A New Narrative for Iranian Foreign Policy

This article was originally published by IISS.

On Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif announced his resignation in a late-night Instagram post, sending shockwaves through political circles in Iran and abroad. Just ten days earlier, Javad Zarif’s fiery performance at the Munich Security Conference had won him praise across the political spectrum in Iran. At a time when public support for the JCPOA among Iranians has slipped to just 51%, Zarif’s strong message struck a chord with the Iranian public, who flooded social media with clips of him defending Iran’s missile program and refuting any notion that the West held the moral high ground. Zarif also made clear that while Europe has made the ‘right political statements’ regarding the JCPOA, it has yet to prove that it is willing ‘to pay the price’ to defend the deal in the face of US ‘bullying’.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has rejected Zarif’s resignation, citing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei’s trust in and esteem for Zarif. But the foreign minister’s reasons for tendering his resignation are hardly opaque. With parliamentary and presidential elections on the horizon, and the economy falling under increasing pressure, he has had to reassure the public of the Rouhani administration’s nationalist credentials and parry accusations of weak leadership from hardliners, which tried to impeach him in December 2018 over his support for Iran’s Financial Action Task Force reforms. The last straw was reportedly his exclusion from meetings with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who was in Tehran on Monday. Zarif felt that the foreign ministry was being unduly sidelined, and told an Iranian newspaper that he sought to defend the ‘integrity’ of the ministry by resigning. Should he stay on, Rouhani and Khamenei’s testimonials may help Zarif prevent the Foreign Ministry’s marginalisation.

Preserving the JCPOA

Regardless of who is foreign minister, Iran’s public diplomacy must find a new balance. Zarif’s resignation illustrates how growing divergence in foreign policy between the Iran’s moderates and hardliners could impede the critical political mission of preserving the JCPOA until 2021, when Iran’s newly elected president will likely have the chance to engage a new American president.

Just as the JCPOA remains the signature foreign policy achievement of the Rouhani administration, it also serves as a symbol of multilateralism for the E3 and especially the European Union. However, as demonstrated by the tortured wording of the recent European Council conclusions on Iran, there is growing fatigue in Europe over efforts to shield the JCPOA from the Trump administration’s attacks and increasing frustration over what are perceived as Iran’s destabilising activities in the Middle East and—in light of attempted political assassinations—in Europe. Many European officials view Iran as intractable and are inclined to take a much harsher stance, albeit short of the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign.

So far, officials in favour of engagement and incentivisation continue to set the overall tenor of European policy on Iran. But the emerging political dynamics indicate that a tougher line from Iran will probably lead to a tougher line from Europe. Pressure has thus increased on Iran’s moderates to reassure European stakeholders of their firm commitment to constructive engagement while also showing domestic strength by following principles established over the four decades of the Islamic Republic. Achieving these dual aims will require the Iranian government to cast Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA as a defining element of Iran’s national vision.

The erosion of a unipolar world order may facilitate this objective. The United States appears to be losing its berth as the primary architect and steward of the global political and economic system. Through a combination of “America First” policies and the abuse of foreign policy tools such as extraterritorial sanctions, the Trump administration has prompted European leaders to question longstanding structural imbalances in the transatlantic relationship, and to call openly for greater political and economic autonomy. Thomas Wright has observed that the Munich Security Conference marked the end of the “transatlantic charade.”

Multipolar Opportunities

Iranian leaders could exploit this development in several ways. Firstly, they could link Iran’s traditional challenge to US primacy with Europe’s developing interest in strategic autonomy. The launch of the INSTEX special purpose vehicle, which seeks to facilitate Europe–Iran trade in the face of US secondary sanctions, is a start. In Munich, citing near-term practical limitations, Zarif characterised INSTEX as insufficient to honour European commitments to save the nuclear deal, echoing a sentiment shared widely in Tehran. He may have missed an opportunity to cast INSTEX as emblematic of an accelerating European push for greater strategic independence.

Secondly, the Rouhani administration might downplay the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal precisely on account of Washington’s diminished leadership. Any Iranian visions of Iran’s centrality to the prospective integration of Eurasia driven by the remaining non-Iranian parties to the JCPOA—Europe, Russia and China – are exaggerated. In fact, there appears to be little momentum behind Iran’s inclusion in emerging political and economic structures, in part due to US sanctions. But Iran can still project general optimism about a stronger political and economic role in the Eurasian geopolitical space on the basis of positive relations with Europe, Russia and China. In this context, the JCPOA could be portrayed not as an agreement imposed by the United States to shackle Iran but rather as an important security and economic pact that could support its normalization in Eurasia.

Finally, Iran can highlight its interest in advancing the establishment of a multipolar world. For two decades Iran’s foreign policy debate has focused on the choice between East and West. Hardliners have argued that Iran should look east, and forge closer ties with Russia and China, which overlook Iran’s human rights failings and remain largely neutral with respect to Iran’s Middle East activities. Moderates have typically argued that Iran must look west and establish closer ties with the United States and Europe, even if this requires a commitment to political reform. This dichotomy may be obsolete, or at least less useful.

