Are Sanctions Boosting Corporate Profits in Iran?

Last year I wrote a major report examining how the inflation generated by sanctions hurts households in Iran. In the report, I note evidence of “the increased cost of inputs being passed on to consumers.” In other words, citing anecdotal evidence, I suggested that Iranian firms were raising prices to protect their margins and that this was contributing to inflation. But the report lacked a substantive review of how firms react to the pressures created by financial and sectoral sanctions. 

Firm behaviour under sanctions is understudied. The widespread assumption is that sanctions are bad for business. After all, they create significant dysfunction in the targeted economy. But the firm-level evidence is mixed. Sanctions do not tend to drive firms out of business, suggesting that companies find ways to adjust to the obvious cost pressures. Hadi Esfahani’s firm-level research has shown that “exits” (companies going out of business) played only a small role in changes in output, employment, and exports following the imposition of financial and sectoral sanctions in Iran in 2012. Saeed Ghasseminejad and Mohammad Jahan-Parvar’s study of Iranian companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2016 provides evidence that sanctions negatively impact profitability, but even sanctioned firms remained profitable in the period of their study. The profitability of firms that were subject to sectoral sanctions fell from an average of 16 percent to 11 percent—the margins remained healthy.

But what are the processes that are enabling Iranian firms to adjust to sanctions? A potential answer can be found in a new paper by Isabella Weber and Evan Wasner titled “Sellers’ Inflation, Profits and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?” Using data on the profit margins of major US companies in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, Weber and Wasner examine how firms “exercise pricing power to enhance or protect short-run profitability” in the face of acute cost pressures. 

While the new research by Weber and Wasner does not discuss sanctioned economies, they describe conditions that can also be observed in Iran. Sanctions represent first and foremost a change in the supply environment—an emergency characterised by surging input costs. Financial and sectoral sanctions force most foreign companies to cease supplying customers in the targeted economy. But even when inputs remain available, currency devaluation triggered by the impact of sanctions on foreign exchange revenue and the accessibility of reserves makes those inputs more expensive. As a result, firms in the targeted country face supply chain bottlenecks and significant cost pressures. Purchasing managers’ index data from Iran makes clear that high producer prices and difficulties maintaining raw material and machinery inventories are the most persistent challenge facing Iranian manufacturing firms.

Moreover, the processes that Weber and Wasner believe underpin the “sellers’ inflation” that occurred after the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States are also at play in Iran. First, “sector-wide cost increases” lead to an “implicit agreement” among firms to raise prices. This occurs because “all firms want to protect their profit margins and know that the other firms pursue the same goal.” While state firms do dominate some sectors of Iran’s economy, such as the automotive industry, the broader manufacturing sector is dominated by private sector firms and is generally unconsolidated. The price increases seen in Iran reflect such implicit agreements and not price leadership by a few dominant firms.

Second, Weber and Wasner argue that “bottlenecks can create temporary monopoly power which can even render it safe to hike prices not only to protect but to increase profits.” In Iran, bottlenecks arose due to the effects of sanctions on imports. Under sanctions, domestic manufacturers face less competition from imported goods and the same bottlenecks also make it difficult to ramp-up output. Given the production constraints, it is nearly impossible for firms to grab market share by undercutting the competition and boosting sales. Because firms will not substantially sacrifice sales by raising prices, they can be understood to enjoy a kind of monopoly power.

Third, much like how the ongoing pandemic disruptions legitimise “price hikes and create acceptance on the part of consumers to pay higher prices,” so too do sanctions help render demand less elastic. Iranian consumers have come to understand high rates of inflation as the outcome the American sanctions and their own government’s monetary policy. While there has been some scrutiny of predatory pricing by Iranian firms in recent years, the pervading view is that firms must raise prices to survive. There is little scrutiny of whether firms are doing more than just surviving when they raise prices.

Finally, firms can raise prices because they know that consumers will keep buying. Weber and Wasner explain that “selling goods that people depend on” grants many firms extraordinary pricing power. Helpfully, the chief financial officer of Procter & Gamble has publicly boasted about this fact, stating that the company is ideally “positioned for dealing with an inflationary environment… starting with the portfolio that is focused on daily-use categories, health, hygiene, and cleaning, that are essential to the consumer versus discretionary categories which in these environments are the first ones to lose focus from the consumer.” Importantly, a significant proportion of Iran’s manufacturing base is devoted to household essentials. Meanwhile, Weber and Wasner point to government interventions during inflationary episodes as another reason why consumers put up with higher prices. Just like the stimulus checks that helped shore consumer spending during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, so too have cash transfers played a role in supporting household expenditures in Iran in the face of sanctions pressures.

Given that the same basic conditions for sellers’ inflation appear to exist in the US and Iran, it would be worthwhile to replicate the Weber and Wasner methodology to study the pricing power and profitability of Iranian companies. But even without a full study, a cursory review of the net margins of Iranian firms raises significant concerns that sanctions are increasing their pricing power of these firms and possibly even boosting their profitability. Comparing the net margins of companies listed in Iran’s securities exchanges (excluding financial firms) with inflation rates over the last decade reveals that, in general, profit margins rise in periods where inflation is elevated. In the four years leading up to March 2018, while Iran benefited from sanctions relief, the average profit margin for listed companies was 17 percent, while the average annual inflation rate was 11 percent. Since March 2018 and after Trump imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran, the average profit margin has risen to 26 percent. In the same period, annual inflation has averaged 40 percent. In short, Iranian companies appear to be more profitable on average when the country is under US secondary sanctions.

The continued profitability of Iranian firms has two ramifications for Western policymakers. First, it is a clear indication that elites in sanctioned economies can continue to accrue wealth, even as sanctions succeed in creating macroeconomic pressure. Second, if firms are in fact generating sellers’ inflation as part of their response to sanctions pressure, the economic resilience of firms is connected to the economic pain of households. Notably, Weber and Wasner raise the prospect that sellers’ inflation inevitably leads to “distributional conflict.” In their view, given that “living standards decline as real wages fall with rising prices,” labour will eventually push back on the profit maximisation by companies and demand higher wages. This too is a consideration highly relevant to Iran, which has seen an intensification of distributional conflict over the last decade. Protests over economic grievances have become more common, particularly protests over stagnant, delayed, or unpaid wages. Four consecutive years where inflation has exceeded 30 percent has eroded the living standard of Iranian households. In this context, firms may not be able to sustain their profit margins forever—in the medium-term, ever-rising prices will lead to demand destruction. However, while Weber and Wasner suggest that American firms have engineered a “a temporary transfer of income from labour to capital,” the implications for Iran, where firms have enjoyed increasing pricing power for the better part of a decade, are more dire.

The fact that Iranian firms have proven resilient under sanctions does have its benefits. This resilience has helped keep Iran’s economy from sliding into a deeper crisis. The resilience of businesses is also critical if Iran is to take advantage of any sanctions relief offered in a future diplomatic agreement. But the processes that underpin this resilience have significant distributional consequences. The sustained profitability of Iranian companies under sanctions represents an extraordinary and ongoing transfer of economic welfare from households to firms. In effect, not only are sanctions failing to weaken Iranian companies and their elite owners, but they are also hurting Iranian households profoundly. This suggests that the enhanced pricing power of Iranian firms and inflated corporate dividends are under-examined contributors to rising economic inequality in Iran, where the top income decile now controls nearly one-third of the country’s wealth. Sanctions were meant to make Iranian companies pay, but it is the Iranian people who are footing the bill.

Photo: IRNA

An Open Letter from 61 Iranian Economists Issues Stark Warning

Editor’s Note: This open letter co-signed by 61 Iranian economists was widely published in Iranian media outlets on June 10, 2022. The letter spurred significant debate and even controversy, with at least one economist claiming they were included as a signatory without foreknowledge of the letter’s content. The letter has been translated here in full in its original form given its insightful diagnosis of the economic challenges facing Iran.

Honorable People of Iran, Dear Compatriots,

Greetings,

When the 13th government took office, electoral rivals were ousted from the country's electoral institutions, bringing apparently uniform governance to the political landscape. In this climate, some analysts predicted, optimistically or naively, an accelerated resolution of the nuclear dispute with the West, as well as the formation of a government backed with maximum support of those holding political power, the military, and the official media in combating corruption, restoring the general business climate, and achieving macroeconomic stability. This was especially the case given that Mr. Raisi's views, programs, and promises as a presidential candidate foretold the formation of an inclusive government that would effectively use the country's vast knowledge and managerial experience. They were reported to have prepared and would implement a 7,000-page reform program with the support of dozens of research institutes and faculties of economics to address critical issues such as inflation, unemployment, and the closure of businesses.

Without tying the nation's livelihood and economy to nuclear negotiations, Mr. Raisi had promised the country would experience 5 percent economic growth, produce one million new jobs and one million new housing units annually, and to rapidly eradicate absolute poverty. He envisaged that the inflation rate would be reduced by 50 percent and then to single digits. Iran's non-oil exports would increase from $35 billion in 2021 to $70 billion in 2022, and the country's total foreign exchange needs would be met using non-oil exports.

In the meantime, many economic and political experts and intellectuals cautioned with foresight and compassion that such promises would not be realisable unless an early agreement was reached in the Vienna talks—after lengthy and exhausting two-year negotiations. Despite under-utilised human and physical capacities, a large number of unfinished projects, and billions of dollars of blocked foreign exchange resources, some of these promises could be fulfilled in the event of a nuclear deal and the FATF's approval, as well as the end of the COVID-19 epidemic; however, their entire fulfilment was also contingent on having good and developmental governance and a well-thought-out plan.

It is unfortunate, however, that since the beginning of April 2022, social unrest and public concern for livelihood and the viability of businesses have reached an explosive stage with the rise in disappointing news reports from the nuclear talks and numerous policy shocks to the country's economy, including the labor and the goods and services markets, followed by the elimination of the preferential exchange rate for essential goods. In the first few months of the year, the inflation and exchange rates have both reached new highs. Official policymakers have referred to the induction of multiple shocks and the escalation of macroeconomic instability as "economic surgery and reform" and "tough decisions for the economy" without considering the far-reaching repercussions of those decisions, the beginning and end, the scope, framework, and depth of this surgery, and its  next steps or consequences for the general public. The prerequisites and instruments of economic surgery, such as the structure and function of governance, the attainment of an adequate level of public trust and appreciation, and the establishment of economic stability, were largely disregarded. Despite unofficial restrictions on independent media, numerous experts, economic and social experts, managers, and business owners have issued numerous warnings about the dire consequences of foreign policy inaction and recent ill-considered and erroneous policies over the past few months.

Hereby, the signatories of this letter, a group of economists of the country, convey our scientific analysis, apprehensions, advisories, and some strategies to help amend policies and alleviate the concerns of the dear people of Iran, purely out of a sense of national and social responsibility and moral and professional commitment to the people.

An Overview of the Government's Economic Surgery Policy

After the parliament agreed to eliminate the preferential exchange rate (USD1 = 4,200 tomans), the government's "economic reform" program began on May 9, 2022, with the Presidential TV address. These amendments led to the elimination of the preferential exchange rate for dairy products, animal and poultry feeds, eggs, oil, and certain medicines and medical devices. These items are referred to as essentials in the household basket. Before this decision, pasta, cakes, bulk bread, and confectionery products were taken off the list of items eligible for a preferential exchange rate upon eliminating the subsidy on industrial flour in April.

The government's policy, dubbed "economic surgery,” was rushed into effect without the administrative arrangements necessary to compensate producers and consumers. This may be a transient solution to the pressing budget deficit problem in the face of sanctions and the global food price crisis; it cannot be an economic reform program, however.

The government and parliament have removed the preferential exchange rate of basic goods and introduced it as the beginning of economic surgery. This decision is made while the annual budget contains thousands of billions in tomans for unneeded, nebulous, and removable expenditures, the permanent or temporary omission of which poses no threat to the government's primary missions or the people's general livelihood. Furthermore, this high-risk policy was implemented in the world's most alarming food security circumstances (amid the risk of global hunger and poverty). To date, there is no information on the financial nature of this policy, its resources, expenditures, or the degree of its imbalance. Even for the first time in recent decades, information tables on the sources and expenditures of explicit subsidies (Table 14 of the General Government Budget) and other sections of the Budget Law have not been published, making it impossible to evaluate or comment on them.

Our admonition to government officials is that the country's situation is extremely precarious, and insisting on eliminating subsidies during this miserable time will exhaust the public's patience and turn them against the ruling system and government. This confrontation can be very costly for both sides of the aisle. Reasonably, after the nation's economy and global food markets have returned to normal, macroeconomic stability has been established, and social tensions have been diminished, economic measures such as the unification of exchange rates, reforms in the four markets of the economy, and the organization of consumer subsidies can be implemented, all based on a prudent plan. Likewise, consideration must be given to the support of vulnerable groups in this scenario. At the macroeconomic level, the successful implementation of economic reforms requires certain unavoidable prerequisites, including the following:

• Oil and non-oil export revenues, sufficient and reassuring reserves, and the availability of foreign exchange to manage potential fluctuations

• Development of vivid and effective policies to stabilise the macroeconomy by regulating inflationary financial and budgetary factors

• Low-cost access to global markets, including the market for basic goods and services, and, if necessary, low-cost financing sources and methods

If policymakers insist on continuing this unfortunate and risky practice, the government and the media should take full responsibility, explicitly and courageously, for the policies implemented and all their social and political consequences. Importantly, they should also avoid attributing failures to past pitfalls or the pressures and suggestions of economists outside the government. Nor should they label these suggestions as sabotage against the government and aggressively rebuff the criticisms of experts and those concerned with the national economy. This form and process of policymaking is at odds with, at least, the scientific approaches and indices of Iranian economists.

A Depiction of the Trends of Macroeconomic Indicators and the Outlook for Iran's Development

Development requires a "strong society–strong state" wherein the empowered state lays the foundation (in the form of public and regulatory goods) for the community's empowerment. An empowered society also requires a government that can pave the way for development through development-oriented governance and facilitative policymaking to ensure higher prosperity, employment, comprehensive social justice, security, and tranquility.

According to global comparative reports, indicators of the public business environment, quality of governance, perceptions of corruption, economic competitiveness, property rights, and other factors that lay the groundwork for long-term and inclusive growth and development, are on the decline placing Iran near the bottom of global rankings. Iran, for instance, was ranked 150 out of 180 nations in the most recent survey regarding anti-corruption efforts, and ranked 127 out of approximately 200 countries on the good governance index. In recent years, the social trust index, a measure of social capital that had risen to nearly 70 percent after the Islamic Revolution in 1981 (1360), has plummeted to the very concerning level of approximately 20 percent. The marriage-to-divorce ratio has decreased from 14 percent at the start of the revolution to around 3 percent today.

