Will Foreign Investment Return to Iran’s Automotive Sector?

Iran produced just 770,000 automobiles in 2019, down from 1,418,550 just two years prior. The re-imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions interrupted new investment in Iran’s automotive sector, particularly by European automakers such as Renault, Peugeot, and Volkswagen.

The median age in Iran is just 32. Limited public transport options and cheap petrol make car ownership attractive and even necessary—under normal circumstances, the Iranians would purchase up to 2 million cars each year, with a total sales value of up to $20 billion. 

The rising cost of manufacturing inputs and a shortfall in production has contributed to a sharp increase in the price of automobiles, particularly in the secondary market. While Iranian policymakers consider the automotive industry as a “strategic sector,” with state-owned firms Iran Khodro and SAIPA among the country’s largest employers, the hit to output over past two years has made clear the limits of the government’s ability to grow the automotive sector without foreign partnerships. 

Over the last year, companies linked to Iran’s defense ministry have stepped in to support production at the Iran Khodro and SAIPA in an attempt to localize the production of more parts and shield automakers from the rising cost of imports. At a signing ceremony in December of 2019, SAIPA CEO Seyyed Javad Soleimani told reporters, “With Defense Ministry’s help, domestic substitutes for 35 key auto parts are to be produced in Iran to curb the industry’s reliance on the global supply chain.” 

The cooperation between automakers and defense contractors is best understood as a stop-gap solution for the automotive industry. In the short-term the goal is to raise output. In the medium-term, the automotive sector will still require the transformative investment that only foreign automakers can provide.

Foreign automakers have long understood the potential of Iran’s large domestic market and the combination of low labor costs and local parts production. Iran’s industrial workforce is skilled and experience, particularly relative to their compensation. The monthly minimum wage is IRR 18.34 million for the current Iranian calendar year—now equivalent to less than USD 100 per month at current exchange rates. Between 2009 and 2011, two out of every 100 cars and commercial vehicles produced worldwide was manufactured in Iran.

These dynamics led numerous European, Korean, and, more recently, Chinese car and truck manufactures to establish license manufacturing agreements and even full joint ventures with Iranian automakers. Iranian auto parts makers developed the supply chain to provide the local parts content on which Iranian policymakers insisted. The manufacturing of the Renault Tondar, known as the Dacia Logan in most markets, saw Iranian spare parts manufacture obtain “Grade A” certifications from Renault. Following the new investments committed after the implementation of sanctions relief in 2016, there were growing expectations that Iran would become an exporter of European-branded automobiles to regional markets. 

Notably, the new post-JCPOA investment was intended to facilitate the partial privatization of the state-owned manufacturers. Through the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO), the Iranian state was set to become a minority shareholder in the new Renault joint venture. A similar deal was struck between Daimler and Iran Khodro Diesel for the manufacturing of Mercedes-Benz trucks in Iran. 

Allowing foreign firms to be the majority shareholders of their joint ventures was an important shift in industrial policy for the “strategic” automotive sector. Such policy was also intended to address the long-running issue of inefficiency and poor productivity among the state-owned automakers. There were also a number of deals between foreign automakers and private sector firms in Iran, such as the agreement between Volkswagen and Mammut, which has produced Scania trucks in Iran since 2008. Scania’s persistence in the Iranian market has earned it a commanding market share of over 60 percent.

Clearly, prior to the re-imposition of sanctions, Iran was set to deepen its dependence on foreign investment to drive growth in the automotive sector. In the case that sanctions are once again lifted, that drive for foreign investment would no doubt resume. Iran’s automotive market will remain attractive, but foreign automakers will want to be sure that any new round of sanctions relief will be durable.

Photo: IRNA

Is France Ready to Stand Up to Trump on Iran?

This article was originally published in LobeLog.

On July 26th, the French foreign ministry issued a declaration about the package of new sanctions targeting Russia and Iran making its way through Congress to President Trump’s desk in the Oval Office.

In the estimation of the French foreign ministry, “the extraterritorial scope of [the sanctions] appears to be unlawful under international law.” The statement outlined the need for the Europeans to “adapt our national mechanisms and update European mechanisms” to protect themselves from the U.S. legislation. The French foreign ministry called for coordination with European partners to address American overreach.

Although Germany is likely to lead the fight against additional Russian sanctions because of its reliance on Russian energy supplies, the French are likely to lead on the European pushback on new Iran sanctions, and even more urgently, to advocate for the preservation of Iran nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Trump stated, “If it was up to me, I would have had [Iran] noncompliant 180 days ago.” Subsequent reports suggest that the administration may be seeking additional access to Iranian nuclear sites. The combination of Trump’s statement and the rumored actions has put the survival of the JCPOA at risk.

