Climate Policy and Cross-Border Hydrocarbon Development in the Gulf

This article is part of a series exploring regional energy cooperation in the Gulf and is published in cooperation with Istituto Affari Internazionali.

The Gulf countries are leading global producers and exporters of oil and gas. They have long reserves lives at current production levels, well beyond 2050, and substantial potential to increase reserves through field development, enhanced recovery, and exploration. They are intrinsically low-carbon producers measured by upstream emissions per barrel, although this is obscured in Iran and Iraq by high levels of flaring of unused associated gas (a by-product of oil production) and leakage of methane. They have strong involvement of state oil companies in oil and gas production, though this varies from an effective monopoly (Kuwait) to a leading role for international operators (Iraq and Oman).

With the exception of Iraq, they have large domestic petrochemical industries. Saudi Arabia and, increasingly, the UAE, have extensive international investments in refining and petrochemicals across the US, Europe, and Asia. While this is mainly on their own account, Kuwait does have a stake in the important new Duqm refinery in Oman. The region’s oil exporters also make use of the extensive oil storage and bunkering facilities in the UAE and Oman. On the other hand, Qatar is the world’s biggest LNG exporter and has a major expansion programme to be completed during 2026-27, Oman and the UAE are smaller LNG exporters (the UAE also expanding), while Iran is an important supplier of gas by pipeline to Turkey and Iraq.

The role of the Gulf states as oil exporters has limited the potential for cooperation between them. The dominance of the state in the upstream industry means that cross-border hydrocarbon investment is very limited. Mubadala Energy, the energy arm of the Abu Dhabi government strategic development company, has some upstream assets in Qatar and Oman, and utility Taqa has oil operations in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. QatarEnergy recently entered a project in southern Iraq led by TotalEnergies for development of oil, gas, water injection and solar power. Sanctions and political disputes have prevented any GCC investment in Iran’s hydrocarbon sector. There has been some interest, for example, and various plans since the early 2000s for gas and electricity connections, and most recently, discussions between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran in July 2023 concerning investment and the development of shared fields.

Gas is more promising for cooperation, given that some of the Gulf states are relatively gas-short. The most notable project, Dolphin, exports gas from Qatar by pipeline to the UAE, with small volumes continuing to Oman. Dolphin faced opposition from Saudi Arabia, which argued that the pipeline crossed its own maritime territory. A similar plan to supply Qatari gas to Kuwait was entirely blocked by Saudi Arabia, which did not want the smaller GCC states to be linked beyond its influence. Although LNG exports from Qatar to the UAE stopped during the boycott of Doha between June 2017-January 2021, Dolphin continued operating as normal, a sign of its importance to both countries, and of the promise of energy projects to constrain conflict.

Some oil and gas fields in the Gulf lie across borders. In general, countries have developed them competitively, extracting as much as possible without an agreement with the neighbouring state. The most notable field affected by a boundary dispute is the large gas-field Dorra, known in Iran as Arash, which lies partly in Kuwaiti waters, partly in the Kuwaiti section of the Partitioned Neutral Zone with Saudi Arabia, and partly, in Tehran’s view, in Iranian waters. Kuwait’s shortage of gas leads to heavy domestic use of polluting and expensive oil. An agreement on Dorra, perhaps via a joint development zone without concession of sovereignty, could be a way forward. Such agreements have enabled Saudi Arabia to supply half of the oil from the Abu Safa field to Bahrain as part of a boundary settlement and Qatar and the UAE to divide the resources of the offshore Bunduq oil-field.

The most important cross-boundary field, not just in the Gulf but in the world, is called the North Field in Qatar and South Pars in Iran. It is world’s biggest gas field. The field, which also contains shallower cross-boundary oil resources, has been developed by each side without formal agreement, but there are tacit understandings to avoid one side moving too far ahead of the other on extraction levels. Qatar imposed a moratorium on further development of the North Field in 2005, and lifted it in 2017. Ostensibly this was for technical reasons, more plausibly for gas market management purposes, but it also gave Iran time to catch up to and even exceed relative Qatari production levels. As Iran’s own output from South Pars increased, so eventually Qatar was able to decide to raise production further, without risking tensions with Iran over unfair levels of extraction.

More intra-regional gas trade would enable reducing the use of oil in the power sector. Qatar, Iran (if its gas resources were properly developed), and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, would be natural gas suppliers by pipeline to neighbours. This would require more regional trust, and transparency to put gas supplies on a reliable commercial basis. Cross-border investment in gas-using sectors such as petrochemicals, multi-country gas networks, and robust arbitration procedures, could create structures that would be more resistant to politically- or commercially-motivated cut-offs. Iran is, for example, a 10 percent shareholder in Azerbaijan’s important Shah Deniz gas field and in the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, along with BP, Russia’s Lukoil and Turkish and Azeri state entities. But the recent history of Russian gas supplies to Europe, and the interruption of federal Iraqi and Kurdistan region oil exports through Turkey, reveals how even long-standing pipeline deals with strong mutual profitability can be derailed.

As COP28 in Dubai signalled, climate policy will exert ever-greater influence on the oil and gas industry: first through requirements to zero-out its own emissions, second through a longer-term reduction in demand, at least for oil. The Gulf countries present a wide spread of economic and environmental vulnerability, and sophistication of climate policy ranges from the very limited (Iraq) to the relatively advanced (UAE). The Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter (OGDC) concluded at COP28 was signed by the national oil companies of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, among others, but not by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, or Qatar.

With the exception of Qatar, all of the Gulf countries are members either of OPEC or the OPEC+ alliance. OPEC and the OGDC, as well as other structures such as the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, offer potential to foster cooperation on decarbonisation paths within the petroleum industry, which include ending flaring and methane leakage, improving energy efficiency, electrifying operations, and incorporating renewable and nuclear power, implementing carbon capture and storage, piloting carbon dioxide removal technologies, producing sustainable aviation and maritime fuels, and developing hydrogen and its derivatives.

Specific cooperation would include aligning standards and regulations; sharing technological learnings and best practices; conducting joint studies on regional carbon dioxide storage capacity or satellite monitoring of methane leakage; and possibly some shared infrastructure, though this is more challenging and probably not essential. Joint investments, either within the Gulf countries or in third countries, could include the production of low-carbon hydrogen and sustainable fuels.

This collaboration can also include policy-related and diplomatic endeavours, on areas such as carbon caps, prices or taxes, international carbon trading under the Paris Agreement’s Article 6.4, dealing with the growing use of carbon border tariffs, and appropriate certification and regulation for low-carbon hydrogen.

The global energy market has been evolving rapidly, notably with the rise of Asia as the world’s key importer and consumer of energy and emitter of greenhouse gases, and the evolution of the natural gas business into a truly internationalised market via LNG trade. Most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the elimination of most of its pipeline gas exports to the EU, and a near-total ban on imports of Russian oil by the EU and other Western countries, have reshaped the global energy market and the patterns of trade in Gulf energy. The increasing US-China tensions, and the moves towards more diversity and robustness in supply chains and greater domestic self-sufficiency in key energy-related materials and technologies, is another emerging and evolving theme.

Greater Gulf cooperation on hydrocarbons, as a part of balanced strategies incorporating climate protection, could manage some of these threats and promote longer-term cooperation solutions to problems facing the region’s critical economic sector.

Photo: Aramco

Iran Archaeology is Awaiting a Sanctions Breakthrough

This article is the fourth in a five-part series.

• Read Part 1 here

• Read Part 2 here

• Read Part 3 here

Cooperation in the field of archaeology between Iranian and foreign researchers has a long history. In my academic research, I am currently combing the archives associated with all the major American archaeological expeditions to Iran, beginning in 1930 and continuing until 1978, focusing on the activities of the University of Pennsylvania Museum, the Oriental Institute, the Field Museum, the Boston Fine Arts Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard University, among others. This record shows intensive contacts between heritage professionals of both nations over a sustained interval in contexts such as field research, museum exhibits, student exchanges, and UNESCO initiatives. As positive as these relations may have been for those who participated in them, heritage collaborations were marked by the same steep power imbalances that characterized the overall midcentury relationship between the United States and Iran. 

In the early days of international collaboration in archaeology, Iranian researchers often participated only as trainees. Iranian leadership in archaeological projects was largely on Iranian projects, in which few foreigners participated. In recent years, this has changed. Since around 2000, all foreign archaeological projects in Iran have been joint endeavors; under current regulations, all cooperative research must be staffed by workers and researchers that are at least at numerical parity. The past two decades have seen major restoration projects at the citadel of Bam (an Italian collaboration), surveys and excavations in the Tehran Plain (British) and in the Mamasani district of Fars Province (Australian, British, and American), continued work at Persepolis and Pasargadae (multi-national, but especially French, German, and Australian), as well as excavations at Konar Sandal (American), and at numerous sites in northeastern Iran (German and Chinese), to name just a few examples. Indeed, one of my sources commented that the period from 2003 to 2016 was a high point for foreign archaeology in Iran.

Since 2017, conditions for foreign involvement in archaeological research in Iran have been less than favorable. However, the work continues. To get a sense of the effect of American policy in shaping archaeological fieldwork in Iran, and specifically joint international collaborative projects, I consulted colleagues and experts from a range of professional and national backgrounds. Given the sensitivity of the topic, all interviews were conducted on background. Most of my sources had worked in Iran as recently as 2018, but several had not been able to travel to Iran since 2014, or even as long ago as 2011. The consensus among these individuals is that conditions have worsened considerably in recent years, taking a particularly bad turn with the Trump administration’s executive orders known as the “Travel Ban,” maximum pressure, and the reimposition of broad-spectrum sanctions in 2018 following the US exit from the JCPOA.

***

During the early years of the Rouhani administration, before and immediately after the JCPOA rapprochement, conditions for archaeological research were seen to be improving. Nevertheless, all of my sources recognized that even in the best of times, the internal political situation in Iran complicates the regular functioning of archaeological research. I heard again and again that while procedures and protocols sometimes move along in a smooth and timely fashion, as often as not, there can be long delays in receiving permits and visas with little warning or explanation. While a considerable contingent of Iranian heritage professionals actively seeks to promote international collaborations, the shifting winds of both global and Iranian domestic politics can have drastic effects on the possibilities for cooperative research. These conditions are understood to make the conduct of archaeology in Iran a highly risky endeavor for foreign missions.

For example, one researcher I spoke with worked in Iran as recently as January 2020. After a lengthy wait, their visas and permits finally came through in late autumn 2019. Due to the rising tensions and skirmishes in the Persian Gulf, the leader of this team felt obliged to devise an escape plan and carry extra cash, charting routes to the nearest international airport, or failing that, the nearest land border through which they could escape in the event of the outbreak of conflict. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani on the 3rd of January 2020, while they were actively excavating, ultimately did not force the research team to flee, but it did show just how necessary such contingency plans had become.

My sources told me that every year it is a struggle to know exactly when one will be able to go to the field, which makes it difficult to plan work and coordinate the participation of specialists. All of the experts I spoke with expressed concern about health, safety, and professional prospects. The consensus seems to be that junior scholars in the West ought not to try to work in Iran until they have a stable position from which they can ride out the ups and downs of intermittent and unstable conditions of access to the field. Several sources related to me that every time they leave Iran after a fieldwork season, they worry that it might be for the last time.

***

Geopolitically speaking, experts agree that archaeology and heritage constitute one of the last remaining channels of good relations between Iran and the West. This has naturally made the field a political football, with foreign specialists in Iranian heritage caught in the crossfire. American archaeologists of Iran have been the most affected. European researchers have had an easier time, but invitations and the processing and issuance of visas are frequently held up by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as retribution for unrelated international disputes. Moreover, Iran’s detainment of dual nationals on charges of espionage in recent years, including in some extreme cases lengthy prison sentences and the threat of the death penalty for field researchers, has caused considerable concern on the part of researchers who hold two passports, especially if their documents are American and/or Iranian.

More directly, American sanctions make funding archaeological research particularly difficult. Archaeology is an expensive and logistically complex endeavor everywhere in the world. Research teams typically involve anywhere from three to twenty scholars and students, and a pricey suite of digital recording instruments, including total stations, GPS devices, photography equipment, laser scanners, geophysical instruments, drones, which naturally arouse suspicion due to their perceived potential for dual use—in addition to the usual trowels, picks, shovels, dustpans, brushes, buckets, and wheelbarrows.

The particular complication in the case of foreign missions in Iran is that it is not possible to conduct bank transfers between international and Iranian banks and international credit cards cannot be used. Therefore, foreign researchers are obliged to carry cash —in some cases amounts approaching EUR 50,000—and exchange it for rials in order to conduct their business. This—in addition to general complications with bank-transfers due to secondary sanctions—is a logistical nightmare for the researchers on the ground, but also a significant concern for funding agencies and university finance departments.

American sanctions extend beyond purely financial matters as well, particularly with respect to the prohibition on the exchange of services. Several experts specifically highlighted issues with the export of scientific samples for analyses that cannot be performed in Iran. After negotiating the already challenging internal bureaucratic regulations governing the shipment of scientific samples within Iran, it is then extraordinarily difficult to transport them safely or predictably to Europe or North America. This can mean, in some cases, years-long delays, which cause particular problems for foreign researchers insofar as their employment or professional advancement may depend on the results of such analyses, not to mention the frustrations of Iranian specialists eager to participate in the international scientific community. American sanctions also prevent the use of basic and routinely-used software packages such as ArcGIS Online, which researchers may be obliged to run through university contracts with the provider of the software, ESRI. This service cannot be accessed in Iran, meaning that a crucial tool in archaeological research is unavailable for both foreign and Iranian researchers.

As it turns out, many of these complications are not due to the actual OFAC regulations themselves, which, strictly speaking, do authorize the use of software, the exchange of services, and even some limited transactions as part of routine academic research. But university lawyers are extraordinarily skittish about permitting and funding fieldwork in Iran, afraid of being sued by the US Treasury. In some cases, these concerns can be allayed through obtaining a specific license to authorize a circumscribed program of research. Due to the complicated, lengthy, and expensive process involved in obtaining such a license, however, in practice this means that it is almost impossible for American citizens to be involved in Iranian projects. This appears to be particularly true of the past five years, when licensing has been much more restricted, and the Trump administration has moved to take power out of the hands of the OFAC bureaucracy.