Due to poor governance, we have been unable to capitalise on the golden opportunities presented by the country's vast human and creative capital, oil revenues, and demographic window so as to achieve rapid economic growth. Oil exports have brought the country over 1.3 trillion dollars since the Revolution began. During this time, the country entered a demographic window in which the population's age structure was more conducive than ever to rapid economic growth. During this period, the country's per capita income has increased by less than 1 percent. Our country is on the verge of a long-term crisis due to the sharp decline in social capital, the inevitable outflows and large-scale layoffs of human capital, the spread of corruption, and the destruction of natural resources and the environment.

Iran's average GDP growth from 1980 to 2018 was approximately 1.6 percent, whereas China, India, Turkey, Malaysia, UAE, and Pakistan averaged between 4 percent and 10 percent during the same period. This meagre growth has occurred despite the fact that, nearly 50 years ago, Iran's economic growth prospects were considered superior to or on par with those of these nations. Due to sluggish economic growth, Iran's share of the global economy has decreased from 1 percent to approximately half a percent over the same period.

In the last decade, Iran's economy experienced the deepest stagflation in 70 years due to oppressive and unprecedented sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy was marked by an average growth rate close to zero, an average inflation rate of above 20 percent, a negative and declining rate of gross fixed capital formation—even less than the compensation for depreciation over the past three years—and even more worrisome, an annual financial capital outflow of 10 to 20 billion dollars, depending on optimistic or pessimistic estimates. In the last ten years, the productivity rate of production parameters has been declining in a concerning manner, and the exchange rate has experienced a 30-fold increase (3000 percent). Although the national unemployment rate is still below 10 percent, it exceeds 15 percent in low-income (often border) provinces. In the last four decades, the average inflation rate has been 20 percent, and in the last three years, it has surpassed 35 percent. The misery index is approximately 50 percent, and inflation in 2021 was greater than 40 percent. Iran's imports have decreased from $70 billion in 2011 to approximately $35 billion in 2021 due to the implementation of sanctions and the reduction of oil export revenues.

These deteriorations have resulted in unequal income distribution and the spread of poverty across society. The Iranian Statistics Center has reported that Iran's average Gini coefficient between 2011 and 2018 was 0.408. This metric indicates that Iran is one of the most unequal societies in the Middle East, itself one of the most unequal regions on a global scale, during the relevant period. According to the report, during the same years, 1 percent of Iran's population, comprising the wealthiest strata of society, had an average of 16.3 percent of the country's total income, which is equivalent to 40 percent of the income of the poorest strata. Official reports suggest that the social and prospective outlooks of housing, education, and health inequality are far more unfortunate and worrisome. The Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare's report notes that the poverty rate increased from 22 percent in 2017 to 32 percent in 2019 due to the sharp increase in the poverty line basket price between 2018 and 2019. This means that in 2019, 32 percent of the country's population, 26.5 million people, are living below the poverty line, and sadly, estimates indicate that it has extended to nearly 40 percent of Iranian households in 2021. In the last decade, with an economic growth rate close to zero and a population growth of about 13 percent, the average Iranian has become 13 percent poorer. However, inflation and inequality mechanisms such as ineffective redistribution policies and corruption have placed the majority of the burden of poverty on low- and middle-income deciles, low-wage earners, and those employed in the economy's informal sector.

The macroeconomic developments of the past decade, i.e., the period of unprecedented intensification of economic, financial, commercial, and technological sanctions, have had the most significant impact on the living conditions of households and the increase in the poverty rate. Looking into macroeconomic variables has two major implications for Iranians' living conditions: first, a decline in welfare and worsening living conditions across the board for all Iranian households, and second, a more severe decline in welfare in low-income groups (1). Although the legal minimum wage for 2022 increased by 57 percent, the same wage, which fails to account for a large proportion of informal workers, is about $4.7 a day and $1.57 for a family of three. It falls below the international poverty threshold of $2 per day. In addition, many large firms, which are confronted with rapidly rising costs and declining demand, have adjusted their labor force, meaning that workers have been the primary losers of this policy due to their decreased share of national income.

The constant increase in the exchange rate and its inescapable effects on the volume of liquidity, on the one hand, and the reduction of revenue sources and the unorthodox and rapid growth of government expenditures, on the other, have resulted in enormous budget deficits, which are the primary cause of accelerating inflation. The escalating exchange rate-inflation spiral has placed the nation at risk of triple-digit, runaway inflation. Widespread corruption and the collapse of social capital, intensified rent-seeking ties, particularly in foreign trade and financial markets, the sharp decline in investment over the past two decades, and high inflation have cast a shadow over the future of Iran's economy and led to an inevitable, damaging, and irreparable outflow of financial and intellectual capital to other nations.

In recent years, as a result of the rise in the exchange rate and the cancerous growth of the budget deficit, the government has been forced to raise the price of energy carriers on occasion and eliminated the preferential exchange rate for the import of basic commodities this year. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the effects of such policies are extremely short-lived due to pervasive corruption, the collapse of social capital, the increase in the exchange rate, and the budget's ailing structure. Indeed,  the budget deficit reoccurs shortly after and at a more considerable scale. Direct subsidies have not helped to offset the decline in public purchasing power and have not prevented the decline in people's livelihoods. Moreover, the government's monetary and fiscal policies have exacerbated the widening divergence.

In summary, the economic situation in Iran is very concerning, based on an abundance of evidence, and there seems to be no prospect of improvement or departure from this current state. Indeed, the downward trend of institutional performance indices (such as quality of governance, general business environment, corruption, economic competitiveness, and innovation), as well as other key parameters such as the outflow of financial and human capitals and the declining rate of economic investments over the past few years, is a substantially more ominous sign for the Iranian economy in future.

Honourble and patient people of Iran, 

Dear Iranians,

Regrettably, the indicators and evidence presented above are not simply numbers on a page; they tell a heartbreaking story of hopelessness, the absence of a bright horizon, a lack of a favourable environment for production and business enterprises, a steady decline in people's purchasing power, growing poverty, and shrinking livelihoods. The obvious outcome of long-term exposure to such high inflation and a steadily rising exchange rate is a sense of social powerlessness and gradual decline. Inequality and income and asset gaps resulting from inflation, corruption, or dysfunctional fiscal and monetary policies, have turned trust and coexistence between the winners and losers of this bitter game into hatred and resentment, causing social capital to be shattered and destroyed. On the other hand, in the current state of the country, where economic and social policies are shrouded in secrecy, any criticism of the government is interpreted as part of a malicious plot against the governing system, making it difficult for experts or academic circles to raise such issues openly. Even more difficult is persuading the rulers and policymakers to accept that the Iranian people's suffering is now due to their long-term ineptitude and mismanagement.

It would be too naive to attribute this disorderliness solely to economic and financial factors such as large and growing budget deficits. Our economic and social problems—including the destruction of natural and environmental resources, systematic corruption, the destruction of social capital, the massive migration of human and innovative capital, the outflow of financial capital, the budget deficit and even the sanctions—are in a more general analysis, the product of poor governance and disregard for the scientific foundations of public policy. 

If only our policymakers could foresee that now is not the time for a tug-of-war and coercive measures on national and global scales. 

If only the esteemed President knew that economic policy is not the venue for an apprenticeship, trial and error, hasty decisions, or unthoughtful manipulations of prices and mediating factors. In fact, having the trust and the psychological and social support of society, having a stable environment based on international cooperation and coexistence, and having a strong bureaucracy equipped with modern knowledge and technology, are some necessary requirements for reforms or, in their own words, "economic surgery."

Dear compatriots,

Based on a review of global experiences and the scientific analysis of national experts and signatories of this letter, the first step to escape this dilemma is to fundamentally alter the nation's foreign strategies and policies, and the second is to alter the manner in which the country is governed. Two long leaps should be taken to solve Iran's complex economic and social issues and compensate for its stagnation in global economic competition:

1. Fundamental reforms in foreign policy by adopting a policy of peaceful coexistence and dignified cooperation with the countries in the region and especially neighbouring countries, as well as balanced and active interaction with major economic powers; also, paying attention to the minimum demands of the honourable people of Iran to improve the living conditions of Iranian people and to promote Iran's position globally. Without restoring the JCPOA and removing FATF-imposed restrictions on the Iranian banking sector, it is pointless to address macroeconomic stability policy and low-cost access to global markets.

2. Without an improvement in the quality of governance, economic surgery or reform will result in pervasive corruption, irreparable poverty and inequality, and deteriorating social and political stability. The prerequisites for effective governance and vital reforms are as follows:

• Improving the quality of governance, the absolute and unequivocal rule of law at all levels, and government accountability for its decisions and public demands

• Minimising political and economic corruption by applying maximum transparency mechanisms to the processes and outcomes of all policies, decisions, allotments, and appointments

• Establishing an impartial, wholesome, accessible, affordable, and dependable judicial system for all social groups

• Accepting and assisting in the creation of a space for dialogue, criticism, and oversight for scientific associations, universities, civic institutions, specialised and professional inclusive organisations, and independent media, and committing to the rules and goals of such a cause in practice

• Possessing a robust and accountable executive and bureaucratic system with convenient and trustworthy databases

• Possessing updated and potent information and communication technologies to implement targeted support and subsidy programs, carry out specific payments for specific target groups, and purchase specific goods and services from specific centres at specific times

• Establishing and expanding the coverage of the welfare and social security system and efficient health insurance through equitable and efficient taxation (not by doubling the financial pressure on the critical sources of pension funds)

• Fostering a competitive environment for the private sector's entrepreneurs and business owners while avoiding government monopolies or security conditions in the marketplace

• Conceiving and implementing a production-focused incentive system that encourages the manufacturing sector and restricts destructive and unproductive activities

For policymakers and government officials to address the current turmoil, some clear implementation plans are also proposed:

1. It is incumbent upon the President and his principal colleagues to report on economic policies and programs, as well as their resources and expenditures, unambiguously and vividly, to seek consultation and advice from knowledgeable and specialised individuals, and to courageously take responsibility for their decisions.

2. A report on the sources and expenditures of the newly established subsidy, the number of households covered by it, and this year's budget imbalance should be publicised officially and transparently. A program of maximum financial discipline should be formulated, published, and implemented, including a revision of the 2022 budget based on public interests rather than the interests of specific groups. More specifically, the government should eliminate budget lines involving rents and overt and covert support for specific groups and centres, the removal of which has no harm to the essential activities of the government in exercising its sovereignty and public welfare provision.

3. A preferential exchange rate should be provided for the import of basic commodities, particularly wheat (until global food security concerns are resolved) and medicine (until compensatory mechanisms in the social security system are established), and any decisions or policies that involve price shocks upsetting the balance for vulnerable groups should be avoided.

4. In certain instances, cash subsidies intended to offset the negative effects of pricing policies are ineffective. It is imperative to build on up-to-date information and new information technologies, as well as close collaboration between the banking system and the goods distribution system, to allocate the payment subsidy in an entirely purposeful way for purchasing basic goods and ensuring food security in pre-specified purchase terminals.

5. The government monopoly on importing basic goods should be reformed into an effective competition. Accordingly, in addition to state-owned companies, all known and authorised traders should be permitted to purchase and import the basic goods required by the country from international markets in any quantity using export currency so as to maintain a sufficient level of strategic stocks of goods. 

Concluding Remarks

To put it bluntly, successful price reforms necessitate broad government accountability, citizen participation in decision-making, the application of elite knowledge, and extensive communication with the rest of the world based on global standards.

Ultimately, while emphasising the motivation of the signatories of this letter to assist in resolving the current turmoil for the benefit of the people, we request that expert criticism be given due consideration.

With the people are God's hands.

Tomorrow, when the vestibule of truth becometh revealed,

Ashamed the way-farer, who, illusory work, made.

The List of Signatories of the Statement of Economists Addressed to the Honourable People of Iran

1.     Ebrahimi Taghi, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

2.     Arbab Hamidreza, Allameh Tabataba’i University

3.     Asgharpour Hossein, University of Tabriz

4.     Afghah Morteza, Chamran University of Ahwaz

5.     Akbari Nematollah, University of Isfahan

6.     Elahi Naser, Mofid University

7.     Emamverdi Ghodratollah, Azad University of Tehran

8.     Amin Ismaili Hamid, Jihad Daneshgahi Institution

9.     Amini Minoo, Payam Noor University, Tehran Branch

10.  Olad Mahmud, Urban Economics

11.  Ahangari Abdolmajid, Chamran University of Ahwaz

12.  Bagheri Mojtaba, Mofid University

13.  Bakhshi Lotfali, Allameh Tabataba’i University

14.  Behboodi Davoud, University of Tabriz

15.  Beheshti Mohammadbagher, University of Tabriz

16.  Pazooki Mehdi , Planning Organization

17.  Pishbin Jahanmir, Chamran University of Ahwaz

18.  Tahsili  Hasan, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

19.  Takieh Mehdi, Allameh Tabataba’i University

20.  Chinichian Morteza, Allameh Tabataba’i University

21.  Hosseini Seyed Mohammad,  Research Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture

22.  Khatayi Mahmud, Allameh Tabataba’i University

23.  Khodaparast Mehdi, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

24.  Khalili Tehrani Abdolamir, Shahid Beheshti University

25.  Dadgar Yadollah, Shahid Beheshti University

26.  Delangizan Sohrab, Razi University

27.  Dahmardeh Nazar, University of Sistan and Baluchestan

28.  Dehkordi Parvaneh, Payam Noor University, Tehran Branch

29.  Rahdari Morad, Payam Noor University, Tehran Branch

30.  Satarifar Mahommad, Allameh Tabataba’i University

31.  Sahabi Bahram, Tarbiat Modares University

32.  Shajari Hushang, University of Esfahan

33.  Sharif Mostafa, Allameh Tabataba’i University

34.  Sharifzadegan Mohammad Hossein, Shahid Beheshti University

35.  Sadeghi Tehrani Ali, Allameh Tabatabai University

36.  Sadeghi Saqdel Hossein, Tarbiat Modares University

37.  Taheri  Abdollah, Allameh Tabataba’i University

38.  Asi Reza, Allameh Tabataba’i University

39.  Ebadi Jafar, University of Tehran

40.  Azizi Ahmad, Former Deputy of Currencies of the Central Bank and University Lecturer

41.  Asari Arani Abbas, Tarbiat Modares University

42.  Isazadeh Saeed, Bu Ali University

43.  Firoozan Tohid, Kharazmi University

44.  Ghanbari Hasanali, Shahid Beheshti University

45.  Ghanbari Ali, Tarbiat Modares University

46.  Karimi Zahra, Mazandaran University

47.  Kia Al-Husseini Seyed Ziaoddin, Mofid University

48.  Lashkari Mohammad, Payam Noor University, Mashhad Branch

49.  Mohammadzadeh Parviz, University of Tabriz

50.  Maziki Ali, Allameh Tabataba’i University

51.  Mostafavi Mehdi, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

52.  Mostafavi Montazeri Sayyed Hassan, Tarbiat Modares University

53.  Monsef Abdolali, Payam Noor University, Tehran Branch

54.  Musaei Meysam, University of Tehran

55.  Mousavi Mirhossein,  Al-Zahra University

56.  Mousavi Habib, Azad University of Arak

57.  Mirzaei Hujjatullah, Allameh Tabataba’i University

58.  Mehdikhani Alireza, Azad University of Arak

59.  Hadi Zanouz Behrouz, Allameh Tabataba’i University

60.  Varhami Vida, Shahid Beheshti University

61.  Yusefi Muhammad Raza, Mofid University

Is Iran's 'Bread' Subsidy Reform a Half-Baked Idea?

