When it Comes to Middle East Diplomacy, Chinese and European Interests Align

A version of this article was originally published in French in Le Monde.

In March, China managed to a broker a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, achieving a diplomatic breakthrough that had eluded European governments. But Europe and China have shared interests in the region and there is scope for the two powers to work together to foster further multilateral diplomacy.

Europe and China, which both depend on energy exports from the Persian Gulf, have long relied on the US-led security architecture in the region. But the 2019 attacks on oil tankers in the UAE and oil installations in Saudi Arabia, widely attributed to Iran, were a watershed moment. Shifting US interests and President Trump’s erratic reaction to those attacks forced the Chinese and Europeans to take more responsibility for regional security over the last four years.

In 2020, China presented its idea for regional security in the Persian Gulf, arguing that with a multilateral effort, the Persian Gulf region can become “an oasis of security.” In the time since, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, signed in March, can be considered an outcome of such efforts.

European governments have also sought to back multilateral diplomacy. France was intent on creating a platform for Tehran and Riyadh to engage in dialogue. President Macron helped launch the Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership that was held in August 2021. The conference was a unique opportunity to gather countries that had not sat around the same table for years. Officials from Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, in addition to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and France participated. Oman and Bahrain joined the second gathering which took place last December in Amman, Jordan.

The European Union also expressed its support for the Baghdad process. Joseph Borrell said during the Second meeting that “promoting peace and stability in the wider Gulf region…  are key priorities for the EU.” Adding that “we stand ready to engage with all actors in the region in a gradual and inclusive approach.”

The Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a strategic partnership with the Gulf reflects the EU’s keenness on expanding its engagements with the region, particularly on economic ties. The partnership is focused on the GCC, but it mentions that “involvement of other key Gulf countries in the partnership may also be considered as relations develop and mature”—a reference to Iran and Iraq.

Clearly, China and the European Union have multiple areas of mutual concern in the Persian Gulf region. Ensuring freedom of navigation, the undisrupted flow of oil and gas from the region, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are shared priorities. But while China is now a central player in the strategic calculations of all states in the region, the Europeans are being largely left out.

European diplomatic outreach has faltered in the face of new political pressures arising from Iran’s continued nuclear escalations, its involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and its repression of ongoing protests for democratic change.   

The French president was coincidently in China when the Beijing Agreement was signed, and he welcomed the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Given shared interests, European officials must now find ways to engage with Chinese counterparts on fostering greater regional diplomacy in the Persian Gulf. 

There are reports that a regional summit will take place in Beijing later this year, involving all GCC states, Iran and Iraq. This is an important opportunity for multilateral dialogue and cooperation. European governments should consult with regional players and China to secure a seat at the meeting. The EU can help regional countries find ways to jointly tackle basic issues that have impeded economic growth which have resulted in spillover effects such as increased food insecurity and inability to mitigate the rising challenges of climate change.

In parallel, the Baghdad Conference could emerge as an EU-backed platform for economic cooperation in tandem to the now ongoing political and security dialogue process in China. The EU can draw in regional countries to help with reconstruction efforts in Iraq, a country that is in dire need of foreign investment. Given the shuttle diplomacy conducted by Iraqi officials between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and considering the role of France and the EU in the Baghdad conference, it would be apt to explore EU-supported joint economic projects in Iraq, especially those projects that create mutual economic interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Whether in Baghdad, Amman, or Beijing, inclusive regional gatherings are needed to address common economic challenges facing all eight countries surrounding the Persian Gulf. Europe can make significant contributions towards regional dialogue on economic integration by helping to create multilateral platforms, transfer knowhow and technology, and provide financial support. These are areas where China has significantly increased its activities, but European countries enjoy far greater experience in establishing the institutions and infrastructure needed for regional economic development. European officials can leverage this experience to support regional diplomacy. Such efforts would also cement European regional influence at a time when US influence may be waning.

The newly appointed EU Special Representative for Gulf Affairs, Luigi Di Maio, should directly oversee and coordinate initiatives in support of economic diplomacy and integration in the region, finding common ground with China to head off competition. Achieving security through stronger diplomacy and deeper economic ties represents a transformative goal that the region can rally around.

