Facing New Alignments, Iran and Tajikistan Relaunch Partnership

Earlier this month, Mahmoud Khosravi Vafa, the head of Iran’s National Olympic Committee, met with Shamsullo Sohibov, Vice-President of Tajikistan’s National Olympic Committee, to discuss improving sports cooperation. The meeting was more than just a consultation between two bureaucrats, it marked the latest step in the recent rekindling of the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan, two countries with deep linguistic and cultural ties.

Once described as “one spirit in two bodies" by the ex-president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan underwent an unexpected breakdown in the mid-2010s. Now, as Iran continues to struggle under Western sanctions, contend with a new hostile US administration, and adapt to its weakened position in the Middle East, it is again turning east. For its part, Tajikistan is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, diversifying relations with as many international partners as possible to secure economic and political assistance.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was the first country to recognize Tajikistan’s independence and establish an embassy in the capital, Dushanbe. Tajikistan reciprocated by opening one of its first foreign embassies in Tehran in 1995. Subsequently, during the civil war in Tajikistan between 1992 and 1997, Iran was part of a foreign coalition that helped mediate the conflict. In this period, Tehran also cautiously supported the Islamic opposition to the current regime in Dushanbe.

After Tajikistan’s civil war ended, Iran made lofty pronouncements of friendship but took few concrete steps towards collaboration. But following the September 11 attacks and the deterioration of Western economic and political relations with the Middle East and its surrounding countries, Iran began to reinvigorate foreign policy towards Tajikistan to compete with the growing Western influence in West Asia.

During two terms in office, former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami committed to funding large-scale infrastructure projects in Tajikistan, such as the strategically significant Anzob Tunnel and Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant. Total trade between the countries tripled from $40 million in 2000 to $140 million in 2007. However, the relationship rested primarily on economic diplomacy; politically, Iran was more focused on counterbalancing the US presence in Afghanistan and on deferring to Russian decisions in Central Asia due to Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear program.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency led to a complete reorientation of Iran’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbors and against the Western agenda in the region. While in office, Ahmadinejad met annually with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, whose government remained quietly wary of Iran, given its role in the Tajik civil war, the accelerating nuclear program, and the desire to avoid being dragged into Iran’s conflicts with Israel and the US. Prioritization of economic diplomacy over politics remained the foundation of Dushanbe’s foreign policy, allowing it more flexibility in playing its allies against each other and extracting more concessions. However, at the time, Tajikistan accepted Ahmadinejad’s overtures, lacking better options in the face of minimal Western economic assistance.

Nonetheless, Iran’s investments proved to be problematic. The Anzob Tunnel was shoddily and hastily finished just in time for President Ahmadinejad’s first visit to Tajikistan in 2006, and poorly maintained even a decade after its construction. Moreover, the construction of Sangtuda-2 was finalized only in 2013—significantly behind schedule—and the power plant was shut down briefly over Tehran’s concerns that Dushanbe could not eventually repay the construction loan. Finally, the US government turned its attention to Iran’s use of Tajikistan’s then largely unregulated financial sector to circumvent Western sanctions and to launder money for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), as exemplified in the case of Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani.

Zanjani, who owned a bank, an airline, a taxi service, and a bus terminal in Tajikistan, was sentenced to death in Iran for allegedly embezzling over $2.7 billion from the country’s state-owned oil industry. His foreign investments were expected to be seized and returned to Iran’s government. But the Tajik authorities denied having any of Zanjani’s assets, angering counterparts in Iran.

In December 2015, Iran, which supported Tajikistan’s moderate Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) during the country’s civil war, invited its leader Muhidin Kabiri to an Islamic conference where he was warmly welcomed by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The government of Tajikistan, which had accused IRPT of an alleged coup attempt just a few months prior, arrested several of its members. Moreover, the Tajik authorities designated the only religious political party in Central Asia a terrorist organization, immediately issuing a note of protest to Iran. The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Tajikistan angrily summoned the Iranian ambassador. The head of the Council of Ulema of Tajikistan described Iran's invitation of Muhidin Kabiri as "abetting terrorism."  