OFAC licensing was one of the major sticking points in the Persepolis Tablet Archive Return project, mentioned in the previous article. I learned that the process of obtaining the license took almost a year and required extensive documentation of every object being transferred and the particulars of the itinerary of the participants in Tehran. OI representatives felt the need to go so far as to print out English-language exhibit labels in Chicago, rather than run the risk of violating sanctions protocols by printing them in Tehran. Such are the absurdities of the situation. Moreover, the Oriental Institute was advised not to do a press junket in the US, to avoid drawing unwanted attention to the work from powerful Iran-hawks in the federal government that might complicate future OFAC licensing.

Simultaneously, the American policy of maximum pressure is squeezing the Iranian economy as a whole. In practical terms, for Iranian archaeologists, this means that access to equipment and the international scientific community is made all the more difficult. Necessary electronics are far more expensive in Iran, visas and funding for participation in international conferences are difficult to obtain, many artifact conservation supplies are scarce and exorbitantly priced, and certain kinds of routine analysis cannot be performed in Iran. Additionally, as discussed previously, due to the funding structure of the MCHT, there is plenty of money for the conservation of monuments and the promotion of tourism, but very little funding for primary archaeological research. Most of the scientific excavation that occurs is salvage or rescue work, which must occur on an accelerated timeline in order to recover archaeological remains in advance of construction and infrastructure projects. Given these conditions, one of the only avenues to obtain funding for academic archaeological field research is to join with a foreign collaborator who might be able to bring with them funding from abroad.

***

Despite all of these difficulties, the expert consensus is that there is huge potential for international scientific collaboration between Iranian and foreign researchers. Those that I spoke to were unanimous in their recognition of the high degree of professionalism among archaeological researchers in Iran, and the quality of their fieldwork. Foreign archaeologists see their Iranian colleagues as partners on an equal footing scientifically, and indeed, many Iranian archaeologists in leadership positions within MCHT, the Iranian Center for Archaeological Research, and in academic departments, have PhDs from the very same universities in France, Germany, the UK, the US, and Canada. Iranian archaeologists are perceived as particularly open to innovation, especially in the use of advanced technologies in archaeological fieldwork, and in archaeometric and laboratory analyses such as geophysics, petrography, metallography, paleoecology, photogrammetry, and radiography, among others. The general view is that the level of scientific work in Iranian archaeology is quite high by global standards, and all that I spoke to felt compelled to relate to me their great sense of privilege when given the opportunity to work in Iran.

The present political situation has forced many foreign archaeologists of Iran to continue their research and publishing collaborations remotely. For some, particularly American and British researchers, this was already the reality for some time. With all of the difficulties in obtaining visas and securing funding to continue cooperative fieldwork in Iran, many of my colleagues have had to come up with creative solutions to keep their work going. In some cases, this takes the form of an active social media presence and online exchanges. In others, it involves remote mentorship of students by virtual means, training them in research methods and guiding their work in data collection and analysis, ideally leading to joint publications and thereby visibility in the international scientific community for those who otherwise would not have access to it.

The question of access is central. To the extent that certain foreign nationals have difficulty accessing the field in Iran, so too do Iranian researchers have difficulty accessing collections of Iranian antiquities stored in Western museums. Several researchers I spoke to expressed strongly that—given the volume of materials stored in institutions such as the British Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, the Oriental Institute, the Louvre, and others—Western researchers have a duty to work with these materials and to make them more accessible. Other ideas that were floated include joint projects conducted remotely, in which projects are designed and published collaboratively, with the fieldwork carried out by Iranians on the ground, and the data and analysis shared over the internet. This of course is not an unproblematic proposal, as global power imbalances would still be at play, and there is a legitimate question as to the extent to which this constitutes a sanctionable exchange of services. My reading of the terms of The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control General License G suggests that such work is authorized, but circumspection is strongly advised.

***

Regardless of all the difficulties, my sources pointed to several bright spots. To pick just one, the Persepolis Fortification Tablet Archive Return is seen as a model endeavor, and a prime example of how to both keep open and reinforce channels of communication between specialists and stakeholders, both Iranian and foreign. As one of my sources noted, the legal case that opened the door to the 2019 return—Rubin v. Islamic Republic—represents an odd confluence of forces, in which the United States government, the Islamic Republic, and an American institution were all on the same side. How often has this been the case in the general course of the relationship between our two countries over the past four decades? As I have documented in my historical research, despite the poor condition of our bilateral relations today, archaeology and cultural heritage were once seen by US State Department officials as among the best channels for establishing positive ties between the United States in Iran. My hope is that they may someday be so again.

 Click here to read Part 5 of this five-part series.

Photo: Wikicommons

Can Blocking Regulations Help Europe Protect Its Iran Business From Trump?

In the last week, European business leaders and policymakers have grown more vocal about the possibility that the European Union would employ blocking regulations to protect European businesses from the reach of US secondary sanctions on Iran. These regulations would penalize European companies for complying with secondary sanctions, which may snapback if the Trump administration decides to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement.

Total CEO Patrick Pouyanné became the first high-profile European executive to publically call for such measures to be considered, disclosing that Total has been in discussions with French and European authorities about “means to protect investments already made in Iran, even in the case of the return of sanctions.”

Speaking at a conference in Paris last week, Denis Chaibi, head of the Iran Task Force of the European External Action Service, stated that the EU was “looking at a number of possibilities” regarding the regulations.” In his assessment, “it is not complicated to do it legally in that the legal instrument exists, but it doesn’t require a huge internal debate,”

These public statements come as European concerns grow regarding the Trump administration's ultimatum to “fix” the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The critical deadline is May 12, when the United States will need to once again waive its secondary sanctions on Iran. Failure to do so would see secondary sanctions “snapback,” exposing European companies to extraterritorial penalties for their commercial activities in Iran.  

But even if the European Union finds the political will to reinstitute blocking regulations in the event of snapback, it is unclear whether they fully effective as a standalone measure to protect European trade and investment in Iran. Blocking regulations are a legal mechanism which seeks to mitigate the extraterritorial effects of sanctions under Public International Law (PIL), the body of law that governs relations between sovereign states and their unions, such as the European Union.

International trade attorney, Edward Borovikov, managing partner at the Brussels office of Dentons, a global law firm, notes that under international law “Sovereign states are expected to exercise moderation and restraint if their legal acts may affect vital economic and commercial interests of another state. But sometimes states violate the principle of restraint for their own national security considerations.” The snapback of secondary sanctions by the Trump administration would represent once such case. In such situations, “there is no efficient and universal legal avenue under PIL to challenge such non-compliance,” says Borovikov.

While the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established under the authority of PIL, may seem a venue to challenge extraterritorial sanctions which restrict trade in goods and services, it is unlikely Europe would be able to successfully challenge the snapback of U.S. sanctions under the WTO’s legal authority.

Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) declares that nothing in WTO rules will “prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.” Borovikov explains that this exemption “means that member states can depart from WTO commitments on trade in goods and services” and points out that while there have been several attempts to bring to WTO adjudication disputes on the application of national security exemptions, “none of the cases ended with conclusive guidance.”

In 1996, the European Union began a dispute process against the United States with regard to extraterritorial sanctions against Cuba. This dispute reached the state of WTO consultations. But ultimately, the EU and US reached a political solution in which the US assured that its secondary sanctions would not be enforced upon European companies. The WTO case was suspended.  

The political solution was necessary for a simple reason. “Even if the WTO had found in the favor of the EU, deciding that the national security exemption did not apply, the United States was never going agree with a WTO’s interpretation of its national security requirements,” observes Borovikov. “The idea that the United States would comply with WTO recommendations in such a situation is hard to believe.”

Given the dead end presented by the WTO dispute avenue, the EU has sought legal mechanisms that rely on the legal authority of the union and its member states. The legal act is the 1996 EU Blocking Regulation. This regulation was established in response to US sanctions on Iran, Cuba, and Libya. The regulations prohibit EU entities and courts from complying with foreign legal acts, such as sanctions laws, listed in an annex. Borokivov explains that “in principle any new extraterritorial laws of any third country may be added to the Annex and indeed help EU persons to continue business with a sanctioned third country.” However, the past success of such regulations in enabling European companies to continue conducting business in these jurisdictions such as Iran was the result of political rather than legal influence.

Borovikov warns that these blocking regulations “cannot provide full protection from secondary sanctions because if the EU persons doing business in the US start economic activities in the Iran, they are at risk of being penalised under the US sanctions regime.” Even if the European Union seeks to penalize its companies for complying with US sanctions, “it is clear that a lot of EU companies would simply face a dilemma between doing business in the US or Iran and where to accept the penalty,” he says.

Given the fact that the US market both frequently offers more attractive economic opportunities and poses more severe penalties and consequences for non-compliance with US law, most companies are likely to wind down their Iran operations and pay any penalties that the EU or their national governments may levy under the blocking regulations.

However, the discussion about blocking regulations is nonetheless worthwhile. Borovikov notes that the prospect of such regulations has in the past played “an important role in bringing about an acceptable solution. The regulations are secondary to the political process between the US and EU and its member states that will hopefully lead to an understanding on Iran business.”

Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations, echoes this assessment: "The threat of reviving the EU blocking regulation in itself can be a useful political tool for Europe to create a cost for the Trump administration and make it think twice about its actions." Moreover, while the blocking regulations may only be partially effective for major multinationals, they can "provide an avenue for smaller-medium sized companies in Europe and Asia that have little or no US exposure to continue conducting business in Iran in non-dollar currencies," says Geranmayeh. 

Multinational executives seem to agree. In a recent survey conducted by Bourse & Bazaar and commissioned by International Crisis Group, a substantial 54 percent of senior executives indicated that “assuming Iran remains committed to the nuclear deal,” blocking regulations, which would protect companies from U.S. penalties, would positively affect the “decision to invest in Iran.” 

Blocking regulations can serve an important role as part of the suite of political, legal, and commercial measures that can be employed by European governments to protect their businesses from the consequences of snapback. At a time when the economic quid-pro-quo that underpins the nuclear deal is under threat, each and every such measure ought to be considered. 

Photo Credit: WTO

Rentierism and Rivalry Between Riyadh and Tehran

This article was originally published in LobeLog. 

In response to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United States has long pursued a strategy of counterbalancing, extending its security umbrella to cover the kingdom and the GCC states. But as promises of security fade in the face of decreasing belief in the American commitment, infighting in the GCC, and the advent of Saudi military adventurism, security is no longer a sufficient paradigm for policy that seeks to temper an intensifying regional rivalry.

In Saudi Arabia, a young Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman (MbS), is poised to rule a country that—on its current trajectory—faces a sustained economic decline as oil revenues shrink and the population grows. By contrast, having demonstrated considerable economic resilience under sanctions and significantly reduced its dependence on oil rents, Iran may finally be poised to achieve sustained growth.

This divergence in fortunes is at the heart of the regional conflict. Should MbS wish to prevent Iranian domination of the region, he will need to secure Saudi Arabia’s economic future and redefine the contribution of economic rents to state power—a puzzle of political economy. In the absence of any robust solution, he will resort, as most rulers do, to externalizing the political instability that will no doubt threaten him within the kingdom’s borders (see Vladimir Putin). The cynical war in Yemen gives an early indication of how such weakness may tragically precipitate further regional conflict.

The power differential between Saudi Arabia and Iran reflects the degree to which the kingdom remains a rentier state and the degree to which the Islamic Republic does not. In the assessment of political scientist Michael Herb, between 1972-1999, the “degree of rentierism” in Saudi Arabia was 80% while in Iran it was just 55%. To the extent that rentierism is understood as a fundamental liability in a country’s long-term political and economic stability, any intervention to temper the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran will need to contend with the fundamental configuration of Saudi political economy, enabling moderation through strength.

Blurry Vision

MbS’s dramatic move to arrest scores of Saudi elites, including Minister of the National Guard Prince Mutaib bin Abdallah and the billionaire chairman of Kingdom Holdings Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, has been widely described as a “purge” or “soft coup.”

But as as executive director of the Arabia Foundation Ali Shihabi has argued, the arrests had little impact on MbS’s political fortunes. He writes, “In actuality, Saudi Arabia completed its political transition last June when King Salman replaced MBN with MBS as heir to the throne.” To this end, it is “wrong to interpret last weekend’s arrests as an action that materially increases the political risk to the monarchy.” Rather, Shihabi suggests that MBS intended to send a message “to political and economic elites that their entitlement to extreme wealth and privilege, and their impunity, is coming to an end.”

The economic consequences of the arrests could be significant. According to a statement on the arrests from the Saudi attorney general, “at least USD $100 billion has been misused through systematic corruption and embezzlement over several decades.”  Shihabi believes that MbS will seek the “recovery of substantial ill-gotten assets from many members of the elite” as part of his effort to correct for perceived abuses.

It is tempting to think, in accordance with MbS’s deliberate self-marketing as an earnest reformer, that the move against corruption is an expression of political strength. This may be true within the internal dynamics of the Saudi Royal family—no doubt his moves against family members were bold. But when viewed within the wider economic context, the need to vilify quasi-state appropriation of wealth in the kingdom speaks to a brewing economic crisis and an acute sense of weakness.

In July, the IMF revised down projections for Saudi GDP growth in 2017 to just 0.1%, with growth for 2018 projected at a paltry 1.1%. In the face of low oil prices and general underperformance, the Saudi economy is teetering on the edge of a recession for the first time since 2010. The overall value of the economy has fallen by over $100 billion in just three years.

Saudi Arabia remains a rich country. But a dwindling cash pile (down nearly $300 billion from the 2014 high) and the first indications of oil’s impending decline as a source of rents have triggered a time-bomb for MbS. The county’s population is ballooning, with the working age population set to grow by 6 million in a country with just 41% workforce participation. MbS is poised to be the first king in Saudi history for whom oil rents will not meet the country’s economic needs or help consolidate his absolute rule.