Photo: IRNA

Regional Economic Integration Comes into Focus at Second Baghdad Conference

The second meeting of the Baghdad Conference on Cooperation and Partnership took place in Amman, Jordan on December 20. Last year’s meeting in Baghdad initiated a process for multilateralism, dialogue, and cooperation between Iraq and its neighbours, some of whom met for the first time in years. This year’s gathering in Amman cemented the initiative as an annual regional summit and, importantly, added economic integration to the regional agenda.

In August 2021, former Iraqi prime minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, with the support of French president Emmanuel Macron, managed to bring together officials from Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as representatives from the European Union, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Countries, and the United Nations. This year, in addition to all those who participated in the first conference, the two missing GCC states—Oman and Bahrain—were present as well.

Al-Kadhimi largely succeeded by focusing on foreign policy, particularly as he sought to ease regional tensions. He was instrumental in revitalising relations with Iraq’s neighbours, which had been strained for years. He was also key in kickstarting dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as setting the stage for Iran-Egypt and Iran-Jordan talks. His hosting of the first Baghdad Conference positioned him—and by extension Iraq—as a trusted regional intermediary.

That is why Iraq’s recent transition to a new government was initially met with concern around the region. Mohamed Shia Al-Sudani’s seemingly pro-Iran stance was expected to once again strain Iraq’s ties with its Arab neighbours. There were reports that Saudi Arabia paused negotiations with Iran because of this change of government in Baghdad. But Al-Sudani’s efforts to retain the mantle passed by Al-Kadhimi put regional leaders at ease. He has committed to continuing his predecessor’s efforts to secure regional and international support for the development of Iraq—Baghdad remains in the title of the conference for this reason.

At the conference, Al-Sudani said, “The priority now lies in strengthening the bonds of cooperation and partnership between our countries through interdependence in infrastructure, economic integration and joint investments.” To that end, he argued that regional states should “strive to work together to transform from consuming to manufacturing countries by establishing joint industrial zones that enhance our collective industrial capacity and link the supply chains to one integrated chain capable of competing in global markets and launching mega projects in various sectors.”

By focusing on economic opportunities, Al-Sudani connected the Baghdad Conference to a wider agenda. He was also making an appeal for support from partners beyond the region, such as the European Union. EU High Representative Josep Borrell was present at the gathering in Amman.

In the Joint Communication on a “Strategic Partnership with the Gulf,” which was published in May 2022, the European Union praised the first Baghdad Conference and committed to supporting the region-led process. While France was the only European country supporting the Iraqi initiative initially, the European Union called for a follow-up process to the Baghdad Conference “with EU involvement” and as part of “a structured, EU-facilitated dialogue process”.

In the face of rising competition with other external players, such as China, Russia, and even India and Japan, European countries and the EU are falling behind. But Europeans can make significant contributions towards regional dialogue on economic integration by helping to create multilateral platforms, transfer know-how and technology, and provide financial support. European expertise can help the region find ways to jointly tackle the basic issues that have impeded economic growth and have resulted in spillover effects, such as increased food insecurity and inability to mitigate the rising challenges of climate change.

Establishing a new development fund by using existing instruments and institutions is key. This would mean including sovereign wealth funds, co-investment programmes, economic zones, or multi-party investment initiatives through regional banks or multinational institutions. The Islamic Development Bank, the various state-owned sovereign wealth funds within the GCC, as well as the European Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have all supported projects that have a multilateral or regional outlook. This could happen through matching funds allocated to the initiative by involved parties.

Through its Global Gateway project, the EU and regional partners could also “explore joint initiatives in third countries through triangular cooperation, financial support, capacity building and technical assistance.” The EU can draw in the regional players to help with reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The Global Europe Instrument foresees projects and investments in Iraq as well. The Instrument aims to fund international cooperation through grants, technical assistance, financial instruments, and budgetary guarantees.

Cooperation in developing a particular port or completing segments of Iraq’s national railway should be the priority. Exploring joint investments in Iraq’s oil and gas industry as well as green energy transition should also be considered.

