oil such as France, Greece, Italy and Spain) should increase their coordination with China and Russia on measures to minimise the impact of US secondary sanctions on Iranian oil exports. European countries should firmly reject any proposed US framework for significant oil reduction from Iran in return for waivers to continue limited oil exports. This would amount to legitimising the US secondary sanctions architecture. Russia and Iran are already in talks over significant Russian investment in the Iranian energy market, which could reportedly involve increased purchases of Iranian oil that could be reprocessed for global distribution via Russia. The E3 and China, together with other relevant private sector entities, should investigate whether it is feasible to offset potential reductions in Iranian oil exports through oil-swap arrangements with non-signatories to the JCPOA such as Turkey and Iraq.

4. The European Commission should incorporate clear guidelines for European companies into amendments to the EU Blocking Regulation. The regulation includes a compensation mechanism (Article 6) that allows European entities to seek compensation if they become subject to extraterritorial US financial penalties. As this mechanism has rarely been enforced, its limits remain unclear. The European Commission should work with member states, regulators and the private sector to clarify and facilitate access to compensation, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises that do business with Iran.

5. The European Commission should mandate a competent body to facilitate legitimate European business with Iran. The body should provide comprehensive oversight of the US Treasury’s enforcement of extraterritorial sanctions. This should involve a reporting mechanism that assesses the legal and other tactics the US Treasury adopts against European companies, pursuant to secondary sanctions. The body should also assist European companies subject to US investigations.

6. The European Commission should address discrimination and overcompliance relating to trade and investment with Iran in the European banking sector. As this problem is a direct consequence of US secondary sanctions, European leaders should primarily address it through regulatory measures that set a burden of proof requiring company boards to certify that their decisions are legally grounded under European law. The Blocking Regulation can provide a foundation for such measures. European regulatory bodies should provide greater oversight of European commercial banks’ decisions to block the flow of funds relating to Iran, reducing the likelihood that such decisions will be arbitrary.

7. The E3/EU should not invest heavily in attempts to negotiate with the US administration on exemptions from secondary sanctions, given the Trump White House’s clear lack of interest in treating European allies amicably. The E3/EU should shift to a more firm and robust negotiating posture similar to their stance on US trade tariffs. They should warn the US about the costs for Western energy consumers of reducing purchases of Iranian oil at a time when Libyan, Venezuelan, and Nigerian exports have been disrupted, given that it remains uncertain whether Saudi Arabia and Russia will increase production to offset this disruption. European governments should limit the US Treasury’s space to demonstrate the power of sanctions in Europe. EU member states should urgently engage in private consultations to prepare countermeasures against US attempts to pressure SWIFT and its board members or to target European entities – using specially designated nationals lists – for doing business with Iran deemed legitimate under EU law.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Could Trump Deliver Iran an Oil Windfall?

This article is republished here with permission from the Columbia University Center of Global Energy Policy.  

The president’s recent statement that OPEC should reduce their prices may merely be an attempt to assign blame for rising gasoline prices in the midst of the US driving season or an even more cynical attempt to rally his political base in opposition to globalism. Or, it may have something to do with the president’s own decision to create a crisis with Iran. While attention is duly paid to how much Americans have to pay at the pump, a more subtle and complicated story will soon play out with respect to Iran and the reapplication of US sanctions ordered by Trump on May 8, 2018. In fact, unless oil prices are contained, the primary result of the president’s action may be to ensure that Iran profits from the oil market risks that sanctions have created.

In Theory

A simple chart helps to bear out the point. Figure 1 is a representation of three important data points: how much oil Iran might be able to export on a given day, the price of its oil, and its daily revenue. On May 8, Iran exported approximately 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil. On that day, oil was trading at approximately USD 75 per barrel. As a result, we can assume that Iran’s oil revenue for that day was USD 180 million (as reflected by the red line).

Figure 1: Daily Oil Revenue at Various Prices and Export Volume

If instead oil had been trading at USD 130 per barrel on that day, Iran would have earned over USD 310 million. And if oil had been trading at USD 50 per barrel, Iran would have earned only USD 120 million—in all, a fairly straightforward math problem to solve.

Where things get more complicated is when one takes into account falling Iranian oil exports and potentially rising oil prices.

Naturally, if oil prices remain roughly the same, every lost barrel of Iranian oil exports means a real economic loss to the Iranian government. If Iranian oil exports decrease from 2.4 million bpd to 1.5 million bpd, Iran will experience a loss of approximately USD 67 million in its revenue stream. Taken over the course of a year, this would mean lost national revenue approaching USD 25 billion, a substantial sum for a country with significant economic problems and strained liquidity.

However, if oil prices go up, then—as Figure 1 shows—the immediate revenue impact of sanctions can be mitigated, potentially entirely. The red line’s intersection with various price curves shows this: at USD 130 per barrel, Iran need only export 1.38 million bpd to average the same daily revenue as at USD 75 per barrel with 2.4 million bpd in exports. With a more conservative oil price increase—for example, to only USD 100 per barrel—Iran would generate the same revenue if it exported only 1.8 million bpd.

But of course, the effects are magnified when an entire year’s worth of sales is factored in, as Table 1 demonstrates.

Table 1: Annual Revenue for Average Export Rates

Even if the Trump administration is able to reduce Iranian oil sales to 1 mbpd, at higher oil prices, Iran’s ability to compensate is substantial. A more meager reduction, matched by higher prices? Iran might profit.

In Practice

There are myriad reasons why a simple mathematical abstraction is incapable of capturing the diversity of reactions and feedback loops that will determine Iranian oil sales and revenues. It is worth noting in this context that US officials had similar concerns that removing Iranian oil from the market would cause prices to go up during the 2011–2013 Iran sanctions experience and that these fears were ultimately unfounded. Arguably, this came because of the moderation shown by the Obama administration in its demands for reductions—20 percent every 180 days—and the revelation of US shale oil production. But still, it is an indication that unexpected forces can intervene.

To start, prices are in part set by supply and certainly by expectations of supply. To the extent that Iranian supply is not taken off the market, then this will have a moderating impact on prices, slowing their rise and ensuring that Iran bears the brunt of the sanctions pressure. The same would apply if additional supply were to be added by other producers, though finding 2.4 million bpd to add to the market by November 4 is not possible. By the same token, if the United States were able to prevent Iran from exporting any oil, then any increase in price would also not be enjoyed by Iran, no matter how high prices might go. Of course, the higher prices would be felt elsewhere in the global economy and back home in the United States. But from the simple perspective of “putting pressure on Iran,” such a scenario would mitigate the dynamics discussed here.

Moreover, oil revenue is not a perfect proxy for sanctions pressure on Iran. One of the elements of US sanctions against Iran is that Iran is barred from freely accessing its revenues held in foreign banks. Instead, per US law, banks are required to make Iran’s funds available only for bilateral trade or for the purchase of humanitarian goods. Any banks that fail to abide by these restrictions can be prohibited from opening or holding correspondent bank accounts with U.S. financial institutions – effectively banned from doing business in the United States. With this in mind, even higher oil prices and record Iranian oil revenues might not meaningfully buttress the Iranian economy if those revenues are locked up in foreign banks. But this in turn requires assumptions to be made about the level of cooperation that the United States might enjoy in sancitnos implementation. Many banks in Europe and in Asia will resist provoking US sanctions and isolation. Some, however, may decide it is worth the risk, as Chinese Bank of Kunlun did in 2012 when it was sanctioned by the United States. It remains a reasonably profitable institution, notwithstanding US sanctions, and may even become more so if other Chinese transactions with Iran were to flow through it. There is nothing in particular to stop other banks in other countries from pursuing the same path, if they determine the cost is worth the benefits.

This in turn informs another important element: whether all of this will matter in affecting Iranian behavior. From 2012–2013, the United States denied Iran over $50 billion in oil sales and prevented it from using billions more that were held in banks around the world. The result, at least in part, was the negotiation and implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That might not be the result of another round of sanctions. Diplomacy with the United States has lost its luster in Iran, and its leaders are now talking about the possible use of military instruments to blockade the Persian Gulf, as they have in the past. Even if this extreme scenario does not come to pass, the idea that Iran’s response to renewed economic pressure would be to deal with the United States and to offer further concessions than in 2013–2015 is, at this point, hopeful speculation. There are many different factors that could undermine this hope, from the practical (Will any US partners work with the United States on sanctions?) to the theological (Would Iran be prepared to negotiate with the "Great Satan" again?). Even more importantly, these factors will interplay with one another in ways that we may not be able to anticipate at the outset.

One factor, to be sure, will be the effect of sanctions on oil prices. Given the risks of this strategy, one need hope the United States has a better plan than badgering OPEC.

Photo Credit: EPA/Shutterstock

Iran Shows New Savvy in Defining Outcome of Key Nuclear Deal Meeting

Following two months of rising uncertainty after President Trump decided to withdraw from the nuclear deal despite Iran’s continued compliance with its commitments, the remaining parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assembled in Vienna on Friday. The meeting of foreign minister was convened at Iran's request. 

Iranian expectations of the meeting centered on an “economic package” that was to be offered by Europe—with the support of Russia and China—to keep Iran in the nuclear deal. As Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif made clear in a tweet prior to the meeting, in the view of Iran, “sanctions and JCPOA compliance are mutually exclusive.” In short, if Europe, Russia, and China are to expect Iran to remain committed to the nuclear deal, they must neutralize the negative effects of US secondary sanctions.

