Facing New Alignments, Iran and Tajikistan Relaunch Partnership

Earlier this month, Mahmoud Khosravi Vafa, the head of Iran’s National Olympic Committee, met with Shamsullo Sohibov, Vice-President of Tajikistan’s National Olympic Committee, to discuss improving sports cooperation. The meeting was more than just a consultation between two bureaucrats, it marked the latest step in the recent rekindling of the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan, two countries with deep linguistic and cultural ties.

Once described as “one spirit in two bodies" by the ex-president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan underwent an unexpected breakdown in the mid-2010s. Now, as Iran continues to struggle under Western sanctions, contend with a new hostile US administration, and adapt to its weakened position in the Middle East, it is again turning east. For its part, Tajikistan is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, diversifying relations with as many international partners as possible to secure economic and political assistance.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was the first country to recognize Tajikistan’s independence and establish an embassy in the capital, Dushanbe. Tajikistan reciprocated by opening one of its first foreign embassies in Tehran in 1995. Subsequently, during the civil war in Tajikistan between 1992 and 1997, Iran was part of a foreign coalition that helped mediate the conflict. In this period, Tehran also cautiously supported the Islamic opposition to the current regime in Dushanbe.

After Tajikistan’s civil war ended, Iran made lofty pronouncements of friendship but took few concrete steps towards collaboration. But following the September 11 attacks and the deterioration of Western economic and political relations with the Middle East and its surrounding countries, Iran began to reinvigorate foreign policy towards Tajikistan to compete with the growing Western influence in West Asia.

During two terms in office, former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami committed to funding large-scale infrastructure projects in Tajikistan, such as the strategically significant Anzob Tunnel and Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant. Total trade between the countries tripled from $40 million in 2000 to $140 million in 2007. However, the relationship rested primarily on economic diplomacy; politically, Iran was more focused on counterbalancing the US presence in Afghanistan and on deferring to Russian decisions in Central Asia due to Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear program.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency led to a complete reorientation of Iran’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbors and against the Western agenda in the region. While in office, Ahmadinejad met annually with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, whose government remained quietly wary of Iran, given its role in the Tajik civil war, the accelerating nuclear program, and the desire to avoid being dragged into Iran’s conflicts with Israel and the US. Prioritization of economic diplomacy over politics remained the foundation of Dushanbe’s foreign policy, allowing it more flexibility in playing its allies against each other and extracting more concessions. However, at the time, Tajikistan accepted Ahmadinejad’s overtures, lacking better options in the face of minimal Western economic assistance.

Nonetheless, Iran’s investments proved to be problematic. The Anzob Tunnel was shoddily and hastily finished just in time for President Ahmadinejad’s first visit to Tajikistan in 2006, and poorly maintained even a decade after its construction. Moreover, the construction of Sangtuda-2 was finalized only in 2013—significantly behind schedule—and the power plant was shut down briefly over Tehran’s concerns that Dushanbe could not eventually repay the construction loan. Finally, the US government turned its attention to Iran’s use of Tajikistan’s then largely unregulated financial sector to circumvent Western sanctions and to launder money for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), as exemplified in the case of Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani.

Zanjani, who owned a bank, an airline, a taxi service, and a bus terminal in Tajikistan, was sentenced to death in Iran for allegedly embezzling over $2.7 billion from the country’s state-owned oil industry. His foreign investments were expected to be seized and returned to Iran’s government. But the Tajik authorities denied having any of Zanjani’s assets, angering counterparts in Iran.

In December 2015, Iran, which supported Tajikistan’s moderate Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) during the country’s civil war, invited its leader Muhidin Kabiri to an Islamic conference where he was warmly welcomed by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The government of Tajikistan, which had accused IRPT of an alleged coup attempt just a few months prior, arrested several of its members. Moreover, the Tajik authorities designated the only religious political party in Central Asia a terrorist organization, immediately issuing a note of protest to Iran. The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Tajikistan angrily summoned the Iranian ambassador. The head of the Council of Ulema of Tajikistan described Iran's invitation of Muhidin Kabiri as "abetting terrorism."  

Dushanbe’s reaction echoed not only the tensions of the civil war but also the country’s deep commitment to secular government, a legacy of the Soviet Union. The Tajik government distinguishes between traditional Islam, which it supports as part of Tajik social life and culture, and political Islam, which it views as a potential threat to state power. Dushanbe’s secular stance allows it to play up the threat of religious extremism to crack down on political rights domestically. The avowed opposition to political Islam has also allowed the country to seek Western aid–a strategy that always stood in conflict with theocratic Iran’s politics.