A new round of protests has begun in Iran. People are taking to the streets following a controversial subsidy cut perceived as an increase in the price of bread. These protests were inevitable in a country in which there are so many economic and political grievances and in which civil society and labour groups, demoralised about their ability to influence policymaking through the ballot box, have turned to mobilisations to get their voices heard and their anger registered.

The policy that has triggered the protests has been widely reported as a cut to a “bread subsidy” that has suddenly increased the cost of bread and cereal-based products. This is inaccurate. The subsidy that has been eliminated was an exchange rate subsidy. The government had been providing Iranian importers allocations of hard currency below market prices. This policy indirectly subsidised the purchase of wheat and a few other foodstuffs by the importers. It did not directly subsidise the purchase of bread by ordinary people.

Importers could apply for foreign exchange allocations from the Central Bank of Iran to import wheat. In theory, this would allow them to bring wheat to the Iranian market at a lower price. But in practice, the subsidy had long ago stopped working. Several distortionary effects of the policy were likely generating inflationary pressure across the economy.

First, the exchange rate subsidy was poorly targeted. To put it simply, the Iranian government was intervening to make foreign money cheaper, not bread prices themselves. The subsidy was therefore ill-suited to stabilise prices when Iran’s import needs rose, a periodic occurrence when the domestic harvest falls short of targets. It was also unable to counteract the effects of global increases in the price of wheat. Breads and cereals prices have risen steadily in Iran for years, quadrupling since 2018. 

Second, providing foreign exchange at a subsidised rate was exacerbating Iran’s fiscal deficit. Financing this deficit is a major driver of inflation in Iran. The official subsidised exchange rate diverged from the exchange rate on which Iran’s government budget is balanced in 2015. Since then, the spread between the two rates has increased dramatically. The subsidised exchange rate has been fixed at IRR 42,000 since 2019. The exchange rate in the Iranian government budget for the year beginning March 2022 is IRR 230,000. As this spread widened, the Central Bank of Iran faced increasing difficulty in meeting demand among importers for subsidised foreign exchange, creating a foreign exchange liquidity crunch that made it harder to stabilise Iran’s currency outright. In recent years, the Iranian government was spending around $12 billion in hard currency on a subsidised basis.

Third, this additional exchange rate volatility has increased the pass-through effects related to Iran’s dependence on imports more broadly. The Central Bank of Iran has had partial success in stabilising the exchange rate by introducing a centralised foreign exchange market for importers and exporters called NIMA. But Iran’s economic policymakers were tying their own hands in the stabilisation of this exchange rate, which is far more critical for Iran’s economic performance, by diverting precious foreign exchange resources towards essential goods importers. When it comes to inflation generally, the government ought to focus on intermediate goods on which “made in Iran” products depend. The exchange rate subsidy for essential goods was making it harder to stabilise the exchange rate for all other goods.

Fourth, the exchange rate subsidy was always subject to abuse. Particularly in the early years, importers were known to seek and receive allocations of subsidised foreign exchange and either pocket those allocations or turn around and sell on the hard currency to other firms at the market rate. This kind of profiteering was difficult to police. As more scrutiny came upon the allocations, importers with political connections were most likely to continue receiving allocations from the Central Bank of Iran, making enforcement politically fraught.

The evidence that the exchange rate subsidy had failed can be seen in consumer price index data. Bread and cereals inflation has outpaced general inflation since last summer. This is a likely reflection that, in practice, a diminishing volume of wheat imports were being conducted using the subsidised exchange rate—the reform was already being priced-in by the newly elected Raisi government. The sudden price increases were are seeing now are more likely the result of price gouging. Firms across the food supply chain are using the policy reform as an opportunity to raise prices, knowing the blame will be cast on the government.

Whether or not the reform is half-baked, the idea has been cooking in the oven for a long time. The subsidy cut was years in the making and the preferential exchange rate was nearly nixed in 2019, as the Iranian economy underwent a painful adjustment following the reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions. At the time, the Iran Chamber of Commerce, the voice of the country’s private sector, issued a strong statement calling for the elimination of the subsidy. But the reform was eventually shelved—the Rouhani administration had been cowered by the 2017 and 2018 economic protests, which were instrumentalised by their political rivals.  

In the end, the Central Bank of Iran took a different tack. They kept the exchange rate in place but began to eliminate the range of imports eligible for the rate. Initially, importers could apply for subsidised foreign exchange allocations for the purchase of 25 essential goods and commodities. As of September 2021, that list was cut down to just seven goods—wheat, corn, barley, oilseeds, edible oil, soybeans and certain medical goods.

These were preparatory steps for the elimination of the subsidy. In practice, many Iranian grain importers had stopped using the subsidised exchange rate, both in anticipation of its elimination and because it was impractical. One of the fundamental problems facing Iran’s food supply chain is that even when Iranian importers can identify buyers and arrange logistics—difficult things to do when under sanctions—the payments that need to be made for those purchases are often delayed. Importers that were applying to the Central Bank of Iran for allocations of subsidised foreign exchange might wait weeks before the money hit their accounts. Cargo ships would sit idle off Iran’s shores, unable to deliver the grain until the seller received their funds. These delays added costs. The Iranian importers were on the hook for huge fees as the ships they chartered remained out of service. Importers that opted to use the NIMA rate have been able to make payments to their suppliers more quickly and reliably. This is because there is far more liquidity in the NIMA market, in which foreign exchange is supplied by Iranian exporters who are repatriating their export revenues as required by law.

Overall, there is a sound economic argument for eliminating the subsidised exchange rate. But that does not mean that there will not be pain for ordinary people in the short term and the protests are motivated in part by an expectation of further pain. The abject failure to communicate a plan around the subsidy reform will lead to its own distortionary effects, including predatory pricing. Failing to communicate directly and clearly with the Iranian public about this major reform is its own kind of contempt, even if the reform itself is not contemptuous.

 In that vein, the elimination of the subsidised exchange rate has been criticised as “neoliberal” and in many respects, it is. As part of the continuity in economic policy, the Raisi administration appears to be continuing the Rouhani administration’s commitment to austerity, seeking relief from inflation through fiscal tightening. The national protests in 2017 and 2018 were triggered by the same anxieties around the government’s perceived failure to protect economic welfare within the Islamic Republic’s social contract.

But on the other hand, this is not a simple economic reform. Iranian officials have likened it to “economic surgery” necessary to repair an economy weakened by sanctions. The reform also does not preclude other redistributive policies. The subsidised exchange rate was a poorly designed and inefficient policy that did more for a small number of elites than it did for Iran’s poor.

The Raisi administration has promised to soften the blow of the reform by providing targeted cash transfers (for two months) to the most vulnerable in Iranian society. Electronic coupons are also being provided. Iran has a good track record with cash transfers, which do something the exchange rate subsidy did not. Such transfers directly boost the consumption of ordinary people in the face of rising prices. If the government can use the fiscal savings from the elimination of an inefficient and poorly targeted policy to shore the economic welfare of Iran’s poor more directly, while also addressing long-running distortions in the foreign exchange markets, this reform may succeed yet. But if the government fails to communicate clearly about its implementation of the reform, the Iranian public will continue to only see failure.

Photo: IRNA

Iran, Russia, and the Limits of Financial War

In response to Vladimir Putin’s increasingly brutal invasion of Ukraine, the West has declared a financial war on Russia. The US Department of Treasury unveiled new sanctions on the Russian financial sector late last week, measures that “target nearly 80 percent of all banking assets” in the country. Forthcoming sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), announced by the European Union jointly with the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, will effectively freeze Russia’s gross international reserves. Further measures targeting Russia’s energy sector will make the Western sanctions programme among the most expansive ever devised, and certainly the most significant to target such a large economy. There has been impressive coordination between US and European authorities in designing and implementing these sanctions, which have been justified by Putin’s provocations. In their rapid imposition and their broad scope, these sanctions are clearly intended to have significant deleterious effects on the Russian economy. The strategy has shifted from deterrence to attrition and from targeted measures to full financial war.  

The only other comparable financial war waged by the United States and Europe has targeted Iran. The Iran sanctions were applied more gradually than those being applied to Russia today. But in 2012, Iran’s central bank assets and energy exports were targeted in move that will be the model for the sanctions on CBR and Russia’s energy industry. These sanctions were initially multilateral in nature, with UN, US, and EU measures imposed in tandem. The multilateral sanctions were in place until 2016, when the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) saw the lifting of most UN and EU sanctions as well as US secondary sanctions. Iran benefited from sanctions relief for just two years, enough time for a return to economic growth, but not enough time for a remediation of the harm that sanctions had caused most Iranian households. In 2018, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed US secondary sanctions on Iran, once again thrusting Iran into an economic crisis, later compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Broadly speaking, the financial war on Iran has been in effect for a decade. The damage incurred by the Iranian economy has been extensive. Currency volatility and high inflation have sapped Iranian purchasing power, pushing millions of Iranians below the poverty line. Chronic weaknesses of the Iranian economy, such as high unemployment and systemic corruption have been exacerbated. Still, despite the many hardships, the Iranian economy did not collapse. Rather, the economy stagnated, growing an average of just 0.37 percent between 2012 and 2020. When excluding 2016 and 2017—the two years of sanctions relief under the JCPOA—the average falls to -1.96 percent. A decade of stagnation and the diminishing welfare of ordinary Iranians combined to create new political pressures on the Iranian government. Labour mobilisations have become commonplace and there have been multiple waves of nationwide protests focused on economic grievances. These protests have been violently suppressed by authorities. Even so, the Iranian government is today pursuing sanctions relief—in the context of renewed negotiations over the JCPOA—not because of fears an impending economic collapse, but because of a view that economic resilience allows Iran to engage in negotiations from a position of relative strength, seeking the conditions for a return to growth.

Unsurprisingly, Iran has become a touchpoint in the discussion around the growing Russia sanctions programme. But the focus has been the Iranian precedent for key moves, such as the removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging network. So far, there has been little consideration of what the outcomes of the financial war on Iran might tell us about the prospects for the financial war on Russia. The cases are not only comparable because of the kinds of sanctions that are being applied, but because the two economies share important similarities. Of course, Russia and Iran are both major energy producers and revenues from oil and gas exports are centrally important for government budgets. But the two countries also boast large manufacturing sectors principally supplying internal markets. Despite general corruption and rentierism, key institutions exhibit technocratic sophistication.

In response to the 2012 and 2018 sanctions shocks, Iran demonstrated that its flawed economy could undergo structural adjustments to sanctions pressure. Such adjustments begin immediately, meaning economies targeted by sanctions can return to fragile growth in as little as a year. In Iran, this capacity for adjustment reflected the bottom-up resilience of households and companies seeking to survive the financial war. The Iranian state lucked out. Officials boasted of their “resistance economy” policies, despite failing to develop a cohesive response to sanctions pressure. Meanwhile, the composition of the Iranian economy meant that sanctions pressure could be absorbed. There is reason to believe that Russia will also absorb such pressure. Across key indicators, Russia appears in a stronger position than Iran was at the outset of its financial war.  

Access to Foreign Exchange

Sanctions targeting a country’s central bank are the most significant measure in any financial war because of the direct impact on the national currency. During the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, Iranian authorities maintained ready access to just 10 percent of the country’s gross international reserves, putting enormous pressure on the Iranian currency and making it very difficult for Iran to manage deficits with key trade partners. In January 2018, a few months before Trump announced his withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the free market dollar exchange rate in Iran was IRR 46,000. Today the exchange rate is IRR 263,000. The dramatic devaluation of the rial is often cited as evidence of the devastating impact of US sanctions. Indeed, devaluation made imported goods, including foodstuffs like wheat, on which Iranian households rely, more expensive. But the Iranian government demonstrated an ability to return order to currency markets, both by finding ways to supply foreign exchange into the market despite sanctions and also through better technical management of the market itself, including through the creation of a parallel market whereby exporters are required to sell foreign exchange earnings to importers. Russia is arguably in a better position than Iran to weather the attack on the value of its currency. It has gone through this storm before—the rouble lost half its value following the imposition of more limited sanctions in 2014, as part of the Western response to the annexation of Crimea. In response to the latest crisis, CBR has already hiked interest rates to 20 percent and imposed a new requirement for companies to repatriate foreign exchange earnings. If we assume that the 10 percent figure represents maximum efficacy for the freezing of central bank reserves, then that would leave CBR with access to approximately $63 billion. However, Russian reserves are equivalent to about 42 percent of GDP. In 2012, Iran’s reserves (then $104 billion) amounted to just 17 percent of GDP. So even if a similarly small percentage of the reserves remain available to CBR following the implementation of the financial sanctions, Russian authorities could fare better than their Iranian counterparts in stabilising the value of the rouble after the latest devaluation shock caused by the financial sanctions.  