Dust and sandstorms, as well as drought and water scarcity, are causing huge financial and human costs for Iraq, but also for all neighbouring countries, as well. Key projects that combat shared environmental challenges, which have proven to be the easiest avenue for cooperation, should be explored.

Even though various regional tensions remain, the outlook for regional cooperation and multilateralism seems bright and the Baghdad Conference is helping define a framework for broader regional cooperation, with integration as its aim. As Dutch diplomat Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, reflected during the meeting, the “demonstration of regional partnership” can now “result in a number of concrete steps.” Hennis-Plasschaert added that these steps “might even lead to a framework for regional integration as an effective means of achieving prosperity, peace and security.”

Photo: King Abdullah Press Office

How the UAE will Underwrite the Iran Deal's Success

As negotiations on the restoration of the Iran nuclear deal reach their “final stage,” doubts persist about whether the lifting of US secondary sanctions will really boost Iran’s economy. Iranian leaders are seeking “guarantees” that they will accrue the economic benefits promised under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), citing both the disappointing experience of sanctions relief between 2016-2018 and the pall that has been cast by President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement.

Doubts around the JCPOA’s economic prospects revolve around whether European companies will bother to engage the Iranian market given the challenging experience of the last few years. But there is another trade relationship that arguably matters more for the future of the JCPOA.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not play a significant role in Iran’s economic recovery during the period of sanctions relief between 2016-2018. This is notable because in the period leading up to the imposition of financial sanctions on Iran in 2012, the UAE was catching up to the European Union as one of Iran’s top trade partners. In the ten years from 2001 to 2011, UAE trade with Iran rose at twice the pace of European trade, rising from $2.2 billion to $24.2 billion. In the same period, EU trade with Iran rose from $12.8 billion to $36.8 billion.

According to data published by IRICA, Iran’s customs authority, UAE trade with Iran peaked in 2011 at $24 billion. That same year, data from Eurostat shows that EU trade with Iran also reached an all-time high at $36 billion. To put it another way, the volume of Iranian trade passing through the UAE was equivalent to two-thirds of Iran’s direct trade with the whole of Europe. During the first decade of the millennium, Iran underwent significant industrial development enabled by the forces of globalisation. Iran lacked a global port and global banks. But its proximity to the UAE offered a conduit to global markets. Dubai was to Iran what Hong Kong was to China in the 1990s—the world’s gateway to a fast-growing economy.

After the imposition of financial sanctions in 2012, both EU and UAE trade with Iran took a hit as the Iranian economy was thrust into a recession. EU trade with Iran averaged just $10.6 billion per year between 2012 and 2015. UAE trade fell less dramatically, given that a large portion of Iranian exports to the UAE, destined for third countries, is comprised of food and consumer goods that fall outside of the scope of sectoral sanctions. The value of UAE trade with Iran averaged $15.3 billion in this period.

In January 2016, the implementation of the JCPOA saw the lifting of a wide range of UN, US, and EU sanctions on Iran. EU trade with Iran rebounded sharply as Iranian exports to Europe rose, driven by oil sales. Iran used its euro-denominated revenues to purchase European goods, especially industrial goods. EU trade with Iran rose to $23 billion in 2017, still down compared to the 2011 peak, but a marked improvement over the period prior to the implementation of the JCPOA. By contrast, trade with the UAE did not rebound. Total trade between the UAE and Iran averaged $14.4 billion from 2016 to 2018—slightly lower than the trade volumes in the period before sanctions relief.

This is the overlooked aspect of why Iran’s experience of JCPOA sanctions relief was underwhelming. While trade with Europe failed to return to its pre-sanctions peak, the greater constraint on Iran’s economic recovery was that trade facilitated through the UAE did not really rebound at all. Consequently, Iran’s ability to engage with all of its trading partners remained diminished. Iranian and foreign companies seeking to do business in the aftermath of sanctions relief could not avail themselves of the most obvious and efficient financial and logistical channels to do so. 

