Iranian Garbage Can Found as U.S. Embassy in Baghdad Stormed
The storming of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad by Iran-backed militias produced many surreal scenes, but perhaps none more so than that captured in a video shared widely on social media. The short clip shows a green garbage can found at the embassy, which the protestors recognized as an Iranian-made product.
One day after a deadly US airstrike which killed 25 militiamen, members of several Iraqi paramilitary groups aligned with Iran marched on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, breaching the outer wall of the compound, which is set behind multiple checkpoints in the heavily guarded Green Zone.
Facing no resistance from Iraq’s security forces, the protestors moved on the embassy, risking further escalation between the United States and Iran days after the death of an American contractor in a rocket attack linked to the Kataib Hezbollah militia. U.S. President Donald Trump warned in a tweet that Iran would “be held fully responsible” for the attack on the U.S. embassy, although he later told reporters that he did not expect a war.
The day’s events produced many surreal scenes, but perhaps none more so than that captured in a video shared widely on social media. The short clip shows a green plastic garbage can, which protestors had recognized as an Iranian-made product. Several men can be heard laughing as they remark on the irony of finding an Iranian garbage can in use behind the walls of the U.S. embassy.
The otherwise unremarkable garbage can may offer a metaphor for the senseless contest between the United States and Iran for political and military influence in Iraq. The fact that the U.S. embassy is using Iranian garbage cans serves as a reminder that basic economic logic can still override the competition that has so frustrated the Iraqi people by stymying development and stoking violence.
A logo visible in the video, written in Persian, indicates the garbage can was manufactured by Razak Chemie. The company, also known as Razak Plast, specializes in the production of plastic garbage cans and dumpsters. Based in Tehran, Razak Chemie, exports to a wide range of markets, including Iraq. It is part of Iran’s large and well-developed manufacturing base, which converts the country’s natural resources—in this case the petrochemical derivatives of oil production—into higher value finished goods.
It is likely that the contractor responsible for sanitation services at the U.S. embassy compound purchased the garbage can from a local wholesaler—perhaps even a local subsidiary of Razak Chemie. A product like a garbage can is exempt from sectoral sanctions on Iran, and Razak Chemie is not a sanctioned entity. It may not have occurred to anyone to check the origin of the garbage can—certainly no one would have anticipated the garbage can would feature in a video shot by Kataib Hezbollah members behind the embassy walls.
Economically speaking, it makes perfect sense that the U.S. embassy in Baghdad would use Iranian garbage cans, potentially in addition to other Iranian products. As one of Iraq’s largest trading partners and—along with Turkey—the neighbor with the largest manufacturing base, Iran is an obvious supplier for a wide range of consumer and industrial goods.
Sure, the contractor at the U.S. embassy could have sourced the same kind of garbage cans from China. But it is likely that Razak Chemie’s products were simply more affordable and more readily available than those from other companies and countries.
A Chinese-made garbage can sold in Iraq would have traveled a long way. It would also have been produced with plastic pellets imported from abroad—very possibly from Iran itself. Between January and November 2019, China imported USD 2.3 billion of plastics from Iran, a category which includes the raw materials necessary for injection molding of industrial garbage cans. Given Razak Chemie can source key raw materials domestically and can get its products to Baghdad via a simple 11-hour journey by truck, cost-competitiveness is to be expected.
A similar business case applies to a wide range of Iranian manufactured goods now exported to Iraq. Last year, Iran-Iraq bilateral trade amounted to USD 12 billion. When Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Baghdad in April 2019, he announced an ambitious goal to grow that figure to USD 20 billion by 2021. By comparison, in 2018, U.S.-Iraq bilateral trade was just over USD 13 billion. However, of that amount nearly USD 12 billion was exports of Iraqi crude oil to the United States. In short, the U.S. is not selling basic products like garbage cans to Iraq—and those products, when not manufactured domestically in Iraq, are frequently sourced from Iran over other global suppliers.
Whatever vision policymakers in Washington may have for economic development in Iraq, it will require the respect for Iraq’s deep economic ties with Iran and the utility of those ties. Of course, in the interests of Iraq’s economic sovereignty and development, these ties ought to be based on fair competition and comparative advantages. Ideally, more of Iraq’s consumables will one day be made domestically, but perhaps it will be through joint ventures in which an experienced firms like Razak invest in Iraqi manufacturing. Already, several major Iranian companies have established local manufacturing plants in Iraq, contributing much-needed foreign direct investment and transferring technological knowhow while also creating jobs.
Iran-backed militias may have made it behind the walls of the U.S. embassy, but Razak Chemie’s garbage can made it there first—unthreateningly and usefully. The United States can no more expect to excise Iranian commercial activity from the Iraqi economy than it can expect to end German commercial activity in Poland—economic development necessitates regional integration.