In response to Iran’s reception of Kabiri, Tajikistan halted the imports of Iranian food products, including poultry, cooking oil, and tea, for the alleged poor quality of these products, as well as a lack of compliance with Tajikistan’s language regulations for product labels. In July 2016, the Transportation Ministry of Tajikistan publicly accused Tehran of violating the terms of the contract to build a key regional railway. Later, the authorities suspended the Tajik branch of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, a charity organization supported by the government of Iran. 

Arguably, the most significant blow to the countries’ relationship landed in August 2017. In a 45-minute documentary aired on Tajik state television, the Internal Affairs Ministry accused Tehran of fomenting the civil war in Tajikistan, providing financial assistance to the now-pariah IRPT, and training Islamist militants on Iranian soil to then be sent back to Tajikistan to carry out political assassinations—claims the government of Iran vehemently denied. 

At the time, it seemed as though the only pan-Persian alliance in the region was over. Yet the sudden American withdrawal in May 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under President Trump once again highlighted Iran’s urgent need to continue building relationships with its eastern neighbors. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly emphasized that Iran must “look to the East” for strategic allies who can help Iran resist Western pressure and overcome the banking and trade issues brought on by Western sanctions.

Thus, in 2019, Tehran and Dushanbe resumed communications. The volume of bilateral trade rose from around $55 million in 2020 to $121 million in the following year. Former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited Dushanbe in June 2019. In September 2021, the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi made Dushanbe the destination in his first foreign trip.

In May 2022, Iran inaugurated a drone production factory in Tajikistan, the first such facility that Iran has built in a foreign country. The factory builds and exports Ababil-2—a reconnaissance and combat drone that has been widely used by Russia in Ukraine—and represents not only Iran’s resumed security cooperation with Tajikistan but also attempts to counter its regional rivals’ influence in the country. This comes in response to Saudi Arabia taking advantage of the preceding period of ruptured relations between Iran and Tajikistan. During this time, Saudi Arabia invested in several economic and development projects in Tajikistan, pure geopolitical opportunism from Riyadh seeking to deprive Tehran’s position as a key ally and investor in Tajikistan. Iran’s drone factory is also an attempt to outrun both Turkiye, who reportedly sold its Bayraktar TB2 drones to Tajikistan in April 2022 during a brewing border conflict with Kyrgyzstan, and Israel, who regularly attacks Iran’s domestic drone-producing capabilities but will likely avoid doing so outside of Iran’s borders.   

A few months later, in September 2022, Iran signed a memorandum of accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at the organization’s summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, becoming a full member in July 2023— a development that Russia and China strongly favored. Soon after, President Rahmon and President Raisi held talks on the margins of the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly, where they discussed further expansion of bilateral cooperation. A flurry of high-level visits and signed agreements followed, including a historic establishment of a visa-free regime between the countries in November 2023.  

The relationship between the two countries reached a new high in January 2025 during President Masoud Pezeshkian’s three-day visit to Dushanbe. Pezeshkian was warmly received as the guest of honor at the Tajikistan-Iran Trade, Economic Investment, and Tourism Forum. The two sides signed two dozen agreements on security, combatting drug trafficking and corruption, simplifying trade and customs, and improving transportation and education links. But while President Pezeshkian spoke of discussions between the sides covering the situation in Afghanistan and the war in Gaza, President Rahmon of Tajikistan emphasized developing cooperation in mining, pharmaceutical, industrial, and agricultural sectors, a reflection of Dushanbe’s continued desire to avoid controversial political topics and stick to economic and cultural collaboration.

Notably, the two presidents reopened the Institute of Tajik-Persian Culture in Dushanbe, which had been shut in the mid-2010s during the nadir in bilateral relations. President Pezeshkian also laid a wreath at the statue of Ismoil Somoni–a significant figure in Persian culture and history–and visited the Avicenna Tajik State Medical University, where he received an honorary professorship. The concluding government statements called on both sides “to find new and profitable ways of cooperation.”

The rekindling of the partnership between Iran and Tajikistan benefits both sides. Iran gains access to a largely untapped, albeit minor, market for its exports and diversifies its trade relations, allowing it more flexibility in the face of Western sanctions on Tehran and Moscow. A presence in Tajikistan brings Iran even closer to Russia and China, the two major geopolitical players in Central Asia, and provides Iranian leaders another avenue for security collaboration on Afghanistan. Finally, a foothold in Tajikistan allows Iran to counter the growing influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkiye in Central Asia after major losses in its political weight in the Middle East since 2024.

