The Job of Iran's Central Bank Governor Just Got Harder

Last Friday, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declared that negotiations with the United States were “not smart, wise, or honourable.” Addressing an audience of Iranian military brass, Khamenei did not explicitly rule out negotiations. But his tone made it clear that Iran was not about to begin talks with the Americans, despite American President Donald Trump stating just two days earlier that he wishes to start working on a nuclear deal with Iran “immediately.”

As is the case in sanctioned economies, when hopes deflate, prices inflate. Within the few days following Khamenei’s speech, the dollar appreciated nearly 7 percent against the Iranian rial, pushing the free-market exchange rate towards the threshold of 1 million rials to the dollar.

The free market accounts for a very small proportion of Iran’s multi-faceted foreign exchange market, generally reflecting the prices available to individuals purchasing physical bills at exchange bureaus. The free market dollar is the dollar that ordinary Iranians use to protect their savings in the face of chronic inflation (dollars stuffed under the mattress, so to speak) or to take their wealth abroad (dollars hidden in a briefcase, so to speak). These limited uses explain why the price of the free market dollar is such an important signal in the Iranian economy: it is the country’s highest-frequency measure of economic sentiments.

In this respect, Khamenei’s speech appears to have gifted Trump the first victory of his renewed “maximum pressure” policy. Despite Trump indicating he was “unhappy” to sign the presidential memo which directed his cabinet to increase pressure on Iran—and despite the limited scope and impact of his only enforcement action so far, the designation of three oil tankers—the rial plummeted against the dollar. Sometimes maximum pressure is self-inflicted. 

Now that Iranian leaders appear to have rejected the opportunity to negotiate with Trump, at least for now, the question becomes whether maximum pressure policies will begin to have more than psychological impacts for Iran’s economy.

This question can be answered by monitoring the indicator that really matters for Iran’s economy— the commercial foreign exchange rate. Until recently, this was called the NIMA rate. The NIMA foreign exchange market was a centralized electronic system established by the Central Bank of Iran in 2018 to streamline the purchase and sale of foreign exchange among Iranian companies. The commercial exchange rate has been notably stable in recent weeks, showing little movement after Trump signed his presidential memo or after Khamenei declared that negotiating with the United States is “not smart.” This is not because Iran’s central bankers have managed to inure the commercial exchange rate to psychological impacts—it is because the impact was preempted in December.

The NIMA rate began to slide in the days after Trump’s election victory on November 4, 2024. This may indicate that, like in the free market, Trump’s victory spurred more demand for hard currency. Iranian companies, anticipating the return of maximum pressure, may have sought to import more goods and build-up inventories in order to mitigate future disruptions in their supply chains. Though, it is also possible that the election outcome led to a change in foreign exchange supply. For example, financial institutions facilitating Iran’s access to hard currency may have grown wary of future sanctions enforcement and could have begun to throttle payments flowing from customers to Iranian exporters. Whatever the reason, the commercial exchange rate was rising at a steady clip.

By mid-December, as rolling blackouts began to hit Tehran, the Central Bank made a dramatic move to devalue the rial. Between December 12 and December 16, the dollar price rose nearly 10 percent—the sharpest such increase since the NIMA rate was established. On December 14, the Central Bank issued an announcement about the new price-level and a plan to restructure the centralized foreign exchange market under the Iran Currency and Gold Exchange Center. Central bank governor Mohammad Reza Farzin, like his predecessors, has instituted new rules and names for Iran’s multi-level foreign exchange market; the aim is for these largely superficial changes to help the central bank manage the largely intractable structural imbalances of the foreign exchange market.

The central bank aims to encourage Iran’s major exporters, such as firms exporting petrochemical products and steel, to sell their foreign exchange earnings through the new Iranian Commercial Foreign Exchange Market. From the outset, Iran’s major exporters have been reluctant to supply the central bank’s foreign exchange market, despite regulations mandating them to repatriate foreign exchange earnings. Managers at these firms who had the political weight to ignore regulations have known that, in an environment where the rial was expected to continually weaken, holding onto dollars was a smart bet.