Photo: Razak Plast
With Focus on Economic Relations, Iran-Iraq Ties Move Into the 'Daylight'
◢ Expectations were high when Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited neighboring Iraq last month. During the trip, his first as president, Rouhani signed multiple trade deals with Iraq, where the return of peace and stability has renewed the government’s focus on economic development. Iran’s reinvigorated diplomacy towards Iraq reflects a new diplomatic and economic strategy towards its onetime foe.
Expectations were high when Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited neighboring Iraq last month. During the trip, his first as president, Rouhani signed multiple trade deals with Iraq, where the return of peace and stability has renewed the government’s focus on economic development. The deals covered a variety of sectors including railway construction, electricity infrastructure, and engineering services.
Today, the volume of annual bilateral trade between Iran and Iraq stands at around USD 12 billion. But Rouhani has targeted ambitious growth, saying the two sides should aim to reach USD 20 billion in trade.
The deputy governor-general of Iran's southeastern Khuzestan province—close to the Iraqi border—said Rouhani's trip prepared the ground for the growth of trade in the Arvand Free Economic Zone. Agreements to complete a railway link connecting the southwestern Iranian town of Shalamcheh to the Iraqi Port of Basra and the decision to eliminate visa fees for travelers were among the most notable achievements of the trip. The tourism sector is booming as Iraqis find it increasingly appealing to visit cities in Iran’s west as well as the northeastern holy city of Mashhad, a popular destination for Iraq's Shiite pilgrims. Iranian pilgrims also travel to Iraq in huge numbers, visiting shrines in Najaf and Karbala.
Any planned growth in bilateral trade will depend on Iran and Iraq addressing a range of financial disagreements, exacerbated in part by US secondary sanctions. Since the reimposition of sanctions by the Trump administration in November, complaints have grown among Iranian stakeholders—including oil minister Bijan Zanganeh—that Badghad was effectively siding with Washington given non-payment of rising debts. Prior to Rouhani’s visit, Iran’s central bank governor, Abdolnasser Hemmati, traveled to Baghdad for technical meetings and secured commitments that Iraq would pay significant arrears related to the import of Iranian natural gas and electricity. A few weeks later, Rouhani told his Iraqi counterpart, Barham Salih that using national currencies in banking transactions would help protect bilateral trade from sanctions pressures.
Just last week, Rouhani stressed in a phone conversation with Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi that an agreement to dredge the Arvand River—signed during his visit to Baghdad—was being implemented. Rouhani was speaking in the context of recent deadly floods that have left behind a trail of death and destruction in several Iranian provinces. During the phone call, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi noted that Iraqis have warmly welcomed proposals that would see a greater presence of Iranian firms in their country.
For its part, the Iraqi government has sought to reassure Iran of its commitment to expanded economic ties with Iran, despite Iraq’s continued reliance on security and economic support from the US. "Iraq insists that the interests of our friendly and neighboring country must be met. We will do our best to reduce tensions in this regard and decrease the damage that will be done to the Iranian nation," declared President Salih.
Overall, Rouhani’s visit won praise across Iran’s political landscape. Hardline newspaper Kayhan, usually highly critical of the Rouhani administration, described the president’s visit as “an act of resistance” to US pressure, which served to “provide relief to the economy.” Financial newspaper Donya-e-Eqtesad, similarly highlighted “Tehran's message to Washington from within Baghdad.”
Iranian media also took pride in comparing Rouhani’s visit to the recent visit to Baghdad of US President Donald Trump. Iran’s state television focused on a series of comments Trump made following his return from Iraq, in which he complains about the secretive style of his visit. Trump sneaked into Iraq "in the dark" while Rouhani landed in "broad daylight,” boasted several Iranian papers. The obvious displeasure of US officials at Iraq’s warm welcome of Rouhani also featured in reports about the trip.
Iran’s reinvigorated diplomacy towards Iraq reflects a new diplomatic and economic strategy towards its onetime foe. By placing a greater priority in ties with Iraq, Iran is seeking to both mitigate the impact of US sanctions, while also countering US influence. In some ways, this strategy is a continuation of the tug of war between the US and Iran which began in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
For some Iraqis, this contest for influence reflects an unacceptable threat to Iraq’s sovereignty. Even the country's top Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani raised the matter with Rouhani when the latter visited the holy city of Najaf. The highly revered religious leader stressed Iraq's sovereignty in his meeting with Rouhani, the first Iranian president to have secured such an audience.
Emerging from nearly two decades of conflict, first during the Iraq War and then during the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), Iraq is now entering a post-war era in which reconstruction will be the foremost political priority. Iran, which played a role in the defeat of ISIS, sees for itself a constructive role in this new phase of Iraq’s development. It remains to be seen to what extent U.S. economic sanctions and political opposition prevent tighter bilateral ties between Iraq and Iran.