For Tajikistan, Iran is another source of foreign direct investment and a minor opportunity to ease its labor migration, trade, and economic assistance dependence on China and Russia, especially as the war in Ukraine and its fallout drag into its fourth year. Access to Iran’s regional transportation links and especially its security capabilities is another important consideration as Tajik authorities prepare for a long-awaited presidential transition. As President Rahmon prepares to transfer power to his son Rustam, his regime is looking for as many allies as possible to ensure stability during the transition.

Rekindling ties with Iran has its benefits. But it will also force Tajikistan into an old dance of balancing Iran’s internal and external politics with its own relationship to political Islam and its desire to stay neutral on the world stage. The two countries may share the same spirit, but they do not yet appear to share the same interests.

Photo: IRNA

Can SCO Members Achieve Connectivity in the Face of Conflict?

The two-day Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit took place last week in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Aside from agreeing to the Samarkand Declaration, which summarises the intention of SCO members to foster deeper economic partnerships, the gathered leaders also signed 44 documents consisting of numerous memorandums, roadmaps, and action plans for cooperation in tourism, artificial intelligence, and energy.

The SCO leaders mostly focused on the importance of new transit routes and economic cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who travelled to the summit as part of his first foreign tour since the COVID-19 pandemic, touted ambitious plans to expand economic cooperation with Central Asian states.

Negotiations over the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway took place in the sidelines of the summit and the three parties agreed to conduct a feasibility study with a view to constructing the new route. Uzbek officials also lobbied for another transit corridor from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, but support among SCO members has been tepid given the need to engage with the Taliban government in Kabul.

Uzbekistan also signed 17 cooperation agreements with Iran focused primarily on transport and trade. Tashkent is seeking further access to Iran’s Chabahar port for its economic development. The Iranian delegation, led by president Ebrahim Raisi, signed a Memorandum of Obligations that paves the way for full SCO membership. Iran’s accession process could be completed in less than a year. The presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko reflected the SCO’s interest in expanding its influence, even among non-member countries.

But the spirit of cooperation and the visions of connectivity were undermined by reminders of the numerous conflicts in which SCO member countries are involved. During the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interactions with fellow leaders were tainted by the war in Ukraine. While there were no official statements about the Ukraine invasion during the summit, most member states found their way to express dissatisfaction with the economic turmoil and destabilisation caused by Russia's invasion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his Russian counterpart that “now is not an era of war.” Several leaders, including Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, made Putin wait in front of cameras before meeting him—a power move that Putin has famously used in recent years.

China, too, expressed its concerns over the consequences of the current events in Ukraine. The strongest message came in the form of vocal support for Kazakhstan. In a statement, Xi said that “no matter how the international situation changes, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Russian hawks had recently threatened Kazakhstan after Kazakh leaders took steps to distance themselves from Moscow.

But the war in Ukraine was not the only conflict to cast a shadow over the summit. During the summit, clashes began between two member states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, tensions also rose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an SCO dialogue partner whose president, Ilham Aliyev was in attendance at the summit.

The border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has been troubled since the demise of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Republics have failed to properly demarcate their shared border due to complicated geographic terrain, mixed ethnic populations, and general political instability. But since last year, the regular border clashes have become more dangerous and more deadly. New clashes between Tajik and Kyrgyz forces erupted during the SCO summit, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. As the clashes between the two Central Asian republic escalated, Russia attempted to show its influence. Just after the summit, Putin spoke with the Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents and called on them to "prevent further escalation." Both countries are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. A tenuous ceasefire is now in place.

Other SCO member states and dialogue partners may be implicated in the conflict if it escalates further. Earlier this year, Tajikistan began production of Iranian-designed drones as part of a novel joint venture. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan has purchased Bayraktar drones from Turkey.

The Samarkand Summit demonstrated the value of the SCO as a platform for bilateral and multilateral initiatives of its member and associate countries. The SCO is especially attractive for strong personalist leaders, whose politics prevent active participation in other international rules-based blocs and bodies. However, because the SCO does not contribute to a rules-based order, the organisation has struggled in the face of conflict—such as the clashes that took place last week between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

If the SCO is to mature as an organisation and make good on its vision of connectivity, it must also serve as a platform for conflict resolution. Until now, SCO member states have viewed longstanding tensions among other members as something outside the bounds of the bloc. India is assuming presidency of the SCO and Modi did chide Putin over his invasion of Ukraine during their bilateral meeting. Will far-flung conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, be of little concern or too costly to ignore?