Dushanbe’s reaction echoed not only the tensions of the civil war but also the country’s deep commitment to secular government, a legacy of the Soviet Union. The Tajik government distinguishes between traditional Islam, which it supports as part of Tajik social life and culture, and political Islam, which it views as a potential threat to state power. Dushanbe’s secular stance allows it to play up the threat of religious extremism to crack down on political rights domestically. The avowed opposition to political Islam has also allowed the country to seek Western aid–a strategy that always stood in conflict with theocratic Iran’s politics.

In response to Iran’s reception of Kabiri, Tajikistan halted the imports of Iranian food products, including poultry, cooking oil, and tea, for the alleged poor quality of these products, as well as a lack of compliance with Tajikistan’s language regulations for product labels. In July 2016, the Transportation Ministry of Tajikistan publicly accused Tehran of violating the terms of the contract to build a key regional railway. Later, the authorities suspended the Tajik branch of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, a charity organization supported by the government of Iran. 

Arguably, the most significant blow to the countries’ relationship landed in August 2017. In a 45-minute documentary aired on Tajik state television, the Internal Affairs Ministry accused Tehran of fomenting the civil war in Tajikistan, providing financial assistance to the now-pariah IRPT, and training Islamist militants on Iranian soil to then be sent back to Tajikistan to carry out political assassinations—claims the government of Iran vehemently denied. 

At the time, it seemed as though the only pan-Persian alliance in the region was over. Yet the sudden American withdrawal in May 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under President Trump once again highlighted Iran’s urgent need to continue building relationships with its eastern neighbors. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly emphasized that Iran must “look to the East” for strategic allies who can help Iran resist Western pressure and overcome the banking and trade issues brought on by Western sanctions.

Thus, in 2019, Tehran and Dushanbe resumed communications. The volume of bilateral trade rose from around $55 million in 2020 to $121 million in the following year. Former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited Dushanbe in June 2019. In September 2021, the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi made Dushanbe the destination in his first foreign trip.

In May 2022, Iran inaugurated a drone production factory in Tajikistan, the first such facility that Iran has built in a foreign country. The factory builds and exports Ababil-2—a reconnaissance and combat drone that has been widely used by Russia in Ukraine—and represents not only Iran’s resumed security cooperation with Tajikistan but also attempts to counter its regional rivals’ influence in the country. This comes in response to Saudi Arabia taking advantage of the preceding period of ruptured relations between Iran and Tajikistan. During this time, Saudi Arabia invested in several economic and development projects in Tajikistan, pure geopolitical opportunism from Riyadh seeking to deprive Tehran’s position as a key ally and investor in Tajikistan. Iran’s drone factory is also an attempt to outrun both Turkiye, who reportedly sold its Bayraktar TB2 drones to Tajikistan in April 2022 during a brewing border conflict with Kyrgyzstan, and Israel, who regularly attacks Iran’s domestic drone-producing capabilities but will likely avoid doing so outside of Iran’s borders.   

A few months later, in September 2022, Iran signed a memorandum of accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at the organization’s summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, becoming a full member in July 2023— a development that Russia and China strongly favored. Soon after, President Rahmon and President Raisi held talks on the margins of the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly, where they discussed further expansion of bilateral cooperation. A flurry of high-level visits and signed agreements followed, including a historic establishment of a visa-free regime between the countries in November 2023.  