The much touted Vision 2030 plan is an attempt to defuse this timebomb through an expansive set of economic and social reforms. In the near term, MbS is aiming to introduce an additional $100 billion annually from non-oil revenue by 2020. As described in a fawning profile in Bloomberg Businessweek, MbS “has already reduced massive subsidies for gasoline, electricity, and water. He may impose a value-added tax and levies on luxury goods and sugary drinks.”

But taxing soda is not going to replace declining oil revenues, and the likely impact of the proposed reforms are being oversold. At a more fundamental level, there are no plans to introduce an income tax, and in order to stave unrest from the least fortunate Saudis, cash handouts are still planned. As though to burnish his populist chops, MbS told Bloomberg, “We don’t want to exert any pressure on [the poor]. We want to exert pressure on wealthy people.”

The prince's turn to populism may be a novel chapter in the House of Saud’s playbook for regime survival, but it reflects a confused approach to reformation of a broken political economy. By failing to consider the importance of taxation, MbS seems unwilling to renege on what historian Toby Craig Jones calls the “devil’s bargain” of Saudi political economy, where “no taxation without representation” is perverted to “no representation without taxation.”

To date, the essential challenge of Saudi political economy remains unaddressed. So long as the country’s rulers depend on a dwindling natural resource or the fickle commitment of international investors to drive economic growth, the state will remain weak.

Lessons From Iran

Across the Persian Gulf, Iran’s leaders have made their own Faustian bargains concerning political economy, but the 1979 revolution provided a hard reset that addressed the central liability currently facing their Saudi rivals. The revolution served to give the government more levers by which to grapple with the chief risk that plagues rentier economies—income inequality. Iran’s present level of income inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, is just below 0.4. At the time of the Islamic Revolution, the level was 0.5.

According to a growing body of evidence, Iran’s combination of resource rents distribution with a progressive income tax has been fundamental to the country’s ability to mitigate inequality, especially given that Iran’s large population renders resource rents alone an insufficient source of government revenue for this purpose. In 2015, for the first time in over 50 years, tax revenues surpassed oil revenues as the primary source of government income.

A recent study by economists Mohammad Reza Farzanegan and Mohammad Mahdi Habibpour of resource rents distribution in Iran concludes that “any transfer policy that uses oil and gas rents which are publicly-owned and managed in Iran will decrease income inequality and poverty.” However, the authors find that “resource dividend” (RD) policies that combine the distribution of oil rents with income tax have the greatest effect at reducing income inequality. In a sample of 140,000 households, the so-called RD policies saw the GINI coefficient fall from 0.44 to 0.32 in rural areas, and 0.39 to 0.33 in urban areas—reductions in line with the overall improvements in Iranian income inequality since the Islamic Revolution.

President Hassan Rouhani continues to battle stubborn inequality, and the perception of misappropriation of rents through government corruption is a major source of political contention. In this sense, Rouhani’s own campaign of arrests, largely targeting elites connected to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, mirrors the moves by MbS. But there is a crucial difference. Rouhani is trying to address corruption because he needs to better distribute rents, half of which originate from taxation, in lockstep with economic expansion. MbS is namechecking corruption because he needs to consolidate rents as he faces a economic stagnation—a position of relative weakness.

A Common Aim

In a lengthy interview with the influential Iranian foreign affairs magazine Diplomacy, former Iranian ambassador to Riyadh Hossein Sadeqi makes an emphatic case that MbS will avoid repeating the “Pahlavi scenario,” largely because of a deliberate effort to seek advice from “intellectual centers” including think tanks and consultancies. Sadeqi acknowledged that “Saudi Arabia has a single-product economy in which corruption exists,” but he also puts faith in the country’s capacity for reform, highlighting early progress instituting the Vision 2030 reforms, particularly in a social context.

This measured and hopeful assessment points to an important consideration for American policymakers. Shifting the emphasis in regional balancing away from military parity towards economic parity opens the door for a less confrontational dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Iranian government has strong interests in Saudi Arabia’s economic stability. The international community should seek to ensure that a concerted program of training and technical assistance, rather than arms transfers to meet security demands, is made available to support MbS’s reform program.

Moreover, any program that seeks to address the residual challenges of rentierism could be a rare opportunity to bring senior Saudi and Iranian stakeholders around the same table to discuss how best to address destabilizing inequality and preserve standards of living in the post-oil world. The Iranian experience would be hugely instructive if Saudi leaders could be convinced to accept some well-intentioned advice.

Photo Credit: Wikicommons

Oil Giant Total Takes to Twitter to Underscore Iran Commitment

In an unusual move, Total's press office issued a series of tweets on Tuesday in order to correct an apparent mischaracterization of the company's position on its planned USD 4.8 billion gas deal in Iran. 

A piece published by CNN Money on Tuesday, and later echoed by Reuters, suggested that Total was "rethinking" its comittment to Iran in light of the company's large presence in the U.S. and President Trump's opposition to the Iran deal. The piece centered on comments made to CNN Money on the sidelines of an energy conference in Abu Dhabi, with Total CEO Patrick Pouyanné stating that "If there is a sanctions regime [on Iran], we have to look at it carefully... We work in the U.S., we have assets in the U.S., we just acquired more assets in the U.S." 

But a series of tweets from Total's official press office account have since sought to dispel the idea that there has been any change in the company's policy towards Iran. The tweets explain how the comments made by Pouyanné are consistent with those made in several interviews since Trump's de-certification of the JCPOA Iran Deal. 

Hey :) Total's position is & has been consistent on the matter. The CNN piece does not say anything new. Don't mind the tittle of the article...just focus on the quotes: "We are working on the project. We launched the tenders, we should award contracts by January." @yarbatman

— Total Press Office (@TotalPress) November 14, 2017

📢💬 @PPouyanne was very clear in an interview with @energyintel less than a month ago: "We signed the contract, we have launched the tenders, we are supposed to award contracts by year-end, so all that is fitting well in terms of schedule..."

— Total Press Office (@TotalPress) November 14, 2017

💬 "We’ll have clarity on situation before year-end. Congress has 2 months to decide what to do. If Total can do it in a legal way, we’ll do that project as we are committed to Iran. If we cannot do it, we’ll have to stop. It’s not politics, it’s just a matter of legal framework"

— Total Press Office (@TotalPress) November 14, 2017

Total's response clarifies that the company remains committed to its project in Iran's South Pars gas field and draws attention to an earlier interview in which Pouyanné stated he does not see a political barrier to conducting business in Iran. That Total is continuing to push ahead on its Iranian project demonstrates considerable resolve, especially given the company's extensive operations in both the United States and Saudi Arabia, two countries whose governments largely oppose Iran's economic opening. Indeed, the company has recently moved to more directly manage political risks by opening an office in Washington. 

Pouyanné's comments to CNN Money do however raise the possibility that the United States will reimpose secondary sanctions, which would penalize non-U.S. entities for conducting business with Iran. Such a "snapback" scenario would compel nearly all European multinational firms, including Total, to pull back from the market. Total, like many other companies, is simply waiting to see what legal approach Congress is likely to take. Pouyanné told CNN, "We are working on the project. We launched the tenders, we should award contracts by January... I hope by that time, Congress will have an answer for the president and the president will have to renew, or not [renew], the certification."

Encouragingly, it remains unlikely that Congress will opt for snapback, which would constitute withdrawal from the JCPOA. Total's landmark deal still seems poised to open a new era of energy investment in Iran. 

Photo Credit: IRNA

In First, Global Financial Institution Takes Equity Stake in Iranian Financial Services Firm

Mofid Securities, Iran’s largest independent brokerage and financial advisory company, has entered into a major new agreement with Azimut Group, one of Europe’s leading asset managers. The agreement will see Azimut take a 20% stake in Mofid Entekhab, the asset management business of Mofid Securities, as Azimut and Mofid seek to bring a higher standard of asset management offerings to the Iranian market for both domestic and foreign investors.

The new deal makes Azmiut the first global financial institution to make an equity investment in an Iranian financial services company. It comes at a time when Iran’s financial services sector has made recent headway in reconnecting with global counterparts. New financing deals with Austria’s Oberbank and Denmark’s Danske Bank and an announced commitment from French bank BPI suggest that more foreign capital is set to flow to Iran in 2018, so long as the possible snapback of secondary sanctions does not take place. Similarly, investor appetite has grown with investment companies deploying foreign capital in Iran’s public and private equities in historic volumes. 

With the minority acquisition and joint pro rata capital increase, Azimut will help Mofid Entekhab to develop new investment strategies in local asset classes. Marketing will see a boost with an expanded, locally trained sales force. Most importantly, Azimut and Mofid intend to launch new offshore funds to enable foreign investors to gain exposure to promising Iranian equities.

Mofid Entekhab currently manages USD 89 million in six mutual funds and managed accounts, with 8% market share among Iran’s equity funds. The Mofid Group, founded in 1994, has earned a reputation for its innovation in the Iranian financial sector. The company has invested considerably to raise the standards of its services to international standards. Notably, Mofid owns Pouya Finance, the fintech company behind BourseView, the most extensive financial data platform for Iran’s capital markets. 

The new partnership with Azimut is consistent with Mofid’s effort to provide clients to “a new suite of financial advisory and wealth management services in line with the highest international standards,” said Hamid Azaraksh, Chairman of Mofid Securities. Azaraksh states that the company’s strategic goal is “to capitalize on [its] track record as the leading financial intermediary in Iran and create with Azimut a benchmark for the local asset management industry.”

For Azmut, the deal represents a bold move into a country with immense financial potential. Sergio Albarelli, CEO of Azimut Holding, described the deal as “a historical first step for a global player entering the Iranian financial market.” Albarelli noted the compatibility of Mofid and Azimut, based on “core values of independence and commitment to performance.”

The deal, announced just a week before U.S. President Donald Trump is set to declare whether he intends to “de-certify” Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, offers another example of the strong European commitment to economic engagement with Iran, which is now in evidence across sectors. 

Photo Credit: Mofid Securities

“Davos of Iran” to Convene as Post-Sanctions Trade and Investment Reaches Critical Juncture

European business leaders and policymakers will convene with their Iranian counterparts at a critical time, setting an agenda for trade and investment as the Trump administration signals its skepticism regarding the Iran nuclear deal.                                                                                 

The fourth edition of the Europe-Iran Forum, which has been called the “Davos of Iran,” returns to the historic Dolder Grand Hotel in Zurich on October 3-4, 2017. The summit is set to be the most significant gathering of Iranian and European business leaders and policymakers to date, demonstrating a clear commitment to the economic dividends of the nuclear deal.

“Multinational companies have now spent two years studying the feasibility of new investments in Iran, and pressure is increasing for long-expected deals to reach the contract stage. Encouragingly, with a number of major agreements signed in the last few months, it seems the commitment to the Iranian market remains strong,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder of the Europe-Iran Forum.

“The aim now is for European leaders to work with Iranian partners to find a sustainable agenda for trade and investment with a view to the long term.”

Helga Schmid, Secretary General of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and a key figure in the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will give a keynote speech outlining the European commitment to the nuclear deal and the provision of sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for its verified compliance. This is the first time that the Secretary General, one of Europe’s top diplomats, will address an audience of business leaders on these matters.

The European push for “business diplomacy” will be bolstered by the participation of an unprecedented multilateral gathering of senior diplomats, including the Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch, and Polish ambassadors to Iran.

There will also be strong representation from the Rouhani administration, which is determined to push forward its agenda of economic engagement following a resounding election victory in May and the President’s inauguration on August 5.

Mohammad Khazaee, the Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance and President of the Organization for Investment, Economic, and Technical Assistance of Iran (OIETAI), will outline the administration’s agenda for monetary policy and regulatory reform. Iran is seeking to make more progress on banking challenges, particularly by improving its compliance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that establishes regulatory standards for international finance.

Deputy Minister of Industry, Mine, and Trade Mehdi Karbasian, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Seyyed Kazem Sajjadpour, will also speak at the 4th Europe-Iran Forum.

Senior business leaders from Iran speaking at the conference include Farzaneh Sharafbafi, the newly appointed CEO of Iran Air and the first woman to lead Iran’s national airline. This will be Dr. Sharafbafi’s first major international address in her new role. Iran Air’s pending deals with Airbus and Boeing, valued at USD $10 billion and USD $17 billion respectively, count among Iran’s most important post-sanctions contracts.

Dr. Mohammad Saeedi, Chairman and Managing Director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), will outline how Iran seeks to modernize its merchant fleet and port infrastructure to keep up with rising trade flows. Iran’s non-oil trade hit nearly USD $30 billion in the four months since the beginning of the Iranian calendar year (March 2017). 

Masoud Khansari, President of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture, will detail the ways in which Iran’s private sector has been empowered to drive economic growth across sectors, including those traditionally dominated by state enterprise.

A wide range of panels will discuss how Iran is succeeding in attracting foreign investment through new partnership models. Of particular importance will be a panel on transportation and logistics, with senior representatives from Alstom, Siemens, and Port of Antwerp discussing the holistic regeneration of Iran’s transport infrastructure and the concrete achievements of their companies in the market, in addition to ongoing efforts to mitigate risk and ensure adherence with global compliance standards.

Moreover, several of Iran’s key private equity and venture capital executives will explore how foreign capital has begun to enter Iran, supporting growth within the vibrant private sector.

Omid Gholamifar, CEO of Serkland Invest, a Swedish investment company focused on Iran, and a participant on the private equity panel, notes, “Over the last two years, foreign investors have deployed venture capital in Iran, supporting young digital businesses. Those investments have done well, spurring entrepreneurship and bringing new services to the market. Now investors are beginning to look at more mature companies and these growth capital investments could turbocharge Iran's private sector." 

The Forum will also mark the release of a new study measuring business confidence in Iran, commissioned in partnership with noted research firm IranPoll. The first-of-its-kind survey examines attitudes among Iranians towards domestic and multinational businesses, as well as the extent to which Iranians believe that business leaders will deliver on important commitments such as job creation, environmental protection, and innovation.

The 4th Europe-Iran Forum is organized by Bourse & Bazaar in partnership with Adam Smith Conferences. It is supported by KPMG, Dentons, and Manoir Industries among other world-class sponsors.