Up until last week the foremost concern had been whether Iran would be able to maintain viable banking channels in the face of a more aggressive US sanctions posture, especially given the limited progress that had been made in reintegrating Iran into the global financial system since Implementation Day. Yet, the announcement that the US would not be providing significant reduction exceptions to allow Iran’s oil customers to maintain their imports when sanctions return in November, will prove Iran’s most significant challenge. Iran relies on oil exports for 40 percent of government revenue.

Iran engaged in expectation management regarding the package ahead of the meeting, perhaps indicating that the Rouhani government has finally learned the consequences of overselling the economic promises made during JCPOA-related talks. The president’s office released two statements Thursday evening indicating that Rouhani had held phone calls with his German and French counterparts. Most pointedly, Rouhani told Macron that the economic package prepared by Europe "does not include all of [Iran's] demands,” but that Iran remained hopeful that the joint commission meeting would help fill the gaps. 

In this way, Friday’s meeting of the joint commission was cast as a test for the French, German, British, Russian, and Chinese diplomats. Would the diplomats be able to develop the necessary economic countermeasures to keep Iran in the deal? Would they be able to show concrete progress on the positive commitments that had been made in the days following Trump’s withdrawal? When drafting the JCPOA, the diplomats had relegated the economic aspects of the deal to an annex, where implementation languished on all sides, slowing trade and investment, until Trump made his fateful decision—was it too much to expect practical solutions to emerge now?

In this context, the joint statement released by the European External Action Service and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who chaired the ministerial meeting, was underwhelming. The statement reiterated that “in return for the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of sanctions, including the economic dividends arising from it, constitutes an essential part of the JCPOA.” As part of this commitment, the statement “affirmed” the commitment of the participants to measures focused on the “promotion of wider economic and sectoral relations with Iran” as well as “the preservation and maintenance of effective financial channels.” Most importantly given Trump’s declared intention to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero, the participants affirmed their intention to defend “Iran’s export of oil and gas condensate, petroleum products and petrochemicals,” among other areas of economic intervention.

The statement was comprehensive in detailing the areas in which Iran wishes to see concrete measures taken, but it did not provide much greater detail than similar statements issued in the weeks immediately following Trump’s withdrawal of the deal. Besides noting that “that the EU is in the process of updating the EU ‘Blocking Statute’" and "the European Investment Bank’s external lending mandate to cover Iran”—two measures first announced in May—no specific tactics were declared in the statement. Of course, it would be a mistake for parties to the JCPOA to reveal their proposed countermeasures too soon, as this would invite American authorities to find ways to undermine them. Yet, nothing in the statement itself seemed to dissuade those hoping for meaningful solutions from a sense of disappointment.

It was therefore notable that Zarif very proactively shared a positive assessment of the meetings upon their conclusion. On one hand, Iran’s foreign minister showed trademark deference to Iran’s other power-brokers, telling reporters that the proposal presented to Iran—“not precise and not a complete one”—should be implemented before the next round of US sanctions come into force in August and that it “is up to the leadership in Tehran to decide whether Iran should remain in the deal” on the basis of this implementation.

Yet, speaking to Iranian media, Zarif highlighted his satisfaction that the parties to the JCPOA, including three “close allies” of the United States, had remained firm in their desire to withstand US pressure. He also highlighted in these interviews and in subsequent tweets that the discussions were “moving in right direction on concrete steps for timely implementation of commitments.” He was remarkably upbeat. 

That Iran had achieved a political success was made clear as French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told reporters that the parties to the deal were trying to deliver an economic package “before sanctions are imposed at the start of August and then the next set of sanctions in November. He added, “ For August it seems a bit short, but we are trying to do it by November.” Le Drian also implored Iran to “stop threatening to break their commitments to the nuclear deal," a statement that may have been taken to undercut the French willingness to help Iran achieve an economic package. 

But on the contrary, such as statement proves that Iran retains leverage in the negotiations. Whether signaling the resumption of enrichment activities or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a coordinated messaging campaign by the Rouhani administration, which includes public statements by Rouhani himself, by Zarif, by Iran’s atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi, and even by IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, has served to remind the world powers of the significant consequences should Iran withdraw from the deal. The assembled foreign ministers were clear that an economic package is the desired political outcome because they need Iran to remain in the deal. Zarif got what he needed from the ministerial meeting. Two months following Trump’s abrogation of the nuclear deal, the remaining parties to the agreement proved able to present a consensus position on the need to protect Iran’s economic interests in direct contradiction of the declared US policy. 

Moreover, while headlines from the likes of Reuters and Bloomberg heralded “no breakthroughs” and “unresolved” issues given the unspecific statement, Zarif’s positive assessment speaks to the fact that Iran was given some indication during the proceedings of what Wall Street Journal reporter Laurence Norman referred to as “real work and genuine ideas” to help Iran both on the banking challenges and the preservation of the all-important oil exports. To this end, Zarif made clear that progress on implementation would follow “direct bilateral efforts.”

It is important to note that the ministerial meeting was far from the only diplomatic or technical dialogue in which Iran has participated since the survival of the nuclear deal was plunged into doubt by Trump’s violation in May.  In just the last week, President Rouhani held successful official visits to Switzerland and Austria, two longstanding trading partners. This follows, an important official visit by Rouhani to China, as well as working-level dialogues in France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These meetings have included officials from the Central Bank of Iran, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Transportation among executives from state and private sector enterprises. It is these bilateral exchanges, not joint commission dialogues, which have given Iran a more precise indication as to how its economic interests might be protected. 

The fact that Iran is back under US secondary sanctions is a failure of multilateralism. But Iran has now recognized that the solution to this failure will not be found in a multilateral format. Whether looking to the European Union or the JCPOA parties, the need to generate politically driven consensus on economic countermeasures will prove cumbersome. As noted by Eldar Mamedov, even the European Parliament is an arena prone to “sabotage." Mamedov, a parliamentarian, illustrates this fact by recounting recent efforts to block the European Investment Bank’s mandate to fund projects in Iran. 

A Bourse & Bazaar white paper published in January on the “economic implementation of the nuclear deal” correctly diagnosed that “the joint commission itself is poorly suited to conduct [economic] coordination given the divergent views” of its parties on “matters of sanctions and economic implementation.” In recognition of this fact, the paper recommended that the “European External Action Service (EEAS), which has taken the mantle of leadership on the nuclear deal since the change in American administrations, would be well positioned to convene… a new multi-agency commission for economic implementation, formed in accordance with European commitments under the JCPOA,” In effect, the paper envisioned a joint commission-type body specifically for economic matters. While the joint commission convenes foreign ministers and their diplomatic teams, an economically focused commission would seek to convene economic ministers and their technical staff.

Such a proposal would seem to be supported by the particularly strong stance taken by French economic minister Bruno Le Maire on the need for France to defend its economic interests in Iran in the face of US secondary sanctions. From the Iranian perspective, the inclusion of Laya Joneydi, Iran’s well-regarded vice president for legal affairs, in Iran’s delegation to the joint commission meeting was a positive step, in part because, as noted by Adnan Tabatabai, it was refreshing to see an Iran represented by a female official. 

Yet, it is probably the case that convening technocrats into a multilateral format would only serve to limit their effectiveness in the near-term. The political limitations faced by nuclear experts Salehi and US secretary of energy Ernest Moniz during the JCPOA negotiations offers a compelling case study. The Rouhani administration is now aware that given the limited timeframes, Iran’s will need to assemble a patchwork of solutions from various countries, particularly by expanding focus beyond France, Germany and the United Kingdom to seek direct cooperation with a wider ranger of EU member states. Based on institutional and economic factors, some countries will be better able to devise solutions on oil imports, others on banking channels, and others on insulating their multinational corporations or promoting their SMEs. To underscore the point, even the revival of the blocking regulation, a piece of EU law, will depend on the individual implementation and enforcement of member states. When it comes to technical matters and economic implementation, only bilateral dialogues can really deliver. 

But if Rouhani and Zarif have learned the limitations of the joint commission and how to work within those limitations, they must also recognize their own limitations. It is impractical for the majority of outreach on the economic package to depend on Zarif and Iran’s foreign ministry. While the lion-like Bijan Zanganeh ably leads the oil ministry, there is a glaring lack of leadership in key bodies such as Iran’s central bank, ministry of economic affairs, and ministry of industry. Both Rouhani and his first vice president Ehsaq Jahangiri have been signaling for several months that a cabinet reshuffle may be on the cards. The politicking behind such a reshuffle is complicated, as parliament would need to confirm new ministers, opening Rouhani to a new round of attacks. But the urgency of new leadership could not be clearer.

If Iran is to succeed in “direct bilateral efforts” to ensure the implementation of an economic package, it must be able to send capable ministers to Europe, Russia, China, and other trading partners to meet with their counterparts in these critical coming months. Zarif can certainly craft a conducive political environment, as evidenced by the positive joint commission outcome, but the foreign ministry cannot orchestrate the defense of Iran’s economy singlehandedly, if for no other reason than the fact that when it comes to the economy, internal challenges greatly outnumber the external ones which Iran's diplomats can reasonable consider within their domain. 

Iran demonstrated real savvy in defining the outcome of the joint commission meeting. No longer seeking to unsatisfactorily bend political commitments into practical solutions for its longstanding economic problems, the Iranian delegation proved willing to aptly designate matters of implementation to the numerous bilateral dialogues currently underway. This allowed a relatively positive political outcome to be taken on its own terms, especially with an Iranian audience in mind. If the Rouhani administration can assemble the right teams for these bilateral exchanges, the vital economic package can still be delivered upon. Hope persists. 