The relationship between the two countries reached a new high in January 2025 during President Masoud Pezeshkian’s three-day visit to Dushanbe. Pezeshkian was warmly received as the guest of honor at the Tajikistan-Iran Trade, Economic Investment, and Tourism Forum. The two sides signed two dozen agreements on security, combatting drug trafficking and corruption, simplifying trade and customs, and improving transportation and education links. But while President Pezeshkian spoke of discussions between the sides covering the situation in Afghanistan and the war in Gaza, President Rahmon of Tajikistan emphasized developing cooperation in mining, pharmaceutical, industrial, and agricultural sectors, a reflection of Dushanbe’s continued desire to avoid controversial political topics and stick to economic and cultural collaboration.

Notably, the two presidents reopened the Institute of Tajik-Persian Culture in Dushanbe, which had been shut in the mid-2010s during the nadir in bilateral relations. President Pezeshkian also laid a wreath at the statue of Ismoil Somoni–a significant figure in Persian culture and history–and visited the Avicenna Tajik State Medical University, where he received an honorary professorship. The concluding government statements called on both sides “to find new and profitable ways of cooperation.”

The rekindling of the partnership between Iran and Tajikistan benefits both sides. Iran gains access to a largely untapped, albeit minor, market for its exports and diversifies its trade relations, allowing it more flexibility in the face of Western sanctions on Tehran and Moscow. A presence in Tajikistan brings Iran even closer to Russia and China, the two major geopolitical players in Central Asia, and provides Iranian leaders another avenue for security collaboration on Afghanistan. Finally, a foothold in Tajikistan allows Iran to counter the growing influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkiye in Central Asia after major losses in its political weight in the Middle East since 2024.

For Tajikistan, Iran is another source of foreign direct investment and a minor opportunity to ease its labor migration, trade, and economic assistance dependence on China and Russia, especially as the war in Ukraine and its fallout drag into its fourth year. Access to Iran’s regional transportation links and especially its security capabilities is another important consideration as Tajik authorities prepare for a long-awaited presidential transition. As President Rahmon prepares to transfer power to his son Rustam, his regime is looking for as many allies as possible to ensure stability during the transition.

Rekindling ties with Iran has its benefits. But it will also force Tajikistan into an old dance of balancing Iran’s internal and external politics with its own relationship to political Islam and its desire to stay neutral on the world stage. The two countries may share the same spirit, but they do not yet appear to share the same interests.

Photo: IRNA

Can Abbas Araghchi Reshape Iran's Foreign Policy?

On August 21, Iranian lawmakers confirmed veteran diplomat Abbas Araghchi as the country’s new foreign minister. Araghchi secured the support of 247 out of 288 MPs in Iran’s parliament, the Majles. Despite the vote total, Araghchi’s nomination was fiercely contested by hardliners. His confirmation hearing reflected the ongoing struggle between pragmatism and hardline revolutionary ideals that continue to shape the country’s foreign policy, and previewed many pitfalls he will face as foreign minister.

To secure his confirmation, Araghchi, like all of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet nominees, reaffirmed his unwavering loyalty to revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader’s directives. Araghchi was addressing a legislature dominated by hardliners. During the parliamentary elections in March, the Guardian Council, a vetting body, had disqualified many moderate candidates. Voters responded by boycotting the elections and hardliners solidified their hold on the legislature.

While many of Pezeshkian’s nominees faced resistance, Araghchi’s confirmation as foreign minister was especially fraught. The confirmation hearings also took place while Iranian officials await the outcome of the Gaza ceasefire negotiations and continue to warn they will hit back at Israel for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 30. In Iran’s current political climate, loyalty to the revolution is often measured by one’s stance on foreign policy issues, particularly regarding the U.S., Israel, and Iran’s support for “resistance front” groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Any deviation from the hardline position on these issues is characterized as betrayal.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamanei, sets the strategic framework, redlines, and priorities for foreign policy, as underscored during his endorsement of Masoud Pezeshkian’s election on July 28. While the foreign minister and president must operate within these parameters, they still hold a vote in the Supreme National Security Council and can use public statements to put pressure on unelected bodies in Iran. Additionally, their personal ties to other national security figures, such as senior leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), can enable them to influence policy.