By allowing a sudden devaluation of the rial in December, the central bank made a major concession to the major exporters. The move may help the bank keep the foreign exchange market supplied with dollars and euros, but it fails to address the fundamental issue which is found on the other side of the ledger—there is no underlying demand for rials given the dim prospects for the Iranian economy.

It is yet to be determined what “maximum pressure” will mean during the second Trump term. Unlike in the first term, there is no Mike Pompeo and Brian Hook to lead the pressure campaign. Plus, little had to be done to restore maximum pressure, as the new presidential memo set out, given that the Biden administration had never rolled back the sanctions imposed during Trump’s first term.

Still, if Trump decides he has been jilted by the Iranians, he could take a more forceful approach to maximum pressure. Any such shift in rhetoric will no doubt push the free-market exchange rate to new highs. The real indicator of whether maximum pressure is hitting Iran’s economy will be the movement of the commercial foreign exchange rate. If the free market rate reflects the mood of Iran’s economy, the commercial rate measures its pulse.

Photo: IRNA

SIPRI Has Revised Four Years of Data on Iran's Military Spending

SIPRI—the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—has just published its “Yearbook” for 2022. The flagship annual publication offers civilian and military leaders around the world a way to compare military spending between countries and to gauge which countries are investing in greater military power.

Last year, I identified a major problem with the data about Iran’s military spending. The 2021 Yearbook estimated Iran’s military spending at $24.6 billion, a total that put it just above Israel in the rankings, as the 14th largest military spender in the world. This did not make sense.

Iran’s military, while posing a threat within the region, does so primarily because of inexpensive missile and drone systems and heavy reliance on proxy forces. Iran’s military lacks the kinds of advanced aircraft, armour, and other systems that are typically found in the arsenals of the world’s top military spenders.

A closer examination of the SIPRI data, and communication with SIPRI’s researchers, revealed that the Swedish think tank had been using the wrong exchange rate to convert Iran’s local currency military expenditures into dollar values. The researchers were using the “official” central bank exchange rate, which has for several years been a subsidised exchange rate used exclusively for the import of essential goods.

This common mistake has been rectified. SIPRI researchers note in the 2022 Yearbook dataset that they are using the NIMA exchange rate to convert to dollars, which results in a far better estimate of the Iranian state’s true purchasing power. The historical data has been corrected going back to 2018.

The impact of the correction is significant. The revised figures mean that instead of ranking as the 14th largest military spender in the world in 2021, Iran was actually ranked 39th. In 2022, spending totalled $6.8 billion. That is a mere fraction of the military spending of regional rival Saudi Arabia, which spends an estimated $75 billion. Iran even spends less on its military than regional minnow Kuwait.

SIPRI should be commended for making this correction. But in certain respects, the damage has been done. For several years their data was used to suggest that Iran posed a much greater threat to regional and global security than it truly did. A significant number of authoritative publications and news reports relied upon the SIPRI data to put Iran’s military spending in context and unfortunately used the inflated dollar totals published between 2018 and 2021. Those inflated figures conformed to a pervasive and convenient narrative—this may explain why the issue went unresolved for so long.

Photo: IRNA

Did Presidential Hopeful Hemmati Successfully Defend Iran's Currency?

Iran’s economic stagnation and widening inequality are top concerns for Iranian voters ahead of the presidential election on Friday. It is therefore no surprise that during three televised debates, candidates ganged up on Abdolnasser Hemmati, until recently Iran’s central bank governor. Frontrunner and head of the judiciary Ebrahim Raisi railed against Hemmati, promising voters that he would reduce the impact of exchange rates on prices, succeeding where Hemmati failed. Former IRGC officer Mohsen Rezaei claimed that Iran’s currency had lost so much value under Hemmati’s watch “the train of the revolution has turned into a scooter.”

It is true that Iran’s currency suffered a steep devaluation while Hemmati was central bank governor, but the attacks from the likes of Raisi and Rezaei are spurred not by the failure, but rather the demonstrable success of Hemmati’s management of Iran’s economic crisis. At least in the narrow area of currency policy, Hemmati made considerable progress in returning stability to foreign exchange markets at each point of crisis, meanwhile reducing the ability for special interests to profit from Iran’s system of multiple exchange rates.    

