Iraq Begins to Adjust to Syria’s Post-Assad Reality

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Qatar—their first encounter. The meeting placed regional security at its core. Talks focused on border control and counterterrorism and shared concerns over instability along the Iraqi-Syrian frontier. 

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in early December 2024 ushered in a new geopolitical reality for the Middle East. Syria’s neighbours, such as Iraq, have been prompted to reassess their approach to Damascus. While Baghdad had no deep affinity Assad, the Assad regime at least provided a degree of predictability while also maintaining close ties with Iraq's strategic partner, Iran.

In this new era, the rise of Syria's interim President, Ahmad al-Sharaa—a former al-Qaeda militant in Iraq—has sparked some alarm among Iraq’s security establishment. Iraq's stance on Syria is shaped by its own civil war experience, when cross-border militancy exacerbated sectarian tensions and fueled years of conflict.

Today, Iraqi officials fear that renewed instability in Syria could provide fertile ground for an Islamic State (IS) resurgence, jeopardising Iraq's already fragile security situation. Securing Iraq’s 600-kilometer border with Syria remains the top priority in the midst of ongoing challenges such as cross-border smuggling, extremist infiltration, and refugee flows. At the same time, Baghdad must assess if Syria’s new leadership can be reliable partners and whether deeper political and economic cooperation can be pursued.

In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s departure, Iraq’s leadership adopted an approach of measured pragmatism. Rather than rushing into full diplomatic engagement like several other Arab states, policymakers in Iraq opted for a security-first strategy. This entailed dispatching intelligence officials to Damascus and extending a cautious invitation to Syria’s new foreign minister for talks in Baghdad. Prime Minister al-Sudani reaffirmed Iraq’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty while swiftly moving to reinforce border security.

The hesitation among Iraq’s leadership reflects both uncertainty over the stability of Syria’s new government as well as internal political debates over normalising diplomatic relations. Al-Sharaa’s past ties to jihadist networks in Iraq has prompted unease. His record is especially sensitive in Baghdad, given the Al Qaeda’s role in orchestrating sectarian atrocities during the 2006-2007 civil conflict.

Having endured a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against IS from 2014 to 2017, and still facing monthly attacks by IS sleeper cells, Iraq remains deeply wary of any potential spillover that could revive insurgent networks within its borders. The continued porousness of the Iraq-Syria border remains a primary vector for IS mobilisation, heightening Baghdad’s concerns.

In the lead-up to the meeting between Sudani and al-Sharaa, Iraq’s initial steps towards engagement with Syria focused on security coordination. In late December 2024, Baghdad repatriated 1,905 Assad-era soldiers who had fled across the border. Around the same time, Iraq’s National Intelligence Director, Hamid al-Shatri, was dispatched to Damascus for talks with Syria’s transitional government, focusing on counterterrorism and intelligence-sharing.

A central issue on the agenda was the al-Hol detention camp, which holds over 40,000 IS-associated detainees—many of them Iraqi nationals—amid deteriorating security conditions. The continued instability in northeastern Syria, where IS remnants remain active, coupled with the uncertain future of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), pose an immediate risk that Baghdad cannot afford to ignore.

The 10 March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the SDF, which outlines a framework for the eventual integration of Kurdish forces into Syria’s national security apparatus, represents another critical variable in Iraq’s evolving defence calculus. Baghdad is closely monitoring how the deal unfolds, particularly its implications for Kurdish armed groups operating along the Iraq-Syria border. While security officials in Iraq see the agreement as a potential step toward stabilising the area, they remain wary that unresolved tensions between the SDF and Turkish-backed factions could trigger further conflict, with possible spillovers into Iraqi territory.

Damascus has responded with public commitments to closer coordination and has agreed to expand joint counterterrorism efforts. This message was reinforced during Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s first official visit to Iraq in mid-March 2025. During the visit, Shaibani called for the restoration of formal border operations and described enhanced bilateral trade as a priority. 