Despite these means, the outgoing administration did not seek to actively shape Iran’s foreign policy. Neither President Ebrahim Raisi nor Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who were both killed in a helicopter accident in May, sought to advance a foreign policy that conflicted with the Supreme Leader’s redlines, the IRGC’s influence, or the parliament’s lawmaking. By contrast, the Rouhani administration, during which Araghchi was deputy foreign minister, publicly clashed with other power centers. This dynamic explains why Araghchi, like other nominees who served under Rouhani, drew sharp criticism from staunch hardliners.

Critics focused on Araghchi’s past as Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, a role he held from 2013 to 2021. MPs like Mohammadreza Ahmadi Sangar and Mohammadreza Sabbaghian argued that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Araghchi helped craft, was flawed from the start—a misguided deal that left Iran vulnerable to the whims of President Donald Trump, who withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Amirhossein Sabeti, a protégé of Saeid Jalili, who lost the presidential election to Pezeshkian, was perhaps Araghchi’s most vocal opponent. Sabeti argued that in the last months of the Rouhani administration, Araghchi was seeking a new nuclear deal that went beyond Khamanei’s redlines and would have effectively dismantled the resistance front. He also criticized the loss of nuclear capabilities that were key concessions of the JCPOA, including the decommissioning of the Arak reactor.

Iranian legislators have been seeking a greater role in defining Iran’s foreign policy. They want the kind of influence wielded by the U.S. Congress over international negotiations. In 2020, the Majles passed the Strategic Action Law, which effectively bars attempts to revive the JCPOA in its original form. The law, which was pushed by hardliners and endorsed by Khamenei, is as a double-edged sword—it provides leverage but also limits the flexibility needed to strike a deal that would relieve Iran’s economic woes.

For Araghchi, the JCPOA represented a calculated risk that preserved Iran’s position on the global stage, even as the Trump administration tried—and failed—to bury the deal at the United Nations Security Council. It is a legacy he has defended. During his hearing, Araghchi pointed out that the Raisi administration undertook its own nuclear negotiations. Even so, he indicated that he will take a fresh approach to any new talks and “strive to get the best agreement” in light of the Strategic Action Law. During his speech, he vowed to prioritize sanctions neutralization, a priority set forth by the Supreme Leader. But he also highlighted the necessity of lifting sanctions.

Araghchi understands that solving the nuclear issue is the key to addressing many of Iran’s economic challenges. The Pezeshkian administration aims to implement the ambitious 7th Development Plan, which targets an 8 percent annual growth rate—a goal that seems far-fetched given Iran’s economic isolation under sanctions. Iran needs around $60 billion in annual foreign direct investment. According to Hadi Ghavami, an MP who spoke in favor of Araghchi’s nomination, the country currently receives one-thirtieth of that amount.

During his confirmation hearing, Araghchi emphasized that while relations with the U.S. will continue to be defined by antagonism, his goal is to manage the rivalry and avoid escalation. This is part of the “heroic flexibility” needed to return back to the negotiating table. He also called upon Europe to enhance its ties with Tehran and to “return back to the list of areas of priorities for Iran.” The relationship with Europe remains fraught, clouded by the fallout from the JCPOA, the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, and Iran’s support for Russia in its war on Ukraine. Yet Araghchi emphasized that constructive global engagement is essential for any vision for development and managed to get hardliners to vote for him despite this vision.

Iranian officials have heavily invested in the country’s “Eastward turn” in recent years. The push for closer alignments with Russia and China began during the Rouhani administration but reached new heights under Raisi. But the strategy has not paid off. While Iran’s security relationship with Moscow is deeper than ever before, it has also become a liability, isolating Iran further from the international community. In a similar vein, China’s role as a key economic partner for Iran cannot be understated. Yet, there’s growing concern in Tehran that the relationship has become too one-sided, especially as Iran’s neighbors enjoy economic rewards from their trade with China.