Energy Revenues and Fiscal Space

Despite initial attempts to create carve-outs for Russia’s energy exports, motivated by a desire to shield Europe from an economic shock and to leave room for escalation, it now appears likely that Russian energy exports will be targeted by Western sanctions. In the case of Iran, such sanctions provided highly effective in reducing exports of crude oil and mostly effective at reducing exports of petrochemical products. Broadly speaking the purpose of energy sanctions is to induce a fiscal crisis. Even in periods in which Iran was permitted to export limited volumes of crude oil under so-called Significant Reduction Exemption waivers, the revenues from these sales could only be used for humanitarian trade, meaning that the fiscal constraints remained significant. In the lead-up to 2012, oil sales accounted for around 80 percent of Iran’s total exports and around 60 percent of government revenues. Russia has a significantly lower dependence on energy sales, which today account for around 60 percent of exports and around 40 percent of government revenues. Tax administration in Russia is also significantly more developed than in Iran. In 2020, the Russian government collected $387 billion in tax revenue, equivalent to around one-fourth of GDP. By comparison, tax revenue in Iran was just $32 billion in 2012, equivalent to one-twentieth of GDP. Like the Iranian government, the Russian government is not heavily indebted. In 2012, Iran’s government debt was equivalent to 10 percent of GDP. Government debt in Russia was equivalent to 16 percent of GDP in 2021. The Russian government is likely to have more fiscal space than Iran in the aftermath of the sanctions shock given a similar debt level and more robust revenue sources. Notably, Iran did not really use what fiscal space it had as part of its response to sanctions, choosing to run austerity budgets aimed at slowing inflation. Russia could take a different approach, directing state investment to compensate for the lost growth in the energy sector.

Dependence on Manufacturing

Russia is the world’s second largest consumer of natural gas. Iran is the fourth. These high rates of consumption reflect that natural gas is used for heating homes, for power generation, and as feedstock in the manufacturing sector. The energy sector in Russia will contract dramatically just as it has in Iran over the last decade, but it will not collapse in large part because of the important role of the manufacturing sector in the adjustment to sanctions and wider economic resilience. In 2012, Iran’s manufacturing sector accounted for 14.4 percent of GDP. In Russia, based on data for 2020, the manufacturing sector accounted for 13.3 percent of GDP. The sectors are of similar importance to their respective economies. But these statistics also underestimate that importance. The relative size of the manufacturing sector in Russia and Iran fluctuates with the oil price—high prices mean that the oil sector contributes more than usual to GDP. Moreover, in both countries the manufacturing sector is a larger employer than the energy sector, given the relatively limited manpower necessary to operate modern energy infrastructure. Manufacturing is the sector that really matters.

The latest World Bank report on Iran, which details the country’s fragile economic recovery, notes that recent growth has been driven by manufacturing. The report points to two aspects of the adjustment to sanctions: “Less market competition—due to import restrictions on nonessential goods—and the price competitiveness of manufacturing and mining production—following the currency depreciation.” The resilience of Iran’s manufacturing sector under sanctions has been further detailed in a study by Hadi Esfahani, who used firm-level data to show that “manufacturing firms adapted to the sanctions environment, and many resumed growth based on domestic demand and resources.” While the sanctions shock does lead to a contraction in the manufacturing sector, it is declining output, not “exits” that are to blame. In other words, manufacturing firms do not tend to go out of business. In fact, manufacturers who produce goods for export markets, especially regional markets, can grow their profit margins as they earn foreign exchange. This adjustment is easiest for firms engaged in light manufacturing, as demand for consumer goods is relatively inelastic and as production of these goods is less capital intensive, shielding manufacturers from higher producer prices. But to take advantage of these conditions, manufacturing firms must maintain output.

Shifts in Trade Composition

The fundamental challenge for the Iranian manufacturing sector since 2012 has been disruptions in the supply of inputs and high producer prices. In this way, the impact of sanctions on imports of industrial goods may be more consequential for the targeted economy than the impact of sanctions on the sale of energy products. Iranian manufacturing firms remain in business and continue to produce for a large domestic market and newly growing regional demand. But to do so, they needed to maintain imports of industrial equipment. Purchasing managers’ index data for Iran makes clear that the primary constraint on the manufacturing sector’s economic performance under sanctions has been the reduction in raw materials and intermediate goods inventories and the high cost of replenishing those inventories. Historically, intermediate inputs and equipment were sourced from Europe. But beginning in the late 2000s, China became a larger supplier. The financial war on Iran accelerated the shift in the country’s trade composition as Chinese suppliers proved more willing to sell to Iran in the face of sanctions. One way to express the relative importance of Chinese and European supply is to look at the ratio of exports from the two suppliers. In 2012, Iran imported 1.2 times more goods from China than it did from the European Union. But machinery imports (HS Chapters 84 and 85) from China and Europe were about equal. By comparison, Russia is significantly more dependent on Europe as its financial war begins. The total value of all imports from the European Union is about twice that from China. The dependence is slightly lower when looking at machinery—the total value of Chinese machinery exports to Russia is 70 percent of European Union exports.

On one hand, this higher dependence may mean that the sanctions shock to the Russian manufacturing sector will be greater than that in Iran. But on the other hand, it demonstrates that Russia has yet to make the “Eastward turn” that many have observed in Iran and other Eurasian economies. To be clear, Chinese firms did not completely ignore Western sanctions on Iran and did engage in de-risking that left Iran behind its regional neighbours with regards to economic ties to China. Bilateral trade has stagnated since 2012 and the inability of Iran to maintain significant oil sales to China for large periods over the last decade also posed financial challenges for maintaining industrial imports. But whereas Iran is one of China’s many economic partners in West Asia, Russia has presented itself as a unique geopolitical partner within a wider Eurasian context. This may make the difference as Russian manufacturers seek alternative suppliers for crucial industrial goods.  

Capital and Its Survival Instincts

If Russia does demonstrate a similar kind of economic resilience to Iran, that does not mean that there will not be economic hardship. In Iran, annual inflation exceeded 30 percent following the 2012 and 2018 sanctions shocks. Skyrocketing prices, especially for food products, pushed many working-class families into poverty. For a once upwardly mobile middle class, the diminished standard of living has been embittering. For most in Iran’s upper class, sanctions have been a nuisance. For some among the wealthy, they have been a boon.  

One unique feature of the Russia sanctions programme is the focus on oligarchs and the perverse influence that individuals with extreme wealth have on the country’s politics, particularly in their perceived fealty to Putin. Western officials are directly targeting these oligarchs, both by targeting their personal assets and through measures targeted at the conglomerates they own. The Moscow Exchange suspended trading last week after a massive sell-off saw the main index fall 50 percent. European and American regulators are promising to review the lax rules that have allowed Russian oligarchs to purchase extensive real estate in Western cities. In both capital markets and real estate, the wealth of Russia’s ruling classes has been augmented by the commingling of domestic and foreign investor capital. As foreign investors retreat from Russia, and as high-net worth Russians are blocked from foreign real estate markets, oligarchs will take a hit. But capital has its own survival instincts.

Russia’s capital markets are far more developed than those of Iran. Unlike the Moscow Exchange, the Tehran Stock Exchange has never hosted significant foreign investment. Still, capital markets did play a role in Iran’s sanctions response in a way that diminished the political, if not absolute economic, impact of sanctions. In 2019, deep into Trump’s restarted financial war on Iran, the Tehran Stock Exchange was the world’s best performing equity market, with market value doubling in dollar terms. There were three reasons for this remarkable performance. First, many listed companies, particularly manufacturing firms, were posting strong financial results after adjusting to the new sanctions reality. Second, high inflation left Iranians scrambling to invest in a safe asset while sanctions made capital flight difficult and costly. For middle class families, the safe havens were hard currency or gold. For upper class families they were domestic real estate or stocks. Third, as wealthy Iranians increased their exposure to capital markets, a policy shift took place. Suddenly, developing the capital markets became a priority for the government and for the nascent financial services industry, particularly with the aim of increasing the number of retail investors. More money poured into the market, even from middle class households, driving prices higher. The returns outpaced inflation, drawing in more investment, and giving rise to what many considered to be a dangerous bubble. But in the meantime, a new feature of Iranian political economy emerged. The newfound importance of the country’s capital markets, an outcome of the financial war, was exemplified in the decision of the government to liberalise a “justice shares” programme that had granted shares in state-owned enterprises listed on the stock exchange to disadvantaged families. Overnight, Iran had 50 million new retail investors with an interest in the political and economy stability that favours stock price appreciation.

By comparison, Russia has around 13 million retail investors. There is significant potential for domestic wealth to pour into the stock exchange, whether spurred by the inflationary environment or encouraged as a matter of new government policy. The implication is that capital markets are useful tools for preserving capital—the desperation of middle and working classes in Russia may help shore the wealth of oligarchs, already in stocks and real estate. Many of the enterprises that oligarchs control may successfully adjust to the new reality and remain profitable. A new class of “light” oligarchs may emerge as certain light manufacturing enterprises benefit from reduced competition and better export prospects. The financial war could also provide a pretext for state capture, with private capital facilitating rentierism, corruption, or smuggling deemed expedient in the face of sanctions.

Take all of this together and it becomes clear that the most problematic aspects of Russian political economy—the obscene concentration of wealth among a politically-connected ruling class—will remain unchanged in the financial war. Meanwhile, the immiseration of the middle and working classes will further disempower civil society, creating a dynamic where dangerous protests are the only means through which to air grievances and in which deprivation focuses those protests on wages and bread. As Bourse & Bazaar Foundation board member Djavad Salehi-Isfahani has shown, just as poverty has increased since sanctions were imposed on Iran, so too has inequality risen. The rich are not getting poorer, but the poor certainly are.

Confounding Aspects

Iran’s economic resilience in the face of sanctions owes little to the state and a lot to its people, who have simply tried to prevent their own financial ruin. Economies are made up of individuals—some wealthy, most poor—who marshal the resources they have. How those resources are distributed determines the effects of sanctions on the wider economy. When comparing the fundamentals of the Russian and Iranian economies—the depth of the comparison here is limited by my lack of detailed knowledge about the Russian economy—it seems reasonable to assume that Russia will endure its financial war. The composition of its industry, the size of its domestic and regional markets, and the resources available to the state are all comparable to what Iran had at its disposal in 2012 on the eve of the financial war that has now lasted a decade. Given the fundamental comparability of the Russian and Iranian economies, it stands to reason that the Russian structural adjustment to the newly imposed sanctions may not even require astute political leadership. This may be a good thing. The Iranian leadership was more inclined to pursue diplomacy when it believed that it had achieved a stalemate in the economic war.

As Nicholas Mulder has observed, “Perhaps the most confounding aspect of sanctions is that regardless of technical sophistication, their outcome is never a matter of economic factors alone.” Western governments will no doubt be able to cause massive damage to the Russian economy, but the individuals who comprise that economy will attempt to adjust. The Russian public, like the Iranian public, is at best ambivalent about the policies of their leaders in response to which sanctions have been imposed. In Iran, a decade later, there is a widespread sense that the price endured by ordinary people is no longer proportional to the wrongs committed by their government. If the sanctions persist in the aftermath of a cessation of the conflict in Ukraine—which is likely—a similar reality may come to pass for the Russia. In this context, the resilience of ordinary people in the face of financial war will not be an act of political resistance, but of basic survival. They will toil for low wages in factories and fields, struggling to put food on the table and at times they will protest, facing down the violence of the state. Meanwhile, the economy will stagnate. So too will a dismal political reality.

Photo: Getty Images

Iran's Automakers Need a Rescue, But Face a Reckoning

Iran’s giant automakers, Iran Khodro and Saipa, are in a tug of war with the Rouhani administration over demands to lift price controls. The state-owned firms are seeking to increase prices by 40 percent.

Executives in Iran’s automotive industry, which counts among the country’s largest employers and includes both state-owned and private sector enterprises, argue that rising inflation and the increased cost of parts and raw materials justify increasing automobile prices, which have long been subject to controls. Rising inflation in Iran has been spurred by the depreciation of the rial, first triggered by the reimposition of secondary sanctions by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

The final say on any price increase lies with the Market Regulation Authority of Iran’s industry ministry. A meeting of the authority on May 4 led to a disappointing outcome for the automakers, as the authority’s board gave preliminary approval to a price increase of just 5 percent.

Despite the outcome, market regulators appear increasingly sympathetic to the demands of automakers and further deliberations are planned. The deputy minister who chaired the meeting, Hossein Modarres Khiabani, acknowledged the challenges facing Iran’s automotive sector, stating “For 15 months, the price controls have remained unchanged while many of the production costs have jumped during the period in question.” While carmakers have been unable to increase their prices, the price of automobiles on the secondary market has surged as inflation picked-up. The growing margin between the two prices has given license to many car dealers to engage in enormous profiteering.

However, regulators are reluctant to allow automakers to increase prices without demonstrating some new economic value. The 5 percent price increase preliminarily approved earlier this month is conditioned on a  “70 percent improvement in efficiency,” although no detail was provided as to how improved efficiency is to be assessed.

For decades, the poor-quality of locally produced automobiles has been at the core of growing discontent among Iranian consumers with state-owned carmakers. Iran Khodro and Saipa are accused of exploiting an uncompetitive market, operating as a duopoly and disregarding customer satisfaction in order to produce cars with fewer features and worse build quality. Even Iran’s Supreme Leader appeared to acknowledge the lagging quality of domestic cars in a recent tweet.

Despite the role that the price controls have played in deepening losses, Iran Khodro and Saipa have also been repeatedly bailed out by administrations unwilling to swallow the political consequences of mass layoffs. Iranian carmakers, particular those that are state owned, benefit from unfettered access to financing and cheap foreign currency, despite a track record of contributing to the non-performing loan crisis at many Iranian banks and a reputation for corruption among senior management. By one estimate, Iran Khodro and Saipa have received over USD 4.7 billion in foreign currency at the subsidized government rate. With the Rouhani administration now facing an unprecedented fiscal crisis spurred by sanctions, low oil prices, and the COVID-19 crisis, observers of the automotive sector are wondering whether the state remains able to support the embattled auto industry.

Any prolonged shutdown at Iran Khodro or Sapia would hammer Iran’s many parts manufacturers, which constitute the backbone of the auto industry. These companies have already been squeezed as sanctions have made sourcing the foreign currency needed to pay for imported raw materials far more difficult. Parts manufacturers are also owed huge sums by the likes of Iran Khodro and Saipa, who use their dominance in the domestic market to bully suppliers.