Photo Credit: Europe-Iran Forum

Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Should Take a Regional Approach to Start-Ups

Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan host some of most interesting and promising start-ups in Southwest Asia. Entrepreneurship and innovation are neither new nor foreign imports to the region. Cities and towns in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan make up parts of the Silk Road, an ancient network of trade routes that once connected the East and West from China to the Mediterranean Sea. Historically, trade, innovation, and cultural exchanges have flourished along these trade routes.

Today, however, the entrepreneurs of this region operate in isolation from one another. Divergent political ideologies, cultural biases, and economic policies have prevented many entrepreneurs from exchanging ideas and collaborating, rendering them unaware of their neighbors’ achievements in areas of social innovation and entrepreneurship. Knowledge sharing and transfer, if sustained, can highlight the achievements of local and regional social and tech entrepreneurs.

While these three countries engage in active trade individually, building a regional start-up ecosystem would provide a space for entrepreneurs to share their experiences and collaborate further. Because of their shared cultures, histories, languages, and similar economies, Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani entrepreneurs already share many common characteristics that could foster more collaboration and generate more economic growth and innovation. Therefore, we propose the formation of a regional start-up ecosystem to benefit the entrepreneurs and the economies of the above countries.

Entrepreneurs and ecosystems do not operate in a vacuum. Political, social, and economic realities influence entrepreneurs and shape start-ups. Establishing a regional start-up ecosystem would reduce border tensions, improve overall regional security, promote good governance, and allow the steady flow of goods and services across the region. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs and social innovators should focus on studying and understanding their regional markets, finding opportunities for growth and scaling within their own region.

Pakistan: An Established Player

Of the three countries, Pakistan has the most elaborate and developed start-up ecosystem. Urban areas of Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Islamabad are home to some of the most renowned and internationally acclaimed entrepreneurs and social innovators (e.g payload, Healthwire, Dockit, Meezaj).

Since the security climate in the country has improved, the start-up landscape has grown and attracted venture capitalists from Silicon Valley, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf. The 2012 launch of Plan9, Pakistan’s first incubator, laid the groundwork for the start-up ecosystem. Pakistan is now home to more than 20 start-up incubators and accelerators that provide co-working, office space, mentorship, networking opportunities, and access to investors.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan has the potential to become the next emerging hub in Asia. Both high mobile penetration and the well-developed telecommunication infrastructure have given rise to tech start-ups that have disrupted almost every sector—wedding, health, fashion, payments. Success stories include Convo, a social networking platform, and have captured the attention of international investors.          

Shaun Di Gregorio, CEO of Frontier Digital Ventures, a venture capital fund based in Malaysia that has previously invested in Pakistani start-ups, notes that “People who have an appetite for emerging markets will be attracted to Pakistan. It’s considered one of the next big frontier markets.”

Pakistan holds an edge over its regional counterparts primarily because of two reasons. First, Pakistan’s market does not set a limit on foreign equity, enabling investors to hold a 100 percent stake without the help of any local partners. Second, total repatriation of investment capital is allowed. Therefore, every penny earned in profit can be returned to the original investor with ease.

While serving as an example for its neighbors, Pakistan’s start-up scene continues to flourish, there is still work to do. As Khurram Zafar, executive director of Lahore University of Management Sciences’ Center for Entrepreneurship, notes “more bridges are needed between Pakistan and the outside world which are best built by the diaspora looking to stay connected with the country.” This lack of connectivity can be seen in the region. Many Afghan or Iranian start-ups are unaware of the incubators or accelerators that exist in Pakistan and unsurprisingly, there are no Iranian tech entrepreneurs in Pakistan’s accelerator programs such asInvests2Innovate or Peshawar 2.0. Collaboration among these three countries would boost productivity, increase access to investment, and promote their status to emerging markets.

Iran: A Rising Star

Iran’s entrepreneurship ecosystem remains nascent yet promising. In the past decade, Iranian policymakers have shifted their focus to entrepreneurship and innovation and there is plenty of room for progress. Iran’s overall score on the 2016 GEI Index is 28.8%, ranking 80th among the 130 countries surveyed. Among the 15 MENA countries, Iran’s ranking at 14 indicates a weak entrepreneurship ecosystem. Compared to previous years, Iran’s overall score has improved, but it has yet to fully realize its potential.

In 2008, Iranian start-ups such as Digikala emerged in the ecommerce and online retail market, becoming the largest ecommerce platform in Iran. Emulating Amazon, this start-up is considered a poster child for start-up success in Iran. In recent years, fast Internet speeds, high mobile penetration, and official support for entrepreneurship have led to creation of a flourishing start-up scene. 

There are many sectors that remain bursting with potential for disruption. They include ride sharing, people to people hospitality, online furniture, design services, and payment delivery. Certainly, there is high demand for these types of start-ups because of Iran’s sophisticated and young costumers, and underserved markets, a legacy of international sanctions which has now been largely removed.  

Despite its low entrepreneurship and productivity scores, Iran ranks fifth after India, China, Russia, and the U.S. for having a significant number of talented and well-educated engineers. Consequently, Iranian policymakers should divert their attention fully to exploiting Iran’s impressive human resources toward boosting competitiveness, promoting employment, and raising productivity levels.

Iran’s start-up scene is vibrant led by several savvy Western educated mentors and modeled after successful Silicon Valley companies. Start up Grind and Start-up Weekend events are held throughout the country. However, there too few incubators and those which do exist often struggle to provide adequate financing opportunities to promising businesses. Accelerators exist, but few are run professionally and optimally. Unfortunately, Iranian legal codes do not protect innovation and intellectual property rights. These obstacles have created setbacks for Iranian entrepreneurs, preventing them from robust growth and scaling.

Afghanistan: Underappreciated Potential

Although Afghanistan’s ecosystem and start-up scene is only now starting to grow. Particularly in urban areas of Kabul, Jalalabab, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat, new programs are being launched teaching youth how to code, teaching entrepreneurship, and many more related programs to increase capacity, knowledge, and skills.

Among such programs are Shetab Afghanistan, the first comprehensive incubation, co-working, and mentor program in Kabul that is helping entrepreneurs and social innovators. There is also Afghanistan Startup, Startup Valley, Startupistan, and many more that are entering the Afghan start-up scene.. A 2015 survey carried out including 27 start-ups in Afghanistan revealed that 70% of Afghan start-ups fail due to ecosystem and market start-up failures, including access to mentors, infrastructure, and more open regulatory environment, and access to finance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, security is not the top concern facing entrepreneurs. Instead, entrepreneurs face the following challenges: limited access to networks and regional markets, faster internet and related infrastructure, trade friendly regulatory environment, an end to corruption, as well as availability of supportive incubation, acceleration and co-working programs. These gaps can be filled within regional frameworks. 

Why Collaboration Matters

It time to put more weight on the effective implementation of new political and economic initiatives, collaborative networks, policies, and programs to regionally link start-up ecosystems across Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The potential benefits of collaboration across regional ecosystems outnumber the disadvantages. It would lead to increased visibility and publicity for start-ups, offering an opportunity to scale into new regional markets. It would increase technical knowledge that is localized, and could potentially open up entrepreneurs from the region to sorely needed financial and mentor resources. Beyond these concrete benefits, local governments should offer incentives to attract large corporations in these countries. After all, large corporations remain vitally important for ecosystem building because they help investment in the supply chain, contract start-ups, or even possibly acquire the most promising start-ups in the long-run.

Because of the dominant Western-centric narrative widely accepted among entrepreneurs and start-up lovers, there is an overarching tendency for entrepreneurs to take examples from the West and emulate them. Therefore, there is a gap in knowledge among young entrepreneurs in these countries about exciting and new developments in their own backyard. While it is reasonable to emulate Western models, it is equally important to adopt and adjust them considering local conditions, specifically cultures, languages, and lifestyles.

For example, initiatives could include regional conferences like a TEDx talk held in Herat focusing on regional start-ups that can incorporate Tadjik entrepreneurs. Another way to foster brainstorming and collaboration among entrepreneurs could be to swap co-working spaces, as is done in Europe, so that an entrepreneur from Lahore can learn about the Iranian social technology market to scale his mobile geo-app for car parking. In addition, Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan member investors could use shared Linked groups as a viable means to bridge cultural biases, connect board members, and enable mentor sharing between various accelerator and incubation programs in the region.

Among the most promising initiatives would be to establish a regional exchange and scholarship program between regional universities. Again looking at the region’s ‘backyard,’ the ASEAN (Association of South Eastern Asian Nations) countries have created several programs that support cross-border innovation and collaboration. For example, the very successful ASEAN University Network has helped hundreds of exchange students to study across borders since 1995. The organizations has built partnerships with other renowned universities around the world to promote knowledge sharing, collaboration, an access to opportunity through joint project-work.

Through the ASEAN Center for Entrepreneurship, regional and global initiatives support various start-ups. Recently, the Malaysian government, through its MaGIC Program, has offered ASEAN start-ups access to a regional accelerator funding and educational support services in Kuala Lumpur. Even "pariah state" North-Korea is sending its young entrepreneurs to Singapore, a powerful start-up hub, to help them in business, law, and economic policy and to learn about Lean Canvas (with the help of Choson Exchange, an NGO).

These initiatives provide compelling models of what could be done to support the achievements of local and regional entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs among Pakistani, Iranian, and Afghan start-ups.

Unfortunately, the international media has failed to present a full and balanced view of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Negative images of violence and terrorism have become ingrained in many entrepreneurs’ minds and rendered them oblivious to the achievements of their neighbors in the areas of social innovation and entrepreneurship. Today’s revival of the ancient trade routes as a successful model for a regional start-up ecosystem highlights not only their historical legacy, but also their contemporary relevance to regional commerce, trade, and advancement of Southwest Asia.

Photo Credit: Bourse & Bazaar

Boeing, Iran, and American Jobs

This article was originally published in LobeLog.

New reports suggest that Iran Air’s first new Boeing jetliner could be delivered within the month.

According to Reuters, Boeing is reallocating a 777 originally designated for Turkish Airlines. This would be the first aircraft of eighty for which Boeing and Iran Air signed a $16.6 billion in December 2016. Deliveries for the order, which include fifty 737 MAX 8s and thirty 777s in two variants, were originally slated to begin in December 2018.

The early deliver will be a boost to President Hassan Rouhani’s reelection push, and follows Boeing’s announcement last week of its second agreement to sell passenger airplanes to an Iranian airline—a deal to sell thirty 737 MAX 8 airplanes to Iran Aseman airlines, valued at $3 billion.

The Iran Air and Iran Aseman deals are among Boeing’s largest open orders and come at a time of softening demand for commercial aircraft among the world’s airlines.

Expectations are also high for the deal within the Iranian business community. Many business leaders in Iran, as well as their European peers, see the Iran Air and Iran Aseman contracts as important bellwethers of the willingness of the United States to continue to implement sanctions relief commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal. Specifically, the deals are a test of whether the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control will continue to provide licenses to both American and European companies that seek to engage opportunities in Iran. Athough Iran Air and Boeing were able to proceed from a memorandum of agreement to a full contract on the back of an OFAC license issued for the relevant transactions, the license was granted in the final months of the Obama administration. The Iran Aseman deal, which is currently limited to a memorandum of agreement, will only be able to proceed to a full contract when the Trump administration issues an OFAC license.

Trump has called the Iran Deal the “the worst deal ever negotiated.” The question is whether he will see Boeing’s opportunity as a redeeming feature.

When Iran Means Jobs

Boeing’s engagement with Iran pits the Trump administration's skepticism of the value of the Iran nuclear deal directly against an avowed commitment to support American jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector.

Numerous American companies are engaged in business with Iran, either via their non-US subsidiaries as permitted under General License H or on the basis of humanitarian exemptions for the export of agricultural commodities or pharmaceutical products. However, it is rare for the products eventually exported to Iran to originate in the United States. Generally, the exported goods of American companies are produced in a non-U.S. manufacturing facility as part of a globalized supply chain. As such, for most American multinational corporations, engaging in opportunities in Iran may deliver shareholder value but won’t unlikely support American job creation on a large scale.

Boeing is an exception to this pattern. For political and practical reasons, the production of airplanes was never offshored and therefore a direct link exists between the orders placed in Iran and American labor at Boeing’s primary production facilities in Bellevue, Washington and to a lesser extent, North Charleston, South Carolina.

Although Boeing is a large, successful American company, it remains politically delicate to pursue business in Iran. Cognizant of this fact, the company has sought to speak Trump’s language when discussing its sales to Iran.

Boeing has highlighted American manufacturing jobs as a fundamental consideration of both the 2016 deal with Iran Air and the recent deal with Iran Aseman. According to Boeing’s official statement on December 11, 2016 announcing the deal to deliver airplanes to Iran Air, the sales will “support tens of thousands of U.S. jobs directly associated with production and delivery of the 777-300ERs and nearly 100,000 U.S. jobs in the U.S. aerospace value stream for the full course of deliveries.” Similarly, the April 4, 2017 announcement of the agreement with Iran Aseman noted “an aerospace sale of this magnitude creates or sustains approximately 18,000 jobs in the United States.”

Boeing’s government relations outreach isn’t limited to public statements. Following Trump’s public lambasting of the company for the cost of a proposed replacement for Air Force One, Boeing CEO Dennis A. Muilenburg has made it a priority to build a direct relationship with the Trump, first meeting with then-president-elect at Trump Tower on January 17. One month later, President Trump visited the Boeing facility in North Charleston, South Carolina which manufactures the 787 Dreamliner. That Trump visited the North Charleston facility rather than the larger Bellevue, Washington facility likely reflected the fact that Trump carried South Carolina in the election, but lost Washington state. Perhaps conveniently, North Charleston is the main manufacturing facility for the 787 Dreamliner, which has not been ordered by Iran Air or Iran Aseman.

After touring the facility, Trump presided over a rally attended by Boeing workers and Muilenberg. “My focus has been all about jobs. And jobs is one of the primary reasons I'm standing here today as your president,” he declared. “I will never, ever disappoint you. Believe me, I will not disappoint you.”