At the same time, Tehran has recognized the opportunities presented by a shifting global landscape. Iran is looking to expand its influence into the Global South—Latin America, Africa, and East Asia. Through this understanding, multilateralism is a key factor in Iran’s core foreign policy strategy, reflected in the increasing involvement in platforms like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union. For Tehran, these alliances are more than symbolic; they are part of a broader effort to counterbalance sanctions pressure while positioning Iran as a significant player in a multipolar world. Pezeshkian has been invited to attend the upcoming BRICS summit in Russia in October, soon after he participates at the UN General Assembly in New York for the first time in September.

To secure the trust of the hardliners, Araghchi declared that “resistance diplomacy” is at “the foundation of Iran's foreign policy approach.” In this view, supporting groups like Hezbollah and Hamas is not just policy; it is a core principle of the revolution. Araghchi’s challenge is to convince the international community that Iran’s continued support for the resistance front is not an inherent threat to regional or global security. This is a difficult task when considering the fragility of the growing rapprochement and diplomatic engagements between Iran and the Arab states. There is considerable skepticism amongst Iran’s southern neighbors about the trajectory of the country’s foreign policy and whether deescalation can be sustained.

Ultimately, Araghchi will need to strike a balance when reshaping Iran’s foreign policy. He must find a way to pursue pragmatic diplomacy in a way that coheres with the ideas of resistance that hold sway over Iran’s hardline politicians. A cautionary tale can be seen in the legacy of Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, under whom Araghchi served as deputy foreign minister. Despite securing major concessions for Iran in various high-stakes negotiations, he failed to penetrate the conservative decision-making circles that ultimately dictate Iran’s broader foreign policy.

Araghchi may have more success. MPs appear encouraged by Pezeshkian’s effort to form a “unity cabinet” and seem to appreciate Araghchi’s closer alignment to key power centers. Iran’s new foreign minister has an opportunity to reshape the country’s foreign policy, cutting a creative path through the rigid confines of the political landscape. Whether he succeeds will depend on his ability to recast pragmatism as a tool of resistance.

Photo: IRNA

With Diverse Tactics, Women's Rights Activists Shaped Iran's Elections

Although there are no official statistics on the number of women who participated in the fourteenth presidential election in Iran, evidence suggests that participation was limited. Mardomak, a research firm, reviewed a random sample of over 8,000 Iranian twitter users one week before the election. Of this sample, just 18 percent were women who supported Pezeshkian. Double that proportion supported one of the two hardline candidates, Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, while 39 percent intended to abstain from the election.

But even if most women voters did not participate in the election, they still had a significant impact on its outcome. In a recent interview with the reformist newspaper Etemad, Shirin Ahmadnia, a sociology professor at Allameh Tabataba’i University, underscored the ways in which women have transformed the political arena through new forms of activism, including election boycotts.

For years, the Iranian women’s movement had adopted a “pressure from below, bargaining from above” approach to activism, aiming to bring about reform through a combination of tactics. But political elites were unswayed by the social pressure and unwilling to engage in good-faith negotiations—the situation of women remained largely the same, whether a moderate or fundamentalist was president. The Women, Life, Freedom movement, which emerged after the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, brought a new urgency to the fight for gender equality. Iranian women were no longer mobilizing to with the goal of reform. They wanted fundamental political change.

The death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter accident led to new elections. Surprisingly, the Guardian Council, a vetting body, approved Pezeshkian to run. Faced with an unexpected election and a surprising candidate, some women activists did choose to vote, casting their ballots for Pezeshkian, who was backed by reformists and moderates. My conversations with nine women’s rights activists in Iran revealed complex feelings about the election and the best tactics to improve the status of women in Iranian society. Their names have been changed for their own safety.

Leila, an activist and writer, did not vote in either round of the election, but she deliberated voting in the second round. “I have not participated in elections since 2021. I asked myself: Should women participate in the elections when the presidential candidates promise nothing about women’s rights? As a woman, why should I participate in the elections of a state that does not show flexibility for women’s rights?”