Photo Credit: EEAS

Europeans Beat Back Americans as FATF Gives Iran More Time on Financial Reforms

At its plenary meeting in Paris, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) opted “to continue the suspension of countermeasures” related to Iran’s inclusion in the so-called “blacklist” of countries with deficiencies in anti-money laundering (AML) and combating financing of terrorism (CFT) standards.  The suspension will be in place until October 2018 and in this period jurisdictions will continue to “advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran.”

The outcome of the plenary was the subject of great anticipation. Progress on the FATF action plan is critical for Iran’s reintegration in the global financial system. The FATF expressed its “disappointed with Iran’s failure to implement its action plan to address its significant AML/CFT deficiencies” noting in a public statement that “a majority of the action items remaining incomplete.” 

Iran’s slow implementation of the Action Plan reflects in part the considerable political scrutiny that has been placed on the process in Iran. Political leaders opposed to President Hassan Rouhani have decried the action plan reforms as an effort by international actors to exert undue influence over the Iranian financial system. They have also questioned the value of the reforms given the pending snapback of US secondary sanctions following President Trump's May 8 withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear deal. 

Iran’s hardliners were not alone in their disapproval of Iran's FATF efforts. American officials had made it clear in the run-up to the plenary that they would be pushing for the resumption of countermeasures against Iran. Congressmen Rob Portman (R-OH) and Ed Royce (R-CA) sent a letter to Treasury Secrtary Steven Mnuchin last week to “ to ensure action next week by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) against Iran. For many in Washington, resumption of countermeasures is seen as a way to further hobble Iran’s financial system, given that banks that might otherwise be structured to work with Iran under secondary sanctions would likely refuse to do so if the FATF action plan had failed to be implemented outright.

Officials from the European members of FATF, noting that the resumption of countermeasures would effectively end the tenuous political support for financial sector reforms in Iran, coordinated in order to ensure that Iran’s case would receive a fair evaluation. Active dialogue with Iranian stakeholders at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Bank of Iran helped European officials gauge the likely tides of political support for the action plan reforms, especially given outstanding legislative requirements such as the ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions.

Iranian officials were keen to impress on their European counterparts that Iran’s compliance with FATF’s recommendations is presently commensurate with many countries, which are not currently blacklisted. An appeal was made for Iran’s case to be evaluated on a technical, rather than political basis, particularly as American antipathy towards the continued suspension of countermeasures has been understood as part of the Trump administration’s broader pressure campaign against Iran.

In addition, Iranian officials noted that the FATF issue was now a matter of direct discussion between President Rouhani and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader. Despite the contentiousness of the issues, there is some suggestion that a political consensus around AML/CFT reforms is achievable. Such a consensus may see reforms characterized as a national endeavor rather than one pursued at the behest of FATF. Overall, within the domestic and international political context, the suspension of countermeasures should be seen as a victory for European and Iranian multilateral cooperation in the face of an increasingly hostile American posture. 

Photo Credit: FATF

As Trump Goes Nuclear On Iranian Oil, Europe Must Match His Brinkmanship

This article was originally published in LobeLog.

In the view of veteran observers of the oil industry, Trump has “gone nuclear.” Speaking during a background briefing on Tuesday, a senior state department official announced that the the Trump administration wants to completely eliminate imports of Iranian oil by its current customers. The official told journalists that, during a tour of countries that has already begun with a visit to Japan, U.S. officials will be “requesting that their oil imports go to zero, without question.”

Until recently, there had been an expectation that the Trump administration would issue significant reduction exceptions as was the case under the Obama administration, allowing countries to sustain some level of imports from Iran if significant reductions take place. Indeed, the guidance issued by the U.S. Treasury on May 8 following Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, made specific reference to significant reduction exceptions as part of the reapplication of oil sanctions. These exceptions were to be devised following “the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence” as consistent with “past practice.” A survey of oil analysts conducted by S&P Platts after May 8 suggested that “US oil sanctions on Iran will likely have an immediate impact of less than 200,000 bpd and will block less than 500,000 bpd after six months.” The announced policy is akin to a reduction of over 2 million barrels per day.

Something seems to have shifted during the OPEC meeting. As reports emerged that Japan had been asked to cease its imports of Iranian crude, Bijan Zanganeh, Iran’s oil minister, engaged in expectation management. During an interview with Bloomberg Television, he stated, “I don’t believe [the Japanese] can receive a waiver from the United States,” adding that Iran would need to “find some other way” to mitigate the effect of the oil sanctions. With Saudi Arabia cavalierly announcing that it will boost its production to record levels in July, it is easy to see how a Saudi commitment to raise production would have been coordinated with an American effort to eliminate Iran’s export market entirely.

To this end, Iran is facing the most serious challenge to its economy and political integrity to date. The Trump administration has taken its avowed commitment to exert “unprecedented financial pressure” far beyond the realm of coercion and into the realm of destruction. For Iran’s government, which receives about half of its revenues from oil sales, the prospects are grim. Of course, such an outcome is consistent with the regime-change goals of the Trump administration and its regional allies. They are seeking to engineer a collapse from within. But what is seemingly unaccounted for in such a scenario is the immense risk of regional chaos and conflict if they push Iran’s government to the brink. The risk is not merely that instability will lead to violence and mass displacement that could spill beyond Iran’s borders, but more likely that when faced with a near-existential threat, Iran’s ruling elite will seek to regain leverage in the most destructive ways possible.

In one plausible scenario, the Iranian reaction to the total embargo of its oil sales will be to try and impose a physical blockade on Saudi exports by closing the Strait of Hormuz and engaging in a new “tanker war.” The threat to close the strait has been a constant feature of hardline rhetoric from Iran over the years, and the move is easier said than done. But any suggestion that Iran could escalate in such a manner would no doubt spook oil markets—about 18 million barrels per day, equivalent to 20 percent of global supply, pass through the strait each day.

European Response

The prospect of a global oil crisis spurred by Trump’s brash move to deny waivers should frighten European leaders. Aside from the risks of confrontation in the region that would stem from any blockade attempt, the knock-on effects of an even short-term supply crisis could send the already fragile Eurozone economies into a recession. European officials have been quick to note the risks, characterizing the move as “really unhelpful and part of an escalation plan” and declaring that Europe “strongly disagree[s] with this plan.”

The timing could not be more fraught for Europe, which had been expected to present its long-awaited package of economic measures to Iran in the next week. These measures, intended to help incentivize Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA in the face of U.S. sanctions snapback, will have little meaning if the preservation of oil imports cannot be assured. Realistically, it will be difficult for Europe to find a way to maintain a viable importation mechanism in the absence of exemptions. If circumvention is not an option, Europe must find new leverage and compel the United States to change its policies. There are three actions that can be taken.

First, European governments must buy themselves and Iran time to reduce the chaos factor. Accelerating and increasing imports of Iranian oil over the next few months, basically allowing Iran to frontload its expected 2019 exports before the sanctions deadline kicks in, would help ensure that Iran retains an ability to sustain the rising pressure. Indian imports of Iranian oil surged in May in anticipation of the U.S. sanctions. European governments should, as a matter of national security, use any excess storage capacity to purchase as much Iranian oil as possible. In order to encourage Europe’s more independent oil traders and refiners to take on these purchases, Iran would need to offer attractive commercial terms in something akin to a flash sale.

Europe should also consider its own coercive measures. American oil exports to Europe have recently reached levels of around 500,000 barrels per day, levels approaching those of Iran. It would be relatively straightforward for Europe to declare that it will seek to eliminate imports of American oil to Europe as a countermeasure for Trump’s move to ban Iranian imports. The impact on the oil-producing American heartland and Trump’s political base could be profound. Importantly, Europe would not necessarily seek to use sanctions in order to enforce such a move. Sanctioning European companies that trade American oil would inhibit the ability of these multinational companies to pick up supply from other producers worldwide. A much more elegant way to impose a cost on the Americans would be to take a page out of the tariffs playbook. Imposing a hefty oil-import tariff would make it commercially unattractive for refiners to important American crude, and so the decision to cease importing American oil would technically be a voluntary decision rather than a decision requiring legal enforcement.

Sanctioning Trump

Finally, European entities could target Trump’s personal assets as damages for the costs incurred due to his prohibition on Iranian oil imports. Congressman Keith Ellison (D-MN) and Vox editor Matthew Yglesias have both recently argued that sanctioning Trump personally may be the best way to change his behavior. As Ellison puts it, “Sanctions targeting Trump’s own companies will sting in a way that he cannot ignore.”

But there may be a more elegant solution already at Europe’s disposal. The EU has initiated the revival of the so-called Blocking Regulation, a 1996 EU law designed to prohibit compliance with US sanctions by EU companies. The regulation includes a “clawback provision” that provides a mechanism for EU entities to sue for damages for costs arising from sanctions. The recovery of damages “may be obtained from the natural or legal person or any other entity causing the damages or from any person acting on its behalf or intermediary.” This broad definition could clearly be extended to Trump.

Moreover, the “recovery could take the form of seizure and sale of assets held by those persons, entities, persons acting on their behalf or intermediaries within the Community, including shares held in a legal person incorporated within the Community.” In short, Trump’s property and assets in Europe could be seized and sold. Given that the assessed costs related to a complete cessation of Iranian oil imports could easily amount to billions of dollars, Trump could ostensibly be threatened with the total seizure of his Europe-based wealth. Of course, the legal action probably would not need to go that far. Dragging the Trump Organization into European court would probably wake up Trump. He has a history of settling in the face of legal challenges, so a threat to his personal empire may force him to rethink his abuse of the American empire.

