Can SCO Members Achieve Connectivity in the Face of Conflict?

The two-day Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit took place last week in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Aside from agreeing to the Samarkand Declaration, which summarises the intention of SCO members to foster deeper economic partnerships, the gathered leaders also signed 44 documents consisting of numerous memorandums, roadmaps, and action plans for cooperation in tourism, artificial intelligence, and energy.

The SCO leaders mostly focused on the importance of new transit routes and economic cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who travelled to the summit as part of his first foreign tour since the COVID-19 pandemic, touted ambitious plans to expand economic cooperation with Central Asian states.

Negotiations over the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway took place in the sidelines of the summit and the three parties agreed to conduct a feasibility study with a view to constructing the new route. Uzbek officials also lobbied for another transit corridor from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, but support among SCO members has been tepid given the need to engage with the Taliban government in Kabul.

Uzbekistan also signed 17 cooperation agreements with Iran focused primarily on transport and trade. Tashkent is seeking further access to Iran’s Chabahar port for its economic development. The Iranian delegation, led by president Ebrahim Raisi, signed a Memorandum of Obligations that paves the way for full SCO membership. Iran’s accession process could be completed in less than a year. The presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko reflected the SCO’s interest in expanding its influence, even among non-member countries.

But the spirit of cooperation and the visions of connectivity were undermined by reminders of the numerous conflicts in which SCO member countries are involved. During the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interactions with fellow leaders were tainted by the war in Ukraine. While there were no official statements about the Ukraine invasion during the summit, most member states found their way to express dissatisfaction with the economic turmoil and destabilisation caused by Russia's invasion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his Russian counterpart that “now is not an era of war.” Several leaders, including Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, made Putin wait in front of cameras before meeting him—a power move that Putin has famously used in recent years.

China, too, expressed its concerns over the consequences of the current events in Ukraine. The strongest message came in the form of vocal support for Kazakhstan. In a statement, Xi said that “no matter how the international situation changes, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Russian hawks had recently threatened Kazakhstan after Kazakh leaders took steps to distance themselves from Moscow.

But the war in Ukraine was not the only conflict to cast a shadow over the summit. During the summit, clashes began between two member states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, tensions also rose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an SCO dialogue partner whose president, Ilham Aliyev was in attendance at the summit.

The border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has been troubled since the demise of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Republics have failed to properly demarcate their shared border due to complicated geographic terrain, mixed ethnic populations, and general political instability. But since last year, the regular border clashes have become more dangerous and more deadly. New clashes between Tajik and Kyrgyz forces erupted during the SCO summit, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. As the clashes between the two Central Asian republic escalated, Russia attempted to show its influence. Just after the summit, Putin spoke with the Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents and called on them to "prevent further escalation." Both countries are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. A tenuous ceasefire is now in place.

Other SCO member states and dialogue partners may be implicated in the conflict if it escalates further. Earlier this year, Tajikistan began production of Iranian-designed drones as part of a novel joint venture. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan has purchased Bayraktar drones from Turkey.

The Samarkand Summit demonstrated the value of the SCO as a platform for bilateral and multilateral initiatives of its member and associate countries. The SCO is especially attractive for strong personalist leaders, whose politics prevent active participation in other international rules-based blocs and bodies. However, because the SCO does not contribute to a rules-based order, the organisation has struggled in the face of conflict—such as the clashes that took place last week between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

If the SCO is to mature as an organisation and make good on its vision of connectivity, it must also serve as a platform for conflict resolution. Until now, SCO member states have viewed longstanding tensions among other members as something outside the bounds of the bloc. India is assuming presidency of the SCO and Modi did chide Putin over his invasion of Ukraine during their bilateral meeting. Will far-flung conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, be of little concern or too costly to ignore?

Photo: Kremlin.ru

As China-Led Bloc Heads to Samarkand, Leaders Struggle to Find Common Aims

This week, Uzbekistan is hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Samarkand. The two-day summit begins on September 15. The leaders of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran and other member and observer states are expected to attend. It will be the first time since the 2019 summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, that leaders will meet face to face in the SCO format.

The upcoming summit in Samarkand aims to present the organisation as a stable, capable, and evolving bloc with the capacity to address regional and global crises. For the host nation, Uzbekistan, the summit is a chance to promote the “Spirit of Samarkand” and to encourage global cooperation over global competition.

For years, the Uzbek government has sought to deepen its relations with other SCO member states. Having the opportunity to host the summit cements Uzbekistan’s position as a valuable member of the SCO community and allows it to push its regional agenda forward. Connectivity, cooperation, and the promotion of regional stability are at the core of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s goals, outlined on the eve of the summit.

