A New Narrative for Iranian Foreign Policy

This article was originally published by IISS.

On Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif announced his resignation in a late-night Instagram post, sending shockwaves through political circles in Iran and abroad. Just ten days earlier, Javad Zarif’s fiery performance at the Munich Security Conference had won him praise across the political spectrum in Iran. At a time when public support for the JCPOA among Iranians has slipped to just 51%, Zarif’s strong message struck a chord with the Iranian public, who flooded social media with clips of him defending Iran’s missile program and refuting any notion that the West held the moral high ground. Zarif also made clear that while Europe has made the ‘right political statements’ regarding the JCPOA, it has yet to prove that it is willing ‘to pay the price’ to defend the deal in the face of US ‘bullying’.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has rejected Zarif’s resignation, citing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei’s trust in and esteem for Zarif. But the foreign minister’s reasons for tendering his resignation are hardly opaque. With parliamentary and presidential elections on the horizon, and the economy falling under increasing pressure, he has had to reassure the public of the Rouhani administration’s nationalist credentials and parry accusations of weak leadership from hardliners, which tried to impeach him in December 2018 over his support for Iran’s Financial Action Task Force reforms. The last straw was reportedly his exclusion from meetings with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who was in Tehran on Monday. Zarif felt that the foreign ministry was being unduly sidelined, and told an Iranian newspaper that he sought to defend the ‘integrity’ of the ministry by resigning. Should he stay on, Rouhani and Khamenei’s testimonials may help Zarif prevent the Foreign Ministry’s marginalisation.

Preserving the JCPOA

Regardless of who is foreign minister, Iran’s public diplomacy must find a new balance. Zarif’s resignation illustrates how growing divergence in foreign policy between the Iran’s moderates and hardliners could impede the critical political mission of preserving the JCPOA until 2021, when Iran’s newly elected president will likely have the chance to engage a new American president.

Just as the JCPOA remains the signature foreign policy achievement of the Rouhani administration, it also serves as a symbol of multilateralism for the E3 and especially the European Union. However, as demonstrated by the tortured wording of the recent European Council conclusions on Iran, there is growing fatigue in Europe over efforts to shield the JCPOA from the Trump administration’s attacks and increasing frustration over what are perceived as Iran’s destabilising activities in the Middle East and—in light of attempted political assassinations—in Europe. Many European officials view Iran as intractable and are inclined to take a much harsher stance, albeit short of the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign.

So far, officials in favour of engagement and incentivisation continue to set the overall tenor of European policy on Iran. But the emerging political dynamics indicate that a tougher line from Iran will probably lead to a tougher line from Europe. Pressure has thus increased on Iran’s moderates to reassure European stakeholders of their firm commitment to constructive engagement while also showing domestic strength by following principles established over the four decades of the Islamic Republic. Achieving these dual aims will require the Iranian government to cast Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA as a defining element of Iran’s national vision.

The erosion of a unipolar world order may facilitate this objective. The United States appears to be losing its berth as the primary architect and steward of the global political and economic system. Through a combination of “America First” policies and the abuse of foreign policy tools such as extraterritorial sanctions, the Trump administration has prompted European leaders to question longstanding structural imbalances in the transatlantic relationship, and to call openly for greater political and economic autonomy. Thomas Wright has observed that the Munich Security Conference marked the end of the “transatlantic charade.”

Multipolar Opportunities

Iranian leaders could exploit this development in several ways. Firstly, they could link Iran’s traditional challenge to US primacy with Europe’s developing interest in strategic autonomy. The launch of the INSTEX special purpose vehicle, which seeks to facilitate Europe–Iran trade in the face of US secondary sanctions, is a start. In Munich, citing near-term practical limitations, Zarif characterised INSTEX as insufficient to honour European commitments to save the nuclear deal, echoing a sentiment shared widely in Tehran. He may have missed an opportunity to cast INSTEX as emblematic of an accelerating European push for greater strategic independence.

