Afghan Authorities Accelerate Push for Road and Rail Projects

As the Taliban government pursues an assertive policy to enhance Afghanistan’s logistical infrastructure, interest in the country’s role as a southern transit hub is gaining momentum across West Asia, facilitating the joint implementation of a wide range of new road and rail projects. Leading the charge is Uzbekistan, which has revived its ambitions through the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway—better known as the Kabul Corridor—positioning itself at the forefront of regional integration.

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, backed by Kazakhstan, is advancing a parallel railway initiative through western Afghanistan to secure more direct access to Pakistan’s seaports. In a symbolic move, the foundation for the 22-kilometre Torghundi-Sanobar railway line was laid in September 2024, making a significant step towards reshaping regional connectivity.

The growing engagement between the Central Asian republics and Kabul in the development of transport infrastructure reflects a shared ambition to diversify foreign trade routes and establish more efficient supply chains to access the vast South Asian market. Alongside ongoing projects involving Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, Afghan authorities have announced plans to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway. This line has the potential to become the shortest trade route between India and Russia, enabling New Delhi to build transport links with Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.

Even Iran, which remains the primary conduit linking Central Asia to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, and, by extension, to global trade, is seeking stronger transport links with Afghanistan. Tehran is planning to launch two railway connections to Afghanistan simultaneously: the Khaf–Herat line in the north and the Zahedan–Zaranj line in the south-west. The railway from Khaf to Herat is nearly complete, and the Taliban intend to extend it to Mazar-i-Sharif, a key Afghan trade hub already connected to the Uzbek-built Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railway (launched in 2011) and the planned Kabul Corridor. Integrating these routes could eventually allow Iran to reach the Wakhan Valley in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which is the narrow strip of land separating Afghanistan from China.

Notably, during a Taliban delegation’s two-day visit to Tashkent in February 2025, Uzbek and Afghan authorities agreed to jointly implement the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway route. According to the Afghan Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, this project would expand Tashkent’s trade with South Asia, Iran, and China, reinforcing the idea that Tehran could utilise the Kabul Corridor to reach the borders of China’s Xinjiang region. Another potential route could see the Zahedan-Zaranj railway extended to Kandahar and Kabul with its subsequent link to the Wakhan Corridor.

In 2020, Iran began constructing the Chabahar–Zahedan railway line, with plans to extend it to Zaranj in Afghanistan’s border province of Nimroz and further onward to Dilaram and Kandahar. Engineering surveys have already been conducted on the Afghan side for the Zaranj–Kandahar railway, which could offer Tehran an alternative access route to Afghanistan beyond the Herat Road—bringing it one step closer to creating a new overland trade route to China.

Nevertheless, the prospect of reviving the Wakhan Corridor— an outcome eagerly anticipated by Tehran—remains uncertain. In 2024, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development announced the completion of gravel laying on a 50-kilometre stretch of the road. However, substantial investments are needed to turn the ancient route into a viable commercial transit point. The Taliban are striving for help from China, although Beijing has so far adopted a cautious, wait-and-see approach and is in no rush to open its arms to Afghanistan.

Despite this limited progress, Tehran appears unlikely to back down, particularly as it pursues other ambitious projects. One of these is the proposed Iran–Afghanistan–Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan–China railway corridor, also known as the Five Nation Road.

Its initial section will be the Khaf-Herat railway, scheduled to begin full operations later this year. The route would continue through Sheberghan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Khulm, and Kunduz, ultimately reaching the Tajik border at the Sherkhan Bandar crossing. It would then stretch eastwards across Central Asia to Kashgar in western China, spanning an estimated 2,000 kilometres. In this context, the Taliban’s proposed Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat railway becomes a strategic segment of a broader transit route from Iran to China.

The creation of a Five Nation Transit Corridor could also benefit Turkmenistan, which has long pursued a railway link to Tajikistan via Afghanistan through the TAT project. This initiative emerged in 2013 amid rising tensions between Tashkent and Dushanbe over transit routes and the desire to bypass Uzbekistan.