Leila understood why some women may have opted to vote when Pezeshkian made it to the second round. “I think some of those who had not voted in the first round participated in the second round because [Jalili] represented religious fundamentalism, which worried me too. But in the end, I decided not to vote because I believed Pezeshkian’s chances of winning were high.”

Historically, women’s rights activists have been considered part of the reformist’s base. But a perceived neglect of women’s demands has led the reformists to lose much of this support. Maryam, a journalist who focuses on women’s issues has volunteered for reformist campaigns in the past. But she did not vote for Pezeshkian. She referred to a feeling of disappointment as candidates failed to make good on their promises. “I did not vote because I have no hope. My friends and I feel disillusioned with the reformists, with politics, and with elections. The president does not play a pivotal role in this dictatorial system.”

Many women experience double discrimination due to their ethnicity. Sahar, an activist from the Iranian province of Kurdistan, viewed abstention as a form of civil resistance. “I did not vote because civil laws, family rights, and political rights discriminate against me due to my gender,” she explained. “Legal reform has stalled for years. Moreover, my ethnicity, language, and identity still lack representation in political discussions.”

Sahar criticized Pezeshkian’s stance on women, adding “According to Pezeshkian, women’s social presence and gender justice are intertwined with their role within the family. He believes a woman’s identity should be defined solely within the family institution. In essence, women are denied individual freedoms and citizenship rights beyond household duties. His traditional thinking fails to recognize each woman’s independent identity.”

While many Iranian women grew disillusioned in the aftermath of the Women, Life, Freedom protests, for others, the turning point came earlier. For Haleh, who was jailed for her activism against the compulsory hijab law, this moment came after the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, which was hit by Iranian anti-aircraft missiles in January 2020. Explaining her decision to boycott the election, Haleh pointed to the failure of the government to create accountability.

“The main reason for me, even before the candidates were announced and before knowing whether we would have a reformist candidate or not, was that after the plane incident, I became disillusioned with the reforms,” Haleh explained. I was convinced that the path we had followed all these years would no longer work. In the past, I had hope and believed that voting for the reformists would lead us down the right path. But now, I ask myself, what difference does it make whether Jalili or Pezeshkian is president?”

While few women’s rights activists believe that Pezeshkian’s victory will lead to fundamental change, particularly on women’s issues, some believe that having a reform-minded president will make a difference. Many women’s rights activists saw voting for Pezeshkian as a chance to address economic hardships, revitalize social movements, and create greater space for women to voice their demands. Many women’s rights activists are struggling to make a living, which makes it difficult for them to sustain their activism.

According to Soudabeh, an activist and social worker, Pezeshkian’s promise to put technocrats back in charge of policy earned him the vote of some women. “They believed that Pezeshkian could address the deterioration of Iran’s economy by appointing people who are more knowledgeable and moderate to key positions. Iran’s situation is like a person with an incurable disease, and the Pezeshkian’s presidency might help slow or reverse the country’s deterioration.”

Some women’s rights activists working in governmental organizations or managing NGOs expressed a similar hope for the Pezeshkian administration. Shahla, an employee of a governmental organization, contrasted the Rouhani and Raisi governments. “During the Rouhani administration, despite its weaknesses, some women activists held management positions. With the fundamentalist representatives now in parliament, we cannot expect fundamental changes, but we are optimistic about social openings for women under Pezeshkian. Positive changes have already begun in our organization, indicating that while the president may not be able change the structure of the system, he can still influence social policies. I believe the state has acknowledged public dissatisfaction and is considering implementing changes, however small.’’