He also underlined Syria’s readiness to cooperate with Iraq against remnants of IS, framing national safety as a “shared responsibility.” Baghdad, for its part, expressed respect for the Syrian people’s political choices while urging Damascus to ensure the safety of Syrians residing in Iraq. This was motivated by rising tensions following acts of violence targeting Syria’s Alawite minority. Syria’s new leadership has also signalled interest in rejoining regional forums and hinted at deeper future engagement. Nonetheless, it is likely to prioritise security coordination and economic lifelines as initial steps in its post-Assad foreign policy.

Discussions reportedly included the potential reopening of formal border crossings to bolster trade and economic ties, though no official confirmation has been issued. Prime Minister Sudani also extended an invitation to al-Sharaa to attend the upcoming Arab League Summit in Baghdad on 17 May 2025, which would mark Syria’s first participation since Assad’s fall. The encounter underscores both countries’ interest in renewing coordination while also highlighting Qatar’s expanding role as a facilitator of regional dialogue.

Though no formal security pact exists between the two states, the Iraq government has taken proactive steps to fortify its defences. Additional units from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have been deployed to reinforce Iraqi Armed Forces positions along the border, aiming to prevent militant infiltration. Iraq has also stepped up its border control operations, targeting smuggling networks and intensifying surveillance of cross-border movements—measures deemed crucial for curbing terrorist activities and illegal trade.

A further issue shaping Iraq’s relationship with Syria is the illicit narcotics trade, particularly the trafficking of Captagon pills, which has long been a highly lucrative industry linked to Syria. Iraqi authorities have escalated anti-smuggling efforts, resulting in several major drug seizures in recent months. These efforts reflect not only Baghdad’s commitment to combating organised crime but also its broader apprehension over how Syria’s new government will handle such networks.

While Iraq’s security forces have intensified enforcement measures, it remains unclear whether Syria’s transitional leadership will actively cooperate in dismantling the entrenched drug trade that flourished under the previous regime. For decision-makers in Iraq, tackling the Captagon crisis is not merely a matter of law enforcement; it serves as a litmus test for the credibility of Syria’s new leadership in managing governance and perimeter control.

Beyond defence issues, Iraq is also entangled in Syria’s unfolding humanitarian crisis. With over 270,000 Syrian refugees residing in Iraq, the government has initiated discussions with Damascus on the possibility of voluntary repatriation. Yet, given Syria’s fragile political transition, the feasibility of such efforts remains highly uncertain. 

Iraq has also expanded its humanitarian aid to Deir ez-Zor and other northeastern Syrian regions, recognising that stabilising these areas is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic necessity to prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for renewed insurgency. Still, the extent of Baghdad's direct involvement in Syria's reconstruction remains ambiguous as the Iraqi government carefully weighs the financial and political risks of committing to more substantial interaction with its fragile neighbour.

While security and political apprehension dominate the immediate landscape, Iraq’s long-term interests in Syria extend to broader economic and infrastructural considerations. The reopening of trade corridors, enhancement of cross-border infrastructure, and development of joint energy projects remain possibilities, but these initiatives all hinge on the stabilisation of Syria’s internal situation. The Iraqi government is closely monitoring whether Damascus can establish a functional administrative and legal framework capable of supporting such cooperation.

Despite deep historical and economic ties between the two countries, reviving meaningful economic connectivity remains a long-term goal rather than an immediate priority. Some Iraqi officials have floated the idea of restoring the long-defunct Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, which could provide the country with a valuable Mediterranean export route. However, the project remains highly speculative due to political uncertainties and infrastructural constraints. The mutability of post-Assad Syria, combined with an unclear regulatory environment, makes any large-scale economic venture premature at best.