If Europe can muster the political courage to pursue these measures in the face of catastrophic security and economic risks introduced by the total oil embargo, it can gain the necessary leverage to push the United States to a more reasonable position. Europe must not rely on China or India or Turkey to skirt the U.S. sanctions. Given the immensity of the threat to global security arrangement represented by the abrogation of the JCPOA, and the global economic arrangement underpinned by the current composition of the oil markets, Europe must match Trump’s “nuclear option” with its own. Perhaps this kind of mutually assured financial destruction can bring the world back from the brink.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Closure of Tehran Bazaar Reflects Fierce Elite Competition, Not Popular Politics

The closure of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar yesterday, and the closure of the consumer electronics bazaar the day before, seemed to be part of the regular and widespread protests that have roiled Iran over the last few months, spurred by economic volatility. Many saw the bazaar’s closure and subsequent protests as a meaningful escalation, a sign that perhaps popular discontent was spreading to key institutions and that coalitions were forming that could challenge the government more directly. After all, the bazaar has historically been seen as the heart of Iranian civil society, an institution where people of all walks of life could cross paths. As a physical institution, it was long a rare incubator for solidarity: “the rooted nature of the market… establish[es] the necessary foundation for communal allegiance, with its confined nature fostering long-term and face-to-face interactions among bazaaris.”

But this conception of the bazaar is an artifact of an earlier time. The bazaar in Iran today can no longer claim to be what historian Roy Mottahedeh eloquently described as “the assessor that sets the valuations politicians must use when they trade.” Over the last few decades, the bazaar has been cleaved from Iran’s civil society, no longer standing at its heart, but rather in isolation, losing its former role as a cite for broad civil society politics, and acting instead in its economic self-interest as the recent protests so transparently expose. Understanding this transformation is fundamental to an assessment of the recent protests. 

The networks of the bazaar that linked the merchants to civil society were deliberately disrupted and broken following the 1979 Islamic revolution. As detailed by Arang Keshavarzian in his seminal Bazaar and State in Iran, the new revolutionary government, concerned about the continued role of the bazaar as a site of contentious politics, sought to constrain the role of the bazaar in civil society via two processes.

First, those bazaar merchants loyal to the revolution and the new Islamic Republic were co-opted into the state, offered positions as the heads of ministries and bonyads. The regime rewarded namely the members of the group of the Islamic Coalition Association (ICA), a small segment of bazaar merchants, who had “financed and organized many political rallies and events… became part of the new ruling elite.” Incorporating these bazaaris into the regime gave them new incentives and power, changing their relations with the bazaar—indeed, they are no longer referred to as bazaaris by other merchants but instead called dawlati, meaning “of the government.” Personal gain motivated the separation from the bazaar. With the economy under state control, officials were in the position to take advantage of power for personal gain, with, “direct access to rents via exclusive importing licenses, tax exemptions, subsidized hard currency, and control over procurement boards and industrial establishments. The bazaaris who have established patronage channels have used them for personal and exclusive ends, and not as a tool for the benefit of the entire bazaar.”

Second, a new kind of profiteering was introduced to the bazaar. During the Iran-Iraq war, the government of the Islamic Republic saw its coffers emptying rapidly. Iran’s economy was increasingly cut-off from global markets for goods and services as a result of economic sanctions.  Some goods were unavailable, others became more expensive. Turning a crisis into an opportunity, elements in the bazaar began to engage in smuggling both in order to gain access to goods that would be sold for high prices in the market, but also to engage in profiteering and to secure rents that could be funneled to quasi-state institutions. Dawlatis in the bazaar enjoyed state-sanctioned access to black market goods that they could sell at market for large profits. They could also benefit from preferential access to foreign currency.

To be clear, these changes did not make the bazaar apolitical. On the contrary, the merchants continued to mobilize in a coordinated fashion, but with a new and more self-serving outlook. Bazaar closures like those seen this week are relatively rare, but did occur numerous times during the the Ahmadinejad years, with notable closures in 2008, 2010, and 2012. It would be easy to assume that these closures were due to the general economic malaise and popular dissatisfaction that marked Ahmadinejad’s tenure, but the fact that the bazaar did not engage in any significant mobilization in 2009, when sustained mass-protests emerged in response to Ahmadinejad's disputed reelection, demonstrates that civil society solidarity was not the motivating factor. The merchants of the contemporary bazaar do not mobilize for the people. They only mobilize for their own interests.

These is a clear line that can be drawn from the bazaar mobilizations of a decade ago to those of today. The Ahmadinejad years saw the rise of a new kind of rentierism in the Iranian economy, where quasi-state entities extended their role in Iranian enterprise. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ambitiously expanded their industrial operations, taking advantage of free-flowing contracts and financing made available by the Ahmadinejad government. A new kind of corporatist rentierism was emerging. Rather than rely on smuggling and arbitrage, quasi-state groups leveraged political connections to provide more valuable products and services to the economy than mere market commerce, sensing an opportunity as the Iranian private sector was squeezed by international sanctions and international companies reduced their presence in the market.

The nascent rivalry between the bazaari class and the IRGC would have been unthinkable in at the outset of the bazaar’s post-revolution transformation, but as IRGC generals saw opportunities develop in the boardroom, new fault lines have emerged, particularly in light of Rouhani’s pursuit of economic reform.

President Rouhani was elected in 2013 on a mandate to liberalize the economy through two interrelated processes: improve monetary policy and overall transparency in the economy and boost foreign trade and investment. He has been a vocal critic of the IRGC and its role in the economy. But it should be noted that corporatist rentierism is not entirely incompatible with liberalization. Rouhani has always positioned himself as giving the IRGC leaders a choice—they can either engage in business or serve proudly in the military, but they cannot do both. Faced with this choice in a liberalizing environment, an entity with links to the IRGC that is a beneficial owner of a company can either profit by offloading its shares in that company to a non-IRGC linked firm (phenomenon which has been observed in several cases) or it can clean itself of its IRGC links in order to position itself to benefit from expected foreign trade and investment. The availability of these options also help explain why liberalization has received a relatively robust endorsement from the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, including a recent statement that parliament must “must independently make legislation on issues such as terrorism or combating money laundering.” Khamenei’s concern is mostly about the pace of liberalization and the provisioning of its fruits, not its intended structural effects.

Importantly these structural effects threaten the bazaar as it operates today. The fundamental source of rents in the bazaar is arbitrage. Access to goods is secured at a low price, either through smuggling or manipulation of the foreign exchange markets, and then goods are sold at a high price. The disproportionate economic muscle of the bazaar network, stems from rents generated by high-value items such as gold and jewelry and electronics.

As the consumer electronics bazaar shut in protest over the currency fluctuations, Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, the Iran’s Minister of Information and Communication Technology, sought to expose the predatory arbitrage. He disclosed that while consumer electronics sellers in the bazaar were sold a total of EUR 220 million of foreign currency at the official exchange rate in order to purchase stock, only approximately EUR 75 million of mobile phones were imported. So two-thirds of the foreign currency provided cannot be accounted for.

The implication is that approximately EUR 145 million in foreign currency was siphoned-off to be sold at the black market rate, likely allowing the traders to nearly double their investment in the foreign exchange. As demonstrated by Jahromi’s resolve to expose such fraud, these types of activities would become impossible if the Rouhani administration can successfully implement the liberalization measures currently being pursued. Whether it is improving tax collection mechanisms, bettering customs controls, raising accounting standards, introducing stronger financial crime laws, or instituting tighter controls on foreign exchange, including a unified rate, such reforms would spell the end of the bazaar’s cash generation, now seen as a drag on the economy at large. 

Meanwhile, IRGC-linked development companies are among those building a plethora of malls across Iran, slowly eroding the bazaar’s long-standing role as the a pillar of Iran’s consumer-driven economy. Ironically, in undermining the bazaar in this way, the Islamic Republic is achieving something the Shah had always sought to accomplish. In 1979, the bazaar mobilized against the Shah largely due to his declared dislike for their “worm-ridden shops” and his attempt to curtail their economic influence. In his own words, the Shah “could not stop building supermarkets. [He] wanted a modern country.” But he never got the chance to render the bazaar obsolete.

Four decades later, economic liberalization and modernization is finally chipping away at the bazaar’s customer base as consumers habits see hours spent in malls and supermarkets rather than in the labyrinthine bazaar. The benefactors of this shift in consumer habits are both Rouhani and his private sector supporters and the opportunistic elements of the IRGC. The losers are the elite traders of the bazaar.

To be clear, not all merchants are part of the predatory elite. There remain plenty of humble grocers and shoe-sellers and spice merchants who can count themselves among those under relentless economic pressure. For these merchants, participating in a closure is not always a matter of choice. Journalist Reihaneh Yasini, in her reporting from the bazaar on Monday, spoke to merchants who described being ordered to shut their shops unwillingly. One young bazaari said, “It was about 11 o’clock when some people came by and said everyone must close their shops. We got scared and also closed.” Another added, “They were angry. They said they would use bricks to smash the windows. They appeared to me to be people complaining about rising costs. It was right for us to close the shop after this happened, though in reality closing the shop has little cost for us. Our sales are so low that closing the bazaar for one day will make little difference to us.”

It is unlikely that the closures were spontaneous. This has not been the historical norm for mobilizations at the bazaar and accounting for historical trajectories and the intense competition of Iran’s present-day economy, the bazaar’s mobilization is best understood as a manifestation of elite competition. Bazaar elites sought to co-opt the voices and slogans of a frustrated and economically insecure population in order to undermine their political opponents and put the brakes on threatening reform processes.

