Central Asian Leaders See Silver Lining in USAID's Demise
When US President Donald Trump announced the temporary freeze and subsequent “reorganisation” of American foreign aid back in January, Central Asian leaders saw both an opportunity and a challenge. Their immediate concern was the impact of aid withdrawal on local communities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had played a key role in the humanitarian and development sectors in Central Asia, particularly in economically fragile Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. For over three decades, USAID supported education and healthcare programmes in the region, addressing service gaps that Central Asian governments have long struggled to address.
Between 2023 and 2024, for instance, Tajikistan received approximately $20 million in assistance from USAID for vulnerable households through the United Nations World Food Programme—no small sum in a country heavily reliant on food imports. Replacing USAID's support with already overstretched domestic resources will prove difficult.
Naturally, the stability of Central Asian societies and economies does not hinge solely on USAID, as US development aid has also never been politically neutral. As the US government data tracking foreign assistance makes clear, funding levels across the region have fluctuated in response to both domestic and international developments.
In Uzbekistan, aid spiked in 2016 following the inauguration of President Mirziyoyev, rising from $6 million to $40 million. Tajikistan saw a similar trend, with US aid reaching up to $60 million last year. Kyrgyzstan’s peak of $75 million coincided with negotiations over the US transit base in 2010, and has since remained relatively stable. In Turkmenistan, USAID's presence peaked in the same period but declined to just $2.8 million in 2024. Kazakhstan received its highest allocation of $45 million in the early 2000s , a figure that has steadily decreased partly due to the country's overall economic growth, though a strong US business presence in its oil sector endures.
But following Trump’s cuts to USAID, assistance to Central Asia has dropped precipitously. Leaked documents detailing cancelled projects show that nearly all existing programs across the Central Asian region were cut indiscriminately. According to an analysis by the Centre for Global Development, 78 percent of programmes in Kyrgyzstan and 69 percent of programmes in Tajikistan were terminated. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were left with no programmes at all. The abrupt nature of this disruption, and the uncertainty it ushered in, is without precedent.
Beyond communities directly affected, the loss of USAID’s support will also have political ramifications across Central Asian states. In addition to humanitarian relief, USAID was active in sectors such as connectivity and trade, particularly in soft infrastructure. These areas are of strategic importance, especially to the Uzbek and Kazakh leaderships, who have been seeking to diversify their international political and economic ties already for some time.
These diversification efforts are specifically linked to the performance-oriented legitimacy of their regimes. While both Astana and Tashkent enjoy substantial investment from the EU, China, Turkey, and Gulf states, the region remains acutely dependent on any available funding and highly sensitive to its withdrawal.
The discontinuation of environmental protection programmes will also be deeply felt. Central Asia is especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and the loss of adaptation funding—in areas such as social resilience, technical infrastructure, and energy security—poses immediate challenges. Local communities and agricultural businesses are likely to raise concerns as these pressures intensify.
Despite the disruption caused by the loss of aid, some Central Asian governments may see a silver lining in the demise of USAID. The freeze has significantly curtailed funding for projects they have long viewed as politically motivated, such as the foreign-funded NGOs they have long sought to suppress. The result has been a weakening of independent civil society and activism, a trend increasingly evident across the region.
USAID did not implement projects directly, but instead channelled funds through local partners. State pressure on these partners—especially NGOs and media outlets—has coincided with and been enabled by US President Donald Trump’s own disengagement, allowing Central Asian governments to increase pressure on civil soceity actors without incurring diplomatic backlash
Tajikistan offers a telling example. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Just two years later, in May 2022, the government cracked down on the foundation’s activities in the wake of protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan region. In this light, Tajikistan illustrates both sides of the USAID coin. Grants supporting locust monitoring, for instance, hardly present political risks regardless of their origin. Even if their practical effects are limited, they may contribute positively to the country’s international image. By contrast, the activities of the Aga Khan Foundation and similar organisations clearly unsettle the authorities in Dushanbe, making any funding directed towards them a source of concern. Trump’s dismantling of USAID, then, appears to be removing what regional leaders view as both the useful and the undesirable types of aid.