Given the clear parallel between Trump’s speech and Boeing’s positioning of its deals with Iran, it is highly unlikely that Muilenburg and Trump did not discuss Boeing’s Iran business, although there has been no public statement to this effect. It is likewise unlikely that Boeing would have proceeded with the deal with Iran Aseman unless it was reasonably confident in the viability of the deal. Certainly, the executives at Iran Aseman, a privately held airline that has not yet announced a similar deal with Airbus, would have insisted on Boeing’s assurances that the aircraft deliveries were politically viable.

Boeing’s Commitment to Iran

Boeing’s commitment to Iran requires not just political resolve, but also long-term thinking. Not only will these deals take many years to come to fruition—the Iran Air deliveries set to begin in earnest in 2018 and the Iran Aseman deliveries only in 2022—but the full extent of the export opportunity represented by Iran will only materialize over the next two decades.

There are three key considerations that Boeing needs to make. First, the company’s ability to supply aircraft to Iran is of great significance given that it has only one other true global competitor in Airbus. If Boeing is unable to fulfill these agreements it will no doubt lose significant orders to the European giant.  

Second, Iran’s current orders are primarily focused on the modernization of existing fleets and the addition of capacity on existing routes. At the moment, Turkish and Emirates Airlines have significant market share in Iran’s international travel market from Iran because of their ability to operate more flights from destinations in Iran to Europe through their respective hubs in Istanbul and Dubai. European airlines have also made significant inroads in the market in the last two years. For example, although Iran Air only operates flights from Tehran to London three times a week, British Airways now operates a daily service. At the same time, an aging fleet makes Iran Air unappealing to travelers and hurts the airline’s ability to compete with international carriers.

In the next decade, during which time existing fleets would have been modernized, Iran’s economic recovery and its favorable geography should combine to further boost tourist and business travel to Iran from a wider range of international markets. Indeed, the IATA has forecasted that Iran’s passenger volume could rise from 12 million passengers today to 44 million passengers in 2034.

Iran Air currently flies to about 50 destinations worldwide. By comparison, Turkish Airlines, leveraging the geography of its Istanbul hub, now flies to 296 destinations worldwide. It’s unlikely that Iran Air or any Iranian airline has the financial resources and market conditions to become a “mega-carrier”—and indeed these airlines are beginning to struggle. Still, Iranian carriers have significant room for growth, particularly in serving “transit” roles, which means that further orders are possible, especially for long-haul aircraft like the 787 Dreamliner.

Finally, Iran’s most commercially successful airline is privately held Mahan Air. Mahan continues to be listed on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list for the use of its civilian aircraft in airlifting troops and munitions from Iran to Syria. But it’s fleet size of 50 aircraft is significantly greater than Iran Air’s 29 aircraft, and it flies to more destinations with greater regularity and a higher passenger volume. Should Mahan reform its business practices and clarify its ownership, Boeing and Airbus could be competing for another significant set of orders.

Framework for “Business Diplomacy”

For the above reasons, Boeing’s engagement with Iran isn’t about a couple of one-off transactions. It is about a longterm commitment to a market that will generate substantial orders over the next two decades. From a political standpoint, this makes Boeing’s foray into Iran so important.

Whereas US diplomats have no access to Iran and limited direct dialogue with Iranian counterparts, American executives are opening substantial channels of communication. In this sense, leaders like Muilenburg become the unlikely interlocutors between pragmatic commercial and governmental stakeholders in Iran seeking to engage US-Iran relations on a transactional basis, and the American political establishment, most notably President Trump himself.

Boeing’s deals could help build a framework on which to develop US-Iran ties in the coming years. In some respects, Boeing’s situation echoes the aborted Conocophillips oil exploration and production deal from 1995. Likewise heralded as a rekindling of US-Iran ties, the Conoco deal died at the hands of congressional pressure and sanctions legislation. But the Boeing deal may have better prospects for three reasons: it does not require an investment in Iran, the sale of new and safer airplanes principally benefits the Iranian people, and most crucially, it supports American jobs.

The Boeing deals need their own “implementation.” This process will keep critical commercial and political stakeholders engaged in a discussion about what constructive engagement with Iran can achieve. In its first phase, under the auspices of President Trump, the scope of engagement will likely remain limited to protecting aircraft manufacturing jobs. Let’s just hope he doesn’t let the workers down.

Photo Credit: Iran Aseman

Swedish Prime Minister Visits Scania in Iran, A Case Study in Commitment

On Sunday, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven visited the Scania truck factory in Qazvin, 25 miles west of Tehran.

The visit, which was a key stop in the itinerary of the largest Swedish business delegation to ever visit Iran, served as an important milestone for Swedish commercial vehicle company Scania, which has demonstrated remarkable perseverance in the Iranian market over the last two decades. Löfven was able to take a tour of the assembly line and meet with workers at the Qazvin facility, who produce nearly 1000 trucks a year emblazoned with Scania’s famous red griffin badge.  

Scania did not mothball its operations in Iran during the sanctions period, choosing instead to continue manufacturing both trucks and buses while competitors such as Volvo, Renault, and Daimler pulled out of the country. Scania's perseverance required extensive coordination with parent company VAG and European regulators. According to Scania CEO Henrik Henriksson, Scania was able to continue its activities in Iran with the necessary approvals only by “maintaining open books with all relevant authorities.”

While Scania’s global competitors are now moving back into the market (Volvo Trucks, another Swedish firm, was also a member of the delegation), the company enjoys a leading position in both the truck and bus market segments in Iran, controlling 64% and 37% of the respective marketshare.

For Henriksson, these figures are a point of pride. “We stood by our customers,” he declared in an interview with Swedish publication TT. Scania’s CEO has visited Iran seven times in the last year—more than any other country—as the company seeks to expand its local production.

The Swedish company works with two local partners. Mammut Diesel, part of the wider Mammut Industrial Group, has been a partner since 2008 and produced 991 Scania trucks at the Qazvin facility last year. Oghab Afshan, which has been a local partner since 2000, produced 863 Scania buses at its facility outside Esfahan last year. The local parts content of Scania vehicles manufactured in Iran is an impressive 20%, but the company is seeking to increase that proportion to 30% by 2018.

Currently, the annual export value for Sweden represented by Scania’s business in Iran is USD 336 million, but Henriksson believes this figure could double if financial channels to Iran were opened. "It is no secret that it is difficult to do business. Channels must be opened if the market is really to take off," he noted.

In coordination with the Prime Minister’s visit, Scania announced a new contract to supply 1350 buses to Esfahan and four other Iranian cities. The first deliveries are expected by the end of this year. The financing for 1000 of these buses will be made available by Shahr-e Atiyeh, an Iranian investment company.

Scania’s success in Iran can be seen as a case study in commitment. Major multinationals that were able to remain active in the Iranian market during sanctions, in part due to the measured support of their governments back home, now find themselves in market-leading positions as competitors try to catch-up.

But beyond the sheer commercial and operational dominance, the Scania success story is also reflective of a strong cultural and ethical approach typical of Swedish industry. Swedish companies have grown accustomed to high public expectations—Swedish media has called attention to salary levels at Scania's Iranian partner firms— but the application of any true corporate ethics in Iran remains a low priority among many multinational firms in Iran. Scania stands out for having generated significant goodwill with its local partners and Iranian policymakers due to its commitment to knowledge and technology transfer. 

Scania has made significant efforts to bring the green technologies available in the European commercial vehicle market to Iran. Mammut recently signed a trilateral cooperation agreement with Iran’s Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization and the Iranian Fuel Conservation Company to support the replacement of 5,000 aging trucks with Scania models that boast better fuel efficiency and lower emissions.

Speaking in advance of the Prime Minister’s visit, Henriksson stated that the firm is seeking to expand its constructive role. "We can contribute with our skills in leadership and education. We want to take part in the effort to improve the environment and road safety in Iran, and hope to receive the support of the Swedish government for this," he said.

As commercial rewards flow from this value-driven business strategy, Scania can serve as a model to other industrial multinationals and their Iranian local partners.

Photo Credit: Urban Andersson

How Entrepreneurship Can Help Address Unemployment in Iran

Unemployment is a major concern for both labor force participants and for policymakers, especially during periods of economic downturn. Unemployment has been shown to have long-term negative effects on an individual's happiness, even after he or she finds employment. Furthermore, the resultant decrease in tax revenue from unemployment affects many aspects of an economy. Not only is infrastructure investment reduced, but social welfare payments are increased, producing strains on any government. Iran has a considerable unemployment rate (12.2% in July, 2016) and an even higher rate of youth unemployment (26.1% in July, 2016). For decades, the Iranian government has tried unsuccessfully to reverse this trend.

In a number of countries (e.g. Germany, India), self-employment is considered to be an important labor market option for the unemployed. In such countries, governments have successfully developed policies to support unemployed individuals in establishing their own businesses. In both these countries, financial subsidies  are coupled with non-financial support, such as mentoring and training. In Germany, two programs (Start-up Subsidy and Bridging Allowance) have helped the unemployed to successfully reintegrate into the labor market. Participants who fulfill certain criteria enter one of these programs and are allotted a monthly salary for a specified period of time, all the while receiving mentorship and business advice. In India, several programs such as Rozgar Yojana (introduced in 2001), have incentivized candidates to start new ventures. Rozgar Yojana is exclusively designed for unemployed educated youth. Since its inception, the program has provided employment for over 3.8 million candidates.

The Iranian economy would need to achieve a sustained annual economic growth rate of 8% in order to successfully integrate all job-seekers into the labor market—a virtual impossibility even with the post-sanctions rebound. Thus, innovative solutions for unemployment, such as entrepreneurship training programs, are paramount. To date, Iranian policy-makers have neglected to explore this kind of "bottom-up" job creation, despite the fact that 16% of the labor force is already self-employed. 

From a cultural standpoint, significant research suggests that Iranians hold positive attitudes toward entrepreneurship. More importantly, young Iranians have both the ambition and the confidence needed to launch new ventures. What these youth lack is strong government-supported programs and incentives for them to pursue potential self-employment.

Factors that increase the expected benefits of entrepreneurship or decrease its opportunity costs can positively influence an individuals’ tendency to become an entrepreneur. The provision of subsidies and the creation of apprenticeships for the unemployed can encourage entrepreneurship. The most significant deterrent to setting up a business is the lack of start-up capital. The government can provide subsidies to alleviate this problem, particularly as private sources for so-called venture capital remain limited.

Implementing a successful entrepreneurship program for the unemployed must include three components. Firstly, it is important to define specific eligibility criteria for potential candidates. Secondly, the performance of participants must be evaluated throughout the mentorship process. Thirdly, the government must include successful start-ups and other ventures in the design and implementation of such programs. Iran's vital business ecosystem is rife with the elements needed to greatly improve its serious unemployment problem. The government must play a more vital role in remedying the issue.

Moreover, higher levels of human capital investment have been shown to engender entrepreneurship. It is important to note that for many who have recently lost their jobs, clear access to new opportunities is important to keep confidence high. A well-designed re-integration and training program that compensates participants would allow these individuals to consider shaping their own futures through an entrepreneurial project. My research suggests that education is one of the strongest drivers of entrepreneurial performance so courses and mentorship can help unemployed persons to create successful ventures. 

Even if most of these candidates eventually return to working for others, the skills and confidence they would garner would be instrumental for their future job security in a dynamic economy. As long as participants of such programs successfully re-integrate into the labor market, the entrepreneurship program will have reached its aim.

Photo Credit: Thomas Christofoletti

Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Oppose Withdrawing from the Iran Deal

As the one-year anniversary of Implementation Day approaches, a new survey has found that nearly two-thirds of Americans oppose withdrawing from the Iran Deal.

The survey, conducted by the University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, which has conducted extensive public opinion research on both American and Iranian views on the Iran Deal, presented respondents with the main terms of the JCPOA nuclear deal and asked them to evaluate the best course for US policy.

The survey focused in particular on the idea that the United States should withdraw from the Iran Deal, and then seek to renegotiate its terms, a course of action proposed by President-Elect Trump during his campaign.

Across the board, respondents expressed doubt that Iran would agree to renegotiate the deal. A total of 69% of respondents, reflecting 75% of surveyed Democrats and 64% of Republicans, felt Iran’s cooperation was unlikely, even if the rest of the P5+1 came onboard.

Interestingly, while Democrats and Independents felt that the low likelihood of success made renegotiation untenable, with 86% of Democrats and 58% of Independents giving a “final recommendation” to continue with the Iran Deal, just 40% of Republicans came to the same conclusion.

Overall, of the sample of nearly 3,000 respondents contacted in late December of 2016, a significant 64% felt that the US should maintain its commitments to the Iran Deal under the existing terms.   

Steven Kull, director of the center that conducted the study, considered the results to be clear. “Though President-elect Trump campaigned on ripping up the deal and seeking to negotiate a better one, the majority of Americans would rather continue with the deal as long as Iran continues to comply with its terms,” he stated.

Importantly, renegotiating the Iran Deal did not feature in Trump’s promised actions for his first 100-days in office. This may reflect an understanding in the incoming administration renegotiation of the deal is not a priority for the American electorate, and when presented with the facts, most Americans feel that renegotiation is unlikely to lead to a better deal.

For deal supporters, the findings are encouraging and suggest that further public outreach about the deal and its benefits can help protect its political viability as Trump enters the White House.

Photo Credit: Wikicommons

Iran Air's First New Airbus Plane Has Been Spotted in Germany

A plane spotter in Germany named Tobias Gudat has taken the first photo showing what is likely to be the first Airbus aircraft delivered to Iran Air. The grainy photograph captures an Airbus A321 with the registration number EP-IFA sporting Iran Air's updated livery. The plane is currently located at Hamburg's Finkenwerder Airport, which is a private airport used by Airbus for test and delivery flights. 

Gudat posted his image to Flickr on December 15th, the same day that Reuters reported that Airbus had made further progress in its negotiations in Iran. Not only is Airbus expected to finalize its deal with Iran Air "within two weeks." But Iran's Aseman Airlines has separately reached an agreement to lease seven Airbus aircraft from a third party. 

The existence of the plane was first reported by German specialist publication Aero Telegraph on November 18. The plane took its maiden shakedown flight two days earlier, at which point it was unmarked. By December 14, the Iran Air livery was added. 