In this sense, the bazaar closures may follow the same playbook as some of the initial mobilizations in Mashhad at the end of last year. These tactics must be called out. There is a very real risk that genuine civil society frustrations are becoming instrumentalized by elites in an effort to preserve the kind of predatory economic activity that has led to so much economic suffering among the Iranian people. Outside observers must remember than the success of civil society protests in Iran depends principally on the independent collective action and claims-making of those mobilizations, not merely on the spectacle of the protests themselves.

Photo Credit: Thomas Cristofoletti

FATF Faces Test of Fairness on Iran at Plenary Meeting

Next week, Iran is facing the end of a four month extension given by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global standard-setting body, for the reform of the country’s AML/CFT regulations. Beginning in June 2016, Iran gave its political commitment to the action plan, accepting technical assistance in order to effectively implement the action plan. This political commitment saw Iran removed from the so called “black list,” the informal name given to the list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT). The common practice in recent years has been to apply "countermeasures" against non-cooperative countries. With countermeasures suspended, Iran was moved to a list of “high-risk” countries subject to “enhanced due diligence.”

As per the FATF procedure, Iran can only be returned to the countermeasure list if it proves to be non-cooperative. It should be noted that no country has been added to countermeasure list merely because of less-than-perfect compliance; if that was the case, in this world which is full of corruption and terrorism, the list of countries against which countermeasures should apply would be far more extensive. No country has managed to achieve perfect compliance with all forty recommendations that form the basis of FATF’s guidelines.

Iran will be hoping for a further extension of suspension of countermeasures at next week's plenary of the FATF, as it is in the process of amending its national laws. Some FATF members have sought to characterize such extensions as exceptional. However, a quick glance at the list of countries currently in the gray list or those which managed to get delisted, points to the fact that extensions are a common procedure.

Countries such as Iraq, Syria, Vanuatu, and Yemen have remained on the gray list for many years.  Countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uganda, Afghanistan, and Myanmar were all eventually delisted in recognition of progress in enacting the recommended reforms, but were given between two and six years in order to proceed with their action plans. Iran has been under much more significant pressure, opening FATF to charges of unfair treatment.

For the purposes of a closer comparison, we can look to the case of one country delisted from the so-called gray list in 2017. Based on FATF’s latest evaluation, this country is non-compliant with numerous recommendations outlined in Iran’s action plan. First, the country is non-compliant in terms of “criminalizing terrorist financing.” Second, the country is non-compliant in terms of “Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing (identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions).” Third, the country is only partially compliant with measures for “customer due diligence.” Fourth, the country is only partially compliant with establishing an effective “Financial Intelligence Unit.” Fifth, the country is non-compliant with wire transfer controls. Finally, the country is only partially compliant with recommendations on criminalizing anti-money laundering.

It is clear that this particular country has deficiencies equal-to or greater-than those of Iran as measured by Iran’s action plan. Yet the country was never included in the FATF blacklist and even managed to be delisted from the gray list as well. This raises the question—is FATF applying double standards against Iran?

FATF emphasizes that it is a technical and not a political body and that all countries are treated equally. Impartiality is important for a global standard-setting body, which seeks to ensure that countries cannot seek to politically undermine one another. 

Iran has attended FATF’s face-to-face meetings and answered extensive questions. Moreover, the FATF recommendations call for the enacting of six laws: criminalizing money laundering (i.e. the AML law), criminalizing financing of terrorism (i.e. the CFT law) and four other laws regarding joining four UN conventions. Of these four laws, two had already been approved by the parliament—Iran has joined the UN Anti-Corruption and Vienna conventions. The remaining laws are being deliberated. These legislative measures are among the most difficult recommendations to enact, as they require the coordination of government agencies, parliamentarians, and other supervisory bodies and therefore it seems that the action plan of Iran has been a difficult one with a rather short deadline provided.

Passing a single law may require 18 months of work, as it needs to be reviewed by the committees of the government and the cabinet, parliamentary commissions and then the parliament itself, and finally the powerful Guardian Council. Iran has achieved a degree of compliance with some aspects of the action plan, a fact acknowledged by FATF itself. Therefore, it would be illogical for the country to be considered non-cooperative.

The authority of FATF derives from the number of countries that have trusted it as a technical body. Therefore, this is not only a sensitive juncture for Iran, but also for the legitimacy of FATF, which must strive to preserve its reputation as an impartial technical body that treats all countries equally.

Photo Credit: FATF Twitter

Mohammad Javad Zarif: Iran Sees a Broken U.S. Foreign Policy

This piece was originally published in Iran Daily. It is republished here with permission. 

Following the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the third multilateral agreement that the current United States administration has withdrawn from. The administration has also put in jeopardy other multilateral arrangements such as NAFTA, the global trade system, and parts of the United Nations system, thus inflicting considerable damage to multilateralism, and the prospects for resolving disputes through diplomacy.

The announcement on 8 May 2018 of United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and the unilateral and unlawful re-imposition of nuclear sanctions—a decision opposed by majority of the American people—was the culmination of a series of violations of the terms of the accord by this administration, in spite of the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the sole competent international authority had repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the accord. The US decision was rejected by the international community and even its closest allies, including the European Union, Britain, France and Germany.

On 21 May 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a baseless and insulting statement, issued a number of demands and threats against Iran in brazen contravention of international law, well-established international norms, and civilized behavior. His statement reflected a desperate reaction by the US administration to the overwhelming opposition of the international community to the persistent efforts by the White House to kill the JCPOA, and the ensuing Washington’s isolation. Mr. Pompeo, in his statement, attempted to justify the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and divert international public opinion from the unlawful behavior of the United States and its outright violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231; a resolution drafted and proposed by the US itself and adopted unanimously by the Council. Mr. Pompeo’s 12 preconditions for Iran to follow are especially preposterous as the US administration itself is increasingly isolated internationally due to its effort to undermine diplomacy and multilateralism. It comes as no surprise that the statement and the one made by the US president on Iran were either ignored or received negatively by the international community, including by friends  and allies of the United States. Only a small handful of US client states in our region welcomed it.

I seriously doubt that had the US Secretary of State even had a slight knowledge of Iran’s history and culture and the Iranian people’s struggle for independence and freedom, and had he known that Iran’s political system—in contrast to those of the American allies in the region—is based on a popular revolution and the people’s will, would he have delivered such an outlandish statement. He should, however, know that ending foreign intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, which culminated in the 25-year period following the US-orchestrated coup in 1953, had always been one of the Iranian people’s main demands since well before the Islamic Revolution. He should also be aware that in the past 40 years the Iranian people have heroically resisted and foiled aggressions and pressures by the US, including its coup attempts, military interventions, support of the aggressor in an 8-year war, imposition of unilateral, extraterritorial and even multilateral sanctions, and even going as far as shooting down an Iranian passenger plane in the Persian Gulf in 1987. “Never forget” is our mantra, too.

The Islamic Republic of Iran derives its strength and stability from the brave and peace-loving Iranian people; a people who, while seeking constructive interaction with the world on the basis of mutual respect, are ready to resist bullying and extortions and defend in unison their country’s independence and honor. History bears testimony to the fact that those who staged aggression against this age-old land, such as Saddam and his regime’s supporters, all met an ignominious fate, while Iran has proudly and vibrantly continued its path towards a better and brighter future.

It is regrettable that in the past one-and-a-half years, US foreign policy—if we can call it that—including its policy towards Iran has been predicated on flawed assumptions and illusions—if not actual delusions. The US President and his Secretary of State have persistently made baseless and provocative allegations against Iran that constitute blatant intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, unlawful threats against a UN Member State, and violations of the United States’ international obligations under the UN Charter, the 1955 Treaty, and the 1981 Algiers Accord. While rejecting these fictitious allegations, I would like to draw the attention of US policymakers to some aspects of their nation’s current foreign policy that are detrimental to the entire international community:

First- Impulsive and illogical decisions and behavior of the US President—and efforts by his subordinates to find some justification to persuade a reluctant domestic and foreign audience—have already surfaced as the main feature of the decision-making process in Washington over the past 17 months. This process, coupled with ill-conceived and hasty explanations to justify outcomes, usually lead to contradictory statements and actions. As an example, in his role as CIA Director, Mike Pompeo once in a Congressional hearing emphatically stated: “Iran has not violated its commitments.” Later, and following the US President’s decision to withdraw from the accord, now Secretary of State Pompeo in his statement on May 21 emphatically stated that “Iran has violated its commitments."

Second- It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that some aspects of US foreign policy have been put up for auction—far beyond the routine lobbying practices. It is, for instance, unprecedented that a US president should choose the very country he had called “fanatic and a supporter of terrorism” during his election campaign as the destination for his first foreign visit as president, or to publicly make aspects of his foreign policy positions contingent on the purchase by one or another country of arms and other items from the United States. It has also been reported that in some other cases, mostly illegitimate financial interests have been the main basis for the formulation of mind-bogglingly ill-conceived US policy positions.

Third- Contempt for international law and attempts to undermine the rule of law in international relations have been among the main features of the current administration’s foreign policy. To the extent, according to media reports, that the US negotiators in the G7 Summit were even insisting on deleting the phrase “our commitment to promote the rules-based international order.” This destructive approach began by showing contempt for the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is arguably the oldest principle of international law. The US withdrawal from some international agreements and undermining others, coupled with efforts to weaken international organizations, are examples of destructive moves so far by the US government, which have unfortunately darkened the outlook for the international order. Obviously, the continuation of such policies can endanger the stability of the international community, turning the US into a rogue state and an international outlaw.