Provided Iranian officials can maintain Iran’s broad diplomatic engagement, they could leave the door open to improved dialogue with the United States while placing the onus on American leaders to earn back trust of the remaining parties to the deal. It bodes well that the Democratic National Committee has already adopted a resolution calling upon the US to re-enter the JCPOA.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Three Years Later: Europe’s Last Push on the Iran Nuclear Deal

This article has been republished with permission from the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

The Iran nuclear agreement marked its third anniversary in a gloomy state. Despite repeated attempts to keep him on board, US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the deal – signed on 14 July 2015 under the formal title the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and thereby pulled the rug from under Europe’s feet. European policymakers are now focused on salvaging the agreement. For a growing number of European corporate decision-makers, the deal is already dead. In reality, the JCPOA is on life support and the next few months could open either its next or final chapter. Despite the significant challenges they face, European governments have some limited time to avert the deal’s collapse.

In 2015, global powers unanimously hailed the agreement as a historic achievement that proved the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, the JCPOA provides unprecedented oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, the agreement states that parties anticipate it will “positively contribute to regional and international peace and security." Many hoped that the resolution of the nuclear dispute would result in a new understanding between the West and Iran, opening a pathway for detente rather than confrontation. Relations between Europe and Iran have certainly made gains in this direction, but the Trump administration’s maximalist stance on Tehran has created an extremely hazardous environment for all remaining stakeholders in the nuclear deal.

Washington's Pressure Package

Since the formal US exit from the agreement in May this year, the Trump administration has sought to sabotage European efforts to sustain the agreement. This has involved a policy of relentlessly threatening and otherwise pressuring any country or company inclined to maintain economic channels with Iran, by weaponising US secondary sanctions. Reportedly, the US administration recently rejected an appeal by the EU foreign ministers to negotiate broad exemptions to such sanctions for European companies. The US clearly intends to specifically target European trade with Iran – although there remain questions about its ability to do so and the reach of US enforcement.

Together with its allies in the Middle East – particularly Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – the Trump administration is increasing its efforts to squeeze Iran on multiple fronts. As a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations outlines, this anti-Iran front views the collapse of the JCPOA as the trigger for a wider policy aimed at confronting Iran. The policy seeks to cause a deep economic crisis in the country, creating domestic divisions intended to bring about regime change. As part of this, the Trump administration has signalled its willingness to go further than any previous administration by choking off Iran’s oil exports. 

European Resistance to US Sanctions

European leaders’ have repeatedly stated their commitment to upholding the JCPOA. Policymakers are making genuine efforts to find an economic package that minimises the impact of looming US secondary sanctions to sustain Iranian compliance with the deal. But these efforts have yet to generate an environment in which a reasonable number of European entities can make a firm commercial decision to continue doing business with Iran.

Although the European Union’s leaders remain unified in their support of the JCPOA, divisions are emerging between the 28 member states over how far they are willing to test the limits of US secondary sanctions. Moreover, several proposed ideas for safeguarding European companies against extraterritorial US sanctions would require months or even years to implement, as they require alternative financial mechanisms that are ring-fenced from US exposure. European governments are also falling short in the political momentum needed to salvage the nuclear deal. For instance, Germany and the United Kingdom are now far more preoccupied with challenges at home than they were in 2015, and EU institutions are focused on averting further transatlantic divide on trade and NATO.

Unsurprisingly, many European firms have little confidence that European policymakers will create the conditions necessary to protect them from US secondary sanctions, including by providing alternative mechanisms for doing business with Iran that are compliant with US sanctions. This has resulted in a wave of pre-emptive corporate overcompliance with impending US regulations and a decline in European business with Iran even before sanctions come into force.

Iran's Patience Wearing Thin

This month, the foreign ministers of France, the UK, Germany, Russia, and China (the E3+2) met with Iran to discuss political and economic pathways through which they could safeguard the JCPOA. And Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, visited Austria and Switzerland to deliver two overarching messages. The first was that Iran’s patience was wearing thin and its full compliance with the JCPOA was only feasible if it continued to receive tangible benefits from the agreement. The second was that Tehran would abandon the agreement if it became unable to maintain oil exports and, accordingly, its share in global energy markets.

Rouhani’s visit followed a tense OPEC meeting, Trump’s call for Saudi Arabia to increase oil production, and weeks of speculation about the extent to which the US could pressure other countries to halt exports of Iranian oil. In Europe, Rouhani stated: “assuming that Iran could become the only oil producer unable to export its oil is a wrong assumption”. 

The leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was quick to emphasise that elite forces were prepared to act on Rouhani’s words, noting: “we will make the enemy understand that either everyone can use the Strait of Hormuz or no one”. Iran has issued such warnings in the past, including during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and in 2011 in advance of the EU and US embargo on Iranian oil. Iran may retaliate against any US attempts to curb its oil exports by disrupting regional crude shipments in the strait, through which 35% of all seaborne oil exports pass. Such measures seem unlikely for now – given the risk of military escalation with US and regional naval forces, and of damaging relations with China and Russia, which wish to keep energy markets stable.

Rouhani’s statement suggests that Iran is hardening its position. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, unexpectedly welcomed Rouhani’s threat.

Despite the significant political and economic challenges shaping Iranian domestic politics, the Trump administration’s maximalist posture may inadvertently lead to a consensus between the Rouhani government and the military elite on how to respond to national security threats. This may abruptly or gradually prompt the Iranian political establishment to shift away from diplomacy with Europe and towards confrontation with the US. Calculations on whether the JCPOA can be sustained will heavily influence this decision.

Iran is likely to continue implementing the JCPOA and engaging in diplomacy with Europe for at least a few more months, as it assesses the impact of US sanctions on its economic relations with Europe, China, and India (particularly in relation to oil exports), as well as the likely trajectory of US domestic politics in the aftermath of midterm elections.