For the last decade, UAE relations with Iran have been strained. The UAE was quick to support the multilateral sanctions on Iran, with Abu Dhabi reigning in Dubai-based banks and companies that had long profited from their links to Iran. Under instruction from the UAE central bank, commercial banks closed the accounts of Iranian companies and Iranian nationals. Multinational companies that had used their UAE-based subsidiaries to conduct business with Iran shifted their operations (Turkish banks emerged as an alternative financial channel for trade with Iran, especially for the European trade that persisted in the sanctions period). The UAE gave tepid support to the Obama administration’s efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear programme but felt excluded from discussions around the possible impact of the deal, which seemed poised to tip the regional balance of power in Iran’s favour. On January 2, 2016, a crowd attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Two days later, and just ten days before the JCPOA was formally implemented, the UAE downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran. Over the next year, Mohammed bin Zayed, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, joined with Mohammed bin Salman, crown prince of Saudi Arabia, to push back on Iranian influence in the region. By the end of 2018, following a unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Trump administration had reimposed secondary sanctions on Iran in full, with the full support of UAE leaders.

In May 2019, the same month that Trump revoked a set of waivers permitting Iran to sell limited volumes of oil to its historic customers, four tankers were damaged in an attack off the coast of Fujairah. The attack, attributed to Iran, was the first incident in a series of escalations that constituted Iran’s response to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure sanctions. Just a few months later, the UAE dispatched a delegation to Iran to discuss maritime security. Leaders in Iran and the UAE eventually came to realise that renewed dialogue could help avoid a spiralling regional security crisis. In December of last year, Tahnoon bin Zayed, brother to Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and the UAE’s national security advisor, visited Tehran. The maturation of this diplomacy has been supported by economic engagement. Over the course of the last two years, the UAE has taken steps to reprise its role as a facilitator of Iran’s trade links, emerging as a key intermediary in Iran’s oil exports to China, despite these exports taking place in violation of US secondary sanctions.

Back in 2019, as the first signs of renewed economic diplomacy emerged, I argued that “Abu Dhabi can’t afford to keep Iran out of Dubai.” The argument still holds true. Dubai and the wider UAE have performed an economic miracle, emerging from the desert as a global center of trade and finance. But as a new analysis from the IMF makes clear, further growth and greater resilience will require regional economic integration. While the IMF report limits its discussion to GCC countries, a restoration of UAE-Iran trade to pre-sanctions levels would be an enormous catalyst for growth. UAE leaders are aware of this fact. In a statement jointly issued with the United States, GCC leaders declared that “deeper economic ties after the lifting of US sanctions under the JCPOA are in the mutual interest of the region.”

When it comes to the prospects for renewed sanctions relief, the increasingly constructive relations between the UAE and Iran must be taken into account. If the UAE plays an active role in facilitating increased trade with Iran following the restoration of the JCPOA, the rise in trade could compensate for any diminished rebound in trade between Europe and Iran. More optimistically, if UAE banks are instructed to resume support for Iran-related transactions, the increase in available foreign exchange liquidity and the multiplication of the available payment channels could have a dramatic impact on the full range of Iran’s bilateral trade relations. Where European and Asian banks may remain hesitant to facilitate trade, UAE banks can step in as intermediaries, taking on the burden of the compliance requirements. They will have enough business to justify the costs of working with Iran.

While the normalisation of UAE-Iran ties remains tentative, UAE leaders aware of the role they can play as underwriters of the restored nuclear deal. The Biden administration, eager to consolidate the restored JCPOA, will likely encourage the UAE to reprise its role as Iran’s primary gateway to the global economy, with the U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of State engaging directly with UAE regulators and companies to help them navigate the new compliance landscape. The potential is enormous. UAE-Iran trade grew at an annualised rate of 28 percent between 2001 and 2011. Had this growth been sustained for just five more years, total trade would have exceeded $80 billion. What matters most for the long-term viability of the nuclear deal is not whether trade with Europe will return to pre-sanctions levels, but whether revitalised trade with the UAE can accelerate Iran’s reintegration into the global economy.