But the increasingly dysfunctional supply chain is catching up to the automakers. A recent report from Donya-e-Eqtesad estimates that up to 50,000 cars remain unfinished, parked in storage yards, due to a lack of parts. Falling productivity in the automotive sector, which accounts for 4 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product, could have a significant impact on the wider economy. The negative outlook for the sector stands in stark contrast to the optimism that followed the implementation of the nuclear deal. In 2017, buoyed by the resumption of industrial cooperation and investment by European automakers such as France’s PSA Group, automobile production hit a record high of over 1.4 million vehicles.

The swift decline in output spurred by the reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions the following year has only been accelerated by the global pandemic. In the period from March 21 to April 20, corresponding to the first month of the Iranian calendar year, Iran Khodro manufactured just 23,246 vehicles, registering a stunning 43 percent decline in production year-on-year. The automaker has discontinued production of seven models, which relied on imported complete knock-down kits, including the Peugeot 2008 SUV and the Suzuki Vitaras. Production at Saipa fell even further, registering a 56 percent decline year-on-year, with just over 9,000 cars produced in the same period. Part of this slowdown is attributable to measures being taken to reduce the risk of transmission of COVID-19 among assembly line workers. Nonetheless, the collapse in production and the controversies around price controls contributed to the ouster of industry minister Reza Rahmani earlier this week. Khiabani has been appointed as caretaker.

The Rouhani administration finds itself at a crossroads and the auto industry faces a reckoning. While regulators have been unwilling to increase the price of automobiles for fear of angering a public already facing diminishing purchasing power, the government cannot simply continue to rescue automakers that have failed to operate efficiently and transparently, selling their products into a profoundly dysfunctional market.

Photo: IRNA

New Cash Transfers May Lift 2 Million Iranians Out of Poverty

This article is republished from the author’s economics blog.

The gasoline price hike of November 15 triggered widespread and violent protests in Iranian cities. Three days later the government implemented an increase in the amount of cash transfers to compensate for the price increase and soften its blow. But do the new transfers adequately compensate for the gasoline price increase? My estimates below show that they more than compensate those in the bottom 40 percent of the population—generally considered to be the vulnerable part of the population—while the top 40 percent lose. Most people in the middle break even.

Estimating the net effect of the increase in the price of gasoline and cash transfers is not straightforward. Unlike the 2010 cash transfers initiated by President Ahmadinejad as part of his subsidy reform program, the new transfers are implemented in a complex way. Instead of universal and uniform per person transfers, they are intended for people in the bottom 70 percent of the income distribution, and are less than proportional to family size. A single member family receives IRR 550,000 (about $20 PPP) per month, with smaller increases for additional members that go to zero for households larger than 5. Given ambiguities in who is in the bottom 70 percent and how household size is measured, it is difficult to get a precise count on the number of recipients and on how the new cash transfers will impact living standards and the poverty rate in coming months and years.

If household size were to follow the census and survey definitions, which are based on a common expenditure pool rather than familial links, close to one million people would be excluded because they live in families with more than five members, but in the 2010 program some households split when registering for the transfers. For example, son or daughter in laws often opted for separate cash transfer accounts. The same may happen now.

With a few reasonable assumptions and using household size as reported by the Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) of the Statistical Center of Iran, we can use the survey for 2018 to estimate the size of the net transfer for each household in 2019.

I first inflate daily per capita expenditures (PCE) observed in HEIS 2018 by the CPI to simulate the distribution of expenditures in 2019. To these I add the amount of transfer per person (IRR 550,000 for a family of one with increments for larger families up to a family of five) and subtract from them the increase in expenditures on gasoline. I use gasoline consumption in 1397 to decide the level of the price hike for rationed and free market gasoline.

In the table below, “PCE” is the value of the PCE in 2018 inflated by the consumer price index (CPI). So, for the bottom 20 percent of the population PCE averaged to IRR 114,000 per day (about $5 PPP), net change in income was IRR 125,410 and “PCE after” are the same averages after adding the amount of transfer and subtracting the increase in gasoline expenditures.  For the bottom quintile, this is nearly 10 percent larger.  The averages for the amount of transfer and the net change show that the bottom 60 percent of the population, the intended target of cash transfers, do benefit from the program while the top 40 percent lose.  Per capita expenditures of the bottom 20 percent, most of whom are classified as poor according to the World Bank $5.5 PPP daily poverty line, will increase by 9.9 percent. This is a sizable gain that can reverse the rising trend in poverty that I documented in my last analysis.

In these calculations the government does not come ahead, so after paying the transfers there is not much left to cover its deficit, if that was part of the plan.

The new transfers also make a difference for the poverty rate, cutting it by 3.4 percentage points, much of it in rural areas (see Table 2). A total of 2.8 million people can move out of poverty (as defined by a poverty line of $5.5 PPP and a PPP rate of IRR 25,000 per USD).  Note that the average decrease in poverty for the entire current year will be smaller than indicated in Table 2 because the program will only affect incomes for the last 4 months of the Iranian year 2019/2020 which ends in 20 March 2020.

In short, these simple calculations show that, for the poorest 20 percent, the net effect of the gasoline price hike and transfers is positive and noteworthy. For the middle class it is a wash and for the higher income quintiles, who have been the principal beneficiaries of cheap gasoline for decades, it is time to pay up.

Photo: IRNA

Rising Employment Casts Doubt on IMF’s Grim Forecast for Iran’s Economy

This article is republished from the author’s economics blog.

In October, the IMF downgraded its forecast of Iran’s economic growth for 2019 from -6 to -9.5 percent. The adjustment brought the IMF’s assessment of Iran’s economic performance closer to that of the World Bank (-8.7 percent) and is revising opinion regarding the ineffectiveness of sanctions in forcing Iran to renegotiate the 2015 nuclear deal. It has strengthened the hand of Iran foes who argue that sanctions are about to bear fruit and urge the Trump administration to stay the course and ignore appeals from Europeans to ease pressure on Iran.

The Financial Times, quoting an unnamed Iranian economist, added alarm to the downgrading by suggesting that Iran’s situation may be worse than it was during the Iran-Iraq war or the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War 2. The idea that life in Iran is anything like the 1940s or the 1980s is nonsense, and the FT reporter who files her reports from Tehran can (but did not) attest to that. It is easy to dismiss this comparison as silly, but the dire predictions of sharp contraction by IMF and the World Bank for the year should be taken seriously. And by seriously I mean to ask why they are at odds with new employment data from Iran.

Surprising Growth in Employment

Earlier this month, the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) release the latest results of its labor force (LFS) survey, for summer 2019. The summer quarter of 2019 (third quarter of the Gregorian year 2019) recorded the highest number of people employed ever, 24.75 million people, up by 3.3 percent relative to summer 2018, when sanctions first hit, and 1.5 percent relative to spring 2019. More than 795,000 jobs had been created since summer 2018, reducing the number unemployed by 430,000 and the unemployment rate to 10.5 percent.

Significantly, this was not due to lower participation in the labor force, which had actually increased by 1.1 percent, so this was not the case of discouraged workers leaving the labor force.  Also significant to note is the fact that employment grew in all sectors, especially in manufacturing, where employment expanded by 4.6 percent compared to the same quarter in 2018, even though is was the hardest hit by sanctions (except for oil).

A similar pattern existed after the first wave of sanctions in 2012, when the currency crashed and the economy entered negative growth, but employment seemed steady for a while before the effect of Rouhani’s austerity program to bring down inflation in 2013 began to show itself in employment (manufacturing employment, in particular,  was on the upswing till late 2013).

Divergent Narratives

What explains the strong discord between the international forecasts and employment figures in 2019?

Before answering this question I should first discuss an often-heard concern that Iranian data are somehow doctored and therefore unreliable, more so than data from other developing countries which form the basis of our understanding of the rest of the world. Many analysts (including me) have worked with the raw data for the labor force survey of Iran (LFS), which are all available on the SCI’s data portal. The LFS was designed by ILO experts to bring Iran’s employment data into line with the rest of the world. The old employment survey, which stopped more than ten years ago did not conform to international standards. For example, it classified a person as employed if he or she had worked at least two days in the week prior to interview. The new survey follows the ILO guidelines and defines the employed as those who have worked at least one hour in the past week. It is therefore disappointing that some so-called experts, inside and outside Iran, reject the SCI data for this very reason. On a recent BBC Persian panel, an expert questioned the criterion of a minimum of one hour in defining employment.  Responding to this type of criticism, a while back SCI published a report showing that defining employment more strictly increases the unemployment rate by one or two points only. Lack of trust in official data runs deep in Iran, and is at times quite healthy. However, in the case of SCI this is unwarranted because its surveys are publicly available in unit record and have become the workhorse for most economic research on Iran.

Now, to answer the question, there are two explanations for the difference in outlook offered by the employment data and the revised IMF forecast that seem plausible. First, the main reason for the lower revised estimate may be Iran’s falling oil exports. Since most United States waivers for buying Iranian oil have expired oil exports have dropped below half a million barrels per day—how far below I do not know. Arithmetics dictate to lower the growth projection for the year if the original projection assumed higher oil exports. However, the link between oil and the rest of Iran’s economy involves more than arithmetics and does not extend to employment. The oil sector employs less than half a percent of Iran’s workforce, so its contraction does not automatically bring down the rest of the economy. Had the IMF chosen to report growth of the non-oil GDP, as they should since it measures the level of economic activity in Iran much better than GDP including oil, they would have made a more moderate downward adjustment. On 2018/2019, as I noted last month, non-oil GDP fell by less than half the rate of the total GDP.

The second plausible explanation is that the IMF’s forecasting model, about which I know next to nothing, may fail to capture the possibilities for substitution in the Iranian economy.  The rise of the dollar brings a large change to the price structure in Iran, opening substantial opportunities for profitable production in the non-oil sectors that employ the 99 percent of the workforce. These are the sectors which are overwhelmed by cheap imports when oil income lowers their prices.

So, in reverse order, and as economic textbooks read, when oil income drop and prices of imports increase, demand shifts from foreign to home goods, encouraging firms to hire workers and expand production. For example, in the past visits to Iran I might have bought a box of Kellogg’s cereal because it tasted better than the Iranian brand and was only twice as expensive. But this past summer, with devaluation having increased the price ratio to four or five, I decided to buy the Iranian brand. Surprisingly, it tasted better, either because the quality had improved or because prices determine taste for Isfahanis!

The engine of this shift in demand and employment is shown in the chart below, which depicts the dramatic change in the real effective exchange rate (EER) in the past two decades. (EER here is the exchange rate deflated by the difference between the inflation rates of Iran and the OECD). The EER fell by more than half during the oil boom of the 2000s, which saw the oil price rise 8 times. This explains why during this period imports flooded Iran’s markets and employment stagnated. Tellingly, during the five years between the censuses of population 2006 and 2011, the economy produced only 14,000 jobs each year, compared to nearly 800,000 jobs since the return of sanctions over a year ago.

The tightening of sanctions in 2011-2012 lowered oil exports and forced a similar realignment of the rial against foreign currencies in early 2012, which was followed by a modest increase in employment and output, as the graph in this post shows.

Dark Clouds on the Horizon

The World Bank has noted that rial’s depreciation can help with economic recovery, and the Iranian economic press have published stories of how responsive is Iran’s private sector to improved incentives for production. But, I would advise caution in becoming too optimistic.  The biggest improvement in incentives in production has come in producing for export markets (saffron and pistachios prices are pegged to the US dollar), but sanctions limit how far (beyond its neighbors) and how much Iran can export. Even meeting local demand faces limitations as most goods produced in Iran use some foreign-produced inputs. About 45 percent of Iran’s imports are of this type.

Other dark clouds on the horizon that no doubt have influenced the lower forecasts of international organizations include the possibility of the return of UN sanctions and resumption of high inflation in Iran. The return of the UN sanctions would make it harder for Iran’s remaining trade partners to work with it, or at least they would exact a higher price for working with Iran. The current impasse with Europeans over INSTEX does not bode well in this regard.

Even without the return of the UN sanctions, Iran’s narrow window of trade can close if organizations such as FATF downgrade the credibility and security of Iran’s banking system, thus discouraging existing partners from handling money flow in and out of Iran for fear of being penalized elsewhere. Regulations to assure the rest of the world that Iran’s bank are being watched and regulated with respect to money laundering have passed Iran’s parliament but face stiff opposition on their way to become law.

As for inflation, it has been falling in Iran for the past six months, which indicates that, as in the 2012 episode, the economy may be on its way to return to normalcy (meaning below 20 percent!). What threatens this trend is the budget deficit, that the government is running out of ways to pay its workers and for the services it provides (it has given up building anything new). The government appears to have managed well so far, delicately balancing the need to keep its services going and to assure the private sector that inflation is under control. How long it can do this with parliamentary elections approaching and Iran’s polity divided as ever, is anyone’s guess. But, any attempt to increase incomes without producing more goods—i.e., populist money printing—will derail the path to recovery that new employment data seem to promise.

High inflation will destabilize the economy by making the exchange rate volatile and less predictable, which is bad for producers. Equally bad is if the government decided to keep the exchange rate constant in nominal terms, which it to let it depreciate at the rate of inflation, as was done after the currency collapse in 2012 when the EER gradually fell and lost nearly all the gain as a result of the devaluation.

Photo: IRNA

Iran's Economy is Bruised, But Not Broken

This article was originally published in Lobelog.

Last April, in a column for this blog I predicted that sanctions are very unlikely to force Iran to renegotiate the multilateral nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In particular, I argued that the belief held by Iran hawks in Washington foreign policy circles, that economic pressure will eventually force Iran to the negotiating table, exaggerated the importance of oil exports for Iran’s economy.

New data indicate that, while Donald Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” has reduced Iranian oil exports to near zero and seriously hurt Iran’s economy, it has not caused anything resembling economic collapse. Furthermore, these data suggest that the economy is not in a steep decline, one that would anytime soon force Iran to capitulate.

The national accounts data, published by the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI), indicate that, in the Iranian year 2018/19 (21 March 2018 to 20 March 2019), GDP declined by 4.9 percent, which is far from a collapse of output. Coming after two years of robust growth following the July 2015 nuclear deal, it puts the economy still above its 2015 level.

This decline was, not surprisingly, led by the oil sector, which fell by 14 percent, followed by manufacturing (6.5 percent), which depends on imports of parts, and construction (4.5 percent).  However, non-oil GDP, which measures the level of domestic economic activity, fell by only 2.4 percent. This is because output in services, which accounts for 55 percent of Iran’s non-oil GDP, remained unchanged, and agriculture, accounting for another 10 percent, fell by 1.5 percent.