Iran Takes Next Membership Step

One of the most important events expected to take place during the summit is Iran’s signing of binding documents related to its admission as a full member of the organisation. Iran’s accession will mark only the third time since its founding in which the SCO has admitted a new member—India and Pakistan joined in 2017. While Iran’s membership will not become official for at least another year, the procedures for its full membership will commence at the summit. Iranian leaders have faced a long wait for admission—it has been 15 years since Iran formally applied to join the bloc.

Tehran views joining the SCO as an important diplomatic achievement. The SCO represents a platform for non-western alignment and provides a platform for negotiations on tangible security and economic projects with other member states. Taking Iran on board, however, does not automatically guarantee either significant immediate benefits for Iran or an increase in the bloc’s capacity to effectively address security and economic challenges facing Asia, particularly while Iran remains under US secondary sanctions.

Eyes on Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan has proved strategically important for all SCO members, and especially the Central Asian republics. Security and humanitarian issues in Afghanistan were discussed in a large international conference hosted by Uzbekistan in July.

Among the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan is the loudest supporter of a taking a proactive approach towards the Taliban. While there are clear political issues with the Taliban, the Uzbek government realises that the critical south-eastern infrastructure corridor runs through Afghanistan. Development of this route promises significant economic benefits for Uzbekistan. The Uzbek president has stated that the SCO “must share the story of its success with Afghanistan.” In other words, it is a task for all regional states to engage with Kabul, and this task may become a benchmark for the capacity of SCO as an organisation. However, Afghanistan must become stable and a reliable partner to allow for its own development, as well to enable regional infrastructure projects to advance.

Tajikistan has a fundamentally different view towards the regime now in charge in Kabul. Dushanbe remains highly critical of the Taliban, raising concerns regarding terrorism and the safety of the Tajik ethnic groups in Afghanistan. However, neither Mirziyoyev or Emomali Rahmon, his Tajik counterpart, wishes to see Afghanistan further destabilised. China, India, and Russia basically hold the same position. Most regional countries are facing security threats from the Islamic State Khorasan Province and its affiliated groups. To add to the worries of the Central Asian states, Pakistan, a major player in Afghanistan, has itself faced political turmoil in the past year following the ousting of Prime Minister Imran Khan.

A Russian Dilemma

Russian president, Vladimir Putin, will face a difficult task in presenting his country as a global power in the face of unsuccessful military operations in Ukraine and economic strains caused by sanctions. The countries of Central Asia have close economic ties to Russia and are suffering the inevitable consequences of Moscow’s isolation.

As most regional countries are engaged in efforts to find ways to mitigate the negative impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow is expecting a not-so-warm welcome in Samarkand. Recently reported battlefield losses in Ukraine have incentivised some SCO member states to more forcefully resist Moscow's ongoing attempts to influence their foreign policy, including their aims and activities within the organisation.

The SCO is largely dominated by China rather than Russia, but Russia has long been seen as a key partner in shaping the bloc’s political and economic aims. But it appears that Russia’s future position and influence within the organisation will be increasingly determined by the priorities of other member states and not Moscow’s ambitions. Moreover, while Russia’s ties with China have been described as a “partnership with no limits” by Chinese officials, the upcoming summit will be the first time Xi and Putin meet in-person since the start of the Ukraine invasion. Their engagements on the side-line of the summit will be telling of the extent of the bilateral partnership, particularly within the framework of the SCO.

Struggling for Common Aims

According to the Uzbek foreign ministry, numerous agreements on cooperation in specific areas, ranging from digital security to climate change, are will be discussed at the summit. The SCO is also seeking to establish partnerships with countries outside its primary geographical core, namely with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, in an effort to further extend the bloc’s political reach. 

Until now, the greatest advantage of the SCO was that the bloc did not impose strict rules or apply pressure to prevent its members from cooperation with non-member states, even those who may be perceived as adversaries to China and Russia. This flexibility has been particularly important for Central Asian states who maintain significant security and economic relations with the United States and Europe alongside their partnerships with China, Russia, and India—as required by their multi-vector foreign policies.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, that flexibility seems at risk. For example, Russian politician Nikolai Patrushev recently declared that military training provided by the United States to certain SCO members poses a threat to Russia. Such accusations will no doubt colour bilateral and multilateral engagements in Samarkand.

Issued at the end of the summit, the "Samarkand Declaration" will present "a comprehensive political declaration on the SCO's position on international politics, economy and a range of other aspects." To what extent the SCO will be able to accommodate its members' varied and even contradictory aims is a question yet to be answered. The Samarkand summit will convene an organisation still searching for its trajectory.