Similarly, Iraq has historically been a key trading partner for Syria, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Yet current trade volumes remain limited, constrained by logistical hurdles, sanctions-related restrictions, and widespread uncertainty regarding Syria’s economic trajectory under its new leadership. Until greater political and security clarity emerges, Baghdad is unlikely to pursue major cross-border infrastructure projects or economic initiatives with Damascus.

Dialogue between Iraq and Syria does not occur in a vacuum. It is heavily influenced by broader regional dynamics, particularly the actions of Iran, Turkey, and the United States. Tehran, which has long been reliant on both Iraq and Syria as strategic buffers and conduits to the Mediterranean, is recalibrating its approach following Assad’s fall. Iran-aligned factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), some of which fought alongside Assad’s forces, are navigating a complex transition. While some have cautiously opened channels with Syria's new leadership, others remain sceptical, wary of the new rulers’ Sunni Islamist orientation.

Turkey’s growing presence in northern Syria adds further complexity to Iraq’s calculations. Ankara’s confrontations with the SDF, its broader regional ambitions, and its evolving posture in Kurdish affairs should all factor into the Iraqi government’s strategic planning. 

Recent peace overtures between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have also raised questions about Kurdish dynamics across the Iraq-Syria border. Iraqi-Kurdish factions are monitoring these developments closely, as any shifts in Turkey’s Syria policy could directly impact their own force readiness and political leverage.

Meanwhile, the uncertain future of US policy in Syria also weighs heavily on decision-makers in Iraq. While American forces continue counterterrorism operations in northeastern Syria, primarily in coordination with the SDF, the long-term sustainability of this presence remains in doubt. A potential US drawdown—currently projected for September 2025—could have significant repercussions for Iraq. Should Washington scale back its commitment, a resulting security vacuum could embolden IS remnants, compelling Iraq to step up its border control efforts to prevent the instability from spilling over. 

For now, Iraqi officials are expected to continue pursuing a phased, security-first approach when it comes to relations with Syria. As regional actors, including Turkey, Iran, and the United States, readjust their positions on Syria, Iraq must carefully navigate its own path, ensuring that its national security remains the cornerstone of its Syria policy.

The trajectory of Iraq-Syria relations in the coming months will hinge on whether Syria’s new leadership can establish stability, contain security threats, and lay the groundwork for meaningful regional cooperation. Until then, Iraq’s engagement is expected to remain cautious, pragmatic, and primarily focused on safeguarding its own frontiers.

Photo: Getty Images

Prospects for Syrian Civil Society Remain Dim While Sanctions Linger

Last month, Syrian civil society actors, sanctons experts, and European officials gathered in The Hague to assess the role of sanctions in Syria’s political and economic transition following the fall of Damascus to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). During a one-day workshop co-hosted by the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation and the Clingendael Institute, participants discussed how Western sanctions policy should be adjusted to alleviate Syria’s desperate economic situation. The gathering focused on ensuring meaningful support to local institutions and civil society, with the ambition of preventing the country from spiraling into renewed conflict. 

Syria remains under multiple overlapping sanctions regimes led by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. These measures—originally designed to pressure the Assad regime—now inhibit economic recovery, reconstruction, and institutional reform, even though the political landscape has shifted.

The US regime, shaped by the Caesar Act and counterterrorism designations of HTS, is the most comprehensive and extraterritorial. General License 24, set to expire in July 2025, provides narrow exemptions focused on essential services but does not allow for new investment or broader engagement. The EU has taken steps to suspend sanctions on key sectors, including energy and transport, yet the extraterritorial effect of US sanctions limits the impact of EU moves. The UN still lists HTS under its 1267 regime, restricting international financial and diplomatic engagement.

While the legal frameworks differ, the overall effect is similar: financial institutions, aid agencies, and the private sector are reluctant to engage in Syria, fearing compliance risks and political fallout.