When Hemmati was appointed governor of the Central Bank of Iran in July 2018, Iran’s currency had already begun to lose value. Beginning in April 2018, Iran’s currency markets responded to the news that the Trump administration was to reimpose secondary sanctions on the country. The accelerating currency crisis would be the first test of a platform the Central Bank of Iran had introduced earlier that year—a new Integrated Foreign Currency Trading System, known by its Persian acronym “NIMA.”  

NIMA is part of Iran’s Comprehensive Trade Platform (NTSW), a set of registries and systems that enable companies to receive licenses to conduct certain kinds of trade and to purchase and sell foreign exchange as part of that trade. NIMA is paired with another platform called “SANA,” the Persian acronym for Foreign Currency Control System. The main difference between these two platforms is that NIMA is for international transactions with importers and exporters, while SANA is for transactions of foreign currency within the country, for instance between exchange bureaus. 

Using NIMA companies no longer needed to seek allocations of foreign exchange from the Central Bank of Iran or commercial banks, a system that disadvantaged companies with less established banking relationships and less political clout. All importers and exporters are required to use NIMA.  

The implementation of NIMA was slow and Hemmati, coming into office at a moment of crisis, struggled to get companies to use the new platform. By September 2018, the price of the dollar had reached a historic high of IRR 170,000 as supply-side pressure grew in advance of the full reimposition of secondary sanctions in November 2018. Imported intermediate and finished goods grew more expensive as suppliers dropped out of the market. At the same time, the Iranian financial system faced reduced liquidity in key currencies such as the Euro. As foreign exchange revenues declined, the central bank was unable to tap into foreign reserves. The Trump administration moved aggressively to freeze these reserves, even for use in humanitarian trade, leading just 10 percent of Iran’s overall reserves freely accessible by the end of 2019. To address these pressures, Hemmati sought to ensure that Iranian companies earning foreign currency made that currency available for sale through NIMA.

As per the guidelines issued by the central bank in November 2018, all exporters have a “foreign currency repatriation obligation.” According to these regulations, companies earning more than EUR 10 million a year in export revenue are obligated to repatriate 90 percent of those earnings through NIMA.

At first, adherence to the guidelines was disappointing. Hemmati publicly criticised large exporters, particularly petrochemical companies, that were failing to repatriate revenues. These companies were delaying in order to profit in rial terms as the currency continued its slide. In February 2019, CBI made a further announcement and instituted an incentive package, in which the exporters were categorised based on their performance in complying with the rules set in the market. Exporters with higher compliance—those who repatriated funds most reliably—would benefit from lower obligations for supply of foreign currency in NIMA.  

Over time, the public pressure and improved incentives led to greater uptake of the NIMA system. The electronic platform significantly increased transparency in Iran’s foreign exchange market. The earnings of exporters are linked to their export licenses, exchange bureaus bought foreign currency according to offers in which the currency, exchange rate, total value, and origin of funds are all known. Importers register their offers to buy foreign currency from exchange bureaus. Each transaction is duly recorded in NIMA.

Hemmati claimed moderate success by March 2019, noting that $19 billion of export revenue had been repatriated via the NIMA system. This was still just a fraction of Iran’s overall export revenue. But the impact of the foreign exchange market was noticeable. When combined with the economy’s structural adjustments to the reimposition of sanctions, the currency policy instituted by Hemmati saw the value of the currency remain below the September 2018 peak for the duration of the next year. A steady decline in the price of the dollar began in May 2019, at which point the price reached IRR 160,000 following the Trump administration’s revocation of waivers permitting Iran to export limited volumes of oil. By the end of 2019 the dollar price was around IRR 130,000.

In the first quarter of 2020, Iran’s economy faced a new shock—the pandemic. The impact of the pandemic was in many respects similar to the impact of sanctions—supply chain disruptions made imported goods more expensive. But at the same time, Iran’s non-oil exports fell due to the impact of lockdowns on production, logistical constraints, and reduced demand, particularly in regional markets. Iran was facing an acute balance of payments crisis. The value of the rial began to slide in earnest around February 2020, when the pandemic hit Iran. The value of the dollar peaked in October 2020 at IRR 330,000, an increase that had contributed to high rates of inflation. The situation may have been worse had NIMA not been in place. During the Iranian calendar year ending March 2021, Iranian exporters repatriated 72 percent of their foreign exchange earnings, around $52 billion.