Despite Iran’s structural discrimination against women, some women’s rights activists still believe that they must not abandon the political arena. They seek improvements, however small, such as creating spaces to express their demands. Shadi, who runs an NGO for women, described the risks when fundamentalists gain power. “Most of us with NGOs working on women’s rights encouraged others to vote despite facing punishment for our activism. We endured the suffocating atmosphere of the Raisi era. Now, a small hope has emerged. Since Pezeshkian has been elected, some people in the governmental organizations we deal with have retreated from their fundamentalist stances.”

Shadi challenged the notion that activists should welcome the further deterioration of conditions in Iran. “Some have criticized me for founding an NGO, believing that increasing social problems could lead to the [Islamic Republic’s] downfall. In these years, so many women have been killed, yet nothing has happened to the state. These expectations are abstract. We must protect women and create spaces where diverse voices are heard,” she insisted. “We must not allow fundamentalists to take power in all three branches of government.”

Reyhaneh, an activist and law student, voted for Pezeshkian in the first round of the election. “I voted in the first round because I believe that the social movements need revitalization, and Pezeshkian’s presidency offers a greater likelihood of this compared to Jalili. Additionally, my decision was grounded in a pragmatic view of potential changes in the country.” Reyhaneh hoped for “less fear on the streets, less suppression of university students, and fewer professors dismissed.”

But she abstained in the second round. “In the second round, I paid closer attention to the debates, and the inconsistency of Pezeshkian’s statements about the economy dissuaded me from voting. For instance, he once emphasized that we should not allow people to experience poverty; yet in another context, he advocated for minimal government intervention.’’

Reyhaneh has low expectations as Pezeshkian prepares for his inauguration.  “I don’t anticipate a reversal in policies regarding hijab, which concerns many of us. There may be some changes in the distribution of positions held by women, and more educated women may enter the government roles, but the glass ceiling will likely remain intact.’’

Saba, a sociologist who supported Pezeshkian, understands why many of her fellow activists refused to vote. She says Iranian women are engaging in “intentional neglect.” These women are no longer abstaining from voting to express anger towards Iran’s political elite. Instead, they are indifferent. “Women are signaling to the state, ‘We want nothing to do with you. We are forging our own paths, building our own businesses to maintain independence, crafting our own narratives, and creating separate media spaces on social platforms. Every day, we distance ourselves further from you,’” Saba explained.

In a campaign statement addressing “the main demands of today’s women,” Pezeshkian acknowledged that “today’s women do not want someone other than themselves to decide their marriage, education, career, clothing, and lifestyle.” Pezeshkian was the only candidate to issue such a statement, which declared that “the expansion and realization of gender justice will not only improve the condition of women but also to the revival of life in Iran.’’ He promised to “respect [women’s] choices” and to “provide a platform” for Iranian women “to become the best versions of themselves.”

Pezeshkian will begin his term without a mandate from Iranian women, but it is still in his interest to fulfill his promises to them. Should he fail to do so, Iranian women will boldly challenge him, as they have challenged his predecessors.

Photo: IRNA

Iran's Presidential Election Combines Low Turnout with High Stakes

The second round of Iran’s snap presidential election marks a critical moment for the country. On July 5, voters will decide between former deputy head of parliament Masoud Pezeshkian and ex-nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. While both candidates will struggle to restore power and prestige to the office of the president, the outcome of the election will be highly consequential for Iran, especially as the succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looms. Pezeshkian and Jalili have presented two diverging visions for the future of the Islamic Republic at a time when most Iranians have come to question the fundamental tenets of their political system.

The political divisions in Iran now extend beyond the long-running rivalry between “Principalists” and “Reformists.” Cleavages exist within progressive and conservative groups and between those who believe in the continuation of the Islamic Republic and those seeking fundamental political change. The record-low turnout in the election’s first round—just 40 percent of eligible voters cast ballots—reflects how a focus on ideological policies has alienated the electorate. In 2021, 18 million people voted for Ebrahim Raisi, whose shock death in a helicopter accident triggered new elections. On June 28, the combined vote for Jalili and third-place contender Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the leading conservative candidates, totaled less than 13 million.