Turkmenistan completed the first stage of the TAT railway in 2016, spanning from Atamurat (Kerki) through Ymamnazar to Akina. The Akina–Andkhoy segment followed in early 2021. However, the Taliban’s return to power in summer 2021 brought work to a halt, as regional actors reassessed the group’s stance on cross-border infrastructure and foreign engagement. Yet contrary to initial concerns, the new Afghan leadership has shown a pragmatic approach to regional connectivity.

In February 2025, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan agreed to carry out survey and design work for the 55-kilometre Andkhoy–Sheberghan railway line, a project first announced by the Taliban in 2024. Meanwhile, in July 2024, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport and the Korea International Cooperation Agency signed a protocol to develop a feasibility study for a 51-kilometre Jaloliddini-Balkhi–Panji Poyon railway, linking Tajikistan to the Afghan border. Both developments indicate a resumption of the TAT project, which could raise concerns in Uzbekistan, given its longstanding role as a key transit country for several of its neighbours’ access to global markets.

The development of trans-Afghan logistics infrastructure is also of growing interest to Russia, which sees the new corridors as a means of extending its flagship International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to Pakistan.

A clear indication of this was the visit of a Russian delegation led by Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu to Kabul on 25 November 2024, during which the construction of the Trans-Afghan Railway was discussed. Following talks with the Taliban, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that the Russian Federation considers this project as an integral component of the INSTC.

The Russian Ministry of Transport later announced that it would collaborate with Uzbekistan to prepare a feasibility study for a railway through Afghanistan, based on two agreed routes: Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Dilaram–Kandahar–Chaman and Termez–Naibabad–Logar–Kharlachi. But this announcement was not confirmed by Uzbekistan Railways.

Russian involvement in constructing both the western and eastern Afghan railway routes—starting from the borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, respectively—would allow Ashgabat and Tashkent to secure a share of cargo flows between Northern Eurasia to South Asia. Increased competition along these routes is likely to drive down the cost of transit transport over time.

The opening of new trade routes through Afghanistan presents significant opportunities for realising Central Asia’s economic and transport-transit potential. Several key factors should be considered when assessing further developments in this area.

One consideration is the potential reorientation of Uzbekistan towards the western Trans-Afghan railway route. The relative cost-effectiveness of the Kandahar Corridor, compared to the railway via Kabul, could serve as a catalyst for such a shift. Although the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar-Chaman route (1,468 km) is longer than the Kabul Corridor (647 km), it offers advantages in terms of terrain and security. Additionally, the route can branch towards Iran through the border province of Nimroz in south-western Afghanistan, providing a valuable strategic link for future transport corridors.

Another important factor is the growing security risks in Pakistan, coupled with increasing tensions in Afghan-Pakistani relations. These dynamics may prompt Tashkent and its external partners to reconsider their preferences on the trans-Afghan track, favouring the Kandahar Corridor instead. In this context, prioritising a transit route that connects to the southern regions of Pakistan—those closest to the ocean—would be more appropriate.

Given the growing significance of Afghan transit in transregional logistics, Central Asian countries will need to balance the interests of all stakeholders to prevent the emergence of intensified geopolitical rivalries along these evolving trade corridors. Harmonisation of the trans-Afghan routes currently under development appears to be both the most likely and most favourable scenario for the future. In such a case, the key stakeholders, particularly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, could pool their resources to establish a unified transregional railway corridor through Afghanistan.

This collaborative approach would enhance the prospects for attracting external investment and accelerating project implementation. Moreover, a consolidated approach is vital for strengthening the region's role in shaping the emerging architecture of trans-Afghan connectivity. If done successfully, Afghanistan could gain a genuine opportunity to position itself as a new transit hub at the heart of Eurasia.

Photo: Asian Development Bank

GCC and Central Asia Want More Trade, But Connectivity Remains a Hurdle

Over the course of the past five years, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the five republics of Central Asia have taken several important steps to expand their economic and diplomatic relations. In addition to the advancement of bilateral relations among members of these two blocs, efforts have also been made at the regional level involving multiple countries from both sides. This includes several gatherings at the ministerial level, as well as the 2023 GCC-C5 summit that convened the six GCC and five Central Asian countries—Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—in Saudi Arabia. The high-level summit resulted in a joint statement on the framework for economic relations. Preparations are currently underway for a follow-up summit in May 2025 in Samarkand.