Photo: WAM

GCC States Bet on Nuclear Deal as They Seek Better Relations with Iran

Iranian foreign policy has been in high-gear over the last week. As Iranian negotiators made their way back to Iran’s capital from the seventh round of nuclear talks in Vienna, the UAE’s top national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan arrived in Tehran. Al Nahyan’s visit is the latest example of the significant shift underway in the foreign policies of Iran’s Arab neighbours, including in their views of the Iran nuclear deal.

In a recent joint statement, the US and GCC declared that the restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) would “pave the way for inclusive diplomatic efforts to address all issues that are necessary to ensure sustainable safety, security, and prosperity in the region.” The GCC was far from unified in its support for the nuclear deal when negotiations were first underway between 2013-2015. Oman was instrumental in facilitating backchannel talks between Iran and the United States. Qatar and Kuwait were vocal supporters of the diplomatic process once it became public. But Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, maintained a cautious position on the nuclear deal and criticised the negotiations for failing to address Iran’s missile program and regional activities. Behind these criticisms was a more fundamental fear that a rapprochement between Iran and the United States would alter Washington’s relationships with its traditional partners as they had not been extensively consulted in the lead-up to the negotiations. The JCPOA appeared poised to tip the regional balance of power in Iran’s favour.

Nevertheless, all six GCC states officially welcomed and endorsed the JCPOA following the Camp David Summit hosted by President Obama in May 2015. The joint statement issued by the US and GCC after the summit highlighted security cooperation and security assurances with a particular focus on “countering Iran’s destabilising activities.” Still, the GCC member states “affirmed their strong support for the efforts of the P5+1 to reach a deal with Iran,” noting that “such a deal would represent a significant contribution to regional security.” In addition, they “reaffirmed their willingness to develop normalised relations with Iran should it cease its destabilising activities.”

President Obama aspired for dialogue between the GCC states and Iran, and stated that the “purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalise Iran.” He also suggested that Saudi Arabia should “share” the region with Iran. This encouragement, however, led nowhere.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, attempted to hamper the implementation of the JCPOA. Just days before the official implementation day of the agreement on January 16, 2016, Saudi Arabia executed a prominent Shi’a cleric which resulted in protests in front of the Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad. In response to the ransacking of the embassy by protestors, Saudi Arabia cut off all diplomatic and commercial ties with Tehran and pushed other countries in the region to follow suit. The tensions continued to rise and any hopes for regional dialogue faded with the end of the Obama presidency. Divisions amongst the GCC states toward Iran and the JCPOA deepened when President Trump took office.

While Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait attempted to facilitate or mediate talks between Tehran and Washington in an attempt to stave a deeper regional crisis, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain supported the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, launched following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Over the next few years, rising tensions between Iran and the US increased the risk of conflict in the region.

Key flash points included a series of attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf, including off the coast of Fujairah in May 2019. Later, in September of that year, there was an attack on Saudi Arabia’s most important oil processing facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. These attacks were attributed to Iran and its proxies. But there was no clear US response to these attacks and the UAE and Saudi Arabia realised that they can no longer solely rely on an American security guarantee. Trump’s escalatory Iran policy had become a liability.

The election of Joe Biden created a new political reality for the Middle East. During his campaign, Biden made clear that his administration would seek a return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA. He also called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” state, indicating that Saudi influence would be diminished in Washington. Biden also committed to reducing the US footprint in the Middle East.

Responding to these shifts, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pursued a de-escalatory approach in their foreign policy. They ended the more than three-year long blockade on Qatar at the Al Ula Summit, participated in the Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership, and increased their back-channel talks with Tehran. These bilateral and multilateral diplomatic developments were unimaginable just a few years ago.

The UAE has been most adamant about repairing diplomatic ties with Iran. Al Nahyan’s visit follows a steady tempo of exchanges over the last two years. In November, Iran’s new deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, travelled to Abu Dhabi to meet his Emirati counterparts—they agreed to open a new chapter in bilateral relations. A few days later, the Iranian and Emirati foreign ministers had a phone conversation where expansion of bilateral ties was stressed.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have held several rounds of talks in Baghdad that included key officials from both countries. Progress has been limited, but if continued, these talks could yield some much-needed results. A small goal would be the resumption of formal diplomatic ties. A bigger goal would be an end to the war in Yemen.