Reformists have likewise struggled to mobilize voters. Progressive Iranians want action on a wide ranging of issues, including women’s rights, internet censorship, political freedoms, minority rights, foreign relations, jobs and wages, healthcare, climate change, and education. While Pezeshkian, who received 10.4 million votes in the first round, has acknowledged these demands, most progressive voters do not believe he can foster change, and have so far stayed away from the polls.

Moreover, many Iranians opted not to vote because of a widespread belief that the election is illegitimate, owing to perceived election engineering and vote tampering. Many influential political figures have boycotted the snap elections, labelling the process an “election circus.” The sham election that brought Raisi to power in 2021 underscored the regime’s commitment to its own dogma, sacrificing decades of legitimacy earned through elections that were not free, but were competitive.

Raisi was a weak president, presiding over a system in which the executive’s powers are curtailed. Unelected bodies and interests groups enjoy significant influence over government policy in Iran and the Supreme Leader sets the red lines. Voters are under no illusions about the limits of the Iranian president’s power. But within the bounds of Iran’s political system, the divergence in the domestic and foreign policies of different presidents are often stark.

During the debates earlier this week, Pezeshkian and Jalili showcased their contrasting visions. Jalili comes from a self-proclaimed shadow government. He has led from the shadows for eleven years since securing just 4.17 million votes in the 2013 presidential election, which was won by Hassan Rouhani. Jalili champions a future where Iran is detached from Western influence. He vehemently opposes any engagement with the United States and, to a lesser extent, European countries. As a member of the Supreme National Security Council, Jalili used his political power to stymie revival of the Iran nuclear deal. Many fear that, if elected, Jalili might withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thrusting Iran back into a nuclear crisis.

On the domestic front, Jalili’s camp includes ultra-conservatives vying for strict Islamic governance, more censorship, and tighter hijab laws and social restrictions. Even though Jalili has positioned himself as a kind of status-quo candidate, poised to maintain the policies of the Raisi administration, he is a divisive figure even within conservative circles. Some Raisi and Ghalibaf allies have indicated that they will support Pezeshkian over Jalili.

That Pezeshkian appeals to some conservatives points to the challenge he faces in mobilizing disaffected voters. His background distinguishes him from recent presidential candidates. He is an accomplished cardiac surgeon with certificates from the United States and Switzerland and served as Mohammad Khatami’s health minister. Some voters have connected with his personal story. Pezeshkian lost his wife and son in a car crash in 1993. He has not remarried.

Pezeshkian has said his foreign policy will be based on “engagement with the world,” which includes “negotiations for lifting sanctions.” Pezeshkian may be permitted to revive talks over the Iran nuclear deal—there is growing awareness among policymakers across Iran’s political specturm that sanctions relief is necessary for getting the economy back on track. However, he will face significant challenges in advancing his domestic policies. The parliament is dominated by hardliners, who will make it difficult for Pezeskhian to confirm his preferred ministers, which may include his outspoken campaign surrogates, former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former communications minister Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi. Without an intervention from the Supreme Leader to encourage post-election unity, the political paralysis in Iran could prove even worse than in the final years of the Rouhani administration.

The specter of further political paralysis has no doubt deterred voters from believing in the viability of a Pezeshkian presidency. Boycotting the first round allowed the Iranian electorate to send a strong political signal that they will not allow their votes to legitimize a political system that is failing them.

But the stakes seem different now. A Pezeshkian victory appears a real possibility. If 10.4 million had not voted for Pezeshkian in the first round, it would have been reasonable for disaffected voters to completely boycott the election. But on the eve of the final round, voters may be thinking more tactically about the stakes of this election. A Pezeshkian presidency is a chance to hit the brakes at a time when Iran is accelerating towards a deeper political, economic, and social crisis. Whether Pezeshkian can turn the car around remains to be seen. But preventing Jalili from driving the country off a cliff might be reason enough to vote.

Photo: IRNA