The volume of trade between the two blocs is currently small. According to data compiled by the World Bank, the share of GCC countries in total exports of goods by Central Asian countries was only 0.8 percent in 2022. The ratio was even smaller for Central Asia’s largest economy, Kazakhstan, which exported only $462 million to GCC countries. This amounted to 0.55 percent of its $83.5 billion total goods exports in that year.

Trade relations are expected to expand from this low base if the forthcoming summit in Samarkand is fruitful. Not only is the GCC interested in the minerals, metals, and agricultural commodities that Central Asia can offer, but both regions are moving toward economic diversification. This will increase the range of manufactured and semi-processed goods that they can exchange.

While both sides have expressed a strong desire to expand their investment and trade relations in many sectors, transit routes and transportation costs pose important considerations for their respective political leaders and business communities. In their July 2023 summit, the leaders of GCC and Central Asia were already mindful of this issue. Connectivity was addressed in the Article 12 of the Summit’s Joint Statement: “The leaders stressed the importance of developing connected transportation routes between the two regions, building strong logistical and commercial networks, and developing effective systems that contribute to the exchange of products.”

The transport networks between GCC and Central Asia cross through several countries. Three distinct transport routes can potentially provide land connectivity between the regions in the coming years. These are the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) that runs mainly through Iran, the Development Road Project (DRP) that runs through Iraq, and the Trans-Afghan Corridor. Each of these multi-modal routes presents its own unique opportunities and challenges.

Firstly, it is important to consider the NSTC route through Iran. Currently the Central Asian countries have access to highway and rail transit through Iran to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. With cooperation of Iran, Russia, and several Central Asian countries the rail connectivity has been operational since 2016. The trans-Iranian Railway connects the Sarakhs railway station on Iran-Turkmenistan border to the Bandar Abbas port on the Persian Gulf and this route is already in use by the Central Asian countries. 

Highway transit for cars and trucks is also operational; Iran’s network of roads and highways connects the Iran-Turkmenistan border crossings to several seaports in the Persian Gulf, from which containers can be transported to GCC countries by ship. The railroad transit will expand further with the completion of the Sarakhs-Chabahar railway line. Nearly two thirds of this route is already complete. The only remaining piece is the Chabahar-Zahedan segment which is currently under construction, though progress is slow due to economic sanctions. Iranian government officials expect this project to be completed by late 2025.  

These transit routes through Iran are safe,  offering the shortest and most cost-effective routes for GCC-CA connectivity. However, many GCC economic operators will avoid using this route in compliance with the U.S. economic sanctions against Iran. GCC countries have demonstrated high compliance with the U.S. sanctions against Iran because of their heavy reliance on American security and military protection; this cooperation is likely to continue in the future. 

Another transit route that can be used for trade between the GCC and Central Asia is the proposed north-south Development Road Project, which will, using rail and highway, connect Iraq’s Faw port at the tip of the Persian Gulf to Turkey’s broader transport network. This project is currently in its final planning stage according to Iraq’s Transport Minister, Razzaq Muhibis Al-Saadawi. After the recent improvement of diplomatic relations between Iraq and GCC countries, Qatar and the UAE have expressed an interest in providing additional financial support, assisting Iraq and Turkey in the endeavor. 

The DRP offers a significantly longer transit route compared to the Iran option. Additionally, it requires greater international coordination, as it passes through multiple countries—Iraq, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—before requiring sea transport across the Caspian Sea to reach either Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan for connections to Central Asia. The Turkey-Turkmenistan segment, which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s middle corridor between Asia and Europe, is already operational. If Azerbaijan and Turkey can convince Armenia to provide them with a transit corridor, this route will become shorter and more cost efficient, yet still less economical than the Iran option. 

The DRP also faces several geopolitical and governance challenges. Kurdish militias that are in war with Turkey operate in the mountainous regions of Northern Iraq, near the Turkish border, posing a security risk to the road both during its construction and after completion. The Iraqi government’s opposition to the participation of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) poses another obstacle to the viability of this project as disagreements between Baghdad and KRG can lead to more disruption. 