After the dollar hit its peak price in October 2020, the rial recovered value quickly because of two factors. Iran’s economic recovery was picking-up steam. Greater oil exports to China and greater regional demand for non-oil goods had buoyed export revenue. Iran’s economic was actually returning to growth. Meanwhile, in Washington, the re-election prospects for Donald Trump were fading, and the notion that Iran could once again benefit from sanctions relief reduced demand for foreign currency, especially among ordinary Iranians who frequent exchange bureaus and purchase dollars and euros as a hedge against inflation.

Iran’s currency has been remarkably stable since October and in another indication of the success of the NIMA platform, the spread between the free market rate and the NIMA rate has been reduced significantly. Combined with a reduction in the number of goods eligible for the subsidised exchange rate of IRR 42,000, this has resulted in a de facto unification of Iran’s three-tiered exchange rate system. Given that one of the largest sources of corruption in the country has been the arbitrage between these rates, including situations in which companies would receive fraudulent allocations of foreign currency at the subsidised rate only to turn around and sell that currency at the free market rate, Hemmati’s interventions can be said to have had a significant impact on corruption—a point he alluded to during the debates.  

To understand Hemmati’s impact, it is perhaps best to compare the case of Iran with that of Turkey or Lebanon, two countries where the devaluation of national currencies is continuing unabated, precisely because leaders at the central bank lack the means or the might to arrest the decline. Hemmati saw that the train of the revolution was at risk of careening into the abyss and at least he sought to keep it on track. His opponents may not prove so adept.

Photo: IRNA

What You Should Know About Iran's Weakening Currency

The Iranian rial has hit a historic low against the dollar, adding to the perception that the country is in the throes of a deepening economic crisis. But the figures that are most concerning for Iranian economic policymakers (there are many) are rarely the most dramatic or those that make the headlines. The rollercoaster ride that has taken the rial to a historic low of IRR 215,000 to the dollar does not tell us as much about the health of the Iranian economy as is widely assumed.

Reporting on Iran’s currency focuses on the azad or free market rate, which is the price of purchasing a single, physical dollar bill at an exchange bureau in Tehran. The buying and selling of eskenas, or hard currency, represents a small proportion of the overall foreign exchange market in Iran, likely accounting for less than 20 percent of all foreign exchange transactions. 

There is also a fixed subsidized rate of IRR 42,000 for each dollar. This rate is made available to importers of critical goods such as food and pharmaceutical products, but the Iranian government has been seeking to shrink the number of goods eligible to be imported at this rate.

The most important rate, which is rarely cited in reporting on Iran’s currency woes, is the rate available in the NIMA exchange, a centralized electronic system established by the Central Bank of Iran in 2018 to streamline the purchase and sale of foreign exchange among Iranian companies. The NIMA rate has hit just over IRR 168,000 in the past week, also a historic low.

The NIMA rate has also risen in recent months, reflecting the reported shortages of foreign exchange available in the market due to trade disruptions brought-on by COVID-19 as well as the underlying difficulties facing Iranian banks, and particularly the Central Bank of Iran, in accessing foreign exchange held in accounts at foreign financial institutions.

After approaching convergence in the summer of 2019, the spread between the free market and NIMA rates has widened considerably, meaning that the devaluation of the rial in the free market is not the best indicator of the strength of the rial, nor an accurate reflection of concerns around inflation.

Since the NIMA exchange began operating in earnest in the last quarter of 2019, inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, has tracked most closely the NIMA rate and not the free market rate. This is to be expected. The NIMA rate reflects the price at which most foreign currency is bought and sold in Iran and crucially it reflects the price at which Iranian companies purchase foreign exchange in order to pay for imported goods.

On one hand, the devaluation of the rial over the last decade has benefited Iranian exporters, making their goods more attractive to foreign buyers. The more liberal approach to foreign exchange policy has helped Iran grow its non-oil exports—a lifeline for the economy as oil exports are constrained by sanctions.

But on the other hand, the more liberal approach to the exchange rate has had an impact on the price of imported goods, whether those are finished goods or raw materials and parts used in the manufacturing of finished goods in Iran. This relationship is most clear when comparing the changes in the NIMA rate with the price index for consumer durables, a category of goods more likely to have imported parts content. When the NIMA rate increases, so does the price of durable goods, contributing to the total cost of the consumer basket.