Necessary European Action

Unless one side backs down, Tehran and Washington will escalate their dispute in a manner that poses real risks to European interests in non-proliferation, security in the Middle East, and global energy supply. It is imperative that in the coming weeks and months European governments redouble their efforts to sustain the nuclear agreement and ease regional tensions.

Firstly, they should continue to explicitly warn the US and their partners in the Middle East that they will not support a strategy aimed at destabilising Iran internally or pursuing regime change in the country. Such an approach risks destabilising a country of 80 million people close to Europe’s border. At the same time, European governments should address their many areas of disagreement with Iran – most urgently, those involving regional security. As ECFR’s new report recommends, this should be done in a strategically careful manner that avoids fuelling further conflict in the Middle East.

Secondly, European governments must strive to fulfil their commitments under the JCPOA. They have made a good start by incorporating US secondary sanctions into the EU Blocking Regulation, due to be amended in August. But they need to quickly implement more practical solutions that will affect companies’ calculations on Iran (for a detailed list of recommendations, see the box below). Otherwise, there will be an exodus of European firms from the Iranian market.

European efforts to keep Iran in the JCPOA will face major challenges, including US attempts at sabotage. The Trump administration will look to use the JCPOA as a bargaining chip in its bilateral negotiations with Europe, China, and Russia on trade policy, tariffs, and sanctions. Therefore, European leaders must make important decisions about how far they are willing to go to secure a nuclear agreement borne out of more than a decade of diplomacy. They can only do so if they act collectively and firmly. Yet they must do so to prevent escalation between the West and Iran that will have disastrous consequences for global security.

Recommendations

1. The EU/E3 should accelerate measures to establish a foundation for sustaining financial channels (including SWIFT) with Iran before November, when the US will introduce secondary sanctions designed to hit Iran’s oil and banking sector. In this, European central and state banks will have act as a bridging mechanism. While there are ways of moving funds to and from Iran, state banks will have to engage in operations that provide settlement and clearing facilities. At the same time, European governments should remind Iran that their banking relationship can only continue if the country follows the Financial Action Task Force’s road map.

2. The EU and member states should devise a financial framework within which European companies (particularly small and medium-sized enterprises) can do business with Iran while complying with US sanctions. Technical experts have called for the creation of special purpose vehicles or “gateway banks” (supported by European state banks). These mechanisms will need to avoid direct links between Iranian entities and European private banks. Cooperation on this should extend into a larger structure that crosses a coalition of willing member states, thereby sharing risk between them.

3. The EU and member states (particularly leading importers of Iranian oil such as France, Greece, Italy and Spain) should increase their coordination with China and Russia on measures to minimise the impact of US secondary sanctions on Iranian oil exports. European countries should firmly reject any proposed US framework for significant oil reduction from Iran in return for waivers to continue limited oil exports. This would amount to legitimising the US secondary sanctions architecture. Russia and Iran are already in talks over significant Russian investment in the Iranian energy market, which could reportedly involve increased purchases of Iranian oil that could be reprocessed for global distribution via Russia. The E3 and China, together with other relevant private sector entities, should investigate whether it is feasible to offset potential reductions in Iranian oil exports through oil-swap arrangements with non-signatories to the JCPOA such as Turkey and Iraq.

4. The European Commission should incorporate clear guidelines for European companies into amendments to the EU Blocking Regulation. The regulation includes a compensation mechanism (Article 6) that allows European entities to seek compensation if they become subject to extraterritorial US financial penalties. As this mechanism has rarely been enforced, its limits remain unclear. The European Commission should work with member states, regulators and the private sector to clarify and facilitate access to compensation, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises that do business with Iran.

5. The European Commission should mandate a competent body to facilitate legitimate European business with Iran. The body should provide comprehensive oversight of the US Treasury’s enforcement of extraterritorial sanctions. This should involve a reporting mechanism that assesses the legal and other tactics the US Treasury adopts against European companies, pursuant to secondary sanctions. The body should also assist European companies subject to US investigations.

6. The European Commission should address discrimination and overcompliance relating to trade and investment with Iran in the European banking sector. As this problem is a direct consequence of US secondary sanctions, European leaders should primarily address it through regulatory measures that set a burden of proof requiring company boards to certify that their decisions are legally grounded under European law. The Blocking Regulation can provide a foundation for such measures. European regulatory bodies should provide greater oversight of European commercial banks’ decisions to block the flow of funds relating to Iran, reducing the likelihood that such decisions will be arbitrary.

7. The E3/EU should not invest heavily in attempts to negotiate with the US administration on exemptions from secondary sanctions, given the Trump White House’s clear lack of interest in treating European allies amicably. The E3/EU should shift to a more firm and robust negotiating posture similar to their stance on US trade tariffs. They should warn the US about the costs for Western energy consumers of reducing purchases of Iranian oil at a time when Libyan, Venezuelan, and Nigerian exports have been disrupted, given that it remains uncertain whether Saudi Arabia and Russia will increase production to offset this disruption. European governments should limit the US Treasury’s space to demonstrate the power of sanctions in Europe. EU member states should urgently engage in private consultations to prepare countermeasures against US attempts to pressure SWIFT and its board members or to target European entities – using specially designated nationals lists – for doing business with Iran deemed legitimate under EU law.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Iran Shows New Savvy in Defining Outcome of Key Nuclear Deal Meeting

Following two months of rising uncertainty after President Trump decided to withdraw from the nuclear deal despite Iran’s continued compliance with its commitments, the remaining parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) assembled in Vienna on Friday. The meeting of foreign minister was convened at Iran's request. 