Another challenge is the many governance issues in Iraq’s fragmented government structure, which has reduced the government’s efficacy and ability to implement long-term plans. Fortunately, Iraq’s political system has become more stable in recent years, contributing to better conditions for the implementation of the DRP. A recent security agreement between Turkey and Iraq might also reduce the security risks in northern Iraq.

A third land transit route between the GCC and Central Asia is the Trans-Afghan option, which will offer rail transit from Uzbekistan to Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar seaports on the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan. Cargo would be able to be transported from these ports to various GCC destinations in the Persian Gulf by ship. The Trans-Afghan Corridor has received support from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the primary Central Asian stakeholders. Uzbekistan has also approached Qatar and the UAE for financial investment in this project, which is estimated to cost $7 billion.

Under the previous Afghan government, the Taliban posed a security risk to the Trans-Afghan Corridor. Now, in a turn of events, the Taliban-led government is a strong supporter, engaging in active negotiations with all stakeholders to expedite the project. In 2024, Afghanistan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan and the UAE to launch a feasibility study for the project. Pakistan is also lobbying the Central Asian countries, Qatar, and the UAE for support. 

Another important tailwind behind this project is the support of several other countries, including Russia and Belarus, which are also interested in development of the Afghan route. For Russia, which faces sanctions and security risks along its Baltic and Mediterranean transit routes, the Trans-Afghan Corridor will serve as an additional branch of the already operational NSTC route through Iran. In addition to the Uzbek option, Russia is also advancing an alternative branch of the Trans-Afghan railway via the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border, further expanding the capacity of transit routes through Afghanistan.

The transit corridor competition that is currently underway between Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan will increase the land connectivity options among the GCC and Central Asian countries in the coming years, reducing exposure to the risk factors in any single country that lies between the two blocs. While at present the only operational route is via Iran, it is encumbered by sanctions risks. The completion of the DRP and the Trans-Afghan Corridor will provide valuable alternatives despite being lengthier and hence more expensive. Their development will be reassuring to both the GCC countries and the Central Asian countries as they seek to boost trade ties as part of a process of West Asian integration.

Photo: Leonid Andronov

New Agreement Boosts Prospects for Connected Grids in the Gulf

The October 9 agreement to finally connect Iraq to the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) marks a significant step toward greater energy integration in the region. Originally established to link the power grids of the six GCC states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—the GCCIA has been gradually expanding its reach. Iraq’s inclusion in this regional grid highlights the growing importance of cross-border energy cooperation to address the rising electricity demands in the Gulf. Iraq’s existing energy ties with Iran, however, suggest that the region could be on the verge of an even more ambitious project: a Gulf-wide power grid that includes all eight Gulf states. 

Energy demand in the Gulf has surged over the years, driven by rapid population growth, industrialization, and the region’s heavy reliance on energy-intensive processes such as water desalination. Between 2010 and 2023, the Gulf's population grew from 153 million to 194 million, with projections indicating it could exceed 300 million by 2050. This population boom has placed immense pressure on power generation systems, which remain dominated by fossil fuels. In 2022, electricity demand alone accounted for about 15% of the total energy consumed in the region, with per capita electricity consumption growing by 74% between 2000 and 2022. This rise in demand is largely the result of increased industrial and commercial activity, infrastructure development, and economic growth, all of which require significant amounts of electricity.

Moreover, most regions surrounding the Gulf experience extremely high temperatures during the summer months, often reaching 50°C. As a result, space cooling has become essential, further driving up electricity consumption. The scarcity of freshwater in the region also leads to heavy dependence on desalination, which is a highly energy-intensive process. Reverse osmosis, one of the commonly used desalination technologies, is particularly reliant on electricity for mass production. Additionally, Gulf governments have historically subsidized electricity, making it relatively cheap for consumers. While this has helped meet public demand, it has also encouraged inefficient consumption patterns.

As of 2023, the Gulf’s combined installed power capacity stood at 272 gigawatts, with 70.4% of electricity generated from natural gas, 25% from oil products, 2.2% from nuclear, 2.2% from renewables (hydro, solar, and wind), and 0.2% from coal. The residential and commercial sectors are the largest consumers of electricity in the Gulf, accounting for 40% and 30%, respectively. In contrast, the industrial and agriculture sectors make up 22% and 6%. In 2022, the total carbon emissions from electricity generation in the Gulf amounted to about 700 million tons, representing 38% of the region’s total energy-related carbon emissions.