Photo: Wikicommons

Iran Gains Prestige, Not Power, By Joining China-Led Bloc

Last week, after fifteen long years in political limbo, Iran’s application to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was finally approved. Iran first showed interest in the Chinese-led organisation in 2004, when it achieved non-member observer status. Although it first sought full membership in 2008, China and other member-states remained wary, primarily due to the impact of U.S-led multilateral sanctions, which made further political and economic entanglement with Iran a risky proposition. While India and Pakistan were admitted in 2017, continued instability in American policy towards Iran kept Sino-Iranian rapprochement on the back-burner. Since the Biden administration began to signal that it was open to negotiations with Iran, China made a renewed push for improved relations, culminating in the signing of a bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Iran in May of this year.

Despite these developments, Sino-Iranian relations remain limited and although Iran’s accession to the SCO—which may take up to two years to complete—appears significant, the move is unlikely to substantially change Iran’s geopolitical position. Despite Iranian rhetoric, the SCO is by no means an anti-Western alliance and is unlikely to furnish Iran much beyond symbolic support for its regional and international objectives. Iranian membership is also not a guarantee of increased Chinese investment or favourable policy decisions. In terms of dividends, Iran will have to make do with propaganda, prestige, and nationalist theatre for international and domestic audiences. 

The Iranian government has touted membership in SCO as a means of opposing the United States and ending Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was unrestrained in his comments at the SCO Summit in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. “The world has entered a new era,” Raisi said, where “hegemony and unilateralism are failing.” He painted Iran’s membership in the SCO as emblematic of an increasingly multi-polar world, where smaller powers could work in tandem to limit the influence of larger powers. More to the point, he called on member states to support Iran’s civilian nuclear program and resist sanctions, which he called a form of “economic terrorism.” 

Compared to the Iranian side, the Chinese press was more reserved. A report from Xinhua emphasized the SCO’s ability to foster a “regional consensus” and to connect Iran “to the economic infrastructure of Asia.” The news was presented alongside developments related to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and while described as a “diplomatic success,” Iran’s membership was not cast as a key outcome fo the summit. Raisi’s exhortations to resist American unilateralism were not reported on at all. Xi Jinping’s summit address did not even mention Iran by name.

Despite the lofty rhetoric of the Iranian president, there are few ways in which the SCO will be able to directly confront American hegemony. As noted by Nicole Grajewski, the SCO is “governed by consensus, which limits the extent of substantive cooperation” between states with divergent policies and competing objectives. It also lacks any legal mechanisms to enforce its decisions or punish member-states that violate its policies or have conflict with other members. Far from the “anti-NATO” it has been portrayed to be, the SCO is more a “forum for discussion and engagement than a formal regional alliance.” Two of the eight present members, India and Pakistan, are close U.S allies, and neither China nor Russia are keen to openly challenge the U.S in the Middle East or Central Asia.

In short, Iran will gain the ability to participate in these discussions, but not in a way that is likely to strongly influence the organization or its policies. China and the rest of the member-states will be keen to avoid alienating the Arab states that see Iran as a regional rival. In a move that seems targeted directly at balancing this concern, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt were also admitted during the Dushanbe summit as “dialogue partners,” joining nations like Turkey and Azerbaijan. While not full members, the presence of these voices will limit how much sway Iran will have at future SCO summits.

 Furthermore, despite its own rhetorical commitment to facilitating trade, economic, and cultural ties between members, the SCO’s success in these fields has been limited. In terms of tangible projects, the SCO has mostly stuck to regional security initiatives like counter-terrorism intelligence sharing, cross-border efforts to fight drug trafficking, and joint military exercises. While the organization has lately attempted to re-brand itself as an economic development platform, it still lacks any institutions for multilateral development finance. Beijing and Moscow also have divergent interests when it comes to major issues like free trade zones, and questions remain as to whether the organization can function as an actual forum for holding practical negotiations between member states, rather than “simply becoming their vehicle for norm-making power projection.”

China and Iran have set ambitious targets to increase trade for nearly a decade, but bilateral trade remains modest despite repeated commitments, discussions, and international summits. There remain substantial barriers to investment. Chinese investors have been urged for years to invest in Iran’s free economic zones in Maku, Qeshm, and Arvand, but investment remains limited. While China is more than happy to ignore sanctions when it comes to oil imports, outside this strategic trade, Chinese firms remain unconvinced that the profit is worth the risk of doing business, and privately grumble about the difficulty of working with Iranian partners. Iranians also face disruption and competition from Chinese goods and services, leading to popular discontent and political blowback from Iranian companies that have profited from the absence of both Western and Chinese competitors. Although there is no question that there is vast potential in economic co-operation between China and Iran, these are not minor issues, and there is little reason to believe that the SCO will provide a forum to address the barriers.

The SCO provides an impressive stage for China and Iran to enact their shared opposition to Western sanctions, hegemony, and unilateralism. But the realities of international political economy and the conflicting agendas of the body’s member states means that joining the SCO is unlikely to empower Iran in a meaningful way.

Photo: Government of Iran