Gulf Critical Minerals Playbook Offers Lessons for Central Asia

At the third ministerial meeting in the Central Asia-GCC format on April 16, 2025, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu invited the Gulf countries to jointly develop Kazakhstan’s strategic minerals’ reserves. He added that the Gulf states are welcome to participate across the entire value chain—from exploration and processing to the development of innovative solutions. Several months earlier, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade extended a similar invitation to Qatari investors, suggesting that the natural resources sector would be a “cornerstone” of bilateral cooperation. 

These overtures are ambitious—and for good reason. Central Asia sits atop some of the world’s most critical minerals, including lithium, rare earths, copper, and uranium. But tapping into these vast reserves will require more than diplomatic goodwill. It will demand significant capital, infrastructure investment, and a favourable institutional environment. 

So far, Gulf investments in Central Asia’s mining and metallurgy sectors have remained modest. In Kazakhstan, the UAE-backed Ansa Silicon LLP—a joint venture launched in 2019—is developing a silicon production facility in Pavlodar, but the project has faced multiple delays and is now scheduled for completion in 2026. Although the Kazakh mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk, and Qatar Mining signed an MoU in 2022, it remains unclear whether any joint projects materialised. In Uzbekistan, the Uzbekistan-Emirates Investment Company holds equity shares in Uzmetkombinat, one of the country’s oldest metallurgical firms, but this investment totals just $1.3 million of a $192 million portfolio. 

This cautious engagement stands in stark contrast to the Gulf's robust investments in other sectors. The UAE’s Masdar and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power have become central actors in the region’s renewable energy boom, financing large-scale solar and wind projects across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) recently acquired an 875 MW gas-fired power plant in Uzbekistan, while Qatar is investing heavily in Kazakhstan’s gas infrastructure. 

In parallel, the Islamic Development Bank—whose shareholders include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE—continues to finance large-scale agriculture, water, and infrastructure projects across the region.

Elsewhere, Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are becoming increasingly active in the global critical minerals market. Saudi Arabia has dramatically expanded its mining ambitions, revising its estimate of untapped mineral wealth from $1.3 trillion to $2.5 trillion and announcing a $100 billion mining initiative in early 2025. State oil giant Aramco and mining company Ma’aden announced a joint venture to secure energy transition minerals, including lithium. 

Saudi Arabia’s key vehicle for foreign acquisitions is Manara Minerals, a joint venture between Ma’aden and the Public Investment Fund (PIF). In 2024, Manara secured a 10 percent stake in Vale Base Metals (Brazil), with assets spanning copper, nickel, and iron ore, and is expected to secure up to a 20 percent stake in Pakistan’s Reko Diq copper-gold project—one of the world’s largest undeveloped deposits. Notably, these stakes do not entail operational control; Manara’s involvement is structured primarily to secure long-term supply. 

This aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy: to secure stable mineral inputs in support of its growing domestic processing and manufacturing base. Mining is positioned as the third pillar of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, with the country targeting $200 billion in mining investments aimed at turning natural resource wealth into industrial growth. In support of this agenda, Saudi Arabia signed major cooperation agreements on critical minerals with the United States and Japan in 2025. 

Domestically, the Kingdom is investing heavily in mid- and downstream capabilities—from lithium refining and battery manufacturing to pilot EV assembly—in a bid to convert raw mineral supply into high-value industrial output. 

The UAE is following a similar trajectory. Through International Resource Holdings, it has acquired a stake in Zambia’s Mopani copper mine and is eyeing control of Alphamin Resources, a major tin producer in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Abu Dhabi’s F9 Capital Management has partnered with South Africa’s Q Global Commodities to develop lithium, nickel, and copper assets across the continent, while other UAE firms are active in Mali, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Ghana. 

Notably, Emirati engagement in Latin America—particularly in Brazil and Argentina—places strong emphasis on technology transfer, R&D cooperation, and processing infrastructure, signalling a broader commitment to integrated value chains. These international efforts complement domestic policies focused on downstream industries, including aluminum production, steel manufacturing, and battery cell assembly. 

As Central Asia’s mineral wealth gains mounting global interest, Western actors are already establishing partnerships across the value chain. The United States is advancing exploration and value-added supply chains for critical minerals and rare earth metals in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while the EU pledged commitments of €2.5 billion to critical minerals projects in the region.

Still, the scale of investment required far exceeds current commitments. CRM value chains—from geological surveys and drilling to smelting and advanced manufacturing—are capital-intensive, high-risk, and require long-term horizons. 

The region’s exploration deficits alone are considerable. The World Bank estimates that Kazakhstan contains over 5,000 unexplored deposits worth $46 trillion. Uzbekistan’s resource potential is estimated at $3 trillion, yet only 40 percent of territory has been geologically surveyed. In Tajikistan, just 6 percent of mountainous areas have been systematically explored.

This presents a strategic opportunity for Gulf sovereign wealth funds—such as Saudi Arabia’s PIF, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala, and Qatar Investment Authority—to fill critical investment gaps. These institutions bring not only long-term capital but also industrial and infrastructure expertise increasingly visible in their global mining ventures. Whether through sovereign wealth funds or joint investment platforms, Gulf capital can help de-risk Central Asia’s critical mineral initiatives. Recently-established vehicles, such as the Uzbekistan-UAE Investment Company and the Abu Dhabi-Kyrgyz Investment Holding, while not mining-specific, suggest growing institutional appetite for structured engagement in the region.

Yet Central Asia-Gulf cooperation need not rely on capital alone. As Central Asian countries seek to attract foreign investors, the establishment of stable, transparent institutional frameworks will be equally essential. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s regulatory overhaul offers valuable lessons.

Ranked among the world’s most attractive mining jurisdictions in the 2023 World Risk Report (MineHutte Risk Ratings), Saudi Arabia has implemented a comprehensive legal reform. Its 2020 Mining Investment Law introduced a digital geological database, streamlined licensing procedures, and built-in risk incentives for early-stage exploration, while embedding ESG standards into the regulatory framework.

These legal reforms have been backed by targeted financing mechanisms: a Mining Fund to channel capital into underdeveloped segments of the value chain, and the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, which covers up to 75 percent of eligible project costs. An “Exploration Enablement” programme further supports greenfield ventures, underscoring the government’s intent to catalysing private-sector participation.

While countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are making strides in digitising geological data, simplifying licensing, and strengthening environmental oversight, the Saudi model offers a broader blueprint—showing how public financing and coordinated industrial policy can support both early-stage exploration and downstream value creation. Inter-regional regulatory collaboration, including the exchange of know-how and best practices, could complement these efforts to maximize the benefits of such reforms.

Finally, Gulf countries bring relevant developmental experience to the table. Like some of their Central Asian counterparts, they have historically depended on hydrocarbon exports and are now seeking to diversify into value-added sectors. National strategies such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Operation 300bn prioritise the importance of building domestic downstream capacity.

This shift is not solely about industrialisation; it is also about building institutions, ecosystems, and incentives that link raw materials to innovation, trade, and employment. For Central Asia, the Gulf’s trajectory offers more than investment—it offers a roadmap for translating natural resource potential into long-term economic resilience and a new form of partnership and economic cooperation.

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