Cross-border electricity trade has also become an important feature of the Gulf’s energy landscape to meet rising demand. Between 2016 and 2022, the accumulated electricity trade in the region amounted to 126.5 terawatt-hours (TWh). Notably, about 55% of this trade involved Iran, which exports electricity mainly to Iraq while importing from countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Iraq accounted for 40% of the region’s electricity trade, all of which was imported from Iran. The GCC countries accounted for the remaining 5%, exporting and importing electricity among themselves through the GCCIA grid.

Iraq, in particular, has struggled with chronic electricity shortages. Despite an installed generation capacity of around 29.4 GW, inefficiencies and under-maintenance have reduced Iraq’s available capacity to just 15.7 GW. In 2022, peak electricity demand reached 30.5 GW, nearly double the available capacity, leading to regular power outages. Iraq has long relied on electricity and natural gas imports from Iran to help meet its energy needs. In 2022, Iran exported 3.5 TWh of electricity to Iraq through four transmission lines, and the two countries signed a five-year agreement in 2023 to import 50 million cubic meters of Iranian gas per day. These imports have been especially crucial during the summer months when electricity demand peaks.

However, Iraq’s reliance on Iranian energy is complicated by US sanctions on Iran. Since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iraq has received waivers to continue importing Iranian electricity and gas. Yet, delayed payments and mounting debt—estimated at $11 billion—pose significant challenges. Iraq spends about $4 billion annually on Iranian energy, but US sanctions have delayed the country’s ability to make timely payments, leading to substantial debt accumulation. To settle this debt, Iraq proposed an oil-for-gas barter deal in 2023, allowing it to repay Iran through crude oil. However, opposition from the US Congress and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East continue to hinder the smooth functioning of Iraq-Iran energy cooperation.

Iran itself faces significant domestic energy challenges, including infrastructure problems and environmental factors such as droughts that have reduced its hydroelectric output. In 2021, Iran faced a 12 GW gap between peak summer electricity demand and supply. These domestic issues highlight the potential benefits of integrating Iran into the broader GCCIA grid, which could help stabilize Iran’s power system while benefiting the region as a whole. Iran’s vast land area and renewable energy potential—particularly in solar and wind—could complement the Gulf’s energy needs. By connecting Iran to the GCC grid, the region could also better manage electricity demand across different time zones, as argued by Robin Mills, leveraging the 1.5-hour time difference between eastern Iran and western Saudi Arabia to extend the availability of solar power during peak hours.

The potential for a Gulf-wide energy grid that includes Iran, Iraq, and the six GCC states presents significant opportunities for enhancing energy security, sharing resources, and balancing electricity supply and demand across the region. However, significant challenges remain. 

Expanding the GCCIA grid to include Iran would require substantial investment in infrastructure, including new transmission lines and modern grid management systems. Iran’s aging power infrastructure would need to be upgraded to ensure reliable connectivity with the Gulf states. Additionally, coordinating electricity markets and pricing across such a diverse group of countries would require careful negotiation and planning. Geopolitical tensions as well as US sanctions, pose other major obstacles to integrating Iran into the GCCIA grid. 

Despite these challenges, a Gulf-wide grid could foster greater political and economic cooperation. Energy interdependence could reduce regional tensions and encourage collaboration on other critical issues, such as water security and climate change adaptation. The Gulf is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including extreme heat, water scarcity, and rising sea levels, all of which could destabilize power grids. Multilateral cooperation on energy could play a key role in mitigating these risks in the Gulf.

The agreement to connect Iraq to the GCCIA represents a turning point in the Gulf’s energy landscape, opening the door to broader regional cooperation. With regional diplomacy expanding between Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf, the possibility of integrating Iran into a Gulf-wide electricity grid becomes an increasingly tantalizing prospect. 

Photo: GCCIA

Iraq and Turkey Seek Cooperation Through Connectivity

Spearheaded by Iraq and Turkey, the Development Road Project (DRP) is an ambitious trade route connecting the Persian Gulf to Europe through rail, road, and port infrastructure. The project intersects with other regional connectivity efforts which aim to transform the Middle East’s from a region beset by insecurity and conflict into a hub of trade and economic opportunity. In essence, the DRP offers a vision for future regional cooperation.