But the diplomacy now underway can have more than just political dividends. During meetings held in Riyadh in mid-November, the political directors of the E3 and the US Special Envoy for Iran welcomed their “regional partners’ efforts to deescalate tensions and promote dialogue in the region” and “underlined that enhanced regional dialogue and a return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA would… allow for more regional partnerships and economic exchange.” The potential for economic exchange was reiterated in a subsequent statement, in which the GCC officials discussed their efforts “to build effective diplomatic channels with Iran,” and affirmed that “deeper economic ties after the lifting of US sanctions under the JCPOA are in the mutual interest of the region.” Last month, Rob Malley, Biden’s Iran envoy, also talked about the notable interest in economic engagement with Iran that had come through in his discussions with GCC officials. Moreover, given that the attacks stemming from Iran’s response to “maximum pressure” focused on economic infrastructure, the linkages between security and economics dividends are clear.

The GCC states’ acknowledgement they can benefit from JCPOA-related sanctions relief suggests that regional diplomacy has reinforced trust in the nuclear talks. The nuclear deal has an important role to play in the emerging framework for regional diplomacy. That bodes well for the deal’s future if it is successfully restored.

Photo: IRNA

Attendance in Baghdad Shows Iran's Commitment to Regional Diplomacy

The Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership, which took place on Saturday, was intended to boost Iraq’s regional profile, gather political and economic support for the country and, most importantly, provide a unique venue for diplomatic engagement between Iraq and its neighbours—Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt.

The decade since the Arab Spring has been marked by rising tensions in the Middle East. The Baghdad Conference offered a hopeful message that regional actors could move beyond tensions and violence. While it was the first time in recent years that officials from Iran and its Arab neighbours had met in such a multilateral format, the conference was not solely intended to foster reconciliation between Tehran and Arab capitals. Numerous intra-Arab conflicts had threatened regional security and the conference presented an opportunity to begin the mending of those fractured relations.

Such a gathering would have been impossible to imagine even just a few months ago. With the help and support of French president Emmanuel Macron, approval from the Biden administration, and the buy-in of all participating states, Iraq successfully managed to play the role of regional mediator.

Since beginning his term in May 2020, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has made it a priority to facilitate greater regional diplomacy. But the conditions were not right until Donald Trump’s departure from the White House, the end of the GCC rift following the Al Ula Summit, and the commencement of back-channel talks between Iranian security officials and both Saudi and Emirati counterparts. Moreover, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which underlined the interconnectedness of the region and the importance of coordinated economic and public health interventions, made Khadimi’s call for dialogue more convincing.

While the summit itself may have comprised more of symbolism than of substance, the mere presence of officials from the nine countries in the same venue and the numerous bilateral talks that took place on the sidelines provided a foundation for further regional diplomacy.

Last December, I suggested that 2021 could be the year that Iran and the GCC states enter into a robust dialogue. In recent years, Iranian leaders have increasingly focused on regional dialogue, reacting to an overall deterioration in regional security and the increased risk of escalation. In 2019, the Rouhani administration proposed the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), a plan of action for regional diplomacy on issues including energy security, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation. A summit was envisioned as one of the initial components of the plan.

The HOPE plan was not taken seriously by many Arab officials nor analytics, who remained sceptical that the plan put forward by the Rouhani administration had backing from the Iranian deep state, which had taken an interventionist line in the region in recent years. But today, the participation of the Raisi administration in the Baghdad Conference provides evidence that the importance of regional diplomacy is understood even among Iran’s so-called hardliners.

Iran’s new foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, made clear that regional diplomacy would be a cornerstone of the Raisi administration’s foreign policy. Of course, there are competing visions of what such diplomacy should entail. Amir-Abdollahian was unhappy about Syria’s exclusion from the Baghdad Conference, and it is precisely for that reason that his next trip after Baghdad was to Damascus. That the conference took place, however, should encourage Iranian leaders to put grudges aside.  Extended hands will encourage Iran to unclench its fists.

Photo: IRNA