Often, reports about the plunging value of the rial suggest that the appreciation of the dollar in the free market reflects the erosion of Iranian purchasing power. But the relationship between the rial’s free market rate and inflation is limited. Unlike in other economies that have experienced currency crises, such as Lebanon, Iran’s economy is not dollarized. When ordinary Iranians exchange rials for physical dollars, they are acquiring an asset that they will most likely exchange back into rials at some future point, preserving the value of their savings in the process. Iranians purchase dollars for the same reason they purchase gold, real estate, and even used cars—they are seeking a hedge against inflation. Hard currency dollar appreciation does not depress the value of the rial as a medium of exchange.   

However, the free market rate could be a signal for price makers about expectations of future inflation, and therefore may influence producers and retailers to increase prices. Moreover, the free market rate may also have an impact on the price of real estate, which is also used as a hedge against inflation. In both instances, the devaluation of the rial in the free market could contribute to higher prices for Iranian households.

But when considering that the free market represents a small proportion of the overall foreign exchange market in Iran, fluctuations in the free market rate are perhaps best understood as a response to inflation, among other economic indicators. In fact, at a time when the central bank is pumping historic amounts of liquidity into the Iranian economy, the conversion of rials into dollars may actually serve to absorb some liquidity. 

This is perhaps the other parallel that can be drawn between the purchase of dollars and assets such as stocks and gold—the currency free market has some of the hallmarks of a bubble, particularly as the spread with the rates available on the NIMA exchange widen. The devaluation of the rial that can be observed in the NIMA exchange, which is equivalent to the rial losing about a third of its value since Iran reported its first two cases of COVID-19 in February, lags behind the devaluation in the free market exchanges, which has seen the rial lose half of its value in the same period.

Given the media attention both inside and outside of Iran to the rial’s free market fluctuations, it is perhaps no surprise that psychological factors may be responsible for the recent devaluation episode. Given that the NIMA rate is a better indicator of the vulnerability of the Iranian economy to inflation, both when considering how much foreign exchange is available in the market, but also when considering changes in the money supply in Iran, it is notable that the free market rate has deteriorated more sharply.

This divergence, which the central bank had worked hard to limit, is beneficial to a wide range of actors within Iran’s financial system, including those engaged in corruption. The arbitrage between the two rates incentivizes commercial enterprises that earn foreign exchange revenue to circumvent the NIMA system. The panic buying of dollars by working class Iranians benefits wealthy Iranians who are more likely to maintain a large portion of their savings in hard currency, or who can bring hard currency back to the country from abroad. Ironically, in the short term, the devaluation of the rial has probably created more wealth than it has destroyed 

Nonetheless, Iranians should be worried about inflation. The COVID-19 crisis has widened Iran’s fiscal deficit and also given rise to balance of payments challenges. There is growing concern that inflation will rise in the coming months as the central bank prints money.

Iran’s central bank governor, Abdolnasser Hemmati, has sought to calm nerves by arguing that increased liquidity is a “structural phenomenon” in the Iranian economy. His statements have yet to reduce demand for dollars, which has risen in anticipation of increased inflation. Nonetheless, the increased demand does not itself mean that Iran is presently experiencing or is set to experience the scenarios of “hyperinflation” that have been long predicted. Rather, those purchasing dollars in the free market are betting that the policymakers will fail to keep inflation under control as it edges towards 30 percent.

Photo: IRNA

Iran Delays Currency Reform Demanded by Private Sector

Despite sharp criticism from the private sector, the Rouhani administration has delayed a key reform to Iran’s currency policy, frustrating the country’s beleaguered business leaders.

In late June, government spokesman Ali Rabiei stated definitively that the administration has no plans to eliminate the subsidized foreign exchange rate made available to importers of essential goods. 

Iran’s current currency policy was April 2018 in the aftermath of a devaluation crisis that had formed in anticipation of the re-imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions as Donald Trump moved closer to his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA nuclear deal in May 2018. Subsequent rounds of sanctions and particularly restrictons on Iran’s oil exports have added further pressure to Iran’s currency markets.

