Long-Awaited Uzbek-Kyrgyz Border Deal Sparks Unrest
The final demarcation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was expected to be a tremendous political victory for Kyrgyzstan. But instead of celebration, the agreement has spurred domestic unrest and intensified repression.
In October, the final demarcation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was expected to be successfully concluded after three decades of negotiations. The agreement was supposed to be a tremendous political victory for Kyrgyzstan, especially for President Sadyr Japarov. But instead of celebration, the agreement has spurred domestic unrest and intensified repression.
Most visibly, the unrest is due to the Kempir-Abad water reservoir in the Uzgen district. The local population in Uzgen believes that the government and president’s close ally Kamchybek Tashiev's negotiating team failed to fully address state borders, land ownership, and water management in the area and did not adequately explain the deal to the public. Concerns about ceding the important reservoir to another country and abandoning Kyrgyz land were frequently voiced, but the government downplayed concerns. Some members of a parliamentary committee responsible for the preliminary approval of the new border also complained about the secrecy of the agreement. The exact full wording of the deal was not published, which led to uncertainty about what they were actually voting for, and some parliamentarians refused to vote at all.
Japarov faced opposition to the announced border agreement both in media and in the streets. On October 22, a committee for the protection of Kempir-Abad reservoir was formed. Activists also organised a demonstration denouncing the deal and demanding transparent public discussions. However, Japarov labeled the protests as the product of the "evil intentions” of a few opponents.
To succeed, the regime has resorted to silencing the opposition voices until the deal is officially signed. On October 23, there was a mass detention of two dozen vocal opposition activists in Bishkek and elsewhere around the country. The Kyrgyz government also decided to take action against the local operations of Radio Free Europe and blocked the broadcaster’s website for two months over the alleged spreading of disinformation. Later, the National Security Committee—headed by Tashiev—ordered Demir Bank to close RFE’s local account.
The crisis over Kempir-Abad and the entire border demarcation process illustrates one of the core problems of the current Kyrgyz government: an authoritarian approach to sensitive domestic issues. On the agreement with Uzbekistan, Japarov and Tashiev decided to push the deal through the opposition using their political influence and power. There is no exact date of the official signature announced, and under the current circumstances, neither the official implementation nor peaceful acceptance of the deal by the Kyrgyz society is certain.
Since his ascendence to power after large public protests in October 2020, Japarov has relied on his image as a strong national leader. Issues regarding territory, national interests, mineral resources, and economic prosperity have formed the core aspects of his political agenda. In recent months, however, he has faced mounting challenges in every domain. Moreover, attempts by Kyrgyzstan to present a border agreement regarding Kempir-Abad failed last year. Experiencing the same failure again would be a huge blow to Japarov’s political career.
Aside from its border issues with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan also lacks fully demarcated borders with Tajikistan. Various factors have delayed the demarcation process since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. These include complicated physical geography, mixed ethnic populations, and domestic political stakes. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been rising in the past few years and there is little hope that the situation will improve in the foreseeable future.
The government’s nationalist rhetoric has not helped. This rhetoric has been accompanied by armed clashes and unprecedented levels of violence earlier this year. Neither Bishkek nor Dushanbe are interested in launching a full-scale war against one another, and destabilisation of the wider region is against the interests of their neighbours too. Even so, neither side has shown the willingness to engage in negotiations. For the time being, leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are using to justify consolidation of power at home.
While condemnable, Japarov and Tashiev’s attempts to secure the regime's position by silencing critics are hardly surprising. But the scale of the repression is concerning. Despite domestic turmoil, Kyrgyzstan still enjoys a reputation as a country with a more vibrant civil society and greater democratic mechanisms than its neighbours in Central Asia. However, researchers, activists, and civil society members interviewed by the author in recent months unanimously pointed to a worsening outlook and cited the disappearance of previously understood “red lines” and the unpredictability of authorities’ punitive actions.
Tashiev’s participation at a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States illustrates Kyrgyzstan's slide towards more oppression. During the meeting in Moscow, non-governmental organisations and international bodies were labeled as threats and destructive forces.
The unrest and regime instability in Kyrgyzstan may have a negative impact also on other international projects, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbek railway, which has been on the table for two decades with no traction until last month when it was finally put forward. If the unrest persists, the parties to the rail deal may run out of patience. Moreover, Uzbekistan may either delay the ratification of the border agreement or demand more favourable conditions at Bishkek’s expense.