Fourth- Predicating decisions on illusions is another aspect of this administration’s foreign policy. This has been especially evident with respect to West Asia. The illegal and provocative decision regarding al-Quds al-Sharif, blind support for the cruel atrocities committed by the Zionist regime against Gazans, and aerial and missile attacks against Syria are some of the more brazen aspects of such an unprincipled foreign policy.

The statement made by Mr. Pompeo on May 21 was the culmination of a delusional US approach to our region. Ironically, the US Secretary of State tried to set preconditions for negotiations and agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran at a time when the international community is doubtful about the possibility or utility of negotiation or agreement with the US on any issue. How can the US government expect to be viewed or treated as a reliable party to another round of serious negotiations following its unilateral and unwarranted withdrawal from an agreement which was the result of hundreds of hours of arduous bilateral and multilateral negotiations, in which the highest ranking US foreign affairs official participated, and which was submitted to the Security Council by the US and adopted unanimously as an international commitment under Article 25 of the Charter?

Recent statements and actions by the US president, including reneging on his agreement with the G7 while in the air flying back from the summit, are other examples of his erratic behavior. His remarks immediately following his meeting with the leader of the DPRK regarding his possible change of mind in 6 months are indicative of what the world is facing—an irrational and dangerous US administration. Does the US Secretary of State really expect Iran to negotiate with a government whose president says: “I may stand before you in six months and say, ‘Hey, I was wrong. I don’t know if I’ll ever admit that, but I’ll find some kind of an excuse”? Can such a government really set preconditions for Iran? Isn’t it actually confusing the plaintiff for the defendant? Mr. Pompeo has forgotten that it is the US government that needs to prove the credibility of its words and legitimacy of its signature, and not the party that has complied with its international obligations and sticks to its word. In fact, the truth is that all US administrations in the past 70 years should be held accountable for their disregard for international law, and their violations of bilateral and multilateral agreements with Iran. A short list of the rightful demands of the Iranian people from the US government could include the following:

1. The US government must respect Iran’s independence and national sovereignty and assure Iran that it will end its intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs in accordance with international law in general, and the 1981 Algiers Accord in particular.

2. The United States must abandon its policy of resorting to the threat or use of force – which constitute a breach of the preemptory norms of international law and principles of the Charter of the United Nations—as an option in the conduct of its foreign affairs with or against the Islamic Republic of Iran and other States.

3. The US government should respect the state immunity of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a fundamental principle of international law, and, while rescinding previous arbitrary and unlawful financial judgments, it should refrain from executing them in the US and extraterritorially.

4. The US government should openly acknowledge its unwarranted and unlawful actions against the people of Iran over the past decades, including inter alia the following, take remedial measures to compensate the people of Iran for the damages incurred, and provide verifiable assurances that it will cease and desist from such illegal measures and refrain from ever repeating them:

a. Its role in the 1953 coup that led to the overthrow of Iran’s lawful and democratically-elected government and the subsequent 25 years of dictatorship in Iran;

b. Unlawful blocking, seizure and confiscation of tens of billions of dollars of assets of the Iranian people after the Islamic revolution, or under various baseless pretexts in recent years;

c. Direct military aggression against Iran in April 1980, which was a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran;

d. Provision of massive military and intelligence assistance to the Iraqi dictator during the 8-year war he imposed on the Iranian people inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars of damages on Iran and its people;  

e. Responsibility in the enormous suffering that Iranians have incurred over the past 3 decades as a result of the use by Saddam of chemical weapons, whose ingredients were provided by the US and some other western countries;

f. The shooting down of an Iran Air passenger plane by the USS Vincennes in July 1988—a flagrant crime that led to the murder of 290 innocent passengers and crew, and the subsequent awarding of a medal to the captain of the ship rather than punishing him for his war crime;

g. Repeated attacks against Iran’s oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1988;

h. Repeated and unwarranted insults against the Iranian people by calling the entire nation “an outlaw and rogue nation” or “a terrorist nation”  and by including Iran in the so-called “axis of evil;”

i. Unlawful and unreasonable establishment of a bigoted list of the nationals of some Islamic countries, including Iranians, prohibiting their entry into the US. The Iranians are among the most successful, educated and law-abiding immigrants in the US and have done great service to American society. They are now prohibited from seeing their loved ones, including even their aging grandparents;

j. Harboring and providing safe haven to anti-Iranian saboteurs in the USA, who openly incite blind violence against Iranian civilians, and supporting criminal gangs and militias and terrorist organizations, some of which were listed for years as terrorist groups by the US and later removed from the list following intense lobbying by those who have received money from them. Some of those lobbyists  now occupy high-ranking positions in the Trump administration;

k. Support provided to Mossad for the multiple terrorist assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists;

l.  Sabotage of Iran’s nuclear peaceful program through cyber-attacks;

m. Fabrication of fake documents to deceive the international community over Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and to create an unnecessary crisis.

5. The United States government must cease its persistent economic aggression against the Iranian people which has continued over the past four decades; nullify the cruel and extensive primary and extraterritorial sanctions, rescind hundreds of legislations and executive orders aimed at disrupting Iran’s normal development which are in flagrant contravention of international law and have been universally condemned, and compensate the Iranian people for the enormous damages to the Iranian economy and its people.

6. The US government should immediately cease its violations and breaches of the JCPOA, which have caused hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect damages for disrupting trade with and foreign investment in Iran, compensate Iranian people for these damages and commit to implement unconditionally and verifiably all of its obligations under the accord, and refrain (in accordance with the JCPOA) from any policy or action to adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.

7. The US government should release all Iranians and non-Iranians who are detained under cruel conditions in the US under fabricated charges related to the alleged violation of sanctions, or apprehended in other countries following unlawful pressure by the US government for extradition, and compensate for the damage inflicted on them. These include pregnant women, the elderly and people suffering from serious health problems; some of whom have even lost their lives in prison.

8. The US government should acknowledge the consequences of its invasions and interventions in the region, including in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region, and withdraw its forces from and stop interfering in the region.

9. The US government should cease policies and behavior that have led to the creation of the vicious DAESH terrorist group and other extremist organizations, and compel its regional allies to verifiably stop providing financial and political support and armaments to extremist groups in West Asia and the world.

10. The US government should stop providing arms and military equipment to the aggressors—who are murdering thousands of innocent Yemeni civilians and destroying the country—and cease its participation in these attacks. It should compel its allies to end their aggression against Yemen and compensate for the enormous damage done to that country.

11. The US government should stop its unlimited and unconditional support for the Zionist regime in line with its obligations under international law; condemn its policy of apartheid and gross violations of human rights, and support the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital.

12. The US government should stop selling hundreds of billions of lethal—not beautiful—military equipment every year to regions in crisis, especially West Asia, and instead of turning these regions into powder kegs it should allow the enormous amount of money spent on arms to serve as funding for development and combating poverty. Only a fraction of the money paid by US arms customers could alleviate hunger and abject poverty, provide for potable, clean water, and combat diseases throughout the globe.

13. The US government should stop opposing the efforts by the international community for the past 5 decades to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It should compel the Zionist regime—with its history of aggression and occupation—to de-nuclearize, thus neutralizing the gravest real threat to regional and international peace and security, which emanates from the most destructive arms in the hands of the most warmongering regime in our time.

14. The US government should stop increasingly relying on nuclear weapons and the doctrines of using nuclear weapons to counter conventional threats—a policy that is in flagrant contravention of its commitment under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the 1995 NPT Review Conference Declaration, and UN Security Council resolution 984. The US should comply with its moral, legal and security obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament, which is a near unanimous demand of all United Nations Member States, and virtually all people across the globe, including even former US Secretaries of State. As the only State that is stamped with the shame of ever using nuclear weapons itself, it is incumbent on the US to relieve humanity from the nightmare of a global nuclear holocaust, and give up on the illusion of security based on “mutually assured destruction” (MAD).

15. The US government should once and for all commit itself to respect the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is the most fundamental principle of international law and a foundation for civilized relations among peoples, and discard in practice the dangerous doctrine which views international law and international organizations as merely “a tool in the US toolbox.”

The aforementioned US policies are examples of what has resulted in Iranians distrusting the American government. They are also among underlying causes of injustice, violence, terrorism, war and insecurity in West Asia. These policies will bring about nothing but a heavy toll in human lives and material assets for different regions of the world, and isolation for the US in world public opinion. The only ones benefiting are and will be lethal arms manufacturers. If the US government summons the courage to renounce these policies in words and deeds, its global isolation will end and a new image of the US will emerge in the world, including in Iran, paving the path to joint efforts for security, stability, and inclusive sustainable development.

I admit that regrettably, it is not realistic to harbor a hope for such a change in US behavior. Thus, at the global level the Islamic Republic of Iran has for years promoted inclusion, multilateralism, dialogue, respect for the rule of law and nuclear disarmament through initiatives such as Dialogue among Civilizations and WAVE (World Against Violence and Extremism), and participated actively in international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and a rule-based international system. We have also presented practical proposals and engaged in serious diplomatic efforts to end regional conflicts in Syria and Yemen through diplomacy from the earliest stages of these unfortunate conflicts, sadly, to the deaf ears of the United States that continues to support aggressors and terrorists in every conflict in our region. And following the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has earnestly engaged with the remaining JCPOA Participants (EU/E3+2) in a good faith effort to salvage this unique global diplomatic achievement. We continue to do so as of this writing.