Iranian policymakers responded to these pressures and the fast-rising cost of imported goods with a policy that plays into Iran’s multiple exchange rates and entails allocating foreign currencies to importers of essential goods at the “official” rate of 42,000 IRR/USD—a far lower rate than the current “open market” rate of around 120,000 IRR/USD.

The government operates a third rate, the NIMA rate, which is named for the online currency system that was established by the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) also in April 2018. The system is made available to exchange houses and banks that buy foreign currency and is where exporters are obligated to repatriate their export yields. In recent months, the NIMA rate has inched closer to the open market rate and now stands at around 110,000 IRR/USD.

For the private sector, the convergence of the NIMA and open market suggests the time is right to simplify the currency market. In late July, the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (ICCIMA), the main representative body of the private sector, released a statement calling for the elimination of the subsidized rate and a long-term move toward rate unification.

The subsidized rate, the ICCIMA argues, contributes to already rampant inflation, enables rent-seeking activities and corruption, reduces general trust in government economic policy, and makes it harder for local manufacturers to compete with imports. Moreover, in the assessment of chamber members, the current policy of subsidization failed to prevent price increases for imported essential goods, which have outpaced inflation.

The ICCIMA has called on the Rouhani administration to eliminate the subsidized rate and move toward rate unification in the long-term by decreasing the gap between NIMA and open market rates in addition to levying capital gains tax on foreign currency trades. It has also said the government should redirect resources away from importers and instead subsidize the consumption of low-income households through cash subsidies, while also providing financing to local manufacturers to help reduce reliance on imports. Finally, the ICCIMA statement calls for the government to ease economic pressure on the private sector by repaying its outstanding liabilities to suppliers and contractors.

“Since the open market and NIMA rates have gotten so much closer, this is absolutely the right time to eliminate the subsidized rate,” ICCIMA board member Ferial Mostofi told Bourse & Bazaar.

“Let us accept that the official rate does not reflect the true value of our currency and try to focus on repatriating non-oil exports using the real rates so that we can have a chance at competing in international markets,” the prominent woman business leader added.

In early March, just before the start of the current Iranian year, the administration showed signs that it mulling whether to end the subsidization policy. CBI Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati admitted in a frank statement that subsidization had failed. “In effect, allocating subsidized currency to essential goods has failed to prevent their price hikes in the medium term due to the nature of market in the economy and the weakness of the distribution and supervision systems,” he said.

But in a June 23 televised interview, Hemmati did claim some success for the policy, noting that the price of essential goods rose by 40% on average during the previous Iranian year, whereas imported goods that did not receive the subsidized rate surged by 98%.

Furthermore, he argued that scraping the current three-tier currency policy during the current Iranian year was simply not worth the hassle. However, he did suggest that the government was trying to reduce the burden of the subsidized rate.

According to Hemmati, from the $14 billion that was approved by the parliament to be allocated to subsidize foreign exchange used to import essential goods in the current Iranian year, more than $3 billion was effectively eliminated when the government decided on April 28 to reassign four items previously listed as essential goods. Those items included meat products—which had experienced extreme price increase despite qualifying for subsidized foreign exchange– tea, butter, and beans.

From the remaining figure of less than $11 billion, Hemmati said, $5 billion was allocated by the time of his interview. Subtract an additional $3 billion that the central bank has said is required to ease imports of medicine and eliminating the remaining subsidy of less than $3 billion is deemed by Hemmati to be “not worth a new country-wide inflationary shock.”

Many private sector business leaders disagree. “There is no doubt that eliminating the subsidized currency policy will entail a price shock, but that shock will be short-term and very much worth it when compared to the long-term detrimental effects of the current policy,” ICCIMA’s Mostofi said.

In her view, if the main goal of the policy is to help middle to low-income families, policies should be adopted that do not spur corruption and waste away the country’s precious foreign currency reserves while the country is contending with a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign.

Photo: IRNA

Iran’s Currency Begins to Shrug Off Trump’s ‘Battle Rial’

Over the last 18 months, the Iranian rial has lost nearly 70 percent of its value, hammered by the Trump administration’s decision to reimpose secondary sanctions on Iran in violation of the  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

A darkening economic outlook and rising inflation led Iranians to rush to exchange bureaus in order to purchase dollars, considered a safe-haven asset. Iranian companies struggled, or in some cases refused, to repatriate their foreign currency earnings, constraining supply in the foreign exchange market and leaving the market vulnerable to shocks.