The photographed A321 is currently the only new Airbus plane assigned to Iran Air. The plane was however originally registered to Colombian airline Avianca and was reassigned to Iran Air prior to its maiden flight. The Aero Telegraph report mentions the possibility that further aircraft currently registered with Avianca and located at Airbus' facility in Spain, could also be assigned to Iran Air. But at the moment no further A321 aircraft, or A330, A350, or A380 aircraft (models originally announced as part of Iran Air's acquisition plan) have been assigned to Iran Air. 

There is significant pressure for Airbus and Iran Air to make the first deliveries as soon as possible. The Airbus deal is seen as a potential watershed for trade and investment in Iran, and will offer the Rouhani administration a powerful symbol that sanctions relief is working. For multinationals and investors the hope is that the successful conclusion of the Airbus deal will raise the comfort level of international banks to transact with Iran. Airbus may also be seeking to ensure the initial delivery is made prior to Donald Trump taking office in the United States. 

Airbus and Iran Air have targeted deliveries in the first quarter of 2017, notably in time for the Iranian presidential election. However, the preparedness of the A321 aircraft currently in Germany raises the prospect that Airbus will make a single early delivery to mark its commitment to its Iranian counterparts. The company will also want to be the first to make a delivery given the simultaneous negotiations between Iran Air and industry rival Boeing. 

The initial contract with Iran Air is likely to cover between 50-60 aircraft out of a total of 118 provisionally stipulated in the agreement signed during President Rouhani's trip to France in January. A successful delivery will make this contract more tangible for all parties, and in particular the Iranian public, who have long demanded newer, safer aircraft. 

Photo Credit: Tobias Gudat

Just $10 Billion Could Fundamentally Change Iran's Economy

As we approach the end of 2016, the most important deal concluded for post-sanctions Iran this year was not among the headline-grabbing agreements signed by Boeing, Airbus, Renault, Siemens, Shell, or Total. Rather, it was a much smaller deal that received absolutely no coverage in the international business media.

In May of this year, German FMCG manufacturer Henkel purchased the remaining shares in its local joint-venture, Henkel Pakvash, taking its ownership to 97.7%. The company was able to deploy EUR 62 million to make the acquisition by purchasing shares on Iran’s Fara Bourse. In August, Henkel subsequently purchased the detergent business of Behdad Chemical for approximately EUR 158 million.

Henkel’s two transactions should be considered the most important of 2016, not only because they were successfully completed (in contrast to many of the larger deals that remain at contract stage), but also because these transactions are reflective of the most important kind of capital deployment for Iran’s near-term economic growth.

Both supporters and opponents of the Iran Deal have been focused on the billion-dollar contracts being made between major multinationals and Iranian state-owned enterprises. The logic is simple. Iran is a large economy and the true economic value of the Iran deal will only be reached when the country receives billions of dollars of foreign direct investment.

Iranian officials have boasted of a USD 50 billion target for FDI in 2016, a massive leap from the USD 2 billion registered the previous year. Reports suggest that Iran will more likely achieve around USD 8 billion. It took the Russian economy eight years (from 1999 to 2007) to see FDI inflows rise from levels commensurate with the current levels in Iran to the USD 50 billion milestone. While the process may take less time in Iran, business leaders and policymakers need to focus on what can be achieved in the next year.

By necessity, larger deals operate on longer timeframes. It will take years for Airbus and Boeing to complete their deliveries, or for Shell and Total to start pumping oil, and for Renault and Daimler to ramp up production. In effect, the contracts signed today will only manifest their full economic value in the next five to ten years.

In the private sector, timeframes for investment are much shorter. As the Henkel deals show, investment in private sector firms can happen quite quickly, even just months after Implementation Day. These transactions are the potential spark for Iran’s economic engine and they represent the overlooked landscape of Iran’s economy. The bulk of untapped economic value lies in the private sector.

Privately-owned companies maintain dominant positions in consumer-facing sectors such as FMCG, food and beverage, pharmaceuticals, consumer technologies, and hospitality and tourism. These companies, some of which are family-owned and some of which are publicly-held, are led by a globalized class of managers, many of whom have studied and lived abroad. Therefore, these companies operate much closer to international best practices for key functions such as accounting, supply chain management, human resource management, and marketing and communications. While many of these firms are under financial duress due to the lasting effects of sanctions, they nonetheless possess strong market share and significant cash flow, making them ripe for turnarounds. Some are in superb financial shape.

Most importantly, these companies are identifiable, if not widely known. While the firms and their owners have remained out of the limelight of Bloomberg, Reuters, or the Wall Street Journal, the grapevine in Tehran has a way of determining which companies deserve to be counted among the top 100, and which are the true standouts. The much talked about “positive list” of clean and compliant companies already exists—one just has to be on the ground in Tehran long enough to catalogue it. This is a small group of companies, at most numbering around one hundred . The very largest of these companies generate around USD 1 billion in revenue. As such, most of these enterprises would require relatively little capital for a strategic or financial investor to take a meaningful, if not a majority, ownership position. This is particularly true if one considers that leveraged buyouts—with debt financing coming from Iran—could be part of the capital solution. Realistically, the value of the purchased stakes, whether majority or minority, would rarely exceed USD 200 million and would probably average between USD 20 to 50 million.

Such transactions are small enough that they would enable the investing company or fund to mitigate the banking sector challenges that are currently throttling Iran trade and investment. The smaller banks that have begun to work with Iran are equipped to handle transactions of this size without breaking their balance sheets. By the same token, it is far easier to convince a large bank to facilitate a smaller transaction on the back of significant investor-led due diligence. Strong evidence for this can be seen in the success of Pomegranate, a Swedish investment fund, in deploying approximately EUR 60 million into Iran's tech sector. 

Looking for one hundred companies with a high average acquisition transaction value of USD 100 million dollars means that a total of just USD 10 billion is needed to trigger a fundamental change in Iran's economy across numerous levels, from company operation to macroeconomic conditions. 

Foreign investment is a protracted process. It will make an impact on the acquisition target at numerous stages, as new strategic shareholders take positions across Iran’s private sector. In the vetting stage, private sector firms will need to prepare themselves for due diligence, taking further steps towards better accounting and corporate governance practices. These firms will also have to embrace internationalization, becoming more knowledgeable of the global commercial landscape, and improving their capacity to engage with foreign investors or partners. When executed, the investment itself will fund knowledge and technology transfers, with the new foreign owner proving their “value-add” by helping the Iranian company make improvements in management and operations.

While the above benefits take place at the microeconomic level, there is a strong body of economic research from Iran that outlines the macroeconomic impact of private sector investment. In 2005, economists Pirasteh Hossein and Farzad Karimi examined how investment priorities in Iran could be aligned to “priorities in production and employment” in order to reduce unemployment and better address “[Iran’s] process of development.” One key finding was that “from an investment point of view, "the service sector and FMCG manufacturing are the two areas that can be considered the “‘great winners’ in generating aggregate employment due to investment.” The authors further note that private firms dominate these sectors. Therefore, “more private sector activity is warranted, since this will spread employment opportunities all over the economy with a faster pace.”

While the paper and its data are over a decade old, the fundamental findings may be even more valid today. Given the date of publication, the authors did not account for the additional impact of post-sanctions investment. They could not have predicted the great strides the private sector has made over the last decade. Certainly, there is ample research that establishes the “positive correlation between growth of national incomes and private investment ratios.” Research also shows that foreign direct investment drives greater private domestic investment in what is called a “crowding in” effect.

Finally, in today's world, trade flows are fickle. An anti-globalist turn in politics makes trade a weaker link for constructive international relations. For Iran to achieve true integration into the global economy, shareholder equity will be the tie that binds. By bringing more foreign shareholders into it's economy, Iran will rise in importance in the economic agendas of its European partners.

A direct investment of USD 10 billion is smaller than the total value of the Boeing/Iran Air deal. Growth capital, triggering value-creation, is what is needed at this crucial moment. Deploying a mere USD 10 billion of such resources into Iran's private sector in the next few years will create more economic value than pouring even larger amounts of capital into mature, state-owned enterprises. Investors and policymakers should take note. 

Photo Credit: Henkel

How Rex Tillerson's Oil Industry Politics Could Boost the Iran Deal

It has been widely reported that Rex Tillerson is to be named the next Secretary of State, ending speculation about perhaps the consequential cabinet post for the prospects of Iran policy in the Trump administration.

Tillerson’s appointment has shocked many. As the Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, he has no formal diplomatic or political experience. Tillerson is also a friend of Vladimir Putin, having built his name as a regional executive for ExxonMobil in the Caspian region in the late 1990s.

Some commentators have suggested that Tillerson’s appointment as Secretary of State will bring the back-room politics of the global oil industry into the heart of American foreign policy. Given the problematic role that oil companies have played in international relations, this may give cause for concern. However, for the prospects of Iran Deal implementation in the Trump administration, Tillerson’s appointment could represent the entry of a pragmatic figure who can look beyond the ideological fixations of people like John Bolton, his reported deputy. Tillerson’s public comments offer clues to his outlook.

Tillerson Does Not Believe in Sanctions

In a May 2014 ExxonMobil shareholder meeting, Tillerson stated, “We do not support sanctions, generally, because we don’t find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensively and that’s a very hard thing to do.” For a global company like ExxonMobil, which works in politically tumultuous markets, sanctions are an inherent risk to business. For example, Exxon has a pending project with Rosneft worth a reported USD 300 billion that is unable to proceed due to US sanctions. 

Given that there has been a renewed call in Washington for new, non-nuclear sanctions to be levied on Iran, Tillerson’s general disbelief in the efficacy of sanctions is important. This is particularly the case as Europe, China, and Russia have each signaled that they will not cooperate with any US attempt to renegotiate the Iran Deal—making comprehensive implementation of any new sanctions impossible.

Tillerson Wanted To Get Exxon Into Iran

In an interview with CNBC from March of this year, Tillerson made it clear that he saw Iran as an attractive market for ExxonMobil, despite US sanctions. He stated:

U.S. companies like ours are still unable to conduct business in Iran. A lot of our European competitors are in, working actively. I don't know that-- that we're necessarily at a disadvantage. The history of Iranian-- in foreign investment in the past, their terms were always quite challenging, quite difficult. We--never had large investments in Iran for that reason. And I don't know that the Iranians are gonna be any different today. We'll have to wait and see and there hasn't been any contracts put out. But I also learned a long time ago that sometimes being the first in is not necessarily best. We'll wait and see if things open up for U.S. companies. We would certainly take a look because it's a huge resource-owning country.

Since he made these comments, Iran has unveiled its new IPC oil contracts and oil majors Total, Shell and DNO have all signed heads of agreement outlining the terms of new investments in oil and gas production in Iran. Tillerson will see his former peers at the oil majors making huge strides in the market and will likely see this as a perfectly natural development for an economy coming out of an onerous sanctions regime.

Tillerson Sees Multinationals as Private Empires

As described in Steve Coll’s increasingly relevant history of the firm, Private Empire, ExxonMobil developed into the world’s largest company by pursuing interests very different from those of the US foreign policy. Tillerson’s predecessor, Lee “Iron Ass” Raymond once declared, “I am not a U.S. company and I don’t make decisions based on what’s good for the U.S.” For all intents and purposes, Tillerman, who rose through the ranks at Exxon, absorbed this outlook.

Raymond’s statement is particularly noteworthy given the intense focus of the current U.S. sanctions regime on defining U.S. and non-U.S. entities or persons and delineating the scope of Iran business that is accordingly permissible. The dilemma facing many of the world’s largest multinationals and financial institutions is that while they do not necessarily see themselves as “U.S. companies,” they are nonetheless treated as such by U.S. regulators. As a result, business interests in Iran become much more difficult to operate.

Tillerson may be sympathetic to rising calls from major European multinationals across industries for the U.S. to be more proactive in the implementation of the Iran Deal, and in particular, to reduce the extraterritorial nature of its regulatory oversight by changing the extent to which global companies can be reduced to US legal entities.

What About Miles’ Law?

There is an old adage of political science called Miles’ Law that describes how perspectives on policy change depending on one's position within the state bureaucracy: “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”

It may be that in assuming the role of Secretary of State, Tillerson will adopt a more inherently political and therefore oppositional attitude towards Iran. Certainly figures like John Bolton will seek to push Iran policy in a much more hawkish direction.

But Tillerson will ostensibly have the greatest authority in the ongoing treatment of the Iran Deal, inheriting the hands-on role defined by Secretary Kerry. As an oil industry CEO named "Rex," he likely has the advantage over Bolton in getting subordinates to bend to his will. Trump is also more likely to see Tillerson as a peer. 

The present implementation of the deal benefits from the expertise and management of career civil servants like Ambassador Stephen Mull and Chris Backemeyer, who could be encouraged to stay on the Iran file if Tillerson adopts a pragmatic approach. Tillerson could run his State Department as a private empire, allowing the overall tenor of the incoming administration’s foreign policy to be defined by Trump and his more vocal acolytes, but ensuring that the execution of State’s diplomatic aims retains a more businesslike, if not outrightly commercial, logic. This would not be too dissimilar from the operation of the Iranian MFA within the overall context of the political posturing of the Islamic Republic. 

Those who support the deal can find some comfort in the idea that a career of training in the realist politics of the oil industry may make Tillerson a more pragmatic voice in Trump’s cabinet, one which may see the Iran Deal as an appropriate measure that addresses key security concerns, but also provides the world’s private empires desired access to a promising market. 

Photo Credit: Fortune

Smarter Iran Policy Could Give Trump Leverage to Protect American Jobs

Last week, President-Elect Donald Trump and Vice-President Elect Mike Pence traveled to Indianapolis, Indiana to save American jobs. In a speech at a manufacturing facility of Carrier Corporation, a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation (UTC), Trump announced that the company would preserve approximately 1000 jobs it had planned to outsource to Mexico and would make a new investment to preserve the competitiveness of its Indiana manufacturing facility. In exchange for its compliance, UTC would receive significant tax incentives.

The Wall Street Journal editorial board called the Carrier intervention a “shakedown,” and it was shocking to many that President-Elect Trump would go so far as to interfere in the decision-making of a private enterprise in order to preserve a small number of jobs.