Nationally, Iran has ensured its security and stability in the past 4 decades on the basis of its inherent domestic capabilities and its reliance on the great Iranian people, not on any foreign power’s benevolence or patronage. Despite foreign pressure and while expending comparatively the least amount in the region on armaments, it has become stronger, more stable and more advanced by the day.

And regionally, in contrast to the US and its foreign policy, Iran—in accordance with its constitution—neither seeks to dominate nor will it ever submit to domination. It believes that the era of regional and global hegemony has long passed, and any effort by any power to achieve it is futile. Instead of yielding to foreign domination or trying to dominate others, countries in our region should seek to create a stronger, more prosperous and more stable region. We in Iran view our security and stability as inseparable from those of our neighbors. We have a common history and culture as well as indivisible opportunities and challenges, and can only enjoy security and stability at home, if and only if our neighbors enjoy internal and international stability and security. We expect other regional countries to adopt a similar approach, and instead of insisting on the failed experiment of “trying to purchase or outsource security,” concentrate on dialogue, mutual understanding, confidence building, and cooperation with neighbors.

The Islamic Republic of Iran views the establishment of a “Regional Dialogue Forum” in the Persian Gulf as the best means to resolve regional crises and create a stronger region. We can begin adopting confidence-building measures to bring regional countries closer to each other on the basis of such principles as the sovereign equality of states, non-resort to the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for territorial integrity of other States, inviolability of international boundaries, non-intervention in domestic affairs of others, and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. By fostering common understanding about threats and opportunities at the regional and global levels, we can move towards achieving a non-aggression pact and creating common mechanisms for regional cooperation. We firmly believe that we, regionally—as the inheritors of the richest civilizations the world has ever known—should stand tall and can solve our own problems amongst ourselves and secure a better future for all of our children without outside interference and patronage, both of which come at a heavy cost to our collective dignity as well as our future development.

Photo Credit: EPA

High Stakes for Iran in Upcoming FATF Meeting

A few days ahead of an international meeting in which Iran’s efforts to improve anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards will be reviewed, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared to pour cold water on the reform process. Yet, it is premature to assume that Iran’s consultations with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are suddenly over after two years of close coordination. FATF, a financial crime watchdog that develops and monitors international AML/CFT standards, faces an important decision on Iran. The stakes are high for Iran, which is seeking to reintegrate into the global economy and there are reasons to believe that FATF’s decision may have repercussions that go far beyond its June 24-29 plenary in Paris.

Consequences of Iran's AML/CFT Deficiencies

If FATF believes that Iran is not adhering to its action plan to upgrade AML/CFT standards, the intergovernmental body could call on its 37 members to reimpose strict financial safeguards. These so-called "countermeasures" would discourage or even lead to the termination of relationships between Iranian and foreign banks, and possibly include Iran losing access to global bank messaging service SWIFT. Alternatively, FATF may decide Iran has made sufficient progress to warrant an extension to the two-year suspension of the countermeasures. Regardless, there are no indications that Iran will be removed from FATF’s black list of high-risk jurisdictions and financial institutions will continue to be urged to conduct enhanced due diligence (EDD) on Iranian-related business relationships and transactions.

This type of guidance places a significant risk management burden on global banks. Through customer due diligence, banks collect information to identify and verify customers in order to comply with regulations and report suspicious activity. EDD comprises several extra steps, such as probing sources of funds, scrutinizing financial statements, and conducting thorough investigations of relevant businesses or individuals. Because of the high level of scrutiny required for the Iranian market, most foreign banks did not return even after the international nuclear deal was implemented in 2016.

Foreign financial institutions, especially those with a US presence, are unlikely to change this calculation without an improvement to transparency and governance in the local banking sector. In particular, foreign banks are worried about unwittingly facilitating transactions with sanctioned entities. Due to ongoing fears of reputational and legal liabilities, Iran’s access to the international financial system is diminished by de-risking practices of global banks for the foreseeable future. 

How Iran Stands to Benefit from Reform

Although the chance to be removed from FATF’s black list is a clear reason for Iran to complete the organization’s action plan, the long-term economic impact of reforms provides another vital incentive. Mismanagement, corruption, and fragmentation in the banking sector dampens economic potential. Iran’s bad debt, estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars, fuels fears of an imminent banking crisis. Strengthening Iran’s banking sector to align with international standards, a priority highlighted by the IMF, would lay the foundation for a more stable economy and promote reintegration with the international financial system.

FATF-related reforms will not be a panacea for Iran’s economy. This year the currency lost over 20 percent of its value against the US dollar (and much more on the black market) between January and June, foreign companies are considering plans to wind down billion-dollar investments, and a drop in oil revenue looms because of the impending renewal of US secondary sanctions. Nevertheless, if reforms convince some foreign banks to stay even after US sanctions are re-imposed, it could offer a lifeline to an economy under tremendous pressure. Moreover, new rules that improve Iranian banks’ transparency are vital to address a major grievance from protests late last year: the need to root out financial sector corruption that enriches elites and undercuts economic opportunities for the working class. 

Iran’s Progress To Date

Despite Iran’s recent decision to delay vital CFT legislation, the government is taking several steps to satisfy the terms of its action plan. The Rouhani administration regularly engages with FATF experts even though there is fierce internal opposition from many of the same political, religious, and military actors who opposed the nuclear deal. In February, FATF credited Iran for establishing a cash declaration regime. In June, a draft bill to amend the AML law was approved by parliament’s judiciary commission and legislators ratified Iran’s accession to an international convention on combating transnational crime. Similarly, Iranian officials are working to implement several technical AML rules that FATF cited in a statement following the organization’s February plenary. Although full implementation will not be realized within two years of beginning the reform process, Iran continues to work toward compliance with international standards across several areas.

The widest gulf between Iran’s commitments and FATF’s expectations remains on criminalizing terrorist financing. To fully comply with FATF standards, text would need to be changed in Iran’s legislation for amending the counter-terrorist financing law and acceding to a related international convention. Both bills contain CFT exemptions for certain types of militant groups, but there is no precedent for FATF accepting legislation with such conditions. Resolving these issues will not be easy, but the political will to be removed from FATF’s black list (if not eventually acceding to FATF) should prompt ongoing discussions.

It is in this context that Khamenei’s June 20 statements, intimating that parliament should abandon the FATF process, are important. Just like in the run up to the international nuclear deal, Khamenei’s maximalist comments are open to interpretation because they may be intended for several distinctive audiences. Domestically, Khamenei is trying to assuage fears from his traditional allies who believe the FATF process is a foreign ploy to weaken the IRGC and hamper Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah. However, this sentiment must be balanced against palpable angst among Iranians that believe the troubled banking sector threatens their livelihoods. This could be why Khamenei mentioned that “some of the provisions of the international treaties may be good” before suggesting that Iran legislate on money laundering and terrorist financing issues independently.

From an international perspective, Khamenei is seeking to increase pressure on European countries to receive the most favorable economic terms possible after the US pulled out of the nuclear deal. Initially, Iran cited ongoing negotiations to salvage the nuclear deal as the primary reason for delaying by two months FATF-related legislation. Only three weeks ago, Khamenei indicated strong support for Iran’s newly established High Council for Economic Coordination. This council, which is composed of leaders from the country’s executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, is coordinating a unified response to US sanctions. That is why it should not be overlooked that their first decision was to speed up the process for implementing the FATF action plan. Khamenei may be fed up with the FATF process, but he also may be negotiating. 

FATF and Trans-Atlantic Tensions

Leading up to FATF’s plenary session in February, there were indications that the US strongly supported reprimanding Pakistan for its failure to combat terrorist financing. Yet, the decision was delayed until at least the June meeting after three FATF members (China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) allegedly intervened on Pakistan’s behalf. The decision exposed a potential break from strong US influence within FATF. It was also a radical departure from the intergovernmental body’s typical decision-making process that relies on consensus rulings.

Coupled with rising trans-Atlantic tensions on foreign policy and trade issues, this calls into question whether the US will be able to build consensus should it seek to reimpose countermeasures against Iran. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine European governments supporting FATF action that further constrains their efforts to salvage the nuclear deal. Beyond European countries, there are several FATF members (China, India, Russia, Turkey) that will be even less inclined to support countermeasures that hurt the foreign investment strategies of their banks, state-run entities, and private companies.

It is possible that neither the US nor Iran will be satisfied with the FATF meeting’s outcome. Still, Iran’s FATF process offers clear benefits to both. For Iran, staying engaged provides much-needed support for a weakened banking sector and a path to reintegration with the global economy. For the US, it provides a global forum to keep pressure on Iran to do more to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

From an international AML/CFT perspective, it also makes sense to keep Iran engaged in the FATF process. Certain Iranian actors, including some banks, grew quite adept at facilitating transactions to evade sanctions over the past several decades. With the return of stringent US sanctions, these vested local interests stand to benefit once again. Re-imposing countermeasures now will reduce vital coordination to protect the global financial system from new money laundering threats. There may come a time when FATF countermeasures are viewed as the only viable option to combat AML/CFT threats emanating from Iran. However, more time is needed to support Iranian efforts to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms. For now, this is the best way to fulfill FATF’s mission to counter threats to the integrity of the international financial system.