Each time the Trump administration announced a new aspect of its maximum pressure campaign; the value of the rial would fluctuate. When the Trump administration took the dramatic step of targeting the IRGC under a new terrorist designation, the rial lost 4 percent of its value in just a few hours.

But there is a growing sense in Tehran that the currency market may have stabilized. When two oil tankers were attacked in the Sea of Oman on June 13—attacks widely attributed to Iran—the United States vowed a forceful response. But there was surprisingly little movement in the value of the rial.

Two weeks later, when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shot down a US spy drone near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, ordinary Iranians and currency speculators again braced themselves for a free-fall in the rial’s value. But the foreign exchange market barely moved—even after news broke that the US had been minutes from executing a retaliatory strike. 

That the rial has strengthened about 13 percent since the first week of May, corresponding to a period in which the United States revoked waivers permitting purchases of Iranian oil and in which Iran announced it would begin loosening its compliance with the JCPOA, has led some economic commentators in Iran to conjecture that the Iran’s foreign exchange market has developed an immunity to the escalating political tensions. The rial may be shrugging off the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign.

One possible explanation for the newfound stability in Iran’s currency markets is that while the Trump administration has nearly maxed-out its own maximum pressure sanctions campaign, the Central Bank of Iran has only recently begun to assert its control over the foreign exchange market. Late last month, Abdolnasser Hemmati, the governor of Iran’s central bank, struck a confident tone in an interview with state broadcaster IRIB, stating, “I promise to strengthen the value of the national currency—the situation is improving, the recovery can be felt.”

To defend the rial, the Central Bank has made several interventions. It has implemented a central marketplace to increase transparency and reduce arbitrage in Iran’s foreign exchange market. The Integrated Foreign Exchange Deals System, known by its Persian acronym, NIMA, has improved the reliability with which Iranian importers in need of foreign exchange can purchase currency, taking advantage of a rate slightly lower than the free market rate. Iranian exporters are required to sell their foreign exchange earnings through the NIMA system, ensuring that vital foreign exchange is not sold to currency speculators on the free market. Additionally, the central bank has for the first time engaged in open market operations, in an attempt to try and slow the inflation that has fed demand for foreign exchange.

While some of the stabilization is likely attributable to these interventions, it is also possible that the rial has stabilized due to the fact that the current exchange rate better reflects the relative purchasing power of the rial and the dollar. The rial had long been kept artificially strong by the Iranian government.

Looking at the demand side, it may be the case that the Iranian public has been inured to the economic uncertainty brought about by the reimposed US sanctions or that there is greater confidence in the management of the foreign exchange market by authorities. In both cases, individuals and companies are less inclined to flock to the dollar as a safe-haven asset, even if Iran’s general economic malaise—marked by high unemployment—persists.

The stability of the currency is all the more remarkable as the Trump administration drives down Iran’s oil exports. The revocation of waivers covering imports of Iranian crude has left China and Syria as Iran’s sole customers. Iran’s oil minister, Bijan Zanganeh, has insisted that Iran has the means to get its oil to global markets, though it is clear that exports have fallen sharply. While the Trump administration has crowed that reduced oil sales deprive Iran of vital foreign currency, it is worth considering that under the waiver system that governed Iran’s oil exports for much of the last decade, Iran had a limited ability to repatriate its foreign currency earnings. In that sense the current circumstances are not new.

There remain measures that the Trump administration can pursue to try and spur a new devaluation episode in Iran. Reports that the White House may finalize the designation of Iran as a “primary money laundering concern,” a move that could cut the country’s few remaining correspondent banking links, reflect one such measure. But for now, as economist Djavad Salehi-Esfahani has recently written, “Fears of ‘Venezuelaization’ of the Iranian economy (collapse) have subsided, allowing the government to revive its long neglected public investment program, which could boost employment and production.” The Iranian public, made weary by a year of economic hardship, will certainly hope that the stabilization of the currency is the first step to a broader recovery.

Photo: IRNA