By a similar token, members of the business and policy communities were dismayed to learn that the Trump administration may seek to interfere in the Iran Deal more deliberately and quickly than previously thought. While Trump was making his announcement at Carrier in Indianapolis, the U.S. Senate voted unanimously to renew the Iran Sanctions Act. The following day, it emerged in a report in the Financial Times that the Tump transition team is exploring new non-nuclear sanctions.

But what if Trump is missing out on the chance to win big on both job creation and Iran policy by connecting the two efforts? The potential nexus of Iran policy and jobs policy is clear. Either Iran can be a direct destination for American-made goods, unleashing a new and highly valuable export market, or, Trump can use his powers to permit non-U.S. companies to more freely trade with Iran, offering a growth opportunity that may enable executives to forego cost-saving layoffs in the US. 

Indiana, where Trump and Pence stood up for American jobs, illustrates the salience of Iran to American business interests quite well. Nearly every major multinational corporation with operations in Indiana, counting among them many of the state’s largest employers, have had or currently maintain business dealings with Iran.

When Trump met with Gregory J. Hays, CEO of UTC, at Trump Tower to negotiate the preservation of the jobs at Carrier in Indianapolis, he probably did not realize that instead of offering a tax incentive, he could easily use his future executive powers to enable Carrier and UTC to resume doing business in Iran, a market that was once highly lucrative. 

In 1972, Carrier invested USD $2.4 million (equivalent to nearly USD $15 million today) in order to acquire 50% of Carrier Thermo Frig (CTF), an Iranian manufacturing joint-venture. CTF operated until the Islamic Revolution, growing steadily and paying its shareholders a dividend of just over USD $1 million in 1978 (equivalent to nearly USD $4 million today). While the numbers may seem small, it is worth considering the unrealized growth potential. In neighboring Turkey, Carrier Corporation currently owns 50% of Alarko Carrier, a manufacturing venture similar to that of the former CTF. In 2016, Alarko Carrier generated USD $131 million in revenue.

Today one can still find Carrier air condition units in Iran. Some are old models from the CTF days, others are newer models imported via the grey market. These are serviced by Sarma Afarin Industrial Co. a publicly traded company, which emerged from CTF when Carrier pulled out from Iran in 1979. Sarma Afarin still manufactures climate control units based on Carrier designs.

A couple of days after announcing the Carrier outcome, Trump turned his attention to Rexnord, a diversified industrial company. 

Rexnord of Indiana is moving to Mexico and rather viciously firing all of its 300 workers. This is happening all over our country. No more!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) December 3, 2016

Just like Carrier, Rexnord had direct business dealings in Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution, and then continued supplying Iran through non-U.S. subsidiaries. The company only began to completely wind down its trade with Iran through in 2009, according to regulatory filings. Iranian companies continue to source and service Rexnord systems through the secondary market.

The incoming administration should realize that the Carrier and Rexnord cases are not exceptions when it comes to Indiana or America's Iran business ties. For example, Indiana is a leader in the American pharmaceutical industry. One of the state’s largest employers is Eli Lilly, which has its global headquarters in Indianapolis. According to regulatory disclosures, the company currently supplies “medicines for patient use in Iran.” The company exports to Iran and conducts related activities “in accordance with our corporate policies and licenses issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.” The encouragement of the Trump administration would certainly help Eli Lilly penetrate the Iranian market, which is becoming a goldmine for European pharmaceutical companies. American firms are being left out. 

Indianapolis is also home to the sprawling North America headquarters of Switzerland's Roche Diagnostics, which researches, develops, and manufactures laboratory equipment for the analysis of medical samples. Under licenses and exemptions for medical equipment, Roche exports diagnostic equipment to Iran through its local agent, Akbarieh. While Roche products manufactured in Indiana are not imported directly to Iran, the research and development performed in Indianapolis informs the rollout of products in the country. Other sections of Roche’s business are operated locally by Roche Pars, a wholly-owned Iranian subsidiary established in August, 2013. Roche Pars is currently the fastest growing pharmaceutical company in Iran, registering 50% annual sales growth as it approaches 5% market share.

Indiana boasts a proud history of transportation manufacturing. The state is home to the world’s sole manufacturing plant for Toyota’s midsize Highlander SUV. While the Highlander is not currently sold in Iran, Toyota’s RAV4 and Corolla models are strong sellers with nearly 4,000 models sold since March of this year. The Highlander would likely do very well, as two of its direct competitors are among the most popular imported models in the country. The Hyundai Santa Fe is Iran’s top selling imported car, followed closely by the Kia Sorento. However, if the Trump-Pence team did decide to unleash Indiana’s mighty Highlander on the Iranian market, they would have to extend an olive branch first, as Iranian legislators have blocked the import of US-manufactured automobiles in retaliation for the US renewal of the Iran Sanctions Act.

According to a 2012 filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Cummins, a world-leader in diesel engines and generators, continued exports to Iran via its European subsidiary until 2010, when sales totaled approximately USD $1.3 million. Just two years earlier, sales were USD $5.7 million. As sanctions have tightened, third party importers have stepped in to divert generators produced in Cummins’ factories in places like Chongqing, China and Pune, India to Iran. Neither Cummins, nor the workers at its Seymour, Indiana factory, now benefit from what was once a promising market. 

Rolls Royce’s Indianapolis facility produces “more Rolls-Royce products... than anywhere else in the world” according to its website. While this facility primarily produces small to medium civil aircraft engines and marine and helicopter engines that are not currently exported to Iran, the company has expressed that it welcomes Iran Air’s pending acquisition of Airbus aircraft that will be powered by the larger Rolls-Royce Trent-series engines. In addition, the company is reportedly in talks with Iranian energy authorities to determine whether Rolls-Royce diesel and gas generation systems can be acquired as part of upgrades to Iran’s power infrastructure.

There are almost certainly other companies in Indiana that would benefit from an enabling of trade ties with Iran. In 2014, NIAC, an advocacy group, published a report that examined the total value of US export revenue to Iran forgone between 1995 and 2012 due to the imposition of sanctions. The researchers found the total value of lost exports to be as high as USD $175 billion. In addition, the lost exports translate to an average of 66,000 jobs lost each year. 

Even in the American heartland of Indiana, the economy depends on the success of major multinational corporations, some headquartered locally, others operating foreign outposts. For nearly all of these companies, Iran is a market of significant interest.  If the Trump administration wants to be known for its business acumen, it should think more creatively as to how best to incentivize global corporations to preserve American jobs. Rather than using public pressure and tax incentives to compel global companies, Trump should offer opportunities that encourage growth and ambition.

Given the renewal of the Iran Sanctions Act, it remains the prerogative of the executive branch to green-light Iran trade through the provision of OFAC licenses. Donald Trump has clearly realized that his new role as President-Elect gives him immense influence over some of the world’s largest corporations. He should use that leverage to give big business what it wants—new markets in which to compete. For the workers at Carrier, Rexnord, Eli Lilly, Roche, Toyota, Cummins, and Rolls Royce, anything that reduces the pressure on their executives to slash costs could make all the difference. Currently, European products dominate Iran's marketplace. Products made in Indiana—and indeed in all fifty states—could find a hugely receptive market in Iran. The Trump administration would be wise to take heed. 

Photo Credit: Wikicommons

Iran's First "Airport City" Blueprints a New Way of Doing Business

Travelers to Tehran often wonder why Iman Khomeini International Airport (IKIA) was built so far from downtown Tehran, requiring at least an hour's drive and often much more given the city's notorious traffic. Many Iranians miss the ability to fly to international destinations from the centrally located Mehrabad Airport, from which IKIA inherited all international flights in 2007. But while Mehrabad is a 20th century airport built to serve Tehran, Iman Khomeini is built for the 21st century, with a wider range of priorities in mind. Today, airports are the key engine of economic growth for cities competing in a globalized economy and in the last decade airport development has become a central focus for urban planners and economists alike. The 2011 book Aerotropolis, written by John Kasarda, Director at the Center for Air Commerce at the University of North Carolina's Kenan-Flagler Business School, helped establish the concept of the "airport city." Kasarda argues that the airport deserves a more central role in how urban spaces are created. He writes, "Rather than banish airports to the edge of town and then do our best to avoid them, we will build this century's cities around them."

The master plan for IKIA includes the vision to create a world-class aerotropolis by building a city around IKIA. The Ministry of Roads & Urban Development has positioned IKIA to investors as "an international crossroad connecting north to south and east to west" which "makes it profoundly eligible to evolve as a regional hub, leading to [the development of ] an Airport City or an Aerotropolis." This is precisely why the airport was built so far from Tehran; it needed room for a new city to grow. Moreover, the airport was meant to connect geographies, and is accessible from Semnan Province in the east, Qom and Isfahan provinces to the south, Markazi Province to the southwest, and Alborz and Qazvin Provinces to the West.

Our firm, Rah Shahr International Group, spent several years developing the master plan concept for Iran's first such airport city, the Imam Khomeini Airport City. In this plan, the airport becomes a nucleus around which commercial centers, residential zones, and transport infrastructure would be organized. The IKIA Airport City will hopefully decentralize a good portion of Tehran's congestion by moving many offices and businesses to the new mega-site. We estimate that IKIA Airport City will require USD $50 billion of investment.

The scope and size of the IKIA project echoes Kasarda's view of airports as "components of large technical systems" that work like machines to create logistical efficiency and economic productivity. In the technical system for IKIA, there will be four major zones, an Aviation Zone (2,800 hectares), a Free Economic Zone (1,500 hectares), a Special Economic Zone (2,500 hectares), and a Mixed-Use Zone (7,000 hectares). Each zone will in turn house different facilities such as light industry, hotel and convention spaces, warehouses and logistics centers, commercial offices, and even public parks. To work effectively, these zones will need to be linked by road and rail to Tehran and Iran's four corners in a "smart" transport network. The main highway from Tehran to Bandar Abbas (with access to Isfahan and Shiraz) passes by IKIA to the East. Saveh Highway passes to the West. In terms of rail access, the extension of the Tehran metro network to a new terminus at IKIA, which is nearing completion, reflects a positive first step. The proposed Isfahan-Tehran high-speed bullet train will connect through IKIA.

Clearly, the master plan for IKIA is one of the most ambitious in Iran, and it will therefore require Iran to innovate new ways of fostering cooperation and economic development between a wide range of stakeholders. This may be the most important legacy of the airport city project. Airports and their surrounding developments rely on enterprise zones and tax abatements to attract tenants, urban development corporations to manage the project delivery, and public-private partnerships to fund the construction of critical infrastructure. As anthropologist Brenda Chaflin explains about the airport in today's globalized world, "Redesigned and reimagined, the airport is... a site of contestation and collaboration between a plethora of state overseers and the private sector, including architecture and construction firms, investors, and development banks." Getting these different groups to cooperate will be a significant challenge, but it may also be the critical outcome for Iran's long-term economic success. IKIA can serve as a testbed for developers, contractors, and investors from both Iran and abroad.

We can already see evidence of new collaborations at IKIA. In 2015, the Ministry of Roads & Urban Development established the IKIA Airport City Company to serve as the contracting party in public-private partnerships around airport city development. Through this entity, the government negotiated a joint-venture with French construction firm Bouygues and French airports operator Aéroports de Paris (AdP) to construct a new passenger terminal in a USD $2.8 billion deal that would increase airport capacity to 20 million passengers per annum in the first phase. A possible further three phases have been planned that would take the airport though 90 million passengers per annum in total capacity.

When such agreements are concluded, the challenge will be to secure financing. One of debates surrounding infrastructure development in Iran is whether the country should be looking to the West or East for support. Given the current economic conditions in Iran, the contractor, not the client, is expected to bring the majority of financing. Chinese infrastructure firms have proven their ability to fund infrastructure projects in Iran, particularly prior to the lifting of sanctions. Though Iranian officials would prefer to use European technology and expertise, most European firms have limited means to finance projects. But as a recent report on Iran from aviation industry body CAPA notes, airport development is so strategic that it may be possible for Iran to work with both sides. French and Chinese companies are already involved in financing development and renovation of Mashhad Airport through the Iran Airports Holding Company, the national airports operator. Moreover, the reports points out that "The French and Chinese have got used to working with each other. France's Toulouse Airport is managed by two Chinese companies, and relations between the two governments are positive." As the Wall Street Journal has reported, companies from South Korea and the Netherlands are also involved in consulting on aspects of airport city development. In this way, IKIA might be a project so large that it enables cooperation across a wide range of countries seeking to invest in Iran, with both economic and political dividends for the country.

In this way, the lesson of the IKIA Airport City project is that Iran's next phase of infrastructure development must focus on both physical and organizational integration. Physical integration means positioning IKIA and Iran's other airports as part of a larger transport system, improving the mobility of goods and people both within Iran and across its borders. Organizational integration means using airports as specific sites to bring different companies from different countries into closer collaboration, even in investing and developing the airports themselves. Taken together, a new way of doing business becomes clear. The subtitle of Kasarda's Aerotropolis claims that the airport city is "the way we will live next." For Iran, there is another important outcome to consider. The creation of airport cities will teach us how we will do business next in Iran.

Photo Credit: AdP

The Politics of Sanctions Relief in Iran: Three Roles for the Private Sector

As politicians and analysts consider the wisdom of offering Iran sanctions relief in exchange for restrictions on the country’s nuclear program, a key stakeholder group remains unaccounted for in the debate – the private sector.

Iran’s private sector stands to gain the most from sanctions relief, and they are uniquely positioned to advance the agenda of normalization through their interactions with both domestic and international business people. Corporate leaders are poised to play three vital roles— interlocutors, stewards, and creators—without which the long awaited nuclear deal will not successfully improve the economic situation in Iran in the way many Iranians anticipate. Policymakers must take account of the relationship between sanctions relief and private sector leadership for the deal to have its much-awaited impact.

In the aftermath of a deal, Iran’s private sector business leaders will be the ideal actors to pick up where the diplomats leave off. These individuals, with global outlooks and ambitions, have already begun reaching out to their peers in the West. And while this outreach is primarily about securing new investment and business opportunities for themselves, it also offers an opportunity to present Iran in a new light, and undo the effects of political vilification and cultural misconception. 