Participants described the Syrian economy as being in a state of accelerating collapse, with deteriorating civil services, soaring unemployment, and households struggling without purchasing power. The destruction of infrastructure, ongoing currency depreciation, and the withdrawal of Russian and Iranian economic support have compounded the crisis. Streets in Damascus are flooded with cheap Turkish imports that Syrians cannot afford. Even in now stable areas of the country, public utilities and services—electricity, water, telecommunications, education—are barely functional.

Against this backdrop, humanitarian needs are escalating, yet aid pledges remain grossly inadequate. According to estimates, Syria’s reconstruction needs range between $250 and $400 billion, while the March 2025 Brussels donor conference resulted in pledges amounting to just $6.5 billion. Even early recovery and resilience programming—technically permissible under many sanctions frameworks—remains underfunded and politically delayed.

Despite the continued implementation of sanctions, participants noted that the international donor community is not entirely constrained from engaging with Syria. Under existing exemptions and mandates, there are already pathways for supporting essential services, infrastructure rehabilitation, and early recovery efforts—particularly when these activities are framed as humanitarian or development aid. According to one workshop participant, the World Bank has confirmed that it can support infrastructure and basic services in Syria under its post-conflict operational framework. However, meaningful engagement still depends on greater clarity and political alignment from member states. If expanded and adequately resourced, the Bank’s early recovery programs could offer a critical lifeline to communities even in the absence of full-scale sanctions relief.

Failure to lift or ease sanctions will prevent private sector and institutional investment that is essential for rebuilding the Syrian economy. But failure to increase aid, even under the current legal frameworks, ensures continued suffering, deepens instability, and risks the re-emergence of violence, organised crime, and extremism.

A central theme in the discussions was the counterproductive reliance on political benchmarks—such as inclusivity, constitutional reform, and governance transformation—as preconditions for sanctions relief. While these conditions seem sensible, they have triggered a rushed and top-down political process in Syria that many civil society organisations (CSOs) described as inorganic and externally driven.

For example, the national dialogue conference was announced to many of its intended participants with less than 24 hours’ notice. Consultations were limited in scope and representation, with key civic figures and regions underrepresented. Similarly, the interim constitution was drafted in just weeks, concentrating power in the executive, offering minimal separation of powers, and making vague commitments to pluralism.

HTS has made symbolic gestures to show its commitment to inclusive governance, such as appointing technocrats and making deals with Druze, southern militias, and Kurdish factions. Civil society actors view these many of these moves as superficial and tailored to meet donor expectations rather than domestic realities. Many warned that the political process risks collapsing without parallel efforts to restore economic viability and institutional functionality.

Moreover, the current sanctions framework often fails to distinguish between political conditionality and humanitarian necessity. As one participant remarked, “you cannot expect people to fight for democracy when fighting for food.”

Syrian civil society actors at the workshop identified several priorities for supporting an inclusive and grounded transition. Chief among them was the need for clearer guidance on sanctions and access to channels for clarification from relevant authorities. Many CSOs, especially those returning from abroad, are eager to establish offices in Damascus but face significant challenges due to legal uncertainties and the degraded infrastructure. Establishing local operations is constrained by the lack of electricity and internet access in particular, two utilities affected by sanctions.

Participants also emphasised the importance of providing training and technical support to ensure compliance with evolving sanctions frameworks, especially around financial procedures and institutional engagement. Access to dedicated funding with simplified disbursement processes, along with protections against bank over-compliance, was also flagged as essential.

In addition, CSOs called for increased support for local governance and service delivery, including civil servant salaries and early recovery programmes. They urged international actors to move away from a narrow focus on minority protection and instead promote a shared civic rights agenda. Finally, participants highlighted the need for more unified CSO advocacy efforts to engage international partners with a coherent voice representing diaspora and in-country actors.