Iraq and Turkey view the project as a foundation for a new partnership based on shared economic interests. Iraqi officials believe that the DRP will have "great impacts on Iraq’s bilateral relationships with its neighbours," allowing Iraq and its neighbours to develop relations "on the basis of common interests." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has heralded the project as "the new Silk Road of our region." Both governments have high hopes that the DRP open a new chapter in their bilateral relations, while also elevating their geopolitical stature as a central node connecting Asia and Europe.

Altogether, the DRP consists of three phases, set to be completed by 2028, 2033, and finally 2050. The total investment in the project is expected to be around $24 billion in the next three decades. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have agreed to contribute financially to the project, alongside investments from the other partner countries. 

The route starts at Grand Al Faw port in Iraq’s Basra, which is only now finishing its first stages of completion as it prepares to enter operation in 2028. It will follow the Euphrates River to Nasiriyah, pass through the holy Shia pilgrimage cities of Najaf and Karbala, continue to the capital Baghdad, and then proceed to Mosul. From there, it will reach the southern Turkish border city of Mersin before finally extending to Europe.

However, the project faces numerous obstacles. For Turkey, the project is contingent Iraq’s support for curtailing the PKK, a Kurdish militant group. For Iraq, the project depends on progress in disputes with Turkey over water rights. Meanwhile, Iran could act as a spoiler for the project if it sees its interests undermined. 

Mutual Benefits

To bring the DRP to fruition, Iraqi and Turkish policymakers will need to learn from the failed connectivity projects of the past. A shared oil pipeline running from Kirkuk in Iraq to Ceyhan in Turkey has been shut for over a decade due to disagreements over how the two countries should share export revenues. But the stakes for cooperation may be higher now than before.

 Turkey is striving for better relations with Baghdad after years of disputes over water-sharing agreements and its military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK actions mostly taken without Baghdad’s go-ahead. This is central to Ankara’s new regional strategy to expand its diplomatic footprint by offering economic and security dividends to its potential partners, in a bid to make diplomatic cooperation more attractive. Additionally, the DRP allows Turkey to position itself as a gateway for Gulf countries to access European markets. Turkey has been vocal about its exclusion from other regional connectivity schemes, especially the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which will passes through Saudi Arabia and Israel.  

For Baghdad, the DRP represents a golden opportunity to diversify its oil-dependent economy—oil exports currently account for 90 percent of government revenues. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is keen to reshape Baghdad from a site of regional competition to a regional mediation hub—leveraging its 'middle position'. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly last year, Sudani expressed his desire for Iraq to be “part of the solution to any international and regional problem.” Sudani also aims to take advantage of Iraq’s strategic location at the mouth of the Persian Gulf to attract new trade and investment projects. Of course, success in these arenas would also boost his popularity ahead of the national elections to be held  in 2025, should he seek a second term.

The DRP has two main selling points. First, according to one estimate, the rail route will save around two weeks compared to the Red Sea-Suez Canal route to Europe, which takes approximately 26 days from Asia—thereby reducing fuel and freight costs associated with shipping goods. Second, the project will reduce regional dependence on the Suez Canal. Since November 2023, commercial vessels travelling to the canal through the Red Sea have been targeted by Houthis forces, under the pretext of the group’s support for Palestine. Consequently, ships have been forced to take the costly detour around the Cape of Good Hope to reach European customers, adding a staggering up to 10 days to the overall shipping time.

Mismatched Expectations

For Ankara and Baghdad, the deals being negotiated alongside the DRP are arguably more important than the project itself, as they attempt to resolve long-standing disagreements. As a condition of its support for the DRP, Ankara is seeking more concessions from Baghdad regarding the PKK, which Turkey has designated as a terrorist organisation. The PKK has long maintained a presence in Iraq’s northern stronghold, allowing it to operate close to the Turkish border. Curtailing the PKK has a practical purpose as well—the group has repeatedly targeted the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and could pose a threat to DRP infrastructure.