The notion of “business diplomacy” has emerged in the last decade as a serious topic of strategic thought, suggesting that the business executive can serve as a special kind of “ambassador.” And in the transition from high-stakes diplomacy to the “business as usual” mentality expected from a détente between Iran and the West, business diplomacy is the essential intermediate step. 

But in order to take on this role, Iran’s private sector business leaders will need a place at the table.  They must be welcome to visit Western countries much the same way American and European trade delegations have begun visiting Iran. Sanctions, stigma, and arcane visa policies should not prevent an Iranian CEO from coming to London, Paris, or New York to discuss his country and his company in the hope of finding an investor or partner. On the contrary, this should be welcomed as a necessary and productive kind of engagement.  

If Iran’s private sector business leaders can consolidate their economic position on the back of foreign investment and trade, they will be able to take on a vital role as stewards of a nuclear deal.  

For the average Iranian, the nuclear deal has one fundamental promise: greater prosperity. The mechanism embraced by the United States and its allies of using sanctions as a coercive policy tool has had the effect of conditioning Iranians in an almost Pavlovian way— geopolitical strife begets economic pain. Consequently, the signal of political accord and the “relief” of sanctions seems to be triggering the expectation of the relief of this economic pain, and even that of economic reward. Indeed, as opinion polls suggest, President Rouhani’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian public hinges on his rebuilding of the economy.  

But the rollback of sanctions will not bring about relief unless it translates directly into an increased flow of goods, services, and capital into Iran. Following the change in the Iran regulatory environment, only private sector companies will be able to establish the flows necessary for economic growth— whether to introduce vital pharmaceuticals, the latest fashions, or investment funds into the country.

Iran’s private sector is uniquely positioned to create value for Iran’s long-term development. Value creation, as a concept of management, entails the proper treatment of shareholders, employees, and customers as part of corporate social responsibility. When value creation is more than the policy of a single business, and instead reflects the ethos of a whole industry or economic sector, private enterprise can take on a true social significance.

In this sense, Iran’s private sector firms, if properly empowered, can serve as the anchor for Iranian civil society. Through a commitment to corporate citizenship, companies can become advocates for the citizenry within the context of Iranian political economy.

In the current situation, the Iranian state and private enterprise compete for access to limited resources and capital. Livelihoods are either tied to a state affiliate or to a private concern Knowing this, class and cultural divisions are exacerbated by economic antagonism. Issues of public health, environmental degradation, educational policy, and legal protection will not be effectively addressed.

The Islamic Republic’s support for privatization has been surprisingly persistent, if unfulfilled. The technocrats are well aware that state owned enterprises struggle to generate economic gains of real value.

The Rouhani administration is committed to privatization and to the success of the non-governmental sector in Iran. The aim is to give new actors a voice in the wider arena of public affairs.  

This commitment has been signaled since the early days of the administration's tenure, and in Rouhani's cabinet’s engagement of the current crop of Iran’s private sector business leaders. The logic is clear. The Iranian state ought to focus on security and governance, and rent seeking should be formalized through taxation. 

But in the history of modern Iran, and especially in the age of globalization, economic policy has never been a national prerogative.

The imposition of sanctions and their aftermath are testament to this fact. As key actors in Iran try to turn over a new leaf, it is up to the P5+1 to empower Iran’s private sector as interlocutors, stewards, and creators, and thereby ensure that policy treats such empowerment not as an afterthought, but as an intended effect of a nuclear deal. Sanctions relief ought not to be seen as merely the quid-pro-quo of any final nuclear agreement. It is truly the sine-qua-non of everything promised by the ongoing détente. 

Photo Credit: AP Photo/Michael Euler

Masters of Montage: Peugeot and Iran's Auto Industry

Earlier this month, Iran's leading auto manufacturer, Iran Khodro (IKCO), announced the re-entry of its French joint venture partner PSA Peugeot Citroen into the Iranian automobile market. The new deal carries special significance as it brings with it the potential for new models to be introduced into an Iranian market where designs created in the 1980s are still produced and sold. Additionally, the announced deal would see 30% of Iranian produced Peugeot cars exported to regional markets. As Iran Khodro’s managing director Hashem Yekke-Zare emphasized, the deal promises to create a regional auto manufacturing hub in the Persian Gulf.  

Speaking to the breadth of the deal, Yekke-Zare said "the terms and conditions of the contract are not comparable with any of the previously signed agreements with Peugeot." The news of the revised auto-production deal even managed to get Iranian investors excited as shares of Iran Khodro nudged up despite a stock market still sluggish given the lack of positive indicators from the ongoing nuclear negotiations.

While news of the new joint-venture was only reported in the Iranian press, leaving its veracity unclear, the importance of a possible nuclear agreement to a resurgence in automobile manufacturing in Iran, particularly by Renault and Peugeot, has been long anticipated in the international business press.

As part of the new deal, Iran Khodro would be expected to meet Peugeot's production guidelines in an effort to bring the Iranian-made cars in line with the overall international standard. The Peugeot 405 GLX and Peugeot Pars (405 variant) remain big sellers among locally produced cars for their low price and plentiful supply of locally produced spare parts. But the overall build-quality lags behind the French-made versions, and a new manufacturing agreement would seek to remedy this.

Iran’s auto industry has typically relied on the domestic assembly of foreign models, a process known locally by the French term montage. In the mid-twentieth century, Iran Khodro democratized car ownership in Iran by producing the tough and affordable Paykan, which was based on the British Hillman Hunter design. In subsequent years, French brands became more popular.

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, both Iran Khodro and its main competitor Saipa, struggled to sign contracts with foreign joint venture partners. Eventually, Saipa would begin the domestic assembly of the much maligned, but now ubiquitous South Korean designed Kia Pride. Iran Khodro produced a more premium product in the form of the French designed Peugeot 405 sedan and 206 hatch. All three of these models have been produced in their millions in Iran (IKCO's top year of production was 2011, with 1.7 million vehicles produced).

The sanctions relief permitted for Iran’s automotive industry as part of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action agreement did enable a 43% rise in production in 2014 (after an effective industry shut down in 2012-2013), supported by increased demand due to a stabilizing economy. In terms of market share, available figures from January 2015 suggest that the Peugeot 405 was the top selling car in Iran, outpacing the much cheaper Saipa Pride. The higher-end version of the 405, the Peugeot Pars, was also a strong seller, with a 54% increase in production.

Usually, such strong sales figures would be a signal of a healthy auto industry. But in Iran, the huge demand for these dated models speaks more to an overall dearth of options. 20 year old designs continue to roll off assembly lines, having had only minimal upgrades. Iranian consumers are ready for newer, safer, and more efficient models.

For this reason, excitement over a new deal with Peugeot serves as a reminder of the tough times that had befallen the Iranian automotive production industry over the last decade. If the reports in the Iranian press are to be believed, Peugeot is angling to take advantage of their market dominance by offering new models for montage. Yet, despite the fact that the Peugeot lion logo is affixed to so many cars in Iran, it is hard to say whether Iranians will remain brand loyal when more options arrive in the market. Already, Chinese, Korean, and even domestically designed IKCO models are chipping away at Peugeot’s traditional market share.

Time is not on the company's side. Sooner or later a nuclear deal will be reached, and Iranian car companies small and large, new and old are likely to be offered a wide variety of contracts to produce a wider range of models. How will the Iranian car auto manufacturing look in five years? The jury is out on the direction of the industry, but a look into the state of the competition serves as a potentially useful guide.

Renault, Peugeot's largest competitor in both France and Iran, has also prepared itself for an eventual easing of sanctions. The company recently offered two new "affordable" models to Iranian consumers in the way of the latest versions of the Renault Clio and Captur models.

Renault is actually the French company to most recently introduce a new model to Iran, providing complete knock-down-kits (CKDs) of its Tondar model, sold in Europe as the Dacia Logan. Significantly, Renault’s strategy offers a different look into how cars are produced and sold in Iran. Renault has not employed the same JV tactics that Peugeot has favored, rather licensing its Tondar model for production by three Iranian companies.

Further, the Wall Street Journal reported in January that Renault last year wrote off about €500 million (roughly USD $580 million) that it had accumulated over the years from sales in Iran, stating that under current banking restrictions it cannot repatriate the money. In what would be a bold strategic move, Renault executives have discussed buying a stake in Iranian manufacturer Pars Khodro using some of those stranded funds, according to people familiar with the matter.

Saipa, Iran's second largest producer has also been on the offensive in recent years. The company most notable for the multiple iterations of the 1980's boxy Kia Pride or Saipa 131 has begun producing knock-down-kits from a range of Chinese car manufacturers–nine models in all–along with a four locally produced small cars. The jump in the number of models with Chinese automotive makers underscores the tenuousness of Peugeot’s market advtantage.

Consumer reports suggest that Iranian car buyers will quite happily make the jump to other car brands, and increasingly to Chinese brands. Iranian car buyers have tired of the cars offered by the oligopoly of local producers and yearn for newer models (updated dashboard and facelifted headlights no longer suffice). Moreover, apprehensions of the quality of Chinese cars are slowly diminishing due to the continually improving safety ratings of the updated models.

Modiran Vehicle Manufacturing (MVM) produces local versions of popular low cost models of China's Chery Automobiles. MVM sought to compete directly with IKCO and Peugeot with inexpensive cars for Iranian consumers. Appreciating the up-to-date styling and features, Iranian drivers took up their offer in their droves. These days, many of the smaller vehicle manufacturers in Iran have either started producing or hope to produce  variants of Chinese cars. This is likely the largest threat to Peugeot and Iran Khodro in the next 5 to 10 years. This also explains Saipa’s stance of doing away with expenditure on R&D and throwing its lot in with Chinese manufacturers.

The future of Iran’s automotive industry will drive the country’s manufacturing sector at large. Iran’s ability to both diversify its economy, and capitalize on its strong consumer base will depend on the capacity for companies like IKCO and Saipa to produce desirable cars. The principal question is whether the bulk of those cars will be of French, Korean, Chinese, or even domestic designs. The longstanding prevalence of Peugeot may be fortified in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement, but inroads by France’s Renault, Korea’s Kia and Hyundai, and Chinese brands like Chery, may change the composition of Iran’s streets and highways for good. 

Photo Credit: Ran When Parked

Let It Rule: Imperatives for Central Bank of Iran

“And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.” A central bank’s power is somewhat like God’s, at least in monetary terms, as a former governor of the Central Bank of Iran once said. This is true for the world's most influential central banks such the Fed, ECB, BOJ and BOE or the SNB. The Swiss National Bank's recent move to abandon a self-imposed peg of the Swiss franc against the euro, introduced in 2011, sent the Franc soaring against the Euro by almost 40 percent, is a testament to the power they exert.

But, the CBI is far from wielding the power and independence that its foreign counterparts enjoy.

The bank is under strict financial sanctions, which have diminished its foreign reserves. Thus it has lost face in the foreign exchange market. Gone are the days when remarks by its governor calmed traders. In recent years, even its actions have little effect. In 2012, the bank had to resort to closing down all currency trade in a bid to halt the collapse of the rial, when vows to stabilize exchange rates and financial intervention failed. At that point the bank had overplayed its hand so much so that traders saw the bank reactionary and imprudent. Little has changed in this regard.

Defenders of the bank might counter that the siege on the CBI for allegedly circumventing sanctions against Iran's nuclear energy program is the source of its ineptitude. And yes, having $100 billion trapped overseas does hurt a lot. But that's not all.

Just look at the list of issues the bank is contending with and you'll see that even with a $100 billion, the leopard doesn't change its spots!

It is struggling to bring 7,000 rogue financial institutions, including one Ayandeh bank, under its supervision. The CBI has tried and failed to decrease interest rates for the past year. But, the same institutions have not complied, leading to drainage of deposits from banks towards their coffers.  

Furthermore, past monetary decisions by the central bank and the former government have led to tens of billions of dollars of toxic debt on the balance sheets of state-owned commercial lenders, in turn driving them towards property speculation. The central bank is seeking to undo this knot in a civilized way, without undue panic and bankruptcies. Results will materialize slowly, if at all.

When we consider the inability to craft effective policy, at the heart of the matter are the limitations on the central bank's legal powers and its authority to make key decisions.

In most developed countries, monetary policy is the domain of a central bank’s governors. Not so in Iran. The money and credit council, a body within the central bank but controlled by the government, sets monetary policy, not the governor and his deputies. This essentially makes the bank an arm of the Ministry of Finance.

The bank also plays the role of the treasury for the government. It receives oil revenues, and then prints rials and distributes the funds to various government branches. Sometimes the foreign receipt part doesn't take place, thus curbing the bank's control over inflation.

And even when the policies are made, the bank is too feeble to implement them. It doesn't have the capability to exert pressure on banks or the currency market, let alone combat those who defy its commands.

So how can investors and business leaders ask for inflation to be restrained, monetary policy to be set and the currency's value to be stabilized, if they are to rely on such a central bank?

Luckily, the solution is simple enough, at least on paper. A separation of powers is necessary. Monetary policy should be detached from fiscal policy, and the bank should be isolated from politics.

To do so, the bank should be given full autonomy on monetary matters, a structure similar to that enjoyed by its counterparts in developed nations. A system of governance, where by all three branches of government have a degree of influence in the bank's governance would better guarantee the bank's autonomy. But this would require a change in the constitution, a lengthy and difficult process.

Furthermore, the central bank's legal clout and ability to exert power on its turf needs augmentation. Its influence has to cut through the lobbying of vested interests. Its responses to crime must become rapid. For this it needs more legal powers and a wider array of financial tools to help it set and oversee monetary policy. Again lawmakers must empower the bank for the benefit of investor, business leaders, and the economy at large. 

Many officials in the current administration have expressed their desire to give CBI greater autonomy and new legislation is under work to give the bank some new powers. But a half-hearted will not be effective. What is needed is a fully independent central bank, as enshrined in law and in the deference of the financial sector at large. After all a strong and independent central bank will help iron-out the full range of economic policies. We ought to let the governor rule his domain.

Photo Credit: mebanknotes.com