France as Lead Investor

For the French, the timing of the new Iran sanctions and Trump’s statements on the nuclear deal are especially troubling. French companies have reached important milestones in the past few weeks that could be jeopardized if political uncertainty begins to undermine business confidence.

On July 3, French energy giant Total signed a landmark $5 billion contract to develop Iran’s South Pars Gas field. Twenty days later, French transportation company Alstom signed a major joint-venture agreement to produce metro carriages in Iran. French carmaker Renault is expected to conclude its long-awaited contract defining the operation of a full-fledged Iran business unit in the next week. At the same time, a steady stream of smaller French investments have brought activity to other corners of Iran’s economy. Sushi Shop, a French fast-casual restaurant chain, opened its first branch in Tehran this week. Add to this Airbus and ATR’s sale of aircraft to Iranian airlines, the mooted market entry of telecommunications giant Orange, and the local expansion of hospitality giant Accor, and the scope of French enterprise is quite large. For France, Iran is a cornerstone market, a rare country where French companies have market-leading positions in strategic sectors.

The success of French enterprises in Iran is a crucial part of France’s program to boost its global competitiveness. In a recent interview, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian, noted France’s dismal trade deficit, amounting to 48 billion euros in 2016. Le Drian drew a comparison to France’s European neighbors: “France suffers from a lack of exporting companies: there are only 125,000—half of which work with only one country. We aren’t competitive enough in this respect.” 

Le Drian was no doubt referencing the export prowess of Germany. This prowess also explains the differing positions of Germany and France vis-a-vis Iran. Despite being Iran’s largest trading partner prior to the imposition of sanctions, Germany sees Iran as only a part of a wider portfolio of trade partners, one of which is the United States. Tellingly, the value of German exports to the US was $114 billion in 2016, whereas French exports were valued at just $47 billion. The respective 2016 export figures for Iran are 2.9 billion euros for Germany and 1.7 billion euros for France. So, although French trade to the US dwarfs the total value of French trade with Iran, in relative terms, Iran is a more important market for France than for Germany.

This is especially true for foreign investment. French companies are increasingly establishing majority-owned business units in Iran. These units, when they become revenue generating, will deliver significant shareholder value. The best example of this is Peugeot, whose sales in the first half of 2017 dipped in both Europe and China, only to remain positive overall because of strong performance in Iran. Importantly, Peugeot does not sell cars in the United States. Although Peugeot may be an extreme case of reliance on the Iranian market, Iran-based revenues can certainly deliver increased shareholder value to French companies.

For Emmanuel Macron, who faces a massive task in revitalizing French business, the economic boon of the Iran deal will prove strong incentive to advocate for its preservation over and above the fundamental security gains that the deal was able to achieve.

France as Deal Saver?

Although coordinated action from all European allies will be necessary to convince the Trump administration to stay the course with the deal, which the international community believes to be working, France may be the country best positioned to lead on the issue. There are a few reasons why.

First, Macron has spent a considerable amount of time with Trump both in Washington and Paris, and has developed a personal relationship that constitutes, if not out-and-out rapport, then at least a kind of understanding between two self-styled “alpha males.” This relationship should give Macron the chance to appeal to Trump more directly, not necessarily relying on communications via his fractured circle of advisors, for whom Trump has “great respect” but to whom he may not listen.

Second, the timing for French leadership on the issue is right. Macron remains energized by his recent election triumph, and one recent study has seen France rise from fifth to first in a world-ranking of soft power, due to both Macron’s popularity and the influence of France’s diplomatic network. Both qualities would be brought to bear in any multilateral outreach to preserve the Iran deal in Washington. Moreover, Germany’s Angela Merkel and her government are set to enter an election contest in September, monopolizing attention during this critical period of equivocation from Trump. It would also be wise to separate the advocacy on Russia and Iran sanctions issue given the complicated ways in which the political circumstances of the two countries are both related and unrelated.

Finally, France could prove the most credible advocate for the Iran deal in Europe, since it was the toughest of the European negotiating parties of the JCPOA. Laurent Fabius, the then-French foreign minister, was seen as a potential spoiler of the deal given the firmness of French demands. The French insistence on strict Iranian adherence to the deal was underscored when Macron emphasized the point in his phone call congratulating President Hassan Rouhani on his reelection. Moreover, to the extent that the conversation around Iran’s non-compliance has been conflated in Washington with a discussion of regional security issues like support for terrorism, French intervention could be key. France is the European country most engaged on confronting global terrorism and could credibly mediate between Iranian and American political and military leaders around some of these issues.

Whether or not Macron and his team are ready to spend the time and energy to safeguard the deal is yet to be seen. But like Trump, Macron needs to show that he is “winning.” French businesses are winning in Iran right now, and the loss of the deal could mean the loss of a significant market once more.

Photo Credit: Wikicommons