Beyond the US, the European Union and its member states have also engaged in a wide range of initiatives in the region over the past three decades. However, making direct comparisons between donors is complicated by differing aid structures, delivery mechanisms, and institutional partnerships. What is clear is that USAID’s contributions, totalling approximately $235 million for the region in 2023, will be difficult to replace in the short term.
European donors, including the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), are already stretched thin, with much of their funding currently diverted to Ukraine. Furthermore, despite the high-profile pledges of EU investment made at EU–Central Asia summits this spring and through the Global Gateway initiative, the core agendas of critical civil society development, democratisation, and human rights have been largely sidelined.
Beyond Western funding, Central Asian states have also accepted aid from other major global actors such as Russia or China. However, since neither country is known for championing civic freedoms, gender equality, or independent media, their support is often viewed with scepticism by local activists. In contrast, their aid models tend to resonate more with less-critical domestic actors—especially government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). This model is particularly prevalent in Uzbekistan, where it is used to co-opt active elements of civil society and integrate them into international cooperation frameworks in a more controlled and state-centric manner.
The future of US development assistance in the region—both within and beyond USAID—remains uncertain. Even if President Trump ultimately decides to preserve some aspects of developmental and humanitarian aid, his rhetoric strongly suggests that support for liberal values is unlikely to continue. Notable exceptions made under intense international pressure—such as continued funding for Prague-based Radio Free Europe and its affiliates—do not appear to extend to Central Asia. Even if they did, rebuilding trust and predictability with local activists and opposition groups would be a slow and difficult process.
Crucially, the near-total freeze of USAID funding should not be mistaken for a complete US withdrawal from Central Asia. While Trump’s strategic focus is shifting—both geopolitically and thematically—Central Asian regimes still possess leverage points that attract Washington’s attention. Chief among them is security cooperation; all sides share concerns about international terrorism and radicalisation, and these issues remain high on the agenda.
The 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan amplified these security anxieties, particularly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which face ongoing risks from extremist networks. Despite broader geopolitical rivalries between Russia, the West, and China, the region has historically collaborated with these actors to counter groups such as the Islamic State. Similarly, cooperation against drug smuggling is likely to continue at least in some form, given the region’s role as a key trafficking corridor.
Lastly, the US remains keen to maintain and expand its economic partnerships in the region, especially in energy production and critical minerals. These goals closely align with EU-led initiatives and reflect continuity between Trump’s and Biden’s approaches Despite Trump’s criticism of USAID as unaligned with “American values,” Biden’s own administration did not make human rights a focal point during the first-ever US-Central Asia summit. Instead, his administration prioritised the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue.
Viewed in a broader context, Donald Trump’s decision highlights the structurally precarious position of Central Asian states. While countries like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have benefited from increased geopolitical competition—capitalising on sanctions evasion and business relocations due to their membership of the Eurasian Economic Union and strategic geography—they also suffer the consequences of their proximity to larger powers.
Three years into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several cases demonstrate that neutrality offers little insulation from economic fallout. Kazakhstan’s oil exports through the Caspian region have repeatedly been disrupted—whether by Russian interference aimed at the European market or by Ukrainian defensive operations. Should a major escalation occur in Southeast Asia, such as military action near Taiwan or an intensification of the current tariff conflicts instigated by Trump, Central Asian economies—already deeply entangled with China—are unlikely to be spared. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan possess some financial reserves to weather some moderate economic turbulence, the rest of the region faces a far more fragile outlook. The World Bank's economic forecast anticipates difficult years ahead.
Ultimately, it is the recipients of USAID and comparable European grants—local communities, civil society actors, and marginalised populations—who will bear the brunt of this shift. Though alternative funding sources may emerge, they will likely bring different political expectations and alignments.
Regardless of the outcome, Trump’s move is likely to reinforce the perception across Central Asia of the West’s volatile and transactional engagement. In contrast, Russia and China, despite their own coercive strategies, offer a different dynamic and hold the potential for more stable prospects. Under these conditions, Central Asian leaders have an even greater incentive to decide where to place their political bets.
Photo: USAID