Iran’s economy has taken a beating, but it is not a disaster, as President Trump likes to describe it. To most Iranians, his remarks last September—which he repeated in June—that Iranians “can’t buy bread,” showed how out of touch he is with the consequences of his own policy.  Travelers to Iran have noticed, as I did this summer, that supermarkets shelves were full (though mostly with home produced goods at high prices), and there were no lines in government distribution centers, which are the hallmark of real disaster economies, like Venezuela.

High prices, triggered by the tripling in the value of the U.S. dollar since early 2018, have taken their toll on household incomes. The most recent SCI survey of income and expenditures shows that in 2018/19 average real incomes per capita fell by 6.7 percent in urban areas and 9.1 percent in rural areas, more than the decline in GDP per capita. These are sharp drops, but obviously not enough to ignite urban protests, as the Trump administration had hoped.

Going forward, the question is whether the Iranian economy is on a steep decline, is stabilizing at a lower level, or is on the road to recovery. This will influence Iran’s willingness, or lack thereof, to negotiate with the U.S., and should matter for Washington as it evaluates its Iran policy in light of its failure so far to yield the desired results. As always, Iran hawks recommend staying the course with “maximum pressure,” believing that Iran will “ultimately do a 180 if they perceive that there’s no way out.”

But what if there is a way out? What if Iran can restructure its economy to become less dependent on imports and truck along with reduced oil exports? Iranian leaders may be pinning their hopes on this scenario and thinking that the worst is over when they flatly reject negotiations.

In this belief they can draw support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In its April 2019 World Economic Outlook, the IMF predicted that negative economic growth in Iran will end in 2020 and positive growth of around 1 percent per year will prevail till 2024. Not a rosy scenario by any means, as it implies loss of economic growth and declining per capita incomes for the foreseeable future, but it may be enough to convince Iranian leaders not to capitulate.

IMF forecasts beyond a year do not always materialize, and we do not know their assumptions about when U.S. sanctions will end. But the latest evidence from Iran’s labor force survey suggests that an end to the recession may be in sight. They show that in spring 2019, compared to spring 2018 before sanctions came back in full force, employment increased by 324,000 and the number unemployed fell by 365,000. As a result, the unemployment rate fell to a five-year low of 10.8 percent.

Significantly, half of this increase in employment was in industry, the sector that is most exposed to sanctions because its production depends on imports of intermediate inputs. Nearly half of all Iranian imports are intermediate goods.

Cynics have reason to doubt official Iranian surveys, but the rise in employment reported by the SCI makes good economic sense. For over a year, Iran’s currency has been at a historic low and its labor costs the cheapest in memory (about $5 per day for unskilled labor, half that in China). With rising profitability, it makes perfect sense for businesses to increase hiring to fill in for lost imports.

But the switch to local production faces two obstacles. First, the U.S. sanctions themselves. To sustain the structural adjustment needed to reconfigure industrial production requires access to global markets, which trade sanctions inhibit. Second, it requires a banking system to finance businesses to restructure. Iran’s banking system is too weak to do so at present.

While the prospects of economic recovery remain uncertain, it is safe to reject the assumption that Iran’s economy is on a “death spiral,” to use a favorite phrase of Iran hawks. While economic conditions are desperate for many Iranians in need of jobs and medicine, they are not desperate enough for Iran’s leaders to risk getting into a costly war with their southern neighbors and the U.S. just to end the current stalemate. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has ruled out negotiations with Trump, is for one interested in finding out if the economy will rise to the challenge of sanctions and thus become the “resistance economy” that he has advocated for years.

Photo: IRNA

Iran’s Supreme Leader Emphasizes Practical—Not Political—Economic Aims

Two weeks ago, during a high-level meeting with the Islamic Republic's political elite, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated familiar calls for a “resistance economy,” but also placed new emphasis on the “business environment and increasing the ease of doing business.” While it is not unusual for Khamenei to focus on Iran’s economic challenges in such addresses, the specificity of some of his statements suggests a new appreciation for the importance of practical economic reforms that go beyond political slogans.

Pointing to several chronic “illnesses” of the Iranian economy during the meeting—attended by President Hassan Rouhani, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, and Chief Justice Ibrahim Raeisi—Khamenei declared, "If those illnesses are cured under the current sanctions, Iran's economy will experience a leap forward."

Khamenei outlined four main challenges facing the Iranian economy: oil dependence, including the spending of oil revenues on “living expenses” rather than long-term development; unnecessary government interference in the economy, including the failure to fully implement the privatization programs outlined in Article 44 of the constitution; the poor business environment, which is hampered by a cumbersome government bureaucracy; and budgetary reform, which extends to government-led reform of the banking sector.

The supreme leader’s latest speech build on an earlier deadline he set for the Rouhani administration, tasking the government to restructure the its budget and overhaul banking regulations. Khamenei took the opportunity to remind government officials that there remain just "two months left for the task to be accomplished.”

Over the years Khamenei has given his assent to various economic reforms, including privatization and banking reforms. But he has also extolled the virtues of import substitution and the need for Iranian industries to indigenize new technologies to help reduce the Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions. These aims have given his messaging a predominantly political outlook.

Over the last two decades, the slogans chosen by Khamenei to indicate the focus of economic policy for the Iranian new year—“boosting production,” “supporting domestic commodities,” “economy of resistance and job creation” etc.—have offered a general goal towards which government policies ought to be directed. But there is a new specificity in the supreme leader’s recent statements that suggest a growing awareness—perhaps triggered by the economic protests of early 2018—of how economic circumstances have a direct bearing on the perceived legitimacy of the political establishment.

In his recent comments, Khamenei admitted that Iran’s economic struggles are squeezing the poor and the middle class. But he expressed confidence that the country had not reached a “dead-end in the true sense of the word." While conceding that U.S. sanctions on Iran are “unprecedented,” he insisted that "the Islamic Republic is made up of a strong metal,” and that this strength derives from the Iranian people and their mentality of “resistance.”

The concept of resistance has long been a central motif of Khamenei’s political messaging. In an economic context, the supreme leader uses the word to describe policies that “fortify and lay solid foundations for the economy.” For economic planners and the business community, the concept of the “resistance economy,” has spurred the launch of programs that seek to improve the resilience of the Iranian economy to external shocks, whether fluctuations in the oil price or sanctions.

First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri leads a recently established department responsible for implementation of such programs. Khamenei even offered a few words of rare praise for steps taken by the Rouhani government within Iran's ambitious self-sufficiency drive, including achievements in wheat production and a recent declaration of gasoline production independence.

Importantly, Khamenei’s latest call to boost industrial production included an acknowledgement that Iran’s industries cannot be fully disconnected from global markets. The supreme leader stated, “At times we may need a certain part or raw material which has to be imported. Financial transactions [for those purchases] are not possible. There are problems. But we need to make a push and produce them indigenously.”

Khamenei also pointed to the phenomenon of Iran’s high interest rates, which are a response in part to chronic high inflation. He relayed an encounter with an industrialist who had told him he “can put his capital in the bank and benefit from the high returns,” but had decided not to do so because “the country needs production.” Khamenei stated that “such people are few” in Iran, and therefore reforms are needed to correct incentives.

Perhaps most remarkably, speaking about the country’s poor business environment, Khamenei stated, “I have heard that in some countries of the world, half the time is needed to launch a new business, but [in Iran] there are many challenges and barriers.” The allusion to “doing business” rankings, which measure the ease of establishing a new business in countries around the world, points to an awareness that successful reform will also require Iran to adopt international best practices, a notion that could have a bearing on the success of key reforms such as those required by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan.

The new specificity in the supreme leader’s comments on the economy may have spurred Rouhani’s speech last week, in which he insisted that he ought to be granted special powers to enable his government to more effectively respond to the “economic war” waged by the United States. Rouhani’s request, which pointed to the provision of such authorities during Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq, was accompanied by a clarification that opening negotiations with the Trump administration is “absolutely” not his government’s preferred policy at this time. 

Some critics have accused Khamenei of seeking to distance himself from the nuclear deal and the widespread disappointment brought about by the reimposition of sanctions.  The supreme leader advised political leaders not to explain away Iran’s economic woes by blaming sanctions, nor to expect the lifting of sanctions at any point in the near future. In a veiled criticism of the Rouhani administration’s economic policy thus far, Khamenei suggested it was a mistake for the country’s economic plan to depend on sanctions relief, stating "[This has been] one of our problems from the outset… We should not make our economy conditioned on [sanctions relief].”

But Rouhani may sense an opportunity in the supreme leader’s more practical interest in economic issues. Having been significantly weakened by the turmoil surrounding the nuclear deal, the Rouhani administration nonetheless retains well-respected ministers in key posts. Rouhani appears to be making the case that should supreme leader truly wish to see some progress on economic reforms, his cabinet deserves renewed political capital as it enters a final two years in office.

Photo: Khamenei.ir

Iranians Forced to Forgo Meat Staples as Prices Soar

Working class Iranians could look forward to a hearty meal of meat stew or kabob at least once a week. But with meat prices soaring to all-time highs, Iranians are having to cut back on their consumption in yet another example of falling living standards as Iran’s economy falters under the pressure of sanctions and mismanagement.

As of the first week of May, a kilo of beef sold for prices ranging from IRR 950,000-1,200,000 rials (USD 22-28) in butcheries across the capital Tehran. In October, prior to the reimposition of US secondary sanctions on Iran, the price of meat was just USD 11. By comparison, the minimum monthly wage of a menial worker in Iran has been set at approximately USD 361 dollars for the current Iranian year. An Iranian worker wanting to purchase one kilo of meat each week for their family would need to spend a staggering one-third of their monthly salary.

The rapid increase in the price of meat has been blamed on a variety of factors, including from corruption, profiteering, and misuse of hard currency subsidies granted to importers. The Iranian government has so far failed to slow the price increases as inflation continues to rise. Inflation has been driven by the sharp devaluation of the rial over the past year, accelerated by the reimposition of US sanctions on Iran after President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) last May.

Iran has never been fully self-sufficient in meeting demand for beef. In the past decade, the country's meat industry suffered a significant decline in its cow population, which fell from 18 million in 2010 to just eight million in 2018, most of which are dairy cows. Widespread droughts in the past two decades have also diminished pastures and significantly dwindled domestic livestock food supplies, requiring greater reliance on imported feed and making animal husbandry less profitable than ever.

In order to try and limit the impact of devaluation on the price of imported foods, the Iranian government decided last August to subsidize imports of 27 "essential products.” Under the new regulations, importers of those commodities would receive allocations of foreign exchange at the official rate of IRR 42,000 to the dollar, a rate far below the free market rate, which climbed as high as IRR 185,000 in October. Meat products and feed for livestock were included on the list as part of the government push to help alleviate the economic burden on Iranian households.

But the price of meat and other key foodstuffs has continued to rise, suggesting the foreign exchange subsidies were a failed policy. Disruptions in the importation of both animal feed and meat products added costs for importers and created constraints on supply. But more damagingly, the falling value of the rial and the availability of foreign currency at an artificially low price lured many importers into smuggling out livestock or imported food in significant quantities to neighboring countries, where they found a lucrative market, causing shortages back in Iran. In countries such as Iraq, smugglers could sell livestock and double their investment. In one reported case, a network led by an unassuming middle-aged woman collected sheep from villages in the southwestern Khuzestan province, loading them onto trucks and smuggling them to abattoirs across the Persian Gulf.  Profiteering has also come to include hoarding. Iran’s state broadcasters have aired videos of raided warehouses, where tons of meat are shown stored, with owners waiting for prices to increase further before bringing the meat to market.  

An investigative report by Iran Newspaper, and republished by the ISNA news agency, points to the existence of a “meat mafia” which has caused much of the turbulence in meat markets. According to documents the paper says it has seen, one of the tycoons received over EUR 35.7 million in subsidized currency, but distributed the product after calculating the prices on the free market exchange rate, meaning he inflated prices by 92 percent. While much of the blame for high prices has been attributed to smuggling, the report challenges this explanation, suggesting smuggling accounts for just a small portion of the problem. According to the report, the smuggling explanation is an organized effort to cover up rampant corruption in meat production, supply and distribution. This claim is corroborated by an Iranian police report that put the total amount of smuggled meat at around "10,000 tons, while the annual national consumption is one million tons." An unnamed official at Iran's agriculture ministry even alluded to political motives, claiming, "The organized plot is not just about economic gains. There are other purposes behind it as well."

But if such a mafia exists, critics of the Rouhani administration have shown no understanding, blaming the government for its inability to tackle the problem. Iran’s judiciary has sought to take some initiative through much publicized arrests and even executions of businesspeople convicted of major corruption unrelated to the meat industry.  But such shows of force seem to have had little effect.

More recently, the government has sought to import frozen meat to address shortages and try and induce lower prices. This triggered long queues as ordinary Iranians sought to purchase the subsidized meat. The lines themselves served to deepen public anger and sparked broad debates about how the government was insulting the "dignity" of Iranians by keeping them waiting for hours just to purchase low-quality meat.

Iranian civil society leaders have also sought to step in. Campaigns have been launched urging Iranians to reduce their meat consumption, for reasons ranging from reducing harm to the environment to improving health. In a controversial interview on state TV, Iranian actress Behnoush Bakhtiari suggested that the high prices might be a blessing in disguise that would push people to a healthier vegetarian diet. The comments spurred swift backlash on social media as the actress was accused of downplaying the government’s failure to assure Iranians a basic standard of living.

The government also sought to impose price controls on butchers in an effort to ease pressure on consumers. But that move “only cost many butchers their job," a senior member of the Tehran Butchers' Trade Union told Bourse & Bazaar asking not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter. "Many of our colleagues found it no longer profitable to continue. They had to shut down their shops and start planning a new business.”

At last, having failed to regulate prices directly, the government has decided to eliminate the subsidized foreign exchange rate for importers. The move has been hailed by many economic commentators as a step towards exchange rate unification, a move, which proponents argue, will eliminate the space for arbitrage. But the impact of the move has yet to be seen.  

Whatever the reasons behind the turbulence in the meat market, the impact on ordinary Iranians is undeniable. 36-year old Ramin, who asked his last name not be used, owns a small butchery in Tehran's affluent northwestern Sa'adat Abad neighborhood and has seen the collapse in purchasing power up-close. "I know costumers who used to buy at least five kilos of beef a month, but now their purchase has dropped to two kilos," he told Bourse & Bazaar. "There are even those who have completely removed meat from their baskets, buying only bones just to have a flavor of meat in their cooking. And I'm talking about this rich neighborhood. You can imagine how those in [less-affluent] southern Tehran are being squeezed."