Iranian expectations of the meeting centered on an “economic package” that was to be offered by Europe—with the support of Russia and China—to keep Iran in the nuclear deal. As Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif made clear in a tweet prior to the meeting, in the view of Iran, “sanctions and JCPOA compliance are mutually exclusive.” In short, if Europe, Russia, and China are to expect Iran to remain committed to the nuclear deal, they must neutralize the negative effects of US secondary sanctions.

Up until last week the foremost concern had been whether Iran would be able to maintain viable banking channels in the face of a more aggressive US sanctions posture, especially given the limited progress that had been made in reintegrating Iran into the global financial system since Implementation Day. Yet, the announcement that the US would not be providing significant reduction exceptions to allow Iran’s oil customers to maintain their imports when sanctions return in November, will prove Iran’s most significant challenge. Iran relies on oil exports for 40 percent of government revenue.

Iran engaged in expectation management regarding the package ahead of the meeting, perhaps indicating that the Rouhani government has finally learned the consequences of overselling the economic promises made during JCPOA-related talks. The president’s office released two statements Thursday evening indicating that Rouhani had held phone calls with his German and French counterparts. Most pointedly, Rouhani told Macron that the economic package prepared by Europe "does not include all of [Iran's] demands,” but that Iran remained hopeful that the joint commission meeting would help fill the gaps. 

In this way, Friday’s meeting of the joint commission was cast as a test for the French, German, British, Russian, and Chinese diplomats. Would the diplomats be able to develop the necessary economic countermeasures to keep Iran in the deal? Would they be able to show concrete progress on the positive commitments that had been made in the days following Trump’s withdrawal? When drafting the JCPOA, the diplomats had relegated the economic aspects of the deal to an annex, where implementation languished on all sides, slowing trade and investment, until Trump made his fateful decision—was it too much to expect practical solutions to emerge now?

In this context, the joint statement released by the European External Action Service and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who chaired the ministerial meeting, was underwhelming. The statement reiterated that “in return for the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of sanctions, including the economic dividends arising from it, constitutes an essential part of the JCPOA.” As part of this commitment, the statement “affirmed” the commitment of the participants to measures focused on the “promotion of wider economic and sectoral relations with Iran” as well as “the preservation and maintenance of effective financial channels.” Most importantly given Trump’s declared intention to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero, the participants affirmed their intention to defend “Iran’s export of oil and gas condensate, petroleum products and petrochemicals,” among other areas of economic intervention.

The statement was comprehensive in detailing the areas in which Iran wishes to see concrete measures taken, but it did not provide much greater detail than similar statements issued in the weeks immediately following Trump’s withdrawal of the deal. Besides noting that “that the EU is in the process of updating the EU ‘Blocking Statute’" and "the European Investment Bank’s external lending mandate to cover Iran”—two measures first announced in May—no specific tactics were declared in the statement. Of course, it would be a mistake for parties to the JCPOA to reveal their proposed countermeasures too soon, as this would invite American authorities to find ways to undermine them. Yet, nothing in the statement itself seemed to dissuade those hoping for meaningful solutions from a sense of disappointment.

It was therefore notable that Zarif very proactively shared a positive assessment of the meetings upon their conclusion. On one hand, Iran’s foreign minister showed trademark deference to Iran’s other power-brokers, telling reporters that the proposal presented to Iran—“not precise and not a complete one”—should be implemented before the next round of US sanctions come into force in August and that it “is up to the leadership in Tehran to decide whether Iran should remain in the deal” on the basis of this implementation.

Yet, speaking to Iranian media, Zarif highlighted his satisfaction that the parties to the JCPOA, including three “close allies” of the United States, had remained firm in their desire to withstand US pressure. He also highlighted in these interviews and in subsequent tweets that the discussions were “moving in right direction on concrete steps for timely implementation of commitments.” He was remarkably upbeat. 

That Iran had achieved a political success was made clear as French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told reporters that the parties to the deal were trying to deliver an economic package “before sanctions are imposed at the start of August and then the next set of sanctions in November. He added, “ For August it seems a bit short, but we are trying to do it by November.” Le Drian also implored Iran to “stop threatening to break their commitments to the nuclear deal," a statement that may have been taken to undercut the French willingness to help Iran achieve an economic package. 

But on the contrary, such as statement proves that Iran retains leverage in the negotiations. Whether signaling the resumption of enrichment activities or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a coordinated messaging campaign by the Rouhani administration, which includes public statements by Rouhani himself, by Zarif, by Iran’s atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi, and even by IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, has served to remind the world powers of the significant consequences should Iran withdraw from the deal. The assembled foreign ministers were clear that an economic package is the desired political outcome because they need Iran to remain in the deal. Zarif got what he needed from the ministerial meeting. Two months following Trump’s abrogation of the nuclear deal, the remaining parties to the agreement proved able to present a consensus position on the need to protect Iran’s economic interests in direct contradiction of the declared US policy. 

Moreover, while headlines from the likes of Reuters and Bloomberg heralded “no breakthroughs” and “unresolved” issues given the unspecific statement, Zarif’s positive assessment speaks to the fact that Iran was given some indication during the proceedings of what Wall Street Journal reporter Laurence Norman referred to as “real work and genuine ideas” to help Iran both on the banking challenges and the preservation of the all-important oil exports. To this end, Zarif made clear that progress on implementation would follow “direct bilateral efforts.”