Photo Credit: Financial Services Commission

Over-Compliance on Iran Sanctions Can Lead to Discrimination

Ireland’s Workplace Relations Commission has fined an unnamed bank EUR 20,000 for discrimination against an Iranian couple. As reported by the Irish Times:

WRC Adjudication Officer Marian Duffy found that the bank did discriminate against the two on the grounds of race. Ms. Duffy said that ‘alternative methods to counter money laundering/terrorist financing and US sanction breaches were open to the respondent… These include the implementation of robust IT systems and procedures, customer advice/guidance and information systems and/or a helpline as part of the process to monitor account activities.’

The comission found that the bank’s policy was neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve its stated aims and therefore was not objectively justified. The bank fundamentally was racially discriminatory in their actions. The bank had stated previously that it has no appetite for dealing with Iranian affiliated customers over risks of sanctions and as a result of maintaining a small presence in the US.

In another example of discrimination, S&P Global Platts had banned Iranian nationals from attending a conference it was holding in London over sanctions fears. The company reserved this ban rapidly following a report in the Financial Times which sparked outrage.

In both the case of the Irish bank and the S&P conference, we see an an overreaction to Iran sanctions, which will only be exacerbated by the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

OFAC and the New Culture of Compliance

Compliance officers have a job to do. That job is not easy. Since the global financial crisis in 2008 a whole heap of new regulations have been introduced surrounding financial services on all fronts. Some industries, such as shipping, are plagued by fraud and corruption relating to banking and letters of credit. This leaves compliance officers with the fear of being held personally liable (as officers responsible for anti-money laundering often are) for even the slightest of mistakes. These mistakes can, of course, have serious personal ramifications.

The “take no chances” attitude now common among compliance officers looking to protect a banks from potential breaches and the resulting penalties, is only intensified when you add the factor of Iran.

On one hand banks see Iran as a nation with a large, successful patriotic diaspora who, regardless of what views they hold, have a deep connection to their country both sentimentally, physically, and often financially. Iran is a country with a huge consumer market and significant economic potential. But there is a catch—Iran is on the wrong side of the most powerful financial enforcement authority in the world; Office of Foreign Assets Control, known as OFAC.

For those who maintain connections to Iran—practitioners, businessmen, professionals and Iranians abroad alike—discrimination is unfortunately not uncommon. Bank accounts connected to Iranians or used for Iran related business have been regularly closed over the last ten years, including the accounts of students who rely fully on money sent by family in Iran.

The reason for these closures can be traced to OFAC, part of the US Department of Treasury. OFAC has issued fines ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars against varying institutions—from RBS to Standard & Chartered, and even the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE. In fact, OFAC has generated so much income from sanctions penalties, that the UK decided to set up its own version, OFSI (Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation) in 2016.

From just a brief look at the scale of fines involved—USD 1.2 billion levied on ZTE alone—it is not hard to see why a compliance officer would not want to follow the law to the letter. But therein lies the paradox: which law?

Conflict of Laws and Regulation

We live in an ever-growing and increasingly interconnected financial market. United States is, and shall remain for this generation at least, the crown jewel at the heart of the global financial market. International companies make more money being present in the US market than in any other market, and this requires being on the “right side” of US laws. For this reason, many companies instinctively abide by US laws even in jurisdictions where these laws would seem not apply.

Since the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, the European Union has permitted its companies to invest in Iran by lifting most of the sanctions. But the United States had only removed secondary sanctions as part of the nuclear deal, not the primary sanctions which restrict “US persons” from trading with Iran. Following President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the announcement that secondary sanctions would be returning, many consider the deal to be doomed. But the remaining signatories remain in compliance with the agreement for now. 

This has left compliance officers at many multinational companies somewhat confused. What laws ought they abide by, those of the EU or the US? On international trade, the answer is simple. If you have connections to the US or a desire the conduct business in the US market, it is best you comply with US regulations.

However, it is also important not to breach local laws in other jurisdictions in which you operate. There can be a contradistinction between abiding by sanctions and breaking the law. For example, a compliance officer may advise against doing business with Iran, but he/she cannot take a broad brush approach and punish Iranian customers by virtue of their race. While the “take no chances” approach to sanctions may make it attractive to comply with US regulations absolutely, without considering local laws, companies are playing with fire and leaving their organizations at risk of unlawful activity that could have serious consequences.

On matters relating to human affairs, it simply does not matter at all if a company has a US presence, discrimination can and should have very severe consequences. OFAC guidance is vague on a whole range of matters, including instances where there is a conflict between EU and US law. But case precedent is building in Europe against acts of over-compliance. Regulators and judges may not be as harsh now, as there may be some understanding of the confusion stemming from a fluid situation. But the courts will be far harsher later, once their position has been established.

It is therefore imperative, before any overreaction has been made by the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, that local legal advice is taken. Remember, we are not back in the former sanctions era of 2006-2015. The EU is not participating in sanctions against Iran.

Finally, those on the receiving end of such discrimination should take immediate legal advice. The more cases which are pursued, the greater the chance that justice will prevail in the end. As relayed in the word’s of Arcesilaus, “Where you find the laws most numerous, there you will find also the greatest injustice.”

Photo Credit: Surrey Court

New US Sanctions Target Operator of Iran's Presidential Aircraft

The US Treasury on Thursday announced a new round of targeted sanctions designations, including sanctions on Dena Airways, the company which operates the Iran’s presidential aircraft used by Hassan Rouhani for official travel.

The new sanctions follow the designation of Iran’s central bank governor, Valliollah Seif, and reflect a further direct targeting of the Rouhani administration.

Dena Airways is the company which operates EP-DAA, an Airbus A340. Until November 2017, the aircraft was registered to Meraj Airways, an entity which was previously sanctioned as part of the Specially Designated Nationals list, known as the SDN list.

The new sanctions on Dena could prevent the use of the use of the company’s sole registered aircraft for official travel, as ground handling companies worldwide may refuse to refuel or service the aircraft. In February, a Meraj-registered aircraft used by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to attend the Munich Security Conference needed to be refueled by the German military, after companies refused to provide services to the aircraft, citing US sanctions. That aircraft, EP-AGB, was notably left off the list of designations, despite another government liveried aircraft, EP-AJC being added to the SDN list. 

The new designations also extend to thirty-one separate aircraft operated by airlines included Mahan, Caspian, and Pouya. These three entities were previously listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s SDN list, and had been targeted due to reported ownership links to the IRGC and to the reported use of aircraft for military airlifts to Syria.

Mahan is Iran’s largest airline by fleet size and number of destinations. The specific targeting of Mahan’s aircraft will inhibit their continued use on commercial flights. For example, EP-MMB, an Airbus A340, flies regular routes to Istanbul, Ankara, Moscow, and Dubai.

Photo Credit: Planespotters

Increased Competition Squeezes Air France in Iran

Air France recently announced the reduction of its flights from Paris to Tehran after first switching the service on the route to its subsidiary airline JOON. At a time of uncertainty surrounding the future of the Iran nuclear deal, the reduction of flights led to speculation that the move may have been influenced by the return of sanctions. But a look to the current competitive environment shows other significant changes to the market to which Air France was forced to react. 

Starting in October 2018, Air France flights will only operate on the Paris-Tehran route during the summer season. A statement from the airline said: "After two years of operations and faced with a weak economic and commercial performance, Air France took the decision to adjust this route's flight schedule to be in line with demand."

The Iranian travel market has changed considerably from when Air France resumed its flights in April 2016, first operating flights three times a week with Airbus A340 aircraft and a seating capacity for 255 passengers. At the time, Air France was the only airline flying between Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport and Tehran and the only competition facing the French national carrier was Iran Air’s weekly flight out of Paris Orly Airport.

A few months later, Mahan Air began flights to Paris three times a week with its own A340 aircraft. Just recently, Iran Air moved its flights from Paris Orly to Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, while also upgrading its aircraft to a brand new A330. In January, Mahan Air announced that it will increase its frequencies to Paris from three weekly flights to four for the summer 2018 season.

Looking to the new competition, travelers journeying between Paris and Tehran have more options than ever before. With Iran Air and Mahan Air flying to Paris with higher frequencies and lower prices, Air France has definitely felt the competitive pressure.

According to figures from the French government, 107,317 passengers travelled between Paris and Tehran on the relaunched service in 2016, a 178 percent increase from the previous year. The following year, the number of passengers further increased to 145,896, up 36 percent. Much of this growth can be attributed to Air France's connecting passengers, traveling from Paris to other destinations. 

The impending return of sanctions is likely to reduce demand from tourists and business travelers on Paris-Tehran route, making the impact of Iran Air's capacity increases and the new Mahan flights more acutely felt. The recent increase in departure taxes and currency restrictions may affect outbound travel from Iran to foreign destinations including France.

Moreover, the expansion of Iranian airlines is also in doubt as European growth is dependent on the arrival of its new aircraft. Iran Air's deals with Airbus and Boeing are now in jeopardy after President Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal, canceling licenses for aircraft sales. 

Nevertheless, Air France also faces more competition with European airlines than it did in 2016. British Airways and KLM resumed flights to Tehran in late 2016, while Austrian Airlines increased its presence in Iran with additional flights to Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, focusing more on Iran’s tourism industry. Aegean Airlines and Ukrainian International Airlines are attracting more connecting passengers and have also increased their presence in Iran.

With more than two years for foreign airlines to observe the Iranian market since 2015, flight adjustments and schedule changes are quite normal to react to over estimations in demand. British Airways and Alitalia have adjusted their schedules with slight decreases in frequencies or capacities to better meet the demand as Iran Air has grown its presence in both London and Rome. 

Air France has been flying to Iran since 1946 with few suspensions. Despite the recent adjustments, 2018 will certainly not be the last year of a full service between Paris and Tehran. 

Photo Credit: Wikicommons