Photo: Kremlin.ru

Iran Gains Prestige, Not Power, By Joining China-Led Bloc

Last week, after fifteen long years in political limbo, Iran’s application to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was finally approved. Iran first showed interest in the Chinese-led organisation in 2004, when it achieved non-member observer status. Although it first sought full membership in 2008, China and other member-states remained wary, primarily due to the impact of U.S-led multilateral sanctions, which made further political and economic entanglement with Iran a risky proposition. While India and Pakistan were admitted in 2017, continued instability in American policy towards Iran kept Sino-Iranian rapprochement on the back-burner. Since the Biden administration began to signal that it was open to negotiations with Iran, China made a renewed push for improved relations, culminating in the signing of a bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Iran in May of this year.

Despite these developments, Sino-Iranian relations remain limited and although Iran’s accession to the SCO—which may take up to two years to complete—appears significant, the move is unlikely to substantially change Iran’s geopolitical position. Despite Iranian rhetoric, the SCO is by no means an anti-Western alliance and is unlikely to furnish Iran much beyond symbolic support for its regional and international objectives. Iranian membership is also not a guarantee of increased Chinese investment or favourable policy decisions. In terms of dividends, Iran will have to make do with propaganda, prestige, and nationalist theatre for international and domestic audiences. 

The Iranian government has touted membership in SCO as a means of opposing the United States and ending Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was unrestrained in his comments at the SCO Summit in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. “The world has entered a new era,” Raisi said, where “hegemony and unilateralism are failing.” He painted Iran’s membership in the SCO as emblematic of an increasingly multi-polar world, where smaller powers could work in tandem to limit the influence of larger powers. More to the point, he called on member states to support Iran’s civilian nuclear program and resist sanctions, which he called a form of “economic terrorism.” 

Compared to the Iranian side, the Chinese press was more reserved. A report from Xinhua emphasized the SCO’s ability to foster a “regional consensus” and to connect Iran “to the economic infrastructure of Asia.” The news was presented alongside developments related to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and while described as a “diplomatic success,” Iran’s membership was not cast as a key outcome fo the summit. Raisi’s exhortations to resist American unilateralism were not reported on at all. Xi Jinping’s summit address did not even mention Iran by name.

Despite the lofty rhetoric of the Iranian president, there are few ways in which the SCO will be able to directly confront American hegemony. As noted by Nicole Grajewski, the SCO is “governed by consensus, which limits the extent of substantive cooperation” between states with divergent policies and competing objectives. It also lacks any legal mechanisms to enforce its decisions or punish member-states that violate its policies or have conflict with other members. Far from the “anti-NATO” it has been portrayed to be, the SCO is more a “forum for discussion and engagement than a formal regional alliance.” Two of the eight present members, India and Pakistan, are close U.S allies, and neither China nor Russia are keen to openly challenge the U.S in the Middle East or Central Asia.

In short, Iran will gain the ability to participate in these discussions, but not in a way that is likely to strongly influence the organization or its policies. China and the rest of the member-states will be keen to avoid alienating the Arab states that see Iran as a regional rival. In a move that seems targeted directly at balancing this concern, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt were also admitted during the Dushanbe summit as “dialogue partners,” joining nations like Turkey and Azerbaijan. While not full members, the presence of these voices will limit how much sway Iran will have at future SCO summits.

 Furthermore, despite its own rhetorical commitment to facilitating trade, economic, and cultural ties between members, the SCO’s success in these fields has been limited. In terms of tangible projects, the SCO has mostly stuck to regional security initiatives like counter-terrorism intelligence sharing, cross-border efforts to fight drug trafficking, and joint military exercises. While the organization has lately attempted to re-brand itself as an economic development platform, it still lacks any institutions for multilateral development finance. Beijing and Moscow also have divergent interests when it comes to major issues like free trade zones, and questions remain as to whether the organization can function as an actual forum for holding practical negotiations between member states, rather than “simply becoming their vehicle for norm-making power projection.”