It is important to note that the ministerial meeting was far from the only diplomatic or technical dialogue in which Iran has participated since the survival of the nuclear deal was plunged into doubt by Trump’s violation in May.  In just the last week, President Rouhani held successful official visits to Switzerland and Austria, two longstanding trading partners. This follows, an important official visit by Rouhani to China, as well as working-level dialogues in France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These meetings have included officials from the Central Bank of Iran, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Transportation among executives from state and private sector enterprises. It is these bilateral exchanges, not joint commission dialogues, which have given Iran a more precise indication as to how its economic interests might be protected. 

The fact that Iran is back under US secondary sanctions is a failure of multilateralism. But Iran has now recognized that the solution to this failure will not be found in a multilateral format. Whether looking to the European Union or the JCPOA parties, the need to generate politically driven consensus on economic countermeasures will prove cumbersome. As noted by Eldar Mamedov, even the European Parliament is an arena prone to “sabotage." Mamedov, a parliamentarian, illustrates this fact by recounting recent efforts to block the European Investment Bank’s mandate to fund projects in Iran. 

A Bourse & Bazaar white paper published in January on the “economic implementation of the nuclear deal” correctly diagnosed that “the joint commission itself is poorly suited to conduct [economic] coordination given the divergent views” of its parties on “matters of sanctions and economic implementation.” In recognition of this fact, the paper recommended that the “European External Action Service (EEAS), which has taken the mantle of leadership on the nuclear deal since the change in American administrations, would be well positioned to convene… a new multi-agency commission for economic implementation, formed in accordance with European commitments under the JCPOA,” In effect, the paper envisioned a joint commission-type body specifically for economic matters. While the joint commission convenes foreign ministers and their diplomatic teams, an economically focused commission would seek to convene economic ministers and their technical staff.

Such a proposal would seem to be supported by the particularly strong stance taken by French economic minister Bruno Le Maire on the need for France to defend its economic interests in Iran in the face of US secondary sanctions. From the Iranian perspective, the inclusion of Laya Joneydi, Iran’s well-regarded vice president for legal affairs, in Iran’s delegation to the joint commission meeting was a positive step, in part because, as noted by Adnan Tabatabai, it was refreshing to see an Iran represented by a female official. 

Yet, it is probably the case that convening technocrats into a multilateral format would only serve to limit their effectiveness in the near-term. The political limitations faced by nuclear experts Salehi and US secretary of energy Ernest Moniz during the JCPOA negotiations offers a compelling case study. The Rouhani administration is now aware that given the limited timeframes, Iran’s will need to assemble a patchwork of solutions from various countries, particularly by expanding focus beyond France, Germany and the United Kingdom to seek direct cooperation with a wider ranger of EU member states. Based on institutional and economic factors, some countries will be better able to devise solutions on oil imports, others on banking channels, and others on insulating their multinational corporations or promoting their SMEs. To underscore the point, even the revival of the blocking regulation, a piece of EU law, will depend on the individual implementation and enforcement of member states. When it comes to technical matters and economic implementation, only bilateral dialogues can really deliver. 

But if Rouhani and Zarif have learned the limitations of the joint commission and how to work within those limitations, they must also recognize their own limitations. It is impractical for the majority of outreach on the economic package to depend on Zarif and Iran’s foreign ministry. While the lion-like Bijan Zanganeh ably leads the oil ministry, there is a glaring lack of leadership in key bodies such as Iran’s central bank, ministry of economic affairs, and ministry of industry. Both Rouhani and his first vice president Ehsaq Jahangiri have been signaling for several months that a cabinet reshuffle may be on the cards. The politicking behind such a reshuffle is complicated, as parliament would need to confirm new ministers, opening Rouhani to a new round of attacks. But the urgency of new leadership could not be clearer.

If Iran is to succeed in “direct bilateral efforts” to ensure the implementation of an economic package, it must be able to send capable ministers to Europe, Russia, China, and other trading partners to meet with their counterparts in these critical coming months. Zarif can certainly craft a conducive political environment, as evidenced by the positive joint commission outcome, but the foreign ministry cannot orchestrate the defense of Iran’s economy singlehandedly, if for no other reason than the fact that when it comes to the economy, internal challenges greatly outnumber the external ones which Iran's diplomats can reasonable consider within their domain. 

Iran demonstrated real savvy in defining the outcome of the joint commission meeting. No longer seeking to unsatisfactorily bend political commitments into practical solutions for its longstanding economic problems, the Iranian delegation proved willing to aptly designate matters of implementation to the numerous bilateral dialogues currently underway. This allowed a relatively positive political outcome to be taken on its own terms, especially with an Iranian audience in mind. If the Rouhani administration can assemble the right teams for these bilateral exchanges, the vital economic package can still be delivered upon. Hope persists. 

Photo Credit: EEAS

Mohammad Javad Zarif: Iran Sees a Broken U.S. Foreign Policy

This piece was originally published in Iran Daily. It is republished here with permission. 

Following the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the third multilateral agreement that the current United States administration has withdrawn from. The administration has also put in jeopardy other multilateral arrangements such as NAFTA, the global trade system, and parts of the United Nations system, thus inflicting considerable damage to multilateralism, and the prospects for resolving disputes through diplomacy.