But even if the border deal materialises and both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan implement the agreement, issues on the ground will likely persist. The newly demarcated border requires effective border management, trust, and mutual endorsement by the locals on both sides. Without a proper arrangement, even a minor skirmish might escalate to a major border conflict. Moreover, the contested future of the Kempir-Abad water reservoir further adds to the complexity to an already fragile situation at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border.
Photo: Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan
Can SCO Members Achieve Connectivity in the Face of Conflict?
If the SCO is to mature as an organisation and make good on its vision of connectivity, it must also serve as a platform for conflict resolution.
The two-day Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit took place last week in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Aside from agreeing to the Samarkand Declaration, which summarises the intention of SCO members to foster deeper economic partnerships, the gathered leaders also signed 44 documents consisting of numerous memorandums, roadmaps, and action plans for cooperation in tourism, artificial intelligence, and energy.
The SCO leaders mostly focused on the importance of new transit routes and economic cooperation. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who travelled to the summit as part of his first foreign tour since the COVID-19 pandemic, touted ambitious plans to expand economic cooperation with Central Asian states.
Negotiations over the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway took place in the sidelines of the summit and the three parties agreed to conduct a feasibility study with a view to constructing the new route. Uzbek officials also lobbied for another transit corridor from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, but support among SCO members has been tepid given the need to engage with the Taliban government in Kabul.
Uzbekistan also signed 17 cooperation agreements with Iran focused primarily on transport and trade. Tashkent is seeking further access to Iran’s Chabahar port for its economic development. The Iranian delegation, led by president Ebrahim Raisi, signed a Memorandum of Obligations that paves the way for full SCO membership. Iran’s accession process could be completed in less than a year. The presence of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko reflected the SCO’s interest in expanding its influence, even among non-member countries.
But the spirit of cooperation and the visions of connectivity were undermined by reminders of the numerous conflicts in which SCO member countries are involved. During the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interactions with fellow leaders were tainted by the war in Ukraine. While there were no official statements about the Ukraine invasion during the summit, most member states found their way to express dissatisfaction with the economic turmoil and destabilisation caused by Russia's invasion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his Russian counterpart that “now is not an era of war.” Several leaders, including Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, made Putin wait in front of cameras before meeting him—a power move that Putin has famously used in recent years.
China, too, expressed its concerns over the consequences of the current events in Ukraine. The strongest message came in the form of vocal support for Kazakhstan. In a statement, Xi said that “no matter how the international situation changes, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Russian hawks had recently threatened Kazakhstan after Kazakh leaders took steps to distance themselves from Moscow.
But the war in Ukraine was not the only conflict to cast a shadow over the summit. During the summit, clashes began between two member states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, tensions also rose between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an SCO dialogue partner whose president, Ilham Aliyev was in attendance at the summit.
The border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has been troubled since the demise of the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Republics have failed to properly demarcate their shared border due to complicated geographic terrain, mixed ethnic populations, and general political instability. But since last year, the regular border clashes have become more dangerous and more deadly. New clashes between Tajik and Kyrgyz forces erupted during the SCO summit, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. As the clashes between the two Central Asian republic escalated, Russia attempted to show its influence. Just after the summit, Putin spoke with the Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents and called on them to "prevent further escalation." Both countries are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. A tenuous ceasefire is now in place.
Other SCO member states and dialogue partners may be implicated in the conflict if it escalates further. Earlier this year, Tajikistan began production of Iranian-designed drones as part of a novel joint venture. Meanwhile Kyrgyzstan has purchased Bayraktar drones from Turkey.
The Samarkand Summit demonstrated the value of the SCO as a platform for bilateral and multilateral initiatives of its member and associate countries. The SCO is especially attractive for strong personalist leaders, whose politics prevent active participation in other international rules-based blocs and bodies. However, because the SCO does not contribute to a rules-based order, the organisation has struggled in the face of conflict—such as the clashes that took place last week between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
If the SCO is to mature as an organisation and make good on its vision of connectivity, it must also serve as a platform for conflict resolution. Until now, SCO member states have viewed longstanding tensions among other members as something outside the bounds of the bloc. India is assuming presidency of the SCO and Modi did chide Putin over his invasion of Ukraine during their bilateral meeting. Will far-flung conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, be of little concern or too costly to ignore?
Photo: Kremlin.ru