Without these resources, CSOs will struggle to play a meaningful role in Syria’s constitutional reform, local governance, or transitional justice efforts. The current imbalance between international expectations and the limited capabilities of civil society risks undermining its legitimacy—not only in the eyes of donors, but also among ordinary Syrians. When CSOs are unable to address pressing socioeconomic needs like livelihoods, essential services, and infrastructure, they can appear ineffective or disconnected from the reality on the ground. As one participant noted, if civil society is perceived as focused solely on political processes while daily conditions worsen, public trust and relevance may quickly erode.

In response to these concerns, participants proposed a set of actionable steps for international actors to align sanctions policy with Syria’s evolving circumstances. For the United States, the immediate priority is to make General License 24 permanent and broaden its scope to include investment and infrastructure-related activities. Participants also urged Washington to remove HTS’ designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) while maintaining its listing as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), at least for now. This modest move would reduce the legal risks associated with engagement while preserving necessary safeguards for the population. Alongside these steps, it was suggested the US should issue more explicit guidance on permissible engagements in Syria—such as FAQs or advisory notes tailored to humanitarian and development actors—to reduce uncertainty and risk aversion.

While the European Union has gone further than the US in suspending sanctions, it still plays a key role. Participants noted that the EU’s suspension of sectoral sanctions, enacted in February, is effectively permanent, but called for an outline of a transparent roadmap towards full sanctions removal. Additionally, they recommended launching an EU-led reconstruction trust fund that is both insulated from US financial jurisdiction as well as open to co-financing from Gulf states and multilateral actors. Restoring a diplomatic and technical presence on the ground would also assist the EU in monitoring developments in Syria, ultimately supporting a more credible political and economic transition. 

Crucially, the EU must actively encourage the United States to take bolder and more decisive steps. Without parallel US action, the efficacy of EU measures remains limited, especially given the extraterritorial scope of American sanctions.

Recommendations for the UN mainly focused on unlocking key legal and diplomatic barriers. Participants called for a review of HTS’s designation under the 1267 regime, taking into account its public disavowal of ties to al-Qaeda and ongoing coordination against the Islamic State. The UN Special Envoy should be mandated to engage the new Syrian authorities to negotiate specific steps toward delisting or, at a minimum, time-bound exemptions aligned with transitional goals. Furthermore, the implementation of UNSCR 2664—which establishes humanitarian carve-outs across all UN sanctions regimes—should be actively promoted and incorporated into member state legislation to improve operational clarity and access for aid providers.

The workshop underscored the sobering reality that Syria’s future depends on concrete steps from the international community to ensure a successful political transition, economic recovery, and reconstruction. Maintaining rigid conditionality while under-delivering on aid and sanctions relief will neither foster inclusive governance nor prevent future conflict. Policymakers must realign their tools with the current realities—pairing cautious diplomacy with tangible economic support and giving civil society the space and resources to lead. As one participant put it, “sanctions might have been a tool to shape Syria’s future. Today, they are part of what’s preventing it.”

Photo: Ahmed Akacha

Reconstruction Aid, Not Sanctions Relief, is What Syria Really Needs

Last week, the Biden administration issued General License 24, which removes prohibitions on a range of transactions with Syrian governing institutions, even while sanctions targeting Syrian entities and individuals remain in place. Syria’s newly appointed foreign minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, welcomed the Biden administration’s move, but insisted that the US must lift all sanctions, which “constitute a barrier and an obstacle to the rapid recovery and development of the Syrian people.” The UN envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, has similarly called for “significant further efforts to adjust sanctions.” Meanwhile, German officials are reportedly discussing a plan that would see the EU ease sanctions on Syria so long as Syrian authorities implement political reforms.

These discussions on sanctions relief are important and reflect the urgency of such relief for Syria’s economic recovery. Syria is entangled in a web of US, EU, and UN sanctions. These measures include sanctions targeting the Syrian state and key economic sectors, which were imposed to weaken the Assad regime. Separate sanctions target Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization that comprises the core of the new Syrian leadership. But while determining a timeline and conditions for sanctions relief is important, Western officials and Syrian authorities are already sliding into a debate over what sanctions relief is warranted and at what stage. Meanwhile, Syrian civil society actors, cognizant of the precarious humanitarian situation in Syria, are being forced to use their political energy to advocate for sanctions relief, when the relief is not what truly matters for the stabilization of Syria. 