The announcement on 8 May 2018 of United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and the unilateral and unlawful re-imposition of nuclear sanctions—a decision opposed by majority of the American people—was the culmination of a series of violations of the terms of the accord by this administration, in spite of the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the sole competent international authority had repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the accord. The US decision was rejected by the international community and even its closest allies, including the European Union, Britain, France and Germany.

On 21 May 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a baseless and insulting statement, issued a number of demands and threats against Iran in brazen contravention of international law, well-established international norms, and civilized behavior. His statement reflected a desperate reaction by the US administration to the overwhelming opposition of the international community to the persistent efforts by the White House to kill the JCPOA, and the ensuing Washington’s isolation. Mr. Pompeo, in his statement, attempted to justify the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and divert international public opinion from the unlawful behavior of the United States and its outright violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231; a resolution drafted and proposed by the US itself and adopted unanimously by the Council. Mr. Pompeo’s 12 preconditions for Iran to follow are especially preposterous as the US administration itself is increasingly isolated internationally due to its effort to undermine diplomacy and multilateralism. It comes as no surprise that the statement and the one made by the US president on Iran were either ignored or received negatively by the international community, including by friends  and allies of the United States. Only a small handful of US client states in our region welcomed it.

I seriously doubt that had the US Secretary of State even had a slight knowledge of Iran’s history and culture and the Iranian people’s struggle for independence and freedom, and had he known that Iran’s political system—in contrast to those of the American allies in the region—is based on a popular revolution and the people’s will, would he have delivered such an outlandish statement. He should, however, know that ending foreign intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, which culminated in the 25-year period following the US-orchestrated coup in 1953, had always been one of the Iranian people’s main demands since well before the Islamic Revolution. He should also be aware that in the past 40 years the Iranian people have heroically resisted and foiled aggressions and pressures by the US, including its coup attempts, military interventions, support of the aggressor in an 8-year war, imposition of unilateral, extraterritorial and even multilateral sanctions, and even going as far as shooting down an Iranian passenger plane in the Persian Gulf in 1987. “Never forget” is our mantra, too.

The Islamic Republic of Iran derives its strength and stability from the brave and peace-loving Iranian people; a people who, while seeking constructive interaction with the world on the basis of mutual respect, are ready to resist bullying and extortions and defend in unison their country’s independence and honor. History bears testimony to the fact that those who staged aggression against this age-old land, such as Saddam and his regime’s supporters, all met an ignominious fate, while Iran has proudly and vibrantly continued its path towards a better and brighter future.

It is regrettable that in the past one-and-a-half years, US foreign policy—if we can call it that—including its policy towards Iran has been predicated on flawed assumptions and illusions—if not actual delusions. The US President and his Secretary of State have persistently made baseless and provocative allegations against Iran that constitute blatant intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, unlawful threats against a UN Member State, and violations of the United States’ international obligations under the UN Charter, the 1955 Treaty, and the 1981 Algiers Accord. While rejecting these fictitious allegations, I would like to draw the attention of US policymakers to some aspects of their nation’s current foreign policy that are detrimental to the entire international community:

First- Impulsive and illogical decisions and behavior of the US President—and efforts by his subordinates to find some justification to persuade a reluctant domestic and foreign audience—have already surfaced as the main feature of the decision-making process in Washington over the past 17 months. This process, coupled with ill-conceived and hasty explanations to justify outcomes, usually lead to contradictory statements and actions. As an example, in his role as CIA Director, Mike Pompeo once in a Congressional hearing emphatically stated: “Iran has not violated its commitments.” Later, and following the US President’s decision to withdraw from the accord, now Secretary of State Pompeo in his statement on May 21 emphatically stated that “Iran has violated its commitments."

Second- It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that some aspects of US foreign policy have been put up for auction—far beyond the routine lobbying practices. It is, for instance, unprecedented that a US president should choose the very country he had called “fanatic and a supporter of terrorism” during his election campaign as the destination for his first foreign visit as president, or to publicly make aspects of his foreign policy positions contingent on the purchase by one or another country of arms and other items from the United States. It has also been reported that in some other cases, mostly illegitimate financial interests have been the main basis for the formulation of mind-bogglingly ill-conceived US policy positions.

Third- Contempt for international law and attempts to undermine the rule of law in international relations have been among the main features of the current administration’s foreign policy. To the extent, according to media reports, that the US negotiators in the G7 Summit were even insisting on deleting the phrase “our commitment to promote the rules-based international order.” This destructive approach began by showing contempt for the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is arguably the oldest principle of international law. The US withdrawal from some international agreements and undermining others, coupled with efforts to weaken international organizations, are examples of destructive moves so far by the US government, which have unfortunately darkened the outlook for the international order. Obviously, the continuation of such policies can endanger the stability of the international community, turning the US into a rogue state and an international outlaw.

Fourth- Predicating decisions on illusions is another aspect of this administration’s foreign policy. This has been especially evident with respect to West Asia. The illegal and provocative decision regarding al-Quds al-Sharif, blind support for the cruel atrocities committed by the Zionist regime against Gazans, and aerial and missile attacks against Syria are some of the more brazen aspects of such an unprincipled foreign policy.