Photo Credit: IRNA
Iraq's Top Cleric Joins Game of Thrones
◢ Ostensibly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Iraq was meant to deepen economic ties between the two neighbors, historically divided by political and sectarian enmities as much as they are connected by geography. Only one Iraqi leader could have kept Rouhani at arm’s length: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, But he didn’t. The audience he gave the Iranian president says as much about Sistani’s own political adventurism as it does about Iraq’s subservience to Iran.
This article was originally published by Bloomberg Opinion.
Ostensibly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Iraq was meant to deepen economic ties between the two neighbors, historically divided by political and sectarian enmities as much as they are connected by geography. The trip was also meant to demonstrate to the U.S. that Tehran and Baghdad would still do business with each other, despite the Trump administration’s sanctions on Iran.
None of this was especially remarkable: the Islamic Republic’s influence over Iraq has grown exponentially in recent years, underscored by Iran’s control of Shiite militias that have captured much of the state security apparatus and now loom ever larger on the political stage. No Iraqi government, much less one led by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, a weak Shia politician, would dare give a representative of the Iranian regime anything less than an effusive welcome.
Only one Iraqi leader could have kept Rouhani at arm’s length: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the country’s most revered cleric. But he didn’t. The audience he gave the Iranian president in the Shia holy city of Najaf says as much about Sistani’s own political adventurism as it does about Iraq’s subservience to Iran.
First, a little background. Sistani, now 88, became a Grand Ayatollah—the highest office in the Shia clergy—during the reign of Saddam Hussein. That he survived the dictator, who ordered the assassination of clerics he disliked, is a testament to Sistani’s studious avoidance of politics. His Friday sermons, often delivered by proxies as he himself aged, made little or no reference to the tyrant’s repression of the Shia.
After a U.S.-led coalition toppled Saddam in 2003, Sistani was able to comment more openly about the way the country was being ruled, criticizing first the American administrators and then the Iraqi governments that followed. But when politicians, keenly aware of his sway over tens of millions of potential voters, sought his endorsement, Sistani demurred. The most he would do is express indirect support for a coalition of Shia parties.
That began to change after the 2014 parliamentary election, which resulted in a hung parliament, followed by frenetic behind-the-scenes jockeying for power by the two-term Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other Shia contenders. A letter from Sistani, calling for the “selection of a new prime minister who has wide national acceptance,” was interpreted as a thumbs-down for Maliki: he was not new, and, having lost control of large parts of the country to ISIS, did not have wide national acceptance.
Four years later, the beneficiary of Sistani’s intervention, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, would himself fall at the Grand Ayatollah’s command. After another indecisive election, Sistani opined that politicians in power should not retain their offices. Although Abadi had only been in charge for one term, during which he had overseen the recapture of territory from ISIS, he was weakened by discontent over corruption and shortages of water and electricity: Sistani’s decree doomed him. (Sistani is apparently untroubled by the public offices that Abdul Mahdi has previously held, including two cabinet posts and the vice presidency, none of them with any distinction.)
Throughout, Sistani remained uninterested in Iraq’s external relations. In 2008, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president to visit postwar Iraq, the Grand Ayatollah turned down requests for an audience. Nor did Sistani meet any American president. He did receive Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2011.
So why now—and why Rouhani? Grand Ayatollahs tend not to care about quotidian matters such as economic ties, or sanctions. Nor would Sistani feel threatened by Iran’s proxy militias: his personal prestige is so great, they would not dare move against him.
One explanation: By welcoming Rouhani, a relatively moderate cleric, Sistani is sending a message to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a hardliner. That would mark the first time that Sistani has sought to meddle in the politics of a neighboring country—and a traditional enemy, to boot. Doing so is uncharacteristically bold.
To what end, though? Some analysts reckon a blessing from Sistani, who enjoys a wide following in Iran, will strengthen Rouhani’s hand back home. But this is hard to credit: Iranian hardliners have never placed much store by outside clerics, even one so venerable as Sistani. Their power derives from the likes of Khamenei, and looks set to be extended by Ebrahim Raisi, the cleric who runs Iran’s judiciary and will have the greatest say in who succeeds the Supreme Leader.
The other possibility is that Sistani is sending a message to Baghdad—that he is now taking an interest in foreign policy, or at least in Iraqi-Iranian relations. Abdul Mahdi, a reluctant prime minister lacking any political standing, is in no position to object, but many Iraqis will rightly be alarmed. This is especially true of Iraqi Sunnis, many of whom live in fear of the militias backed by the regime Rouhani represents.
The wider Arab world will have noticed that Sistani has never extended the courtesy of an audience to any visiting Arab head of state—whether King Abdullah of Jordan, the Emir of Kuwait, or the presidents of Tunisia, Lebanon and Libya. Dabbling in foreign affairs, the Grand Ayatollah may find, can be a lot trickier than domestic politics.
Photo Credit: IRNA