China and Iran have set ambitious targets to increase trade for nearly a decade, but bilateral trade remains modest despite repeated commitments, discussions, and international summits. There remain substantial barriers to investment. Chinese investors have been urged for years to invest in Iran’s free economic zones in Maku, Qeshm, and Arvand, but investment remains limited. While China is more than happy to ignore sanctions when it comes to oil imports, outside this strategic trade, Chinese firms remain unconvinced that the profit is worth the risk of doing business, and privately grumble about the difficulty of working with Iranian partners. Iranians also face disruption and competition from Chinese goods and services, leading to popular discontent and political blowback from Iranian companies that have profited from the absence of both Western and Chinese competitors. Although there is no question that there is vast potential in economic co-operation between China and Iran, these are not minor issues, and there is little reason to believe that the SCO will provide a forum to address the barriers.

The SCO provides an impressive stage for China and Iran to enact their shared opposition to Western sanctions, hegemony, and unilateralism. But the realities of international political economy and the conflicting agendas of the body’s member states means that joining the SCO is unlikely to empower Iran in a meaningful way.

Photo: Government of Iran

Iran Looks to Central Asia in Effort to Grow Exports

Over the past year, Iran has faced disruptions in its foreign trade relations following the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.  Trade with partners like Europe and China has suffered because of U.S. secondary sanctions. In the face of these uncertainties, Iran has adopted a “neighborhood policy” as it seeks to protect trade flows. The policy has been recently expanded to Central Asian states, which serve both as an export market as well as the geographic bridge as Iran seeks to strengthen integration with Russia and China. For the landlocked Central Asian states, Iran is a vital conduit to international waters. In a May 2018 speech, President Rouhani described closer ties with Central Asia as a “fundamental policy.” The policy is now in the early stages of implementation.

At the beginning of December, Tehran hosted two economic summits with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the first such meetings in two and three years respectively. A week later, an Iranian delegation traveled to Tashkent in an effort to deepen trade ties.

On December 2, a joint commission of economic cooperation was held between Iran and Tajikistan. Iranian energy minister Reza Ardakanian presided over the meeting, which focused primarily on cooperation in energy and transportation projects. Iranian contractors have a history of infrastructure development in Tajikistan, such as the Anzob Tunnel completed in 2015 and Sangtuda 2 hydroelectric power plant. But discussions at the joint commission focused on new projects that would improve Tajikistan’s links to export markets through Iran, and also help support increased bilateral trade, such as the construction of warehouse facilities at Chabahar Port, and the completion of a railway corridor that would link Tajikistan and Turkey through Iran as part of the integration efforts of the Economic Cooperation Organization. 

As part of a broader effort to reset political relations, Iran’s President Rouhani made a state visit to Dushanbe in March 2019. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon may soon make his first visit to Iran in six years.

Just a day after the summit with Tajik officials, Iran held a similar high-level commission with Kyrgyzstan. Mohammad Eslami, Iran’s minister of roads and urban development, led the Iranian participation in what was the first commission meeting in three years. The negotiations, which resulted in an extensive memorandum, included a focus on banking ties and transport links.

In the area of banking the Iranian and Kyrgyz officials discussed the establishment of a protocol to ease trade conducted in national currencies among commercial banks. Iranian economy minister Farhad Dejapsand and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Hukan Batov, also discussed the establishment of a joint export bank and export credit agency to help facilitate trade. In the area of transit ties, Iranian and Kyrgyz officials continued dialogue on the use of Iran’s Chabahar port, where Kyrgyzstan has owned land since 2007 following a land swap with Iran, but has yet to develop warehouses or other infrastructure at the site. Iran has sought expanded ties with Kyrgyzstan in recent years. Kyrgyzstan so far is the only Central Asian state to have agreed a 10-year strategic roadmap with Iran—the agreement was signed in December 2016.

A week after the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan summits, Iranian industries minister Reza Rahmani led a delegation of over 50 Iranian companies for a two-day business summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbek companies use Iranian ports to get their goods to global markets. But with a population of 33 million, Uzbekistan also represents a significant potential market for Iranian exporters. Iran’s Zagros Airlines has re-established a direct light between Tehran and Tashkent, after a three-year hiatus. Bilateral trade between Iran and Uzbekistan grew 40 percent in 2018.

Increased trade with neighbors such as Iraq and Turkey has been a key contributor to Iran’s economic resiliency over the past decade, particularly as sanctions depressed exports to markets like Europe and China. In this regard, improved relations with Central Asian states have a strategic importance for Iran in the face of the U.S. “maximum pressure” sanctions companies. Moreover, the Central Asian states will also play an important role in China’s growing sphere of economic influence and as part of the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, with which Iran has recently concluded a free trade agreement. If the plans discussed by Iran with its Central Asian neighbors are properly implemented, a new pathway for regional economic development will be opened in the medium-term.

Photo: Railnews.ir