The statement made by Mr. Pompeo on May 21 was the culmination of a delusional US approach to our region. Ironically, the US Secretary of State tried to set preconditions for negotiations and agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran at a time when the international community is doubtful about the possibility or utility of negotiation or agreement with the US on any issue. How can the US government expect to be viewed or treated as a reliable party to another round of serious negotiations following its unilateral and unwarranted withdrawal from an agreement which was the result of hundreds of hours of arduous bilateral and multilateral negotiations, in which the highest ranking US foreign affairs official participated, and which was submitted to the Security Council by the US and adopted unanimously as an international commitment under Article 25 of the Charter?

Recent statements and actions by the US president, including reneging on his agreement with the G7 while in the air flying back from the summit, are other examples of his erratic behavior. His remarks immediately following his meeting with the leader of the DPRK regarding his possible change of mind in 6 months are indicative of what the world is facing—an irrational and dangerous US administration. Does the US Secretary of State really expect Iran to negotiate with a government whose president says: “I may stand before you in six months and say, ‘Hey, I was wrong. I don’t know if I’ll ever admit that, but I’ll find some kind of an excuse”? Can such a government really set preconditions for Iran? Isn’t it actually confusing the plaintiff for the defendant? Mr. Pompeo has forgotten that it is the US government that needs to prove the credibility of its words and legitimacy of its signature, and not the party that has complied with its international obligations and sticks to its word. In fact, the truth is that all US administrations in the past 70 years should be held accountable for their disregard for international law, and their violations of bilateral and multilateral agreements with Iran. A short list of the rightful demands of the Iranian people from the US government could include the following:

1. The US government must respect Iran’s independence and national sovereignty and assure Iran that it will end its intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs in accordance with international law in general, and the 1981 Algiers Accord in particular.

2. The United States must abandon its policy of resorting to the threat or use of force – which constitute a breach of the preemptory norms of international law and principles of the Charter of the United Nations—as an option in the conduct of its foreign affairs with or against the Islamic Republic of Iran and other States.

3. The US government should respect the state immunity of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a fundamental principle of international law, and, while rescinding previous arbitrary and unlawful financial judgments, it should refrain from executing them in the US and extraterritorially.

4. The US government should openly acknowledge its unwarranted and unlawful actions against the people of Iran over the past decades, including inter alia the following, take remedial measures to compensate the people of Iran for the damages incurred, and provide verifiable assurances that it will cease and desist from such illegal measures and refrain from ever repeating them:

a. Its role in the 1953 coup that led to the overthrow of Iran’s lawful and democratically-elected government and the subsequent 25 years of dictatorship in Iran;

b. Unlawful blocking, seizure and confiscation of tens of billions of dollars of assets of the Iranian people after the Islamic revolution, or under various baseless pretexts in recent years;

c. Direct military aggression against Iran in April 1980, which was a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran;

d. Provision of massive military and intelligence assistance to the Iraqi dictator during the 8-year war he imposed on the Iranian people inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars of damages on Iran and its people;  

e. Responsibility in the enormous suffering that Iranians have incurred over the past 3 decades as a result of the use by Saddam of chemical weapons, whose ingredients were provided by the US and some other western countries;

f. The shooting down of an Iran Air passenger plane by the USS Vincennes in July 1988—a flagrant crime that led to the murder of 290 innocent passengers and crew, and the subsequent awarding of a medal to the captain of the ship rather than punishing him for his war crime;

g. Repeated attacks against Iran’s oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1988;

h. Repeated and unwarranted insults against the Iranian people by calling the entire nation “an outlaw and rogue nation” or “a terrorist nation”  and by including Iran in the so-called “axis of evil;”

i. Unlawful and unreasonable establishment of a bigoted list of the nationals of some Islamic countries, including Iranians, prohibiting their entry into the US. The Iranians are among the most successful, educated and law-abiding immigrants in the US and have done great service to American society. They are now prohibited from seeing their loved ones, including even their aging grandparents;

j. Harboring and providing safe haven to anti-Iranian saboteurs in the USA, who openly incite blind violence against Iranian civilians, and supporting criminal gangs and militias and terrorist organizations, some of which were listed for years as terrorist groups by the US and later removed from the list following intense lobbying by those who have received money from them. Some of those lobbyists  now occupy high-ranking positions in the Trump administration;

k. Support provided to Mossad for the multiple terrorist assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists;

l.  Sabotage of Iran’s nuclear peaceful program through cyber-attacks;

m. Fabrication of fake documents to deceive the international community over Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and to create an unnecessary crisis.

5. The United States government must cease its persistent economic aggression against the Iranian people which has continued over the past four decades; nullify the cruel and extensive primary and extraterritorial sanctions, rescind hundreds of legislations and executive orders aimed at disrupting Iran’s normal development which are in flagrant contravention of international law and have been universally condemned, and compensate the Iranian people for the enormous damages to the Iranian economy and its people.

6. The US government should immediately cease its violations and breaches of the JCPOA, which have caused hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect damages for disrupting trade with and foreign investment in Iran, compensate Iranian people for these damages and commit to implement unconditionally and verifiably all of its obligations under the accord, and refrain (in accordance with the JCPOA) from any policy or action to adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.

7. The US government should release all Iranians and non-Iranians who are detained under cruel conditions in the US under fabricated charges related to the alleged violation of sanctions, or apprehended in other countries following unlawful pressure by the US government for extradition, and compensate for the damage inflicted on them. These include pregnant women, the elderly and people suffering from serious health problems; some of whom have even lost their lives in prison.

8. The US government should acknowledge the consequences of its invasions and interventions in the region, including in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region, and withdraw its forces from and stop interfering in the region.