Following his visit to Iraq on April 4, his first since 2011, Erdogan claimed to have signed a security pact with Sudani against the PKK. Erdogan emphasised that Iraq had finally recognised the PKK as a “terrorist” organisation. However, the Iraqi central government designated the group as a “banned” organisation, stopping short of labelling it a “terrorist” group. It is conceivable that Ankara made these initial claims to pressure Baghdad into adopting a full designation. A source with knowledge of the Turkish position told the author that Ankara understands and does not expect Iraq to combat the PKK in its strongholds or engage in direct confrontation. Instead, Ankara suggested that the Iraqi central government could implement alternative measures to curb the PKK’s operational abilities in Sinjar, such as increasing checkpoints in the areas and prohibiting permits for PKK offices

These more pragmatic requests contrast starkly with the reality on the ground. In April, Erdogan threatened a major offensive to clear the PKK from Iraqi Kurdistan once and for all. Following through on these threats, Ankara launched a new offensive in Iraq in May, which accelerated in June. While the offensive has been more limited than observers expected, the Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security declared that it “rejects Turkey’s military operations within Iraq.” Although this statement is likely more for public consumption than anything else, it indicates that a prolonged incursion could build public resentment. 

For its part, Iraq has focused its demands surrounding the DRP on services and water management rather than security. Baghdad has long condemned Turkish dams for reducing water levels in Euphrates and Tigris rivers—crucial for Iraqi irrigation. In a positive development, both countries signed a framework agreement to resolve the water issue during Erdogan’s visit. But ongoing meetings between bilateral working groups, formed after Erdogan's visit, have yielded little progress, making it unlikely that Baghdad will receive its fair share of water anytime soon.

Pushback from Iran

In Iraq, the DRP has also faced local opposition from Iran-backed groups who could scuttle the project—Ankara and Baghdad have done little to secure broader buy-in for the project among these groups. The new revenue streams associated with the DRP could stir-up competition among the different groups comprising the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)— an umbrella organisation comprising various military groups in Iraq, many of which are backed by Iran.

The spokesman for the Iran-backed Shia paramilitary group Kata’ib Hezbollah announced that the road “remains a concern” without specifying the reason. Kata’ib Hezbollah has demanded “guarantees” about the project from Iraqi authorities sparking fears that they could hinder the DRP’s progress. Meanwhile, an official from the parliamentary bloc representing the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq took to social media to state that the project represents a “stain in the history of Iraqi politicians.” However, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq is unlikely to act as a spoiler given its growing role within the PMF that may increase its chances of receiving substantial revenues from the DRP project.

Ultimately, Iraqi paramilitary groups might be tempted to target the DRP if they are not included or perceive their interests to be at risk. In the past, the PMF have attacked Turkey’s interests, including energy export infrastructure, in response to its military operations in Sinjar– a hotspot of competition between Ankara and Tehran.

Given Iran’s deep ties to Iraq and its significant sway over several armed groups in the country, its stance could make or break the project. The role it chooses will also depend on the fluctuating state of Iran-Turkey relations. Iran has shown wariness about connectivity projects that could rival its own aspirations to become the primary hub for transit routes, particularly with the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Tehran’s support for the DRP is therefore conditional on its involvement. Specifically, Iran aims to complete its first railway link with Basra soon. If this railway connects to the DRP—a possibility Iran is pursuing—it would enhance trade with both Iraq and Turkey. This point was made clear during a meeting in June between Iranian Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Sudani, where Iran expressed its willingness to "contribute" to the project.

Looking Ahead

Importantly, the Iraqi government has yet to conduct a comprehensive feasibility study to assess the mega project's viability. Turkey and Iraq seem comfortable with the delay, viewing it as a confidence-building measure that could eventually lead to greater economic consolidation. However, the real challenge lies ahead: addressing the longstanding issues that have strained Iraq-Turkey relations for years, rather than skirting around them with vague promises that will only resurface later and derail the project. In the absence of security-focused negotiations to address these issues, they risk becoming bigger obstacles to the DRP’s success.

Much of the diplomatic burden unfairly falls on Iraq to rally support among the different armed groups and governorate-level political groups—who may act as spoilers if their interests are not met. Baghdad should engage seriously with groups likely to feel excluded, while both countries should adopt a multi-pronged diplomatic approach to secure regional buy-in.