Secondly, the Rouhani administration might downplay the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal precisely on account of Washington’s diminished leadership. Any Iranian visions of Iran’s centrality to the prospective integration of Eurasia driven by the remaining non-Iranian parties to the JCPOA—Europe, Russia and China – are exaggerated. In fact, there appears to be little momentum behind Iran’s inclusion in emerging political and economic structures, in part due to US sanctions. But Iran can still project general optimism about a stronger political and economic role in the Eurasian geopolitical space on the basis of positive relations with Europe, Russia and China. In this context, the JCPOA could be portrayed not as an agreement imposed by the United States to shackle Iran but rather as an important security and economic pact that could support its normalization in Eurasia.

Finally, Iran can highlight its interest in advancing the establishment of a multipolar world. For two decades Iran’s foreign policy debate has focused on the choice between East and West. Hardliners have argued that Iran should look east, and forge closer ties with Russia and China, which overlook Iran’s human rights failings and remain largely neutral with respect to Iran’s Middle East activities. Moderates have typically argued that Iran must look west and establish closer ties with the United States and Europe, even if this requires a commitment to political reform. This dichotomy may be obsolete, or at least less useful.

Provided Iranian officials can maintain Iran’s broad diplomatic engagement, they could leave the door open to improved dialogue with the United States while placing the onus on American leaders to earn back trust of the remaining parties to the deal. It bodes well that the Democratic National Committee has already adopted a resolution calling upon the US to re-enter the JCPOA.

Photo Credit: IRNA

Negotiations On Legal Status of Caspian Sea Approach Finish Line

Negotiations on the international legal status of the Caspian Sea, which started in 1996, appear to have at last reached the finish line. After 22 years, the five countries around the sea have come close to signing a convention on its legal status. If they do, it seems that the agreement will allow to pave the way for the construction of the underwater the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and other projects and will also close the access to the sea for the armed force of third countries.  

Russia has completed its part of the work on the preparation of the convention. According to its official legal information website, the government in the end of July approved in the draft submitted by the Foreign Ministry after coordination with Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It is expected that the document will be signed at the summit of their heads of state on 12 August in Aktau, Kazakhstan.

Over the long negotiating process, the Caspian Five have held 51 meetings of a special working group at the level of deputy foreign ministers (the main negotiating platform established in 1996), about 10 meetings of foreign ministers and four presidential summits (in 2002 in Ashgabat, in 2007 in Tehran, in 2010 in Baku and in Astrakhan in 2014). In the last years the negotiators agreed on 90 percent of the draft convention. The delay in the agreement on the last 10 percent was because the most controversial issues remained to be solved. Two of the most acute have been the principle used for the division of the Caspian Sea and the mechanisms of approval of underwater pipeline and cable projects.

Iran has had a special position on the first issue. Insisting on Soviet-era agreements, it has not recognized the agreements between Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the division of the northern part of the Caspian Sea signed in 2003. These three countries used for delimitation the middle modified line (equidistant from the coast line and taking into account the length of the coastline). The Iranian position was instead to divide the sea into equal sectors of 20 per cent, since using the middle modified line would leave it with the smallest sector of about 11 per cent.

In response to such a difficult challenge, the draft of the convention does not include precise wording with geographical coordinates of the boundaries of sectors, but rather only the principles for the division of the sea. This allows for the transfer of responsibility for the division from the five-sided discussion to the two - and three-way level, as was the case when the northern part of the sea was divided.

Judging by the dynamics of recent contacts between Iran and Azerbaijan, bilateral negotiations on the division of the southern part of the sea are in full swing. This positive trend in relations between the two may have been one of the reasons for progress in the five-sided Caspian dialogue.

The second cornerstone for the negotiation process was the possibility of building trans-Caspian projects. Originally Russia and Iran emphasized the environmental danger of such projects and stressed the need for coordination by all five countries. Turkmenistan defended its right to build the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline without any consultations with its neighbours. In response to this challenge, the draft of the convention indicates that all submarine cables or pipelines must meet the necessary environmental requirements and standards approved under inter-state agreements. However, all the countries around the Caspian Sea would have the right to lay any pipelines and cables without the consent of their neighbours, but with the necessary notification about the routes taken. This means that, theoretically, after signing and ratifying the convention, Turkmenistan will be able to start looking for partners for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.

There is still a possibility that one of the parties refuses to endorse the draft document in its current form at the last moment. But the approval of the draft by Russia’s government and the announcement of a date for the summit indicate that the meeting will take place and, most likely, will bring about the long-awaited convention. 

Photo Credit: Russian Press Service