9. The US government should cease policies and behavior that have led to the creation of the vicious DAESH terrorist group and other extremist organizations, and compel its regional allies to verifiably stop providing financial and political support and armaments to extremist groups in West Asia and the world.

10. The US government should stop providing arms and military equipment to the aggressors—who are murdering thousands of innocent Yemeni civilians and destroying the country—and cease its participation in these attacks. It should compel its allies to end their aggression against Yemen and compensate for the enormous damage done to that country.

11. The US government should stop its unlimited and unconditional support for the Zionist regime in line with its obligations under international law; condemn its policy of apartheid and gross violations of human rights, and support the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with al-Quds al-Sharif as its capital.

12. The US government should stop selling hundreds of billions of lethal—not beautiful—military equipment every year to regions in crisis, especially West Asia, and instead of turning these regions into powder kegs it should allow the enormous amount of money spent on arms to serve as funding for development and combating poverty. Only a fraction of the money paid by US arms customers could alleviate hunger and abject poverty, provide for potable, clean water, and combat diseases throughout the globe.

13. The US government should stop opposing the efforts by the international community for the past 5 decades to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It should compel the Zionist regime—with its history of aggression and occupation—to de-nuclearize, thus neutralizing the gravest real threat to regional and international peace and security, which emanates from the most destructive arms in the hands of the most warmongering regime in our time.

14. The US government should stop increasingly relying on nuclear weapons and the doctrines of using nuclear weapons to counter conventional threats—a policy that is in flagrant contravention of its commitment under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the 1995 NPT Review Conference Declaration, and UN Security Council resolution 984. The US should comply with its moral, legal and security obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament, which is a near unanimous demand of all United Nations Member States, and virtually all people across the globe, including even former US Secretaries of State. As the only State that is stamped with the shame of ever using nuclear weapons itself, it is incumbent on the US to relieve humanity from the nightmare of a global nuclear holocaust, and give up on the illusion of security based on “mutually assured destruction” (MAD).

15. The US government should once and for all commit itself to respect the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is the most fundamental principle of international law and a foundation for civilized relations among peoples, and discard in practice the dangerous doctrine which views international law and international organizations as merely “a tool in the US toolbox.”

The aforementioned US policies are examples of what has resulted in Iranians distrusting the American government. They are also among underlying causes of injustice, violence, terrorism, war and insecurity in West Asia. These policies will bring about nothing but a heavy toll in human lives and material assets for different regions of the world, and isolation for the US in world public opinion. The only ones benefiting are and will be lethal arms manufacturers. If the US government summons the courage to renounce these policies in words and deeds, its global isolation will end and a new image of the US will emerge in the world, including in Iran, paving the path to joint efforts for security, stability, and inclusive sustainable development.

I admit that regrettably, it is not realistic to harbor a hope for such a change in US behavior. Thus, at the global level the Islamic Republic of Iran has for years promoted inclusion, multilateralism, dialogue, respect for the rule of law and nuclear disarmament through initiatives such as Dialogue among Civilizations and WAVE (World Against Violence and Extremism), and participated actively in international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and a rule-based international system. We have also presented practical proposals and engaged in serious diplomatic efforts to end regional conflicts in Syria and Yemen through diplomacy from the earliest stages of these unfortunate conflicts, sadly, to the deaf ears of the United States that continues to support aggressors and terrorists in every conflict in our region. And following the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has earnestly engaged with the remaining JCPOA Participants (EU/E3+2) in a good faith effort to salvage this unique global diplomatic achievement. We continue to do so as of this writing.

Nationally, Iran has ensured its security and stability in the past 4 decades on the basis of its inherent domestic capabilities and its reliance on the great Iranian people, not on any foreign power’s benevolence or patronage. Despite foreign pressure and while expending comparatively the least amount in the region on armaments, it has become stronger, more stable and more advanced by the day.

And regionally, in contrast to the US and its foreign policy, Iran—in accordance with its constitution—neither seeks to dominate nor will it ever submit to domination. It believes that the era of regional and global hegemony has long passed, and any effort by any power to achieve it is futile. Instead of yielding to foreign domination or trying to dominate others, countries in our region should seek to create a stronger, more prosperous and more stable region. We in Iran view our security and stability as inseparable from those of our neighbors. We have a common history and culture as well as indivisible opportunities and challenges, and can only enjoy security and stability at home, if and only if our neighbors enjoy internal and international stability and security. We expect other regional countries to adopt a similar approach, and instead of insisting on the failed experiment of “trying to purchase or outsource security,” concentrate on dialogue, mutual understanding, confidence building, and cooperation with neighbors.

The Islamic Republic of Iran views the establishment of a “Regional Dialogue Forum” in the Persian Gulf as the best means to resolve regional crises and create a stronger region. We can begin adopting confidence-building measures to bring regional countries closer to each other on the basis of such principles as the sovereign equality of states, non-resort to the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for territorial integrity of other States, inviolability of international boundaries, non-intervention in domestic affairs of others, and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. By fostering common understanding about threats and opportunities at the regional and global levels, we can move towards achieving a non-aggression pact and creating common mechanisms for regional cooperation. We firmly believe that we, regionally—as the inheritors of the richest civilizations the world has ever known—should stand tall and can solve our own problems amongst ourselves and secure a better future for all of our children without outside interference and patronage, both of which come at a heavy cost to our collective dignity as well as our future development.

Photo Credit: EPA