Photo: Depositphoto

How Europe’s Forthcoming SPV Can Help Iran Fight Inflation

Europe has yet to launch its special purpose vehicle (SPV) to support trade with Iran and while Iranian stakeholders grow increasingly impatient, some have begun to question the likely impact of the new mechanism. The chief complaint is that the initial SPV, if limited to humanitarian trade, will not have a meaningful economic impact for Iran, which had sought to maintain oil exports to Europe in the face of US sanctions.

As recently argued in a joint report from Bourse & Bazaar and the European Leadership Network, the creation of a humanitarian SPV (H-SPV) has important advantages from the standpoint of protecting the new trade mechanism from interference by the United States. A focus on non-sanctionable trade will enable Europe and Iran to develop a more robust mechanism that delivers practical value for businesses. When a truly useful mechanism has been devised, subsequent SPVs can be established to facilitate what the United States considers sanctionable trade. 

Nonetheless, in order to be welcomed by a broad spectrum of Iran’s political and business establishment, the initial SPV, especially if limited to non-sanctionable trade, must demonstrate a positive impact on Iran’s economy in the near term. An examination of the nature of Europe-Iran trade and the impact of this trade on Iran’s currency markets, suggests that the SPV could have a significant and stabilizing impact on Iran’s economy by helping to fight runaway inflation, the foremost economic challenge facing Iran’s leadership.

Trade Deficits and Inflation

Since early 2018, Iran has been struggling to contain rising inflation exacerbated by rapid currency devaluation. Rising costs of imports have impacted the costs of goods in the consumer basket. The year-on-year increase in the consumer price index in Aban (October 23 - November 22), the most recent period for which data is available, was 39.9 percent. This increase was driven by year-on-year rises in categories including food and beverages (59.9 percent), tobacco (150.8 percent), clothing and footwear (48.5 percent), and furnishings and household goods (83.1 percent). The increase in the health category, which includes medicine, was a significant 19.6 percent.

These categories represent the daily needs of Iran’s households. They are also, broadly speaking, goods which do not fall under the restrictions of US secondary sanctions. Not only are the goods themselves not sanctioned, but the larger role of the private sector within the food, pharmaceutical, and FMCG sectors in Iran means that the Iranian corporate entities active in these sectors are typically not subject to secondary sanctions. On this basis, a humanitarian SPV which would focus on non-sanctionable trade, would be well-suited to support Europe-Iran trade related to these elements of the consumer basket.

While Iran does manufacture many of these goods domestically, overall consumption still relies on a significant volume of imports of food and medicine, with the European Union (EU) the most important trading partner. Even the domestically produced products rely on imports of raw materials which mainly originate in the EU. In 2017, the most recent full year of trade without sanctions, Iran faced a trade deficit with Europe of just under EUR 1 billion in the food and beverage, medicine, clothing and footwear, and furniture categories, based on imports of EUR 1.3 billion and exports of approximately EUR 300 million. Importantly, this figure does not include Iranian imports from Switzerland, a major source of pharmaceutical products with about as much export volume as Germany. But given that the SPV is an EU undertaking, and given that the Swiss are working on a separate banking channel to support their humanitarian trade with Iran, it can be kept separate for the purposes of this analysis.

Beyond humanitarian goods, Iran has typically run a trade deficit of about EUR 1 billion with Europe, even in those years that Iran has been able to export significant volumes of oil to European buyers. The trade imbalance with the EU has a direct impact on inflationary pressures in three areas. First, the euro is a strong currency and the rapid devaluation of the rial has made imports considerably more expensive over the last year. Second, purchasing European goods generally involves higher transaction costs for Iranian importers related to the restrictions on banking channels between Europe and Iran. Finally, Europe is the only source for a number of imports, particularly medicines, meaning that a fall in exports will have a direct and often unmitigable impact on available supply in Iran, pushing prices higher and creating black markets for some specialized medicine. All three phenomena can be seen in the Iranian market today.

There are other indirect drivers as well. As is common for countries at the same level of development, Iran’s process of industrialization is import-intensive. New technologies are acquired to produce a wider range of foods, medicines, and consumer goods domestically, often in accordance with licenses for European formulations or technology. Iran imported EUR 5.5 billion in industrial machinery and equipment in 2017 in order to support domestic industrial capacity. When this equipment or the relevant services, spare parts and training are unavailable, it has a knock-on effect on manufacturing output, available supply, and the market price for consumers.

On one hand, the fall of Iranian imports of European machinery from their 20-year high of over EUR 8 billion in 2004, suggests that Iran is increasingly sourcing such machinery from other markets, especially China. But, Europe retains a technological advantage over China for the manufacturing of food and medicine and the most popular brands in Iran in these categories are often European brands or formulations. This means that substitutions cannot be easily made for the equipment necessary in the domestic production of these goods. Moreover, Iran also relies on European technology for the storage and distribution of food and medicine across the supply chain.

The SPV Intervention

Given these challenges, the appeal of Europe’s SPV, if properly operationalized, is clear. The SPV can help alleviate inflationary pressures by empowering European and Iranian policymakers to better manage foreign exchange risks, reduce transaction costs, and address the trade deficit, particularly around key items within the consumer basket.

First, in the area of foreign exchange, the SPV could reduce pressure on the Central Bank of Iran to source and allocate euros for importers of so-called “essential goods.” Presently, delays in the allocation of foreign exchange are leading to payment issues on the part of Iranian importers of both food commodities and pharmaceuticals. In one manifestation of these delays, cargo ships are remaining anchored off of Iran’s coast for as many as sixty days, incurring demurrage costs.

If the SPV oversees a ledger of trade between Europe and Iran, a role which some have compared with that of a “clearing house,” it would be able to coordinate a version of book transfers, which would enable Iranian importers to pay European exporters indirectly with the SPV coordinating a euro-denominated payment by a European importer on behalf of the Iranian importer. In turn, the Iranian importer would make a rial-denominated payment on behalf of the European importer to its counterparty in Iran (an exporter). Through such a mechanism, there would be no need for the Central Bank of Iran to source and allocate Euros for the purchase by the Iranian importer, as monies already in Europe would be used to make the payment. In this way, reducing demand for euro allocations among Iranian importers should help the CBI more effectively operate the NIMA system, its central marketplace for foreign exchange, thereby reducing the significant inflationary pressures arising from foreign exchange markets.

In a related fashion, the facilitation of book transfers by the SPV would also help eliminate the additional transaction costs currently incurred when arranging cross-border financial transactions between Europe and Iran. Due to the higher compliance risks associated with accepting Iranian-origin funds, the few European banks that do continue to transact with Iran impose fees on clients of up to three percent of the total transaction amount. Some routine and low-risk trade currently facilitated by the few correspondent banking channels that remain between Europe and Iran could be shifted to the SPV, reducing the compliance costs associated with cross-border transactions that can depress export volumes.

Finally, the SPV will only truly succeed if it is operationalized alongside an effort to shrink Iran’s approximate EUR 1 billion trade deficit with Europe in non-sanctionable goods by increasing Iran’s non-oil exports. To be clear, it is highly unlikely that the full volume of Europe-Iran trade will run through the SPV. Where possible, companies will certainly favor using normal channels, facilitating payments through the small number of European banks that will remain willing to process payments for humanitarian trade. Nonetheless, the fundamental problem faced by Iranian importers is access to the euros necessary to sustain purchases from Europe. In this case, in the absence of oil sales, foreign finance, or foreign direct investment, Iran’s exports to Europe will remain the only reliable source of euros for the Central Bank of Iran which is responsible for making foreign exchange available to Iranian importers. 

A New Vision for Europe-Iran Trade

As such, it should be a primary goal of the SPV to increase the volume of European imports from Iran, helping to minimize the trade balance and increase the supply—and thereby reduce the cost—of Euros for Iranian importers. This may seem a difficult task. Iran’s manufacturing output is generally inferior in quality and higher in cost than that available from EU member states and from other countries with active trading relationships with the bloc.

But there are a few product categories where Iranian producers could regain or establish market share in Europe. In 2000, Iran exported EUR 316 million worth of “floor coverings” to Europe, a figure which primarily reflects the sale of traditional Persian wool rugs. By 2017, the sales amounted to just EUR 28 million. The collapse in Persian rug exports may reflect changing tastes among European consumers, as similar decreases can be seen for the same product category as exported by India, Pakistan, and China. An industry-led campaign to boost the popularity of Persian rugs among younger consumers could help reverse the trend.

Iran’s loss of market share in the export of key foodstuffs is harder to explain. European consumption of pistachios has exploded in the past 20 years, but the increase demand has been met by supply from the United States, the only other major producer of pistachios in the world. Iran lost its mantle as top exporter of pistachios to the EU in 2004. Had it captured just half of the growth in European imports since that date, pistachio exports would be around EUR 150 million higher.

Similarly, Iran’s exports of caviar to Europe have fallen from EUR 26 million in 2000 to just EUR 700,000 in 2017. In the same period, exports from the United States have risen from EUR 11 million to EUR 26 million. Exports from China have risen from less than EUR 500,000 to EUR 7 million. It is also notable that Iran’s export of shrimp to Europe has collapsed from EUR 40 million to EUR 2.7 million since 2000, despite the fact that Iran’s seafood industry remains healthy.

Altogether, by dramatically ceding market share, Iran has likely failed to realize around EUR 250 million of export potential in these categories. However, Iran’s growing exports of saffron, which have risen from EUR 24 million in 2000 to EUR 67 million in 2017, help illustrate that Iranian suppliers can achieve significant growth in the European market. This analysis does not account for the many categories of foodstuffs such as nuts and fruits where Iran’s exports to Europe remain very low, but where Iran ranks among the top global producers.  Generally, Iran could become a reliable supplier of food ingredients and herbal medicine to Europe, but it will require an effort from both sides to facilitate the growth. Iran also exported just over EUR 30 million in pharmaceutical products to the EU in 2017—another potential area for growth. Organizing relevant delegations in both directions to expand commercial ties in these sectors would be an important step.

The non-oil trade deficit has been the subject of some attention among Iranian authorities. The National Development Fund of Iran, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, has a program to provide capital to Iranian commercial banks in order to fund loans for private sector export-oriented enterprises. Many of these projects are focused on agricultural production, where loans are used to implement new (often European) technology in order to increase the quality or quality of production while also creating jobs.

Nonetheless, the primary instinct for Iranian officials has been to try and reduce import demand. Recently, the government announced a measure to ban the advertisement of foreign products for which there exists a domestically manufactured equivalent. But given that demand for many imports will prove inelastic, a focus on boosting exports would be a far more prudent strategy for dealing with the trade deficit.

When looking to non-sanctionable goods and the current trade deficit of EUR 1 billion within this category, the possibility of boosting Iranian exports by EUR 250 million is significant from the standpoint of reducing pressure on foreign exchange markets. Add to this other intended improvements to the cost efficiency of trade, and it becomes clear how the forthcoming H-SPV could help Iran address some of the external drivers of inflation. Most importantly, this analysis shows that the launch of the SPV is not the end of an implementation process. It is just the first step in a much-needed reimagining of Europe-Iran trade relations and a process in which the EU can showcase its commitment to a working partnership with Iran.

Photo Credit: IRNA

7 Charts That Challenge the Distorted View of Iran's Economy

Recently, a number of people have insisted to me that Iran has squandered its chance to joint the ranks of the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—which count as the great emerging markets of the world. As sanctions return, as the rial sheds value, and as protests become routine, Iran is increasingly portrayed as an economic basket case where state collapse is just around the corner.

But even a cursory look to the recent experiences of BRIC markets makes it clear that Iran’s pains are not unique. In particular, Brazil has been in a near constant state of political and economic crisis since 2014, when an investigation called Operation Carwash uncovered massive corruption within Petrobras, a state-owned energy company, which was at the center of a “corruption machine” enriching allies of then President Dilma Rousseff. Since these revelations, millions of Brazilians have participated in protests around the country, their anger only increasing as a recession brings higher inflation and rising unemployment.

As I relayed in an interview with Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paolo, in January of this year, the slogans of the protests then emerging across Iran and still visible today, echo those of the protests that have been roiling in Brazil. The reason for this is simple. From a developmental standpoint, Iran’s economy is very similar to those of the BRIC countries, especially Brazil.

The policy failures of the Iranian government have garnered much attention in light of the recent protests. But they are not unique. They are the same failures that can be observed in Brazil, as well as other upper-middle income economies undergoing complex economic transitions. The frustrated cry of the Iranian protestor is the same cry as that of the Brazilian protestor. Sure, there is some local political and economic dialect. But the language of corruption and inequality is the same.

Despite this, the economic crisis in Iran has been characterized as a uniquely Iranian phenomenon, resulting from a set of political circumstances which can be traced back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Looking to Iran and Brazil in a comparative framework offers an important corrective to this characterization. Similar combinations of macroeconomic conditions produce similar political manifestations—protests against corruption, anger at social injustice, even calls to overthrow the government.

Put in its proper context, what is most unique about the crisis in Iran is not the economic reality, but the political reaction. Despite the clear parallels between the cases in Brazil and Iran, we do not see foreign powers “reaching for a regime change strategy” to alleviate the frustrations of the Brazilian people. No doubt, the failures of the Iranian government to create a robust economy are partially political failures. The country has an antagonistic relationship with the world’s superpower and its political elites are continually embroiled in needless scandal.

But as the seven charts below show, Iran is not an outlier when it comes to its economic performance. Governments of very different political persuasions and institutional frameworks—like those of Brazil and Iran—routinely fail to solve the fundamental challenges of economic development precisely because economic growth is difficult to achieve, harder to sustain, and insufficient to improve living standards. This is the context in which we ought to objectively understand and grapple with the idea of economic reform in Iran.

1. Struggles with Inflation

Both Iran and Brazil have long tried to keep inflation in check. Brazil suffered from extreme inflation in the early 1990s, hitting nearly 3000 percent. Iran also went through a period of chronic inflation, hitting an official rate of 50 percent in 1995. By the later part of the decade, both countries began to bring inflation under control. In 2016, the inflation rates in Brazil and Iran converged. Both are back on an upward trend, contributing to public frustration over the cost of living.