The debate over sanctions relief risks becoming a distraction from the far more important aim of securing reconstruction aid. Syria is a country devastated by a brutal civil war. While sanctions exacerbated economic hardships in the country, contributing to currency devaluation, hyperinflation, and soaring budget deficits, the measures were significantly tightened only in 2019, at which point the Syrian economy had already effectively collapsed. In short, sanctions relief will not suffice to restore the Syrian economy.

The inadequacy of sanctions relief as both a political and economic goal becomes especially clear when considering what sanctions relief really entails. Sanctions are nothing more than language contained in laws and regulations. As such, lifting sanctions means nothing more than the creation of new legal language. While the imposition of sanctions does impose legal prohibitions that prevent governments or private sector actors from engaging in certain economic activities, lifting sanctions does not introduce any obligations for those actors to resume economic activities. 

Clearly, sanctions relief cannot be the primary goal of advocacy. Removing legal prohibitions for economic engagement with Syria is very important, but it is a simply a means to an end. The goal of advocacy must be to push Western governments to take action that will really make a difference. What Syria needs is for Western governments to forthrightly commit to providing billions of dollars of reconstruction aid that can help resurrect the Syrian economy.

To this end, it is troubling is that Western governments have so far said little about their commitment to reconstruction in Syria. The recent visit of the German and French foreign ministers to Damascus was followed by headlines declaring that the EU would “will not fund new Islamist structures” rather than headlines committing European financing for reconstruction.

While European governments did provide Syria much-needed humanitarian aid during the long civil war, support for reconstruction will require a far greater political commitment. Not only is the scale of financial assistance required much larger, but the aid must be provided in parallel with what will surely be a complex political transition. The challenge of creating more inclusive political institutions in Syria may explain Western equivocation on the issue of reconstruction aid. But the reluctance to even signal the possibility that substantial aid could be forthcoming reflects a typical cynicism in Western capitals. To ensure that Syria secures both sanctions relief and the billions of dollars in aid, Syrian authorities and Syrian civil society must be unified in their calls for reconstruction support. There are several reasons why effective advocacy requires clear messaging that the paramount goal is reconstruction assistance, and not sanctions relief. 

First, sanctions relief itself will not restore the Syrian economy, even if it is provided quickly. As Karam Shaar and Benjamin Fève have detailed, the economic situation in Syria is dire. The economy has contracted 80 percent since the onset of the civil war. Nine out of ten Syrians live below the poverty line. The damage to cities and infrastructure is extensive. A 2018 study used satellite imagery to identify over 100,000 damaged structures in Syria’s major cities, including thousands of homes destroyed by the Assad regime’s criminal use of barrel bombs on civilian targets. In this context, rebuilding Syria’s economy means replacing the capital stock while also restoring economic institutions and networks. A 2019 estimate on the costs of reconstruction put the figure as high as $400 billion. Given the scale of the devastation, post-conflict recovery in Syria is not something that can be accomplished through the resumption of private sector business activity. A resumption of trade and investment in Syria will certainly help stabilize the economy and improve the welfare of ordinary Syrians. But rebuilding critical infrastructure and restoring public services, actions necessary for Syria’s long term economic development, will require massive investments made by the Syrian state, with funds provided by foreign donors. This is precisely how Western governments have sought to support economic recovery in Ukraine, where the United States and EU have so far provided a combined $67 billion of financial support to the government. A similar commitment must be made for Syria.