Before this can happen, both nations urgently need to flesh out the funding details and conduct a feasibility study to align expectations among the many stakeholders. Ultimately, in a region where infrastructure projects too often get caught in the crossfire—and considering the unpredictable nature of the Iraqi political sphere—this venture requires a more proactive approach to succeed. Political will alone is not enough.’

Photo: AK Party

Can SCO Members Achieve Connectivity in the Face of Conflict?

The two-day Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit took place last week in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Aside from agreeing to the Samarkand Declaration, which summarises the intention of SCO members to foster deeper economic partnerships, the gathered leaders also signed 44 documents consisting of numerous memorandums, roadmaps, and action plans for cooperation in tourism, artificial intelligence, and energy.

The SCO leaders mostly focused on the importance of new transit routes and economic cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who travelled to the summit as part of his first foreign tour since the COVID-19 pandemic, touted ambitious plans to expand economic cooperation with Central Asian states.

Negotiations over the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway took place in the sidelines of the summit and the three parties agreed to conduct a feasibility study with a view to constructing the new route. Uzbek officials also lobbied for another transit corridor from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, but support among SCO members has been tepid given the need to engage with the Taliban government in Kabul.

Uzbekistan also signed 17 cooperation agreements with Iran focused primarily on transport and trade. Tashkent is seeking further access to Iran’s Chabahar port for its economic development. The Iranian delegation, led by president Ebrahim Raisi, signed a Memorandum of Obligations that paves the way for full SCO membership. Iran’s accession process could be completed in less than a year. The presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko reflected the SCO’s interest in expanding its influence, even among non-member countries.

But the spirit of cooperation and the visions of connectivity were undermined by reminders of the numerous conflicts in which SCO member countries are involved. During the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interactions with fellow leaders were tainted by the war in Ukraine. While there were no official statements about the Ukraine invasion during the summit, most member states found their way to express dissatisfaction with the economic turmoil and destabilisation caused by Russia's invasion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his Russian counterpart that “now is not an era of war.” Several leaders, including Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, made Putin wait in front of cameras before meeting him—a power move that Putin has famously used in recent years.

China, too, expressed its concerns over the consequences of the current events in Ukraine. The strongest message came in the form of vocal support for Kazakhstan. In a statement, Xi said that “no matter how the international situation changes, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Russian hawks had recently threatened Kazakhstan after Kazakh leaders took steps to distance themselves from Moscow.

But the war in Ukraine was not the only conflict to cast a shadow over the summit. During the summit, clashes began between two member states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, tensions also rose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an SCO dialogue partner whose president, Ilham Aliyev was in attendance at the summit.

The border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has been troubled since the demise of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Republics have failed to properly demarcate their shared border due to complicated geographic terrain, mixed ethnic populations, and general political instability. But since last year, the regular border clashes have become more dangerous and more deadly. New clashes between Tajik and Kyrgyz forces erupted during the SCO summit, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. As the clashes between the two Central Asian republic escalated, Russia attempted to show its influence. Just after the summit, Putin spoke with the Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents and called on them to "prevent further escalation." Both countries are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. A tenuous ceasefire is now in place.

Other SCO member states and dialogue partners may be implicated in the conflict if it escalates further. Earlier this year, Tajikistan began production of Iranian-designed drones as part of a novel joint venture. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan has purchased Bayraktar drones from Turkey.

The Samarkand Summit demonstrated the value of the SCO as a platform for bilateral and multilateral initiatives of its member and associate countries. The SCO is especially attractive for strong personalist leaders, whose politics prevent active participation in other international rules-based blocs and bodies. However, because the SCO does not contribute to a rules-based order, the organisation has struggled in the face of conflict—such as the clashes that took place last week between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

If the SCO is to mature as an organisation and make good on its vision of connectivity, it must also serve as a platform for conflict resolution. Until now, SCO member states have viewed longstanding tensions among other members as something outside the bounds of the bloc. India is assuming presidency of the SCO and Modi did chide Putin over his invasion of Ukraine during their bilateral meeting. Will far-flung conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, be of little concern or too costly to ignore?

Photo: Kremlin.ru