2. Stubborn Unemployment

One of the main drivers of recent protests in both Iran and Brazil has been anger over chronic unemploument. In Brazil, unemployment has risen sharply due to the recent economic downturn, and is now approaching levels seen in Iran. Revelations of deep-seated corruption in government have led Iranians and Brazilians to share the belief that their government officials are more concerned about their personal economic wellbeing than about creating jobs and tackling inequality.

3. Ease of Doing Business Rankings

Weak rule of law and the lack of transparency which enable corruption also serve as barriers to investors and entrepreneurs. Iran and Brazil are ranked 124th and 125th respectively in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings. While the performance of Iran and Brazil varies across the constituent parts of the overall score, it is clear that conducting business in the two countries is similarly onerous and risky.

4. The Role of Foreign Direct Investment

However, despite the fact that Brazil is just as difficult a place to do business as Iran, the Brazilian economy has attracted nearly 25 times more net foreign direct investment (FDI) than Iran in the period from 1980 to 2016. Brazil’s economy has been burnished with over USD 1 trillion dollars in FDI, while Iran’s economy has secured just USD 44 billion in the same period. Brazil’s success in attracting foreign investment began around 1995, when the country was coming out of its hyperinflation crisis and when a new class of emerging market investors began to finance the new wave of globalization. Iran missed out on this emerging markets gold-rush. The passing of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act in 1996 by the U.S. Congress and the intensification of sanctions in 2008 at a time when global investors sought elusive growth in emerging markets in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, saw Iran’s FDI inflows stagnate.

5. Similar Growth, Differing Volatility

Despite missing out on FDI inflows, Iran has not been a growth laggard. Over the period of 1980 to 2017, Brazil and Iran achieved the exact same average annual GDP growth: 2.45 percent. The key difference is that Iran’s growth has been more volatile given that it is principally driven by oil revenues and is therefore tied to fluctuations in the global oil price. International sanctions have also frustrated economic growth in Iran.

6. Brazil’s Debt-Fueled Growth

But if Iran’s growth has been fueled by oil, Brazil’s growth has been fueled by its own global market—the debt market. Brazil’s external debt has skyrocketed, exceeding 70 percent of GDP, as the country has repeatedly turned to international bond markets and IMF loans in order to counteract domestic economic fragility and soften the impact of recessions. The recourse to debt allows Brazil to reduce economic volatility. While Iran’s oil buyers can be fickle, creditors are always ready to offer Brazil more financing.

7. GDP Per Capita

Iran and Brazil have seen similar overall levels of economic growth in the last four decades and standards of living, as measured by purchasing power, have likewise been improving at a similar rate. But this is all the more remarkable given that Brazil has enjoyed much greater access to international investment and financing. Even so, the average Iranian today enjoys greater purchasing power than the average Brazilian. The gap in GDP per capita widened during Brazil’s recent economic downturn, but it will likely narrow again as Iran enters its own economic crisis, marked by returning inflation and a devalued currency. Nonetheless, Iran can be said to have delivered greater economic dividends to its population than one of the vaunted BRICs, even without the stimulus of international finance.

Photo Credit: Bourse & Bazaar

Iranian Protests And The Working Class

This article was originally published in Lobelog. 

In February of 2017, I wrote about Iran’s “forgotten man,” the member of the working class who seemed invisible in the talk of the country’s post-sanctions recovery:

What has been lost is an appreciation that the “normalization” of relations between Iran and the international community is as much about elevating “normal Iranians” into a global consciousness, as it is about matters of international commercial, financial, and legal integration. While there has been progress in building awareness of Iran’s young and highly educated elite, whose start-ups and entrepreneurial verve play into the inherent coverage biases of the international media, a larger swath of society remains ignored. By a similar token, the rise of the “Iranian consumer” with untapped purchasing power and Western tastes has been much heralded, but the reporting fails to appreciate that Iran’s upper-middle class rests upon a much larger base whose primary economic function is not consumption, but rather production.

With the new wave of protests sweeping Iran, it seems that the country’s forgotten men and women may be mobilizing to ensure their voices are heard in Iran and around the world. There is a growing consensus that the protests are comprised primarily of members of the working class, who are most vulnerable to chronic unemployment and a rises in the cost of living.

The idea that these are working class protests has explanatory power. First, if the protests are indeed a working-class mobilization, then they are less surprising, and can be seen as akin to the regular “bread riots” that took place during Ahmadinejad’s second term, when Iran’s economy suffered its sharpest contractions.

Second, a working class outlook may explain why the political slogans and imagery of the Green Movement have not been deployed by the protestors. The Green Movement was a predominately middle class movement focused on civil rights, which emerged in response to a chosen candidate being fraudulently denied an election victory. Solidarity with lower class voters was limited and economic grievances were not a central focus.

Third, such a demographic composition may explain the support conservative political groups in Iran have given to the protestors, despite the spectacle and soundtrack of anti-state slogans that have marked many of the gatherings. Conservative politicians are being careful not to alienate members of their base, while trying to cast the protests the predictable outcome of Rouhani’s economic policies. Moreover, a working class composition of the protests can explain how exactly Iran witnessed a successful presidential election with historic turnout and a clear victor just six months before mass mobilizations in cities across the country to protest the government. It may be that those turning to protest now feel their voice was not heard in the May elections.

A simple comparative review of upper-middle income countries such as Iran—including Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and Russia, among others—demonstrates that while protests end with political expressions, they usually begin with economic motivations. That Iran’s working classes are ready to mobilize, and that the mobilization was so quick, makes sense within the context of Iran’s current economic malaise.

It is generally overlooked when discussing Iran’s post-sanctions economy that Rouhani has operated an austerity budget since his election in 2013. Some even describe his policies as “neoliberal.” While an imperfect descriptor, his administration’s economic approach does broadly correspond to the neoliberal “Washington consensus,” which seeks economic reform through trade liberalization, privatization, tax reform, and limited public spending, focus on foreign direct investment, among other policies.

Such an economic approach is in many ways understandable. Rouhani is seeking to correct the populist excesses of the Ahmadinejad administration while also addressing longstanding structural issues in Iran’s economy such as its overextended welfare system,  a reliance on state-owned enterprise, and cronyism and corruption. But these are, by dint of difficulty, long-term reform projects, which may not fully cohere until after Rouhani’s tenure has ended. In a way, it is laudable that the administration is applying such an outlook for the benefit of what Homa Katouzian has called a “short-term society.” But the near-term political costs are becoming clear.

Rouhani’s budget is ultimately ill-suited to addressing the economic imperative of job creation, which is urgent and at the heart of popular dissatisfaction. As economist Djavad Salehi-Esfahani has written in response to Rouhani’s most recent budget:

One of the main stated goals of this budget is to create jobs, but it is hard to see how it can do that by slashing the development budget at a time that interest rates are very high (they exceed inflation by 5 percentage points or more).  The unemployment rate has been rising in the five years that Rouhani has been in office, mainly because of increased supply pressure, but low demand has been an equal culprit.  With unfavorable news about the future of the nuclear deal and the removal of sanctions, thanks to the 180-degree turn in US policy toward Iran, the prospects for a foreign-investment driven recovery are dim.  With public patience running low, the debates in the parliament over this budget should be more serious than the usual haggling over the needs of special interests.

Most governments in Rouhani’s position pursue expansionary monetary policy and boost public spending to try to drive investment and economic growth. But Iran faces a series of economic challenges that complicate such a response. For example, the principle economic achievement of the Rouhani administration has been to bring inflation under control. The International Monetary Fund expects inflation to sit below 10% this year, down from 40% in 2013. Controlling inflation is critical to bringing stability to prices in Iran’s basket of goods, where other market forces continue to drive up prices. Any attempt to pump money into Iran’s economy to spur investment risks undermining the success on inflation.

Additionally, in the face of low-growth, central banks commonly lower interest rates to make it cheaper to finance new investment. But Iran’s interest rates are being slowly rolled back from a high of 22% to the present level of 18%. Slow adjustments are necessary due to Iran’s banks being overleveraged. Reducing the interest rate too drastically, especially as inflation remains stubborn, would have two effects. First, savers would see their deposits lose value. This would predominately hurt lower-income savers who have a less diversified range of assets. Members of the middle class still benefit from asset appreciation in still robust categories like real estate, stocks, or even gold. Middle class fortunes have improved somewhat following the nuclear deal for this reason. On the contrary, members of the working class rely on interest-bearing deposits accounts to conserve wealth and are therefore very vulnerable to fluctuations in interest rates. The controversy over the unsustainable interest rates offered by unlicensed savings and loan institutions, which spurred protests in cities across Iran in the summer 2017, is indicative of the vulnerability.

Second, a lower interest rate would threaten the financial wellbeing of many of Iran’s banks, which have long skirted reserve ratios and amassed toxic debt. Any attendant drop in deposits would make it even harder for banks to shore up their reserves, making politically fraught recapitalization by the central bank more likely. In the recent assessment of Parviz Aghili, CEO of Iran’s Middle East Bank, it would cost as much as $200 billion to bring Iran’s $700 billion balance sheet in compliance with Basel III standards, which call for a minimum leverage ratio of 6%. By comparison, Rouhani’s total budget for the next Iranian calendar year is $104 billion.

In the face of limited options, the Rouhani administration believed that post-sanctions trade and investment, made possible by the sanctions relief afforded under the Iran nuclear deal, would enable the country to kick-start growth and investment that supports job creation. But the economic dividend of the nuclear deal has not materialized as anticipated. The majority of business leaders believe that this is primarily due to external factors, namely President Trump’s threats to re-impose sanctions on Iran, rather than Iran’s own challenging business environment. The nuclear deal has been so central to Rouhani’s economic plan, with the nuclear deal and investment deals basically conflated in much of the discourse, that the concern around the future of the nuclear deal has also hit confidence in Rouhani’s economic management at large.

Overall, Rouhani is running an austerity budget because he is between a rock and a hard place. The policies he is adopting are economically sensible and necessary—so much so that the budgets have been passed despite pushback from parliament and other corners of the Iranian power structure as to the approach, neoliberal or not. But the policies are politically costly, testing the patience of a people who feel that the hopes for a better livelihood slipping away as the years pass. As Mohammad Ali Shabani writes, the circumstances in Iran can be described by the concept of the J-curve, which posits that mobilizations occur “when a long period of rising expectations and gratifications is followed by a period during which gratifications … suddenly drop off while expectations … continue to rise.”

We cannot fault Iranians for their rising expectations, for they are a people who know their immense potential. This is especially true of the working classes, who have built Iran’s diversified economy with their labor and the country’s rich culture with their values. As Iran has grown richer and more advanced, the burgeoning middle class has come to represent the future. But the recent experiences of wealthier economies offer a cautionary tale about “forgetting” the working classes, and sacrificing their expectations to protect the gratification of others.

Photo Credit: IKCO

Let It Rule: Imperatives for Central Bank of Iran

“And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.” A central bank’s power is somewhat like God’s, at least in monetary terms, as a former governor of the Central Bank of Iran once said. This is true for the world's most influential central banks such the Fed, ECB, BOJ and BOE or the SNB. The Swiss National Bank's recent move to abandon a self-imposed peg of the Swiss franc against the euro, introduced in 2011, sent the Franc soaring against the Euro by almost 40 percent, is a testament to the power they exert.

But, the CBI is far from wielding the power and independence that its foreign counterparts enjoy.

The bank is under strict financial sanctions, which have diminished its foreign reserves. Thus it has lost face in the foreign exchange market. Gone are the days when remarks by its governor calmed traders. In recent years, even its actions have little effect. In 2012, the bank had to resort to closing down all currency trade in a bid to halt the collapse of the rial, when vows to stabilize exchange rates and financial intervention failed. At that point the bank had overplayed its hand so much so that traders saw the bank reactionary and imprudent. Little has changed in this regard.

Defenders of the bank might counter that the siege on the CBI for allegedly circumventing sanctions against Iran's nuclear energy program is the source of its ineptitude. And yes, having $100 billion trapped overseas does hurt a lot. But that's not all.

Just look at the list of issues the bank is contending with and you'll see that even with a $100 billion, the leopard doesn't change its spots!

It is struggling to bring 7,000 rogue financial institutions, including one Ayandeh bank, under its supervision. The CBI has tried and failed to decrease interest rates for the past year. But, the same institutions have not complied, leading to drainage of deposits from banks towards their coffers.  

Furthermore, past monetary decisions by the central bank and the former government have led to tens of billions of dollars of toxic debt on the balance sheets of state-owned commercial lenders, in turn driving them towards property speculation. The central bank is seeking to undo this knot in a civilized way, without undue panic and bankruptcies. Results will materialize slowly, if at all.

When we consider the inability to craft effective policy, at the heart of the matter are the limitations on the central bank's legal powers and its authority to make key decisions.

In most developed countries, monetary policy is the domain of a central bank’s governors. Not so in Iran. The money and credit council, a body within the central bank but controlled by the government, sets monetary policy, not the governor and his deputies. This essentially makes the bank an arm of the Ministry of Finance.

The bank also plays the role of the treasury for the government. It receives oil revenues, and then prints rials and distributes the funds to various government branches. Sometimes the foreign receipt part doesn't take place, thus curbing the bank's control over inflation.

And even when the policies are made, the bank is too feeble to implement them. It doesn't have the capability to exert pressure on banks or the currency market, let alone combat those who defy its commands.

So how can investors and business leaders ask for inflation to be restrained, monetary policy to be set and the currency's value to be stabilized, if they are to rely on such a central bank?

Luckily, the solution is simple enough, at least on paper. A separation of powers is necessary. Monetary policy should be detached from fiscal policy, and the bank should be isolated from politics.

To do so, the bank should be given full autonomy on monetary matters, a structure similar to that enjoyed by its counterparts in developed nations. A system of governance, where by all three branches of government have a degree of influence in the bank's governance would better guarantee the bank's autonomy. But this would require a change in the constitution, a lengthy and difficult process.

Furthermore, the central bank's legal clout and ability to exert power on its turf needs augmentation. Its influence has to cut through the lobbying of vested interests. Its responses to crime must become rapid. For this it needs more legal powers and a wider array of financial tools to help it set and oversee monetary policy. Again lawmakers must empower the bank for the benefit of investor, business leaders, and the economy at large. 

Many officials in the current administration have expressed their desire to give CBI greater autonomy and new legislation is under work to give the bank some new powers. But a half-hearted will not be effective. What is needed is a fully independent central bank, as enshrined in law and in the deference of the financial sector at large. After all a strong and independent central bank will help iron-out the full range of economic policies. We ought to let the governor rule his domain.

Photo Credit: mebanknotes.com