Second, if sanctions relief is cast as the main goal of advocacy, Syrian stakeholders risk enabling Western governments to wash their hands of the responsibility to provide reconstruction assistance. We already see signs that Western governments will be content to provide sanctions relief so long as they can foist the responsibilities of reconstruction on other actors—the issuance of the General License 24 was quickly followed by the dispatch of Turkish and Qatari floating power plants to Syria. It was also no surprise that Al-Shaibani made his first overseas visit to Saudi Arabia, another potential reconstruction donor. Western governments should not leave Syrian authorities to seek reconstruction assistance from regional powers alone. Such an arrangement would give regional powers extraordinary influence over the course of the political transition in Syria. Western governments, meanwhile, will have little influence beyond the leverage provided by their remaining sanctions, and will therefore be inclined to keep those sanctions in place. While the US began to ease sanctions on Sudan in 2017, a paltry increase in aid contributed to Sudan’s slide into a deep economic crisis just one year later. The imposition of austerity measures by President Omar al-Bashir in 2018 spurred a new round of unrest, eventually triggering a new civil war. To avoid the same fate, Syria needs reconstruction support from a wide range of donor countries. This will ensure that the issue of reconstruction is not unduly politicized. Western policy must shift from the mindset of economic coercion to one of economic inducements.

Third, the best way to ensure that sanctions relief works is to ensure Western governments are committed to providing reconstruction aid. Providing effective sanctions relief is a complex process. Even if Western authorities issue new licenses or rollback sanctions designations altogether, the implementation of sanctions relief depends on proactive outreach by authorities to provide guidance and encourage economic operators to take advantage of the more permissive environment for trade and investment. Western governments have tended to take a lackadaisical approach to the provision of such guidance unless the lingering sanctions are preventing the implementation of their own policies. A cautionary tale can be seen in the aftermath of the 2016 peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC, a rebel group designated by the US as a foreign terrorist organization (the same designation that applies to HTS). The US supported the peace deal but provided limited aid for its implementation. The US aid program was mainly focused on supporting the Columbian government in implementation of the deal, rather than supporting reintegration of the FARC rebels into civilian life. This is partly why FARC was only removed from the FTO list in 2021, five years after its fighters had demobilized. Had US authorities been required to engage with FARC at an early stage because of their own policy commitments, there would have been greater urgency to remove the legal impediments to such engagement by any and all actors. Ultimately, the delay in providing sanctions relief jeopardized implementation of the peace deal.

Finally, there are certain kinds of aid and technical assistance that only Western governments can provide to Syria. For example, rebuilding Syria's economy will require reform of the banking sector, including through the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing controls that give international banks and financial institutions confidence they can avail themselves of sanctions relief and transact with Syrian banks. If Western governments lift sanctions, but do not help Syrian banks improve their financial integrity, then the economic recovery will falter, largely due to overcompliance among private sector operators. Here, the cautionary tale is Iran, where the lifting of nuclear sanctions in 2016 led to a modest recovery in trade and investment. However, failure to support Iran's push to comply with critical financial crime regulations left Iranian banks unable to reintegrate with the global financial system. Foreign companies seeking to re-establish operations in Iran faced tremendous barriers as they struggled to conduct even routine banking operations. Unsurprisingly, foreign firms also struggled to secure financing for trade or investment deals. The failure to mobilize more investment into Iran left the nuclear deal vulnerable to domestic and foreign political opponents, and the deal effectively collapsed in 2018 following a unilateral US withdrawal.

If Syrian authorities and civil society demand that Western governments provide reconstruction assistance, they will benefit from sanctions relief. But if they allow the parameters of the debate to focus on sanctions relief alone, whatever relief and reconstruction support materializes will certainly prove insufficient. In this sense, Syrians must not only push Western governments to recognize their direct responsibility to redress the economic consequences of sanctions, but also the expediency of contributing to Syrian reconstruction generously and broadly. The price tag of Syrian reconstruction will be high, but Western governments can afford it. What no one can afford is to squander this historic opportunity to build a more prosperous, equitable, and resilient economy in Syria.

